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ABSTRACT
This dissertation constitutes an examination of the inner-theological basis of Adolf
Schlatter's theology which, as recent research has established, needs to be understood in
terms of a theology of God's works. The foundation of Schlatter's theology is recon-
structed by means of a critical outline and assessment of three dogmatic concepts,
namely: a) the relation between God and the world; b) the ground and mode of God's
agency in, and towards, the world; c) the structure of God's agency and works.
I argue that the doctrine of the Trinity constitutes the ontological basis for Schlat-
ter's concept of divine action. It is seen that Schlatter relates God's triune being ad intra
and God's triune economy ad extra, through the notion of love. This analogia caritatis
assumes the form of an analogia operationis which gives rise to an analogia relationis.
Special attention is devoted in this context, first, to the role which Schlatter ascribes to
the Holy Spirit and, second, to the Christocentricity of Schlatter's approach. At decisive
points in this study, attention is drawn to parallels between Schlatter's thought and the
contemporary trinitarian theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg, Colin Gunton, Christoph
Schwebel and others.
In the light of the trinitarian depth-structures of Schlatter's theology of divine ac-
tion, an effort is made to explicate his theology of God's works as an attempt to model a
theology in methodological obedience to God's triune economy. Fundamental aspects of
Schlatter's approach are briefly reconsidered from a trinitarian perspective. What the
present study has found itself obliged to offer constitutes, in essence, a new reading of
Schlatter's dogmatics, conceived, in effect, as an applied trinitarian theology.
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1. The State of Research: Schlatter's Theology as a Theology of God's Works
7
Although the 150th birthday of the Swiss-born theologian Adolf Schlatter (16 August
2002) triggered a rather contained academic discussion of his theology, there is no doubt
that the last thirty years have brought with them a renewed interest in his theological work.
This interest is no longer limited to Schlatter's exegetical work nor to German theology in
general. Rather, his systematic and philosophical theology has increasingly come into fo-
cus and some of his major works have been translated into English alongside the estab-
lishment of what could be called an American scholarship on Schlatter. I
This dissertation is an attempt, consequently, to continue these lines of research, not
only with respect to scholarly timeliness and international academic exchange but also, and
primarily, with regard to the material state of research. The two most recently published
monographs by Walldorf and Rieger affirm and follow Neuer's interpretation of Schlatter's
theology as a "theology of facts" or, to use Schlatter's own phrase, "observational theol-
ogy.'" We must not reproduce here what others have exhaustively outlined and discussed,
1 For an overview of the respective literature see Neuer, "Introduction Die Bibel verstehen," 9-10. It
seems worth mentioning in passing that Yarbrough's dissertation, The heilsgeschichtliche Perspective has re-
cently been published (The Salvation Historical Fallacy? Reassessing the History ofNew Testament Theol-
ogy. Leiderdorp: Deo Publishing, 2004), that a translation of Schlatter's Kennen wir Jesus? will be published
in 2005 and that two dissertations have been submitted recently: one by Clemens Hagele on Schlatter's scrip-
tology (University of Dortmund) and the other by Daniel Ruegg on Schlatter's doctrine of the sacraments
(London School of Theology).
2 Briefe, 76-77. A coherent and systematic outline of Schlatter's conception can be found in Neuer, Zu-
sammenhang, 43-49, 245-52; idem, AdolfSchlatter: ein Leben, 167, 488-98. See further Walldorf, Realisti-
sche Philosophie, 251-72; Rieger, Rechtfertigungslehre, 241-49; von Lupke, "Gottes Gaben wahrnehmen,"
283-90.
INTRODUCTION 8
however, a pithy sketch of Schlatter's theological conception is required in order to clear
the ground for understanding the task and the promise of this study.
An "observational theology" is, according to Schlatter, a theology grounded in the per-
ception of God's revelatory actions and works within the created reality ofthis world.'
The primary and most important function ofthe dogmatician is that one thing which in every scientific
work occupies first place, namely observation. Observation shows him in reality those events that
bring us into relationship with God and mediate the divine acting to us by which God unveils himself
to us.... [I]n this way the dogmatician does not, of course, establish the existence of God, but rather
our certainty of God by outlining how God, through his own work, establishes this certainty in us."
These words indicate that the indissoluble connection between knowledge of God's being
and of God's agency is a fundamental characteristic of Schlatter's dogmatics.
Only then can we speak of knowledge of God when he makes himselfknowable to us through his work
which happens to us. If we were looking for a knowledge of God that came about without him and
was not his gift, we would tear apart our idea of God through a contradiction, since we make ourselves
independent of the one whom we call our God and creator, and make him dependent on us if we try to
establish our relationship to him on our own. We know God exclusively through God himself, only be-
cause he grants us his knowledge and only in so far as he does this. When we ask for God we ask for
his revelation (emphasis A. L.).5
Schlatter's theological conception is directly connected with his awareness that the disre-
gard of God's actions and works gives rise to two self-contradictions in theology. The first
one is a methodological self-contradiction. As soon as the divine economy is negated as
constituent of knowledge of God, the latter must necessarily come about without God.
Thus, theology stands in contradiction to its own object.
Since the senses do not provide us with a picture of God, the idea of God seemed to be the property of
reason which the latter gained somehow by its own means and at which it is called to try its skill of
thinking. However, every rationalistic theology dies. This happens not only because it fails to recog-
nise the always valid conditions of our thinking but also because it gets entangled in an especially
harsh contradiction in its evaluation of the concept of God. A knowledge ofGod, which were to come
about without God, would carry in itself the denial ofGod. One only becomes aware ofGod through
him. Every so-called knowing of God which claims to have come about without God, collapses be-
cause ofthis antithesis (emphasis A. L.).6
3 Schlatter has a holistic understanding of the terms "empirical" and "observational." They refer to sen-
sory as well as spiritual perception (Wahrnehmung) and thus enclose the whole of man's experience of real-





In his unpublished inaugural lecture the young Schlatter already states in plain terms:
"Even our theological work ofthinking does not issue creative commands: 'Let there be!""
The second self-contradiction concerns the material level of dogmatics. Without refer-
ence to God's actions and works, theological knowledge and speech disintegrate into
a description of God which lists his attributes and thus consists in general ideas through which the
richness of the divine acting is to be grasped and ordered. Such descriptions of God, however, provide
us merely with abstractions without the perceptions out of which they grow, disconnected from the ac-
tualities in which they have their ground. Yet, our ideas are knowledge only when the facts out of
which they emerged stand before our perception. Therefore, the propositions used for the description
of God easily gave the impression that they were ungrounded because it was no longer visible from
whence they stemmed. Out of this emerged the peculiar undertaking to supplementarily prove the idea
of God although the theologian allegedly possessed it already. Because only the syllogistic combina-
tion of abstractions should serve this purpose, these proofs did not establish knowledge and did not
overcome doubt but rather awakened it.8
This means that the doctrine of God stands unmediated and disconnected from the rest of
the dogmatic loci. The irrelevance of the perception of God's works and actions for knowl-
edge of God's being turns into the theological irrelevance of God's being. The latter loses
its constitutive function for the theological understanding of the divine actions and works.
Theology suffers, so to speak, a twofold loss of reality.
The scholarly consensus established during the last twenty years can be summarised as
follows: At the heart of Schlatter's "theology of facts" lies the indissoluble connection be-
tween knowledge of God's actions and works and knowledge of, and speech about, God.
On account of this, Schlatter's theology can also be called a theology of God's works."
7 *Dogma und Geschichte," 8.
8 Dogma, 12.
9 A closer look at the material just outlined would reveal what Neuer outlines as the three reasons for
Schlatter's conception: his epistemology, his concept of revelation and the missionary dimension of his theol-
ogy. See Neuer, Zusammenhang, 45-46; idem, AdolfSchlatter: ein Leben, 489-90.
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2. The Task and the Promise of the Present Study
10
The principal aim of this dissertation is to examine the inner-theological foundation of
Schlatter's theology of God's works. The significance of this lies in the fact that the con-
ceptual possibility and the nature of a theology such as propounded by Schlatter rest upon
its capacity to answer the following questions: How does theology conceive of
a) the relation between God and the world as his creation?
b) the ground and mode of God's agency in and towards creation?
c) the structure of God's agency and works?
A systematic and coherent discussion of these fundamental issues would amount to some-
thing like a theology of divine action. The fact that Schlatter does not provide such a theol-
ogy does not mean, however, that he leaves the above questions aside. Rather, the concept
of divine agency is integral to - and underlies - Schlatter's exposition of the different
works of God - that is, the products of God's actions - as they constitute God's
Heilsgeschichte.
Subject to the aforementioned conditions, the prime objective of this study is to recon-
struct Schlatter's theory of divine action in a systematic manner. In this we seek, first of all,
to fill a surprising gap in the research carried out on Schlatter thus far and, second, to sub-
stantiate, deepen and - whenever necessary - critically assess the results of past research
within this field. Indeed, the perspective which we adopt requires what may be described
as a "new reading" of Schlatter in that our primary thesis is, quite simply, that Schlatter's
concept of divine agency not only gives rise to, but is also grounded upon, a doctrine of the
ontological Trinity. Appreciating this will be argued to be absolutely essential to under-
standing Schlatter's approach aright. To this end, we shall seek to show that this is crucial
to appreciating how Schlatter - on the basis of God's self-revelation in the person and work
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of Christ - both interrelates and integrates statements about God's triune being; about
God's interrelation and interaction with the world; about the relational structure of God's
actions and works; and, finally, about the relational and dynamic character of creaturely
being. Central to this conception is a pneumatologically-reflected notion of God's triune
love, according to which Schlatter relates the respective analogues at the material as well
as at the noetic level of dogmatics.
Our use of phrases such as "trinitarian grammar" or "trinitarian depth structures" is in-
tended to indicate from the very beginning a) that Schlatter's trinitarian conception of di-
vine action cannot be found as a single and coherent locus of his dogmatics and b) that ex-
plicit references to the Trinity occur rather occasionally in his writings. On these grounds it
would be a hopeless over-interpretation of Schlatter to argue for the Trinity as some kind
of a priori principle from which he deduces his theology. On the other hand, the argumen-
tation of this study seeks at every point to avoid projecting into Schlatter concepts which
are not demonstrably grounded in his writings. Our argument will be that the trinitarian
"depth structures" of his theology arise - so to speak organically - from his attempt to
model a theocentric dogmatics which does not treat God's being as a separate doctrinal
piece." It is imperative, therefore, that theologians are not misled into downplaying the
trinitarian character of Schlatter's theology due to his not having developed its trinitarian
structure more explicitly. An interesting witness to the discovery of such dogmatic "depth
structures" appears in Peter Brunner's foreword to Michael Seemann's book on Brunner's
Gottesdienstlehre:
Bei dieser Gelegenheit mochte ich Ihnen doch noch sagen, daft Ihre Darstellung mir sogar gewisse
Zuge meiner Gottesdienstlehre deutlich gemacht hat, die ich so vorher nicht gesehen habe. Dabei war
mir besonders aufschlufireich, wie der katholische Theologe die Zentrierung meiner Gottesdienstlehre
um die Rechtfertigung hervorhebt. Ich darf Ihnen versichern, daft dieses Merkmal nicht einem vorge-
10 This is the reason we do not find a separate and coherent outline of God's being - that is, a theology in
the narrow sense of the word - in Schlatter's dogmatics. See also Neuer, Zusammenhang, 56-57.
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fajJten Plan zu verdanken ist, als ob ich mir gesagt hdtte: 'Du bist evangelischer Theologe, also mujJt
du von der Rechtfertigungslehre aus die Gottesdienstlehre entwickeln.' Ein solcher Gedanke ist mir
weder vor noch wahrend meiner Arbeit gekommen. Es vollzog sich jene Zentrierung, die Sie beobach-
tet haben, sozusagen ganz von selbst. 'Rechtfertigung' ist eben kein isolierter Glaubensartikel (wenn
sie auch an ihrem dogmatischen Ort gesondert zur Sprache kommen mujJ), sondern prdgt recht ver-
standen - als tragende Mitte das Ganze der christlichen Lehre. 11
This thesis, then, constitutes a creative reconstruction of Schlatter's thought by way of a
synopsis of essential aspects of his theology under a frame of reference which is not ex-
plicitly given and which, therefore, cannot simply be reproduced.
The material constellation just indicated requires that primacy be given to the recon-
structive aspect of the task before us. Clearly, the scholarly legitimacy of this thesis - and,
consequently, its contribution to the field of research - stands or falls with our capacity to
ground our argumentation incontestably in Schlatter's writings and thought. Two formal
measures have been taken in order to support this effort.
First, we intend to substantiate our interpretation with recourse to extensive references
- not only to published sources but to a great deal of unpublished work to which we have
been privileged to have access.
Second, we have sought to design the architectonics of this thesis in such a way that it
reflects Schlatter's Denkweg, namely the direction of his theological thinking. Conse-
quently, we shall begin with an examination of his understanding of God's action in crea-
tion, preservation and salvation before progressing to a systematic outline of his theory of
divine action. In chapters IV and V we show how Schlatter's christology and - in the wake
ofthat - his doctrine of the Trinity, govern his interpretation of divine agency. We seek to
establish, by way of a summary, that an awareness of the trinitarian "depth structures" of
Schlatter's theology is necessary to understand fully the thrust and logic of his dogmatics
as a whole - a feature that Schlatter-scholarship thus far has appreciated all too little.
11 P. Brunner, "Geleitwort zu P. Dr. Michael Seemanns Buch," 335-36.
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It is obvious from what has just been said that this dissertation seeks to point beyond
itself to future scholarly work by establishing the basis for a conversation between Schlat-
ter's unique theological contribution and contemporary trinitarian theology. This is not
something which we attempt in this thesis since to do so properly would constitute a thesis
in itself
PROBES INTO SCHLATTER'S CONCEPT OF DIVINE AGENCY 14
CHAPTER II. PROBES INTO SCHLATTER'S CONCEPT OF DIVINE AGENCY
We have chosen Schlatter's teaching on creation, preservation and salvation as the ba-
sis for our investigation of his understanding of divine economy. Our primary concern in
this chapter is not to explore Schlatter's ontological understanding of these three dogmatic
loci as established products of God's agency. Rather, our objective is to unearth his concep-
tion of the ways which God himself has chosen for his action toward and within creation.'
We shall approach these topics mainly from an anthropological perspective whereby fre-
quent reference will be given to Schlatter's understanding of God's action toward, and in,
the impersonal sphere of creation.
1. God - the Creator of Humanity
A. Introductory remarks
i. The ontological dependence of creation upon the Creator
At the outset of this section it seems necessary to bring some basic aspects of Schlat-
ter's understanding of God as Creator to our attention. In Schlatter, God is the "originator
and worker [Wirker]," the "Creator and Perfecter. The one, 'who causes everything,' is God
- the one, 'from whom and through whom and to whom everything is.':" Through his crea-
J The close connection between an act and its product comes to the fore when we use the same word for
an action and its result (e.g. creation or salvation). Since we are primarily concerned with Schlatter's notion
of divine action, our presentation of his doctrines of creation, man, sin, providence, salvation, redemption,
etc. as God's works will be of merely fragmentary character. Many questions arising from the presented ma-
terial must remain unanswered. References to helpful primary and secondary sources will be given.
2 Grtinde, 29; similarly in Metaphysik, 59; Opfer, 3. Schlatter goes as far as to say that "[b]eing God
means being Creator" (Theology ofthe Apostles, 28; cf. Paulus der Bote, 255). See also Neuer, Zusammen-
hang, 64-66.
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tive action upon the creature, God constitutes the ontological basis of all creation. Schlatter
argues "that we must conceive of everything as being conditioned by God."3 This means
that every creature is contingent upon God for its existence and being. "All are creatures
and stand in an unalterable dependence on God."4 This dependence is, as Schlatter elabo-
rates, expressed through the concept of God's Fatherhood. By calling God our Father
we ... name the one to whom we owe that we are and what we are .... This powerful connection
embraces everything in us. As mysterious and inexplicable as it may be, it is a brightly shining reality,
incontestable, and fundamental to our whole consciousness, so that a community emerges here which
is incomparable and unbreakable (emphasis A. L.).5
Schlatter articulates the ontological relatedness of the creature to God as "the dependence,
in which everything created stands in relation to him [God]," as "the untearable bond
through which everything created clings to the Creator," or as "our communion [Verbun-
denheit] with God ... [which] gives us existence and essence."
ii. The analogy of all creaturely being and the notion of the imago Dei
The thoughts just sketched out result in a rather broad and general concept of the
imago Dei. In antithesis to a naturalistic concept of divine causality Schlatter expounds:
"We are receptive to the Christian idea of God only when we understand causation in such
a way as to bring forth community and make the recipient of the effect the image and wit-
3 *Wesen und Quellen, 15.
4 Theology ofthe Apostles, 31; similarly in Erlauterungen Ill, 436.
5 RufJesu, 313. See also Dogma 87-89; Kennen wir Jesus?, 28-29; *Genesis, 40-41.
6 Metaphysik, 87; Dogma, 38; "Theology of the New Testament and Dogmatics," 182 (in above order).
We will examine Schlatter's concept of the relation between God and man more closely in due course. How-
ever, it is already necessary to introduce here the distinction between creaturely God-relatedness (Gottesbe-
zogenheit) and soteriological God-relationship (Gottesbeziehung). Schlatter himself does not explicitly use
these terms, but the differentiation is inherent in his concept. "God-relatedness" denotes "the general relation
of all to God which is instituted through creation" (Johannes, 28). "God-relationship" refers to the personal
communion of God and believer instituted through the saving work of Jesus Christ and mediated by the Holy
Spirit. See also Walldorf's exposition of Schlatter's notion of God-relatedness in Realistische Philosophie,
236-37 and Neuer, Zusammenhang, 148-50.
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ness of the one who causes him [the recipient]."? Schlatter conceives "the divine causing
[Wirken] as the divine forming [Bilden] which generates his image [Bild] in US."8 Thus
every creature is generally a witness of its maker and called to be God's image." "Intrinsic
to the idea of God is the notion that all being is related to God and somehow makes his
power and will visible.':"
Through the ontological relatedness of every creature to God there emerges an analogy
of all creaturely being. "Our connectedness with God connects us with everything because
everything is connected with God."11 Inother words: "Our relatedness with everything rests
upon the fact that we, and with us everything that exists, have come about through God.'112
In this way, God as Creator establishes a homogeneity and unity which enables interrela-
tion and interaction between the different spheres of created reality." Yet, as Schlatter un-
derlines, the analogy of creaturely being means also true otherness and distinctness. "How-
ever, because it is not our image but God's image (which is indissolubly different from our
image) that is in everything, we stop any attempt to arbitrarily remove the differences that
distinguish US. n14In our context here this means that the imago Dei of man is distinct from
the imago Dei ofthe rest of creation.
It is interesting to observe that Schlatter's anthropology does not entail an explicit ex-
position of the notion ofman being created in the image of God. This does not mean, how-
7 Metaphysik, 59.
8 Ibid., 46.




13 We will again meet this idea below in the context of the mutual effectivity between man and nature and
man and history. Walldorfhas outlined the fundamental significance of the analogy of all creaturely being for
Schlatter's critically realistic epistemology in Realistische Philosophie, 133-41. See also Kindt, Gedanke der
Einheit, 129-30; Neuer, Zusammenhang, 63; idem, "Introduction Metaphysik," 10.
14 Metaphysik, 46.
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ever, that Schlatter does not have a doctrine of the imago Dei in the specific sense of Gen
1:27. Rather, as we shall see in a few moments, he reflects and develops every ontological
characteristic of man with recourse to God-relatedness, which is ontologically constitutive
of the human creature. Put differently, human personhood, corporeity and sociality are not
co-ordinated with, and on the same level as, human God-relatedness." Rather, what is true
ontologically is applied as a noetic principle. In his discussion of the question as to why
man is continuously creating false images of God, Schlatter states: "We human beings
cannot do without God. If we want to be human beings we must find God, for we cannot
come to ourselves if we do not come to God. The coming to ourselves [Einkehr bei uns
selbst] and the remembrance of God are indissolubly bound to each other." 16 God's relation
to and action upon man, which are ontologically constitutive ofhuman being, provide the
conceptual basis without which Schlatter's anthropology as an ontology of human crea-
tureliness would instantly collapse. We could therefore say that Schlatter's anthropology is
an applied doctrine ofthe imago Dei.
B. Human personhood
i. The ontological dependence of the human person upon God
In Schlatter's view, personhood is the fundamental characteristic of human being
which distinguishes man from the impersonal sphere of creation. I? The three structural
IS Neuer (Zusammenhang, 148-50) and Walldorf (Realistische Philosophie, 236-244) also argue for the
human God-relatedness as the fundamental category of Schlatter's anthropology.
16 "Kreuz Jesu," 7. See also Walldorf, Realistische Philosophie, 236-44.
I? See Dogma, 20. Schlatter links his concept of the person with that of the spirit so that the human spirit
makes the person (see e.g. Dogma, 30, 38-49, 82). See further Neuer, Zusammenhang, 142; Walldorf, Realis-
tische Philosophie, 230 n. 16.
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characteristics of the person are knowing, acting and unity." Schlatter's understanding of
these terms can be summarised as follows:
a) The person has a self-consciousness, that means the ability to differentiate between the "I" and the
"Not-I" (subject and object). Through this differentiation, man is able to know.
b) The person has the capacity to act in the form of conscious thinking, willing and acting, which in-
cludes human freedom.
c) The person is marked by the unity of consciousness. The manifold acts and uncountable processes
of consciousness are embraced by a unity which gives wholeness [Ganzheit] to the person. 19
Each characteristic of human personhood is realised in the mutual interplay of the three
personal functions of thinking, feeling and volition."
The three ontological characteristics above indicate that Schlatter develops a substan-
tial concept of personhood. The human person is a homogeneous self capable of free and
self-determined action." Yet the person can only be a person by means of a set of relations
through which man becomes what he is. Schlatter indicates this aspect when he concludes
the section on personhood by defining the life of the person as the mutuality of being and
becoming.
Therefore, we call that which we find in ourselves as the given [uns Gegebene] neither only being -
this would only be identity without self-differentiation, only immutability [Beharren] without flexibil-
ity [Beweglichkeit] - nor only becoming - this would only be the transition into another and a second,
without unity. We are - for in the second we are also the first, in the new the same. We become - for
we are not merely the first but also the second and the unity which binds the two together. Because we
are in such a way that we become, and become in such a way that we are, therefore we live.,,22
18 See Briefe, 36. Schlatter develops these three characteristics in Dogma, 22-25.
19 This summary is taken from Neuer, Zusammenhang, 141-42. See also Walldorf, Realistische Philoso-
phie, 227-28.
20 See Dogma, 89-124 (thinking), 124-47 (feeling), 148-98 (volition). For the mutuality of volition and
thinking see e.g. Dogma, 93-96, 162-63; Ethik, 249. For the role of human feelings see e.g. Dogma, 125;
Ethik, 321; Griinde, 40-41. For the mutual strengthening or weakening of all three functions see Ethik, 375-
76. Schlatter emphasises that any imbalance in the mutuality and interdependence of the three personal func-
tions leads to either a rationalistic, voluntaristic, or eudemonistic concept of personhood (see Metaphysik, 32-
36; cf. Neuer, Zusammenhang, 144; Walldorf, Realistische Philosophie, 157).
21 See also Neuer, Zusammenhang, 142, 356 n. 24. He points out that this understanding of personhood
stands in line with the traditional Western approach which was significantly shaped by the Boethian defini-
tion of the person as "rationalis naturae individua substantia." However, as Neuer underlines and as we have
already suggested, Schlatter rejects any rationalistic concept of personhood. For his explicit critique see e.g.
Dogma, 145-46; Philosophische Arbeit, 19,250; Furcht vor dem Denken, 51; Grunde, 20. For further refer-
ences see Walldorf, Realistische Philosophie, 216 n. 7.
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We shall come to man's relation to nature, as the impersonal sphere of creation, and fellow
man in due course. For the moment we need to focus on God's relation to and action upon
man by means of which the human person comes into being. Schlatter expounds:
He [God]is the one through whom we are persons. That means: he is the generator [Erzeuger] of
knowledge, of power, and of the unity that embraces manifoldness. We cannot equate the one through
whom we are with us. For we have received that which we are not able to create. Our originator [Ur-
heber] is able to do what we cannot do. For he gave us knowledge, power and life.23
Schlatter specifies the notion of God as Creator of the human person when he elaborates
that the characteristics of personhood are created through, and grounded in, God's personal
being. He articulates his view in negative terms:
"'God is dead.' The one who believes that knows: 'I am dead also.' All three characteristics ofpersonal
life - knowing, acting and unity - are consequently gone. We will not be able to preserve our know-
ing, acting and being-one [Einssein] if we originate from the not-knowing, not-acting and in-plurality-
separated world cause [in Vielheit zerteilten Weltgrundj.,,24
In other words, God's life, knowing, causal power, unity and freedom bring forth the life,
knowing, acting, unity and freedom of the human person." God's thinking, willing and
blessedness create human thinking, willing and feeling." "[F]or God's work is the first one,
the creative one, the ground of our whole capacity [Vermogen]."27
23 Ibid., 26.
24 Briefe, 36-37. Similarly in Dogma, 29; Andachten, 417-18; "Heilige Geschichte," 223; "Gottes Sohne,"
10-11.
25 See Dogma, 34-36, 155-56.
26 See ibid., 35-36, 97-99, 138-39, 149-50, 154-57, 175-77, 178, 180.
27 Ethik, 77. Without going into much detail, we encounter here a central point of Schlatter's critique of
Schleiermacher's theology. According to Schlatter, man's dependence must not be limited to a certain part of
human life: "Not only something in us but we are made through a causation [Verursachung] that stands above
us" (Dogma, 24). Instead of isolating feeling as the area in which man experiences his dependence upon God,
Schlatter elaborates that man in the totality of his being and life - even in his most active and productive
functions - is dependent upon God (see e.g. Dogma, 24, 558 n. 17; Philosophische Arbeit, 236). In antithesis
to the Schleiermachian tradition, we see Schlatter actually performing what Bailer calls a "totalisation of
Schleiermacher's approach." For a deeper investigation of these issues see Bailer, Prinzip, 66-74; and Rieger,
Rechtfertigungslehre, 263-74. For a similar refusal to isolate a certain characteristic of human being "as the
locus at which experience ofthe Word of God is possible" see Barth, Church Dogmatics 1. 1, 201-04. "We
may quietly regard the will and conscience and feeling and all other possible anthropological centres as pos-
sibilities of human self-determination and then understand them in their totality as determined by the Word of
God which affects the whole man" (202).
ii. Creatio ex nihilo
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The material just outlined brings two interrelated aspects of Schlatter's notion of crea-
tion to the fore. First, creation is a one-sided, transcendental and all-powerful act of God.
We encounter here a concept of God's exclusive mono-activity (Alleinwirksamkeiti. God's
creative action "takes place without us - not only without our co-operation but also without
our knowing.':" God's creative agency means: "He reigns, He forms [gestaltet], He be-
gins." Schlatter speaks of "the majesty of the divine creating which seizes us as a forming
power ... [and] transcends our thinking and willing with the reigning power of a will that
does not ask us."29
Since God gave us causal power, he has revealed himself to us as the one who possesses the force to
cause [Kraft zum Wirken]. Because he has this as the One in whom there is no division, his acting is
creative, a complete causality. God's force does not stand beside his Word; rather, his Word is his
force. Through this the idea of creation is given to us. At this point we reach the limits of our capacity
to see. For the perception of origination and becoming is nowhere granted to us. We see only that
which has come about [Entstandenes] - only the results of acting. Even the processes of becoming,
which take place within ourselves, are completely veiled to us. We are therefore unable to develop a
creation theory .... Because we are not Creator we neither see nor comprehend a creative act, for
where our vocation ends there also ends our perception and comprehension."
Schlatter summarises his concept of God's act of creation in this context through the term
creatio ex nihilo, "The meaning of the formula is to outline God's causality as complete.'?'
In Schlatter, the transcendence and superiority of divine creative action go hand in
hand with the human incapacity to perceive and comprehend an act of creation. A creative
act is a miracle and a mystery." This explains why Schlatter does not further outline ex-
28 Dogma, 350-51.
29 "Unterwerfung," 8; similarly in Jesus und Paulus, 105.
30 Dogma, 36. The idea of the unity of God's creative power and Word is central to Schlatter's concept of
divine agency and will come into focus at a later point (see e.g. Johannes, 3; Erlduterungen 1,604-05; "Jesus
und wir heutigen Menschen," 209; "Wunder der Bibel," 72).
3! *Dogmatik I, 194. Cf. Erlauterungen III, 436.
32 See e.g. Dogma, 462; Griinde, 30-31, 71; Dienst, 46; Andachten, 381; Opfer, 24; Marienreden, 8;
"Glaube und Geschichte," 347; "Wunder der Bibel," 72-73, 75; "Neue Testament," 109; "Jesus und wir
heutigen Menschen," 212; "Frohlichs Traktat, 280-81. Because of the incomprehensibility of a creative act
Schlatter refuses to develop any kind of creation theory which tries to explain the causal joint, that is, the
point at which a divine or inner-worldly cause brings forth an effect. The causal factors and the processes of
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actly how personhood is created. The creative act, as the moment in which the personal
characteristics and functions of man are called into being, cannot be observed. Yet, the in-
comprehensibility of the "How" questions neither the "That" of God's creative action nor
the "Who" of Creator and creature." Schlatter argues that the creation, as the result and
product of God's creative action, discloses something of the Creator and his activity. "Our
task is to perceive what has come about. The knowledge about the cause, which generates
it, and the ground, which carries it, is disclosed to us as far as the characteristics of that
which has become [des Gewordenen] make its origin known. "34 How, then, does the human
person, as the product of God's creative activity, inform Schlatter's understanding of crea-
tion as an act of God? The answer to this question brings us to the second aspect of Schlat-
ter's approach.
The existence of creation - the fact that human or non-human creatures have being -
indicates that the divine act of creation has been successful and is completed. Schlatter, we
may say, takes the notion of creatio ex nihilo seriously when he refrains from understand-
ing it as a divine activity extended in time. Although the act of creation includes the crea-
tion of the spatio-temporal continuum, the act itself, like all divine actions, "does not hap-
pen within time. "35 On this basis Schlatter refutes the idea of creatio continua, for it un-
dermines the perfection of God's creative power and leads to an unbiblical ontological ac-
tualism thereby thwarting the particularity and indelible value of creaturely being.
becoming, which bring about and mark creaturely existence and life, constitute a mystery which Schlatter
wants to respect (see e.g. Dogma, 46-47, 55, 60-61, 96; Ethik, 264-66, 279; Metaphysik, 61; Briefe, 27-29;
Ruckblick, 54).
33 In general, Schlatter gives primacy to being over knowing, to the actuality of events over man's rational
constructability of the same. Thus, he underlines: "The inexplicability of the 'How' does not shake the 'That'"
(Philosophische Arbeit, 43). "The fact [Faktum] must be lord over our thoughts, not vice versa" (* Wesen und
Quellen, 7; cf. ibid., 121-22). See also Dogma, 61; Briefe, 38; Walldorf, Realistische Philosophie, 143.
34 "Glaube und Geschichte," 347; similarly in "Wort und Schrift," 33.
35 Metaphysik 72. Schlatter argues that the causal timelessness applies - albeit only to a lesser measure
also to creaturely causes.
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The formula that the existence of the world comes about through its continuous creation is to be re-
moved, for it makes the origin [Entstehung] and the existence of the world doubtful. What must be
created over and over again has never been created. Here the act is not described in such a way as to
reach its goal and find its completion in it.36
Therefore, creation means that God truly creates and establishes something which is other
than himself, namely creature and not Creator. This moment of God's creative activity is
most clearly displayed in the creation of the human person.
The one world cause [Weltgrund], who embraces everything, is also the Creator of our thinking and
willing, not only the worker [Wirker] of nature but also the Lord of the human persons [Geister]. He
endows the latter with a life peculiar to themselves [einem ihnen eignenden Leben] so that his working
[Wirken] reveals itself as giving and his will as goodness."
Schlatter's substantial concept of personhood must therefore be understood as the result of
his notion of God's creative action. It is precisely in creating the human person as a homo-
geneous self capable of free and self-determined action that the perfection of the divine
creativity is revealed. Along these lines Schlatter reflects on human volition and freedom:
In that the power of affirmation and choice over our will is given to us, we experience that God's cre-
ating is meant seriously and does not merely create apparition but rather life. He cares about us.
Therefore, our will is handed over to us in order that we have it as our own product (emphasis A.
L.).38
C. Human corporeity and the gift of space and time
In Schlatter, embodiment is the second ontological characteristic of human being.
Thus man is given two different modes of being [Seinsweisen]: personal life (spirit) and
bodily life (nature). Our primary interest here lies not in the way Schlatter relates both as
distinct yet related." Rather, we want to focus on his idea that God, in creating man as cor-
poreal being, brings forth and enables human life.
36 Dogma, 37.
37 Griinde, 29.
38 Dogma, 149. See also ibid., 30, 177.
39 For this see Neuer, Zusammenhang, 123-33, 145-46; Walldorf, Realistische Philosophie, 230-33.
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i. The creation and enabling of human being and action through nature
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For Schlatter, the body is the "the greatest thing given to him [man] as his own ... the
work of the Creator.':" Man is a corporeal being. "Nothing happens apart from the body,
for the individual does not live separate from the body.":" Through his body man is part of
nature. The relation and interaction of man and nature is a mutual one. "Nature seizes us
and moves us; we seize and move nature. We are subject to its effects and at the same time
exercise effects on it. "42 This is to say that, on the one hand, nature constitutes and deter-
mines man. With regard to the exercise of the three personal functions, Schlatter expounds:
"Neither in our thinking nor in our act of volition is anything else given to us except the
unity of nature and spirit. Thinking collapses without the sensory functions as does volition
without the instincts given to us through nature.'?" In a similar way "nature gives us happi-
ness through the manifold sensations that take their rise from it. ,,44 In his capacity for free
and self-determined action man is also dependent upon his body. "Everything we bear
within ourselves pertaining to our capacity to act; whether our worship or our service per-
formed for others; whether our knowledge and love for God or our kindness toward men, is
tied to our bodily organs. "45 Thus, Schlatter underlines that it is nature "through which we
become and in which we live," and that "nature is our mother and makes US."46
On the other hand, man is empowered through his body to actuate and realise his ca-
pacity for free and self-determined action. "The human body is ... the instrument through
40 Romans, 41. In Opfer, 30 Schlatter states "that the body belongs to that which is from God."
41 Romans, 142.




45 Theology ofthe Apostles, 205. See also "Natur, SUndeund Gnade," 50: "We can only act in and through
nature. Flight from nature means the renunciation of acting."
46 Dogma, 15; Ethik, 84 (in above order); cf. Andachten, 302.
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which we are capable of action. ,,47 The Creator thus empowers the human creature to act
physically. Schlatter speaks of an extension of man's "sphere of power" [Machtbereich] in
this connection. "We are not only conscious and capable of ourselves [unserer selbst
machtigs but also of our body and through it of an infinity of things. There are organs pre-
pared for our acting; for what is produced by nature becomes our co-worker [Mitwirker]
through its connectedness with US."48
Important for our purposes is Schlatter's idea that the interaction between man and na-
ture is grounded in God's action. For God created man and nature. "In the beginning God
created the heavens and the earth; you are God's creature and live in God's creation.":"
Thereby God establishes an analogy of being between man and nature on the basis of
which their interaction becomes possible. The unity of the distinct spheres of creation
manifests itself in the metaphysical categories which ontologically mark all creaturely be-
ing." However, for Schlatter it is not only a single and initial act by which God enables the
interaction between man and nature. Rather, God continues to rule nature through the "in-
telligible powers" which he has established in it. These powers are number, law, type and
purpose." Schlatter holds that nature "has a spirit [ein Geistiges] within itself who forms it
and without whom it neither exists nor ever causes [wirkt]. The intelligible in nature makes
47 Paulus der Bote, 553. See also Ethik, 380; Opfer, 27.
48 Dogma, 40. Schlatter uses the term "organ" in this context in order to show that body and nature are not
merely instruments but have their own life [Eigenleben]. It is precisely through the realisation and actuation
of this life, not in contradiction to it, that the organ stands in the service of a higher act and purpose. For
man's action upon and in nature see also ibid., 159, 161; Ethik, 382.
49 "Wort und Schrift," 28. For nature as the product of God's creative action see also Dogma, 51-57; "Ide-
alismus oder Theologie," 357, 371; "Herr hat gegeben," 114-15; Griinde, 54; Opfer, 30; "Natur, Sunde und
Gnade," 63.
50 Walldorfhas outlined this aspect in detail in Realistische Philosophie, 138-39. For an in-depth study of
Schlatter's metaphysics see ibid., 146-213.
51 See especially Dogma, 40-41, 52-58. For a detailed exposition of these four intelligible powers see
Walldorf, Realistische Philosophie, 244-51. For the relation ofthe intelligible structures and the metaphysical
categories see ibid., 138-41.
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it a witness to God. ,,52 As the Creator and ruler of nature, God enables the mutual effecting
between man and nature.
Since we honour God as our Creator we do not seek him without nature, either by veiling nature from
us or by trying to break it. Likewise we do not merely see the natural processes, the things and the
laws forming them. Rather, above the things and their regular [gesetzmaj3igen] movement we have the
God, who rules them, before our eyes. Therefore, we direct our thinking and acting towards nature in
the conviction that it - from its origin through the God who creates it - is receptive to our action upon
it and brings forth the success which is prepared through our acting.53
From the material just outlined Schlatter draws a conclusion which is crucial for our
attempt to understand his notion of divine action: it is ultimately God who creates and rules
man through nature. "It [nature] is God's work and conceived [gedacht] and ruled by him
so that the divine giving is mediated to us through its act.":" Put differently: "Nature stands
before us in the dignity of the divine work as the medium through which God makes and
governs us." We are "set into our body and nature in such a way that God makes and rules
us through them. ,,55
ii. The divine gift of space and time
In close connection to Schlatter's concept of human embodiment stands his idea that
God gives space and time to the human creature. "The one who has made us is the one who
grants us space and time.":" Both are -like man - created by God and consequently to be
affirmed as the mode of being given to man. What interests us here is how Schlatter out-
lines space and time as the gifts of God through which he enables man to be a personal and
52 Dogma, 52; similarly in Griinde, 54.
53 Ethik, 381-82.
54 Dogma, 57.
55 Ethik, 253, 329 (in above order); similarly ibid., 51, 295-96; Dogma, 57; "Natur, Sunde und Gnade,"
50; Erlebtes, 116; "Grenzen der kirchlichen Gemeinschaft," 5; "Wunder," 831.
56 Dogma, 49.
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free agent." According to Schlatter, space is the basis for the efficacious power of the uni-
verse as well as for the human capacity for free and self-determined action." Because the
human being is a corporeal being, space is the mode of human existence through and in
which man relates to the objects and persons around him. As we saw a few moments ago,
Schlatter is aware that corporeality (spatial existence) conditions and limits human action.
Yet it is precisely because of the bodily mode of being that man exercises the power to
cause effects. Through space the contact is established by which an action is transferred as
an effect upon another person or object." In short: in giving space, God enables man to re-
alise his creaturely capacity for free and self-determined action.
Time is, as Schlatter puts it, "even more closely connected with the causal event be-
cause we see the succession in the transmission of the movement from the one being
moved to the other. "60 Schlatter is aware that human causal power is conditioned and
weakened by time - for the effect and success of an action are not established instantly but
require time. Schlatter speaks of "the blockage between the causal action and the action
which is caused by it through a time that lies between both. "61 Human causal power cannot
skip over this space in time. Yet without time, human action would not be true action be-
cause time gives an effect of an action its duration and thus its success and fruit." We may
say that God, the Creator of time, gives time to man and thus enables the same to be and
live in the way God intended human being and life.
57 For a profound exposition of Schlatter's concept of space and time see Walldorf, Realistische Philoso-
phie, 193-98.
58 See Metaphysik, 70-71.
59 See ibid., 68.
60 Ibid., 71.
61 Ibid., 71. Similarly in "Zwei Scharen von Hoffenden," 323.
62 See Metaphysik, 72-73.
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D. Human sociality and history
i. The creation and enabling of human being and action through community
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In Schlatter's view, human sociality and communality should not be regarded as
merely supplementary products of already complete individuals who decide to live to-
gether, e.g. on the basis of a contract. Rather, "community is the creation of God in the
same way as man is, who does not come about in any other way than through commu-
nity.?" In other words, man as personal and corporeal being is placed in different commu-
nities such as family, society or state, and religious communities - all of which are onto-
logically constitutive of human being. "We do not have our lives as isolated beings but
only as members of the community out of which we come into being and for which we
live. ,,64 Schlatter specifies the meaning of this statement in terms of the dependence of the
individual person upon the community. Through the marriage and family of his parents,
man inherits his bodily as well as his spiritual life," Through the language of the commu-
nity, man receives the ability to think and is open to the thoughts of another person." Man
receives his own will and the motives for his acting and volition from his fellow man."
Human community is also the soil of feeling such as the sharing of joy, compassion, hon-
our, shame, etc." In sum:
[N]othing takes place in our soul without the assistance of the community, from the first condition for
all activity, from life which the parents have brought forth and for which society passes all the provi-
sions, up to the most personal achievements of our own thinking and volition in our service for God,
we always work with what we have received; think with those thoughts that are given to us; speak
63 Dogma, 61; similarly ibid., 20; Griinde, 60; Philosophische Arbeit, 193. The primordial mutuality of
individuality and community, unity and plurality will be examined in connection with Schlatter's idea of the
vestigia trinitatis.
64 Dogma, 20. Cf. ibid., 61.
65 See ibid., 61-63; Griinde, 58.
66 See Dogma, 63; Griinde, 57.
67 See Dogma, 61, 63-64; Griinde, 58.
68 See Dogma, 127-31; Griinde, 57-58.
PROBES INTO SCHLATTER'S CONCEPT OF DIVINE AGENCY 28
those words which are told us; will that will which the community awakens in us, and act in that
power which it [the community] has stored for US. 69
As we have seen to be the case with nature, it is ultimately God who creates the human be-
ing through community: "God reveals himself to us not as the Creator of individuals but as
the Creator and Lord of his kingdom because he makes us through the community and for
the community."70 In a roundabout way, man as personal and corporeal being is not only
dependent upon and constituted by the community but also establishes it by acting upon
and in it.
In that he [man] has completed his will through action, it [the will] has become unrepealable and ir-
revocable, acts back upon the doer, and determines his will as well as his condition. He has instituted
community with others by making his will the cause of their experiences. Through this history has
emerged - the life history of the individual, whose actions and experiences are combined into a unity
through a causal concatenation, the history of the small and big communities, and, finally that of hu-
mankind, the movement of which is determined through our actions."
Adolf Koberle aptly summarises the relational dimension as one of the distinctive features
of Schlatter's anthropology.
When Schlatter thinks about man as metaphysical mystery, then he is above all concerned with the so-
ciological structure of our historical existence. Long before Martin Buber, Ferdinand Ebner and Frie-
drich Gogarten, this Christian dogmatician started to fight resolutely against the Cartesian ego-
loneliness-thinking [Ich-Einsamkeitsdenken] and pointed out how man lives creationally embedded in
I-Thou relationships and in all kinds oforders of encounter [Begegnungsordnungen aller Art].72
69 Ethik, 55. Cf. ibid., 108; "Glaube und Geschichte," 343. For a more comprehensive outline of this sub-
ject see Neuer, Zusammenhang, 146-48; Walldorf, Realistische Philosophie, 233-35.
70 Dogma, 20.
71 Ibid., 158. See also ibid., 68. Human corporeity makes the interaction with nature as well as with other
people possible. "Our body is the strong bond through which we are placed in [hineingesenkt] nature. Thus, it
[the body] also mediates our partaking in the history which takes place around us" (Opfer, 27). Corporeity is
therefore the ground from which community, culture, and history emerge. See Dogma, 54; "Natur, Sunde und
Gnade," 50. Klaus Bockmuhl, whose theology is significantly influenced by Schlatter's work, seems to ar-
ticulate the same idea in the following statement: "[C]orporeality becomes not only the field of man's social-
ity, but also, regarding his ability to act, his 'authority to act,' the field where history becomes possible: hu-
man embodiment becomes the scene of ethics" ("Die Leiblichkeit des Menschen," 69; emphasis Bockmuhl).
72 Koberle, "Adolf Schlatter," 88. See also Walldorf, Realistische Philosophie, 233-35.
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ii. The creation and enabling of human being and action through history
29
We have seen that the three characteristics of personhood, corporeity and sociality are
ontologically constitutive of man as a free agent or, as Schlatter calls it, "originator of ef-
fects.':" Schlatter uses terms such as "causal capacity," "causal power," "power of action,"
and "production power of the person" in order to articulate this concept. 74 Through his ac-
tions man is related to fellow man but also to the people prior to and after him. For Schlat-
ter this is the point at which community and history emerge. "Because the event goes over
from the generator of the effect to its recipient, we live in community, and therefore our
life is the product [Erzeugnis] and the producer [Erzeuger] of history." 75 Both history and
community cannot be separated. "When we speak of history we must appropriate the con-
cept of community and say that those who lived before us made our lives possible, and that
we have made possible the lives of those who are born from us. The community generates
actual, effective causal relations. "76
In Schlatter, man's relation to history is of the same mutual character as man's relation
to community. Man generates history and vice versa."
[H]istory has its origin in the inner sphere of man - in his will - and comes about through his action.
The productive power of the person appears in it. Hence its efficaciousness is not limited to the mate-
rial side of our life only, but reaches into the most inner and spiritual dimension and shapes our per-
son. Therefore, the new arises in history according to the forming power of the person, and this new is
blessing or curse - furtherance or hindrance of those who follow."
73 See Dogma, 22-24.
74 See e.g. Metaphysik, 87; Dogma, 36, 82, 148, 150, 175,206,262; Theology ofthe Apostles, 133, 135.
75 "Selbstdarstellungen," 160.
76 "Glaube und Geschichte," 343. Cf. Church in the New Testament Period, 1; "Wort und Schrift," 28.
77 See Dogma, 83.
78 Ibid., 82. Cf. ibid., 85,172; "Heilige Geschichte," 216-17, 221-22, 226-27; "Glaube und Geschichte,"
348. It is in this context that Schlatter accentuates the mysteriousness and incomprehensibility of history (see
Dogma, 83, 154; "Heilige Geschichte," 220-21). In "Paulus und das Griechenturn" he speaks of the "incom-
prehensible positivity of which historical research is aware" (143).
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The groundedness of history in the conscious and self-determined action of the human
person makes it distinct from the impersonal realm of nature. "[I]n nature the force is the
mover; in history, however, it is the will. The force reveals itself in effects, and of such
consists nature. The will, however, reveals itself in action, and of such consists history.,,79
As already suggested, man does not only bring forth history but is also dependent
upon, and constituted by, it. "[O]ur life comes about through the life of those who live be-
fore us, our thought comes about through the thought of those who think before us, [and]
our work comes about through the work of those who act before us." The laws of history
make it possible for an action which took place in the past to affect man and determine his
bodily and spiritual existence. According to Schlatter, man is subject to the physical, logi-
cal, ethical and religious laws of history." As distinct as history may be from nature,
through these laws and structures it is also similar to nature.
Through the strong causal relations which rule the course of history, the same is similar to a natural
process. Therefore, that which comes out of our inner life is put out of our freedom's reach and inter-
woven with natural events which bring it [that which comes out of our inner life] close to the stability
and impregnability of natural processes. What has been done cannot be undone just as natural laws
cannot be broken.Y
In all this, history is the work of God. God creates and enables history, so to speak, indi-
rectly through man, whom he has created as personal, corporeal and socio-historical being.
God not only creates but also rules history. For Schlatter the laws and structures of history
make clear "that the effects of our freedom and sin always remain embraced by the divine
governance. "83 It is by means of this ruling activity that God makes the interaction between
man and history possible. According to Schlatter, "the community, which unites us in spite
79 "Heilige Geschichte," 217. See also "Glaube und Geschichte," 339-40.
80 Ethik, 108-09.
8l See Dogma, 82. Space does not allow us to explore Schlatter's thought in detail. For this we refer to
Neuer, Zusammenhang, 163-65.
82 Dogma, 82. See also ibid., 157-58; Philosophische Arbeit 19; "Heilige Geschichte," 222.
83 Ethik, 108.
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of the stretching of time, comes about through the divine acting. We are reminded of the
latter through its [history's] laws, the overarching relation in which the events following
each other stand to each other.'?' Schlatter expounds "that the course of the world [Welt-
laufJ is governed by God's will in such a way that it [WeltlaufJ creates the space for our
acting and preserves the fruits of our work." This conviction "constitutes the indispensable
precondition for our active participation in history. ,,85
What applies to nature is therefore also true about history. Because God creates and
rules history, he is the one who places man in history, that is, he creates, forms, rules and
guides man through history."
E. On being the image of God
i. Relationship with God
In the following sentences Schlatter provides a pertinent summary of what we have
examined thus far. The God made visible through Jesus is the God, "who is the Creator, the
giver of our space and our time, the former [Bildner] of our body and our earth, also the
ruler of our history and the worker [Wirker] of our community, which joins our life to-
gether, who, because he is the Creator of all this, is also its completer ...."87 The relational
figure inherent in the notion of God as the one "from whom and to whom all things are"
entails two aspects when it is applied to man. Schlatter articulates the first aspect as fol-
lows: "From him we receive everything we possess, and through him we are what we are.
84 Dogma, 85.
85 Ibid., 160-61.
86 See ibid., 16,85,516; Ethik, 51, 83-85,108-09,256-58,261,279,296; Erlebtes, 51,116; "Grenzen der
kirchlichen Gemeinschaft," 5.
87 "Jesus unsere Hoffuung," 310
PROBES INTO SCHLATTER'S CONCEPT OF DIVINE AGENCY 32
This is the giving and creative will of God."88 We have presented this aspect as the onto-
logical relatedness of the creature to the Creator. Because of God's creative action upon
(and relation to) the creature, the latter is God's image in a substantial and indelible man-
ner. With regard to man, this means for Schlatter that "we have to find the God-likeness,"
of which Gen 1:27 speaks, "in the empirical man.?" Hence, it comes as no surprise that
Schlatter links his concept of man as a personal self, capable of free and self-determined
action, explicitly with the idea of imago Dei: "Through his power to rule, man is the image
of God, not the image of the devil" and "participates, according to the measure of the erea-
ture, in the royal autonomy [Selbstandigkeit] and freedom of God"90 The human person as
a free corporeal and social agent is the image of God, who, in his transcendence and sover-
eignty, creates and rules the creature.
However, the ontological relatedness of man is only the first aspect of the statement
that everything is from and to God. Schlatter presents the second aspect as follows: "We
are for him and to him; that is the moving [bewegende] will of God, the will that sets our
goal, the will that carries us forward and upward."91 Man is purposively created towards a
personal God-relationship which transcends the God-relatedness characteristic of every
creature."
88 Opfer, 3.
89 *Genesis, 37; cf. ibid., 42. Schlatter bases his argument also on Gen 9:6.
90 "Natur, Sunde und Gnade," 56; "Wille," 826 (in above order).
91 Opfer, 3.
92 According to Schlatter, the religions are phenomena of this teleological orientation (see e.g. Dogma,
198-203; "Kreuz Jesu," 7-14; *Wesen und Quellen, 112-20). In this context Schlatter considers the term
"natural religion" which "is not to say that we are born with the God-consciousness as comprehended knowl-
edge or complete will, but rather that through the organisation that constitutes us, we are caused to ask for
God" (Dogma, 28-29). Yet, because of the distinction of God-relatedness and God-relationship Schlatter ex-
pounds that the term "natural religion" should not be used. To know something about God does not automati-
cally mean religion as relationship with God (see Dogma, 29). Walldorf expresses Schlatter's notion by using
the terms "latent God-consciousness" [latentes Gottesbewusstsein] and "non-thematic awareness [unthema-
tisches Gewahrsein] in which the self, world, and God are still undifferentiated" (idem, Realistische Philoso-
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However, there is still something greater than being a creature. James, like the other apostles, has
called this 'something greater' the sonship of God (Kindschaft Gottes). When he calls us 'creature' he is
saying: our existence consists with everything it comprises through God's power. When he calls us
'children born of God' he is saying: God puts in your inner, personal life communion [Verbundenheit]
with him."
In this personal God-relationship the human creature does not merely receive life but lives
it in personal response to God; lives it for God, thereby offering to God what has been re-
ceived. This teleological orientation of humankind to become children of God is grounded
in the fact that God created man as a personal and free agent. Schlatter explains:
[T]he difference between nature and spirit results in a different presence and mode of activity of God
here and there. For nature is merely shaped. The spirit, however, is shaped in order to shape himself.
Therefore, the analogy which describes the divine action in relation to the human persons [Geister] is
'reign' [Regierung]. Through this term we say that the intrinsic value of our personal life is continu-
ously affirmed and established through the divine activity."
God wills to be in a relationship with man in which the latter participates and exists in pro-
priety to his personal being, to his being-other than God. For Schlatter, this implies that
God grants man the capacity for action, that is, causal power within the Creator-creature
relationship: "That a right before God is given to us, is the creation of the divine love and
stems from the fact that it [the divine love] values us. Hence, our will is even before God a
causal power. His love ascribes the task to us in which our service for God consists. ,,95
This is the context in which Schlatter argues for the distinctness of man's relationship
with God. The impersonal sphere of creation is, from the beginning, placed in a complete
relationship with God so that it, so to speak, automatically and necessarily fulfils its pur-
pose and glorifies its Creator. "The creature is bound in the necessity which is laid upon
it."96 Whereas this interrelation and interaction is appropriate to the nature of impersonal
phie, 243). Based on these considerations we cannot agree with Irmgard Kindt's rather misleading statement
that Schlatter justifies the usage of the term "natural religion" (Gedanke der Einheit, 30).
93 Andachten, 197. Cf. Dogma, 38-39; "Anteil," 302.
94 Dogma, 37; *Dogmatik 1, 124: "We are known by God and at the same time knowing; the things are
only known."
95 Dogma, 197. Similarly ibid., 149; Theology ofthe Apostles, 133.
96 Andachten, 372.
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being, the fact that God created man as a personal being rules out any automatism in his re-
lationship with man. Schlatter illustrates this through the idea of temptation: "The stars are
not tempted. They run their course in perfect correctness, bound to the law given to them. I
am tempted because God's gift is given to me in such a way that it becomes my property."?
The proprium of the relationship between God and man is this: "The community that God
grants us with himself lays claim to our own will because God imparts to us personal life
through his grace ... and makes the success of his community with us dependent on our
behaviour.?" Schlatter leaves no doubt that he regards divine sonship (Kindschaft) as the
relationship which transcends the relatedness of impersonal creatures to their Creator.
The creature stands in dependence upon God even if it does not know him. The child, however, knows
the Father. The creature must do the will of God even if it neither knows nor wills it. The child, how-
ever, serves God through its own will and in its own obedience. For this reason we are made children
of God through the Word of truth. 99
To sum up: Man's purposive relatedness and orientation towards God is fully realised
and complete in the personal relationship of divine sonship. "I am his creature, but to be
his child is more than being his creature. Sonship [Kindschaft] is not merely dependence
on God's power, but also participation [Anteil] in God's life."!" Within this relationship
man lives his life and exercises his creaturely capacities in personal and volitional response
to the Creator, thereby imaging the one from whom he has received his creaturely exis-
tence and being.
Only then are we receptive to the Christian idea of God, when we understand causation in such a way
as to bring forth community and make the recipient of the effect the image and witness of the one who
causes him [the recipient]. Then, in the affirmation of the one who calls the world into being, commu-
nity with him is given to us. Hence, our whole work is based upon our receiving, our freedom upon
our dependence, and therefore the goal which determines our whole thinking and willing arises out of
97 Ibid., 367. The distinctness of man's relationship to and glorification of the Creator is a central theme in
Peter Brunner's essay "Die Freiheit des Menschen." See especially p. 114 where the affinity to Schlatter's
conception is clearly displayed.
98 Ethik, 77.
99 Andachten, 197. See also Jesu Gottheit, 99; Kennen wir Jesus?, 32.
100 Andachten, 15.
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our relation to God. For now we reveal the giver with what we have received, and we possess freedom
ofthought and will in order that we think and say God's thought and will and do God's will. 101
It is only in the personal relationship of divine sonship that man becomes the one God
intends him to be - namely a true human being. "Through communion with God," as
Schlatter puts it, "we gain humanity."!" Thus, with reference to the notion of imago Dei in
Gen 1:27 Schlatter explicates "the [purposive] relatedness toward God as the specific dif-
ference of man, hence as what is properly human. "103
ii. Relationship with the rest of creation
Based on the personal relationship with God - the vertical relation - man is enabled to
realise fully his interrelation and interaction with nature and fellow man - the horizontal
relations.!" In this context, Schlatter specifies his idea that the God-likeness of man con-
sists in being created as a personal self, capable of free and self-determined action. As we
have seen above, God exercises his creative power in such a way as to bring forth crea-
turely being and life. Through his creative relation to the creature he enables the same to be
other than himself. According to Schlatter, man is the image of God when he relates and
acts at the horizontal level in analogy with the relation and action that takes place between
God and man at the vertical level. 105
101 Metaphysik, 59; cf, "Pforte zum Romerbrief," 61.
102 D 506' f ibid 571 77, "H '1'0 G hi h "723ogma, , c . I I " _ -__, el I",e esc IC te, _ .
103 *Genesis, 42. See also Walldorf, Realistische Philosophie, 242. Colin Gunton puts this aspect of the
imago Dei as follows: "To say that man is created in the image of God refers to the fact that God constitutes a
particular being among all the other created beings to subsist in a particular and unique kind of relation with
him. In that respect at least the image is indelible" (idem, The Triune Creator, 207).
104 Space does not allow us to enter into the details of Schlatter's argument. For the fundamental character
of man's relationship with God in Schlatter's ethics see Neuer, Zusammenhang, 150-53,
105 Christoph Schwebel states along similar lines: "This distinction of the human creation [the imago Dei],
summarized in the concept of the human person, can be characterised as the ability to relate actively to the re-
latedness which constitutes human existence and which is grounded in God's creative action. This ascribes to
human beings the ability to relate to God, to themselves in their social context, and to their cultural and natu-
ral environment" (God: Action and Revelation, 32),
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a) Nature (non-personal creation)
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With regard to nature this means that man affirms his dependence upon nature and ex-
ercises his power to rule and use it in such a way as to preserve it and enable it to be itself.
Schlatter uses different terms such as "cultivation" and "sanctification of nature" 106 in order
to articulate this idea. Central to his considerations is the notion of free dominion over na-
ture through service for, and submission to, it: "Through our acting upon nature we gain
our dominion over it. However, the law unswervingly asserts itself here that we gain do-
minion over nature through our service which purely and simply obeys it [nature]. Any re-
fractoriness [Widersetzlichkeit] over against the natural order [Naturordnung] avenges it-
self as impotence [Ohnmacht] .107 Through this concept Schlatter wants to move beyond the
fatal choice of either worship or the arbitrary subjugation and exploitation of nature. 108
Rather, personal relationship with the Creator enables man "to be at home" in nature: "Be-
cause we know God as the Creator of nature, we want to live in it and avoid anything that
separates us from it. For the unnatural divides us from the divine work."!" Schlatter links
this kind of interaction between man and nature with the God-likeness of man:
There emerges a higher justice above a lower one - a more complete right above a less complete one
according to the measure in which we, in our acting, preserve and make fruitful what nature has given
to us. Thus, our right comes closer to the divine right, and God's image becomes visible in us, who
makes nature the bearer ofhis grace for us. II O
106 See Ethik, 253, 255. For the following see also Neuer's essay, "Naturtheologie als Basis einer okologi-
schen Ethik ."
107 Dogma, 161; similarly in Philosophische Arbeit, 105: "[W]e exercise our dominion over nature only in
the strictest obedience to it."
108 See e.g. Dogma, 44-49; Briefe, 29; Ethik, 83-84,254; "Natur, SUnde und Gnade," 65.
109 Andachten, 381; Ethik, 253 (in above order).
110 Ethik, 67.
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b) Community (personal creation)
37
With regard to the interrelationship of human persons Schlatter argues that the imago
Dei is realised when persons relate to and act upon each other in such a way as to free and
enable one another to be and to act. This "liberating action" is "the attribute of love," the
interaction in which "we in our activity found the activity of the other . . . in order that
through it the other may become capable of himself [seiner selbst machtig werde]." III Thus
emerges, according to the "rule of love," the true community of love in which "one serves
freely and rules liberatingly," "in which the individual works for the community and the
community works for the individual." 112 The important point to see now is that, according
to Schlatter, the imago Dei is realised when human persons relate to and act upon each
other in analogy with God's creative and enabling action upon man. "As those who give
freedom we are God's image."!" In correlation to his understanding of God's action toward
man, Schlatter holds that, when human persons act upon each other, "the image of the gen-
erator [des Erzeugers] comes about in the generated one [im Erzeugten] through the causal
process. ,,114
The lonely man who attempts to make himself the complete person out of himself in his isolation,
does not become God's image but destroys the same and comes closer to the devil's image. Likewise,
we do not become God's image in that we, in suffering dependence, are moved by the drives that grip
us from outside; this way we make ourselves like nature. We become God's witness and image, how-
ever, by giving the strong, blessed and righteous life, which God granted to us, to others also. I 15
III *Dogmatik I, 10; cf. ibid., 139-40; Dogma, 154-55.
112 Ethik, 140. For the term "rule oflove" in this context see Griinde, 60, 66.
113 *Dogmatik I, 140.
114 "Selbstdarstellungen," 163. For the analogy see the citation above, p. 35 n. 10l.
lIS Ethik, 63.
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2. God - the Preserver and Ruler of Humanity
A. Preliminary remarks on the relation between creation and providence
38
The material presented thus far already entails many of the basic aspects which char-
acterise Schlatter's concept of divine providence. In Schlatter, creation and providence are
closely linked to each other. Before we start to present Schlatter's thought on divine provi-
dence in a coherent and systematic form it is important to see that his way of relating crea-
tion and redemption strives to obviate two extreme positions. The first one is an ontologi-
cal actualism in which providence is seen as the continuation of the initial act of creation.
This approach is in danger of depriving creation of its true subsistence and particular iden-
tity in otherness vis-a-vis the Creator. Furthermore, as we have seen Schlatter arguing,
God's creative activity tends to be no longer conceivable as complete and successful."?
The second position to be obviated is an understanding of God's creative activity as an
initial act after which God - in a deistic manner - leaves creation to itself. According to
Schlatter, the goodness and perfection of creatura as the result of God's perfect creatio
should not be used for denying further acts of God through which he continues to relate to
the world."? Rather, the ontological dependence of the creature upon God continues to
show itself in a variety of providential actions by which God sustains, enables and rules
creation. In other words, God's initial mono-activity [Alleinwirksamkeit], through which he
calls the world into being, founds a divine omni-activity [Allwirksamkeit] through which
116 See above, p. 21 n. 36. E. Brunner argues along similar lines in his discussion of the idea of creatio
continua: "Certainly the danger of Pantheism lurks in the background. The danger-zone has already been en-
tered when Creation and Preservation are identified with one another. For anyone who does not admit the dis-
tinction between the creation and the preservation of the created world does not take the fact of creation seri-
ously. The relation of God to that which He has created is not the same as His relation to that which is yet to
be created. That which has been created stands actually 'over against' God" (E. Brunner, The Christian Doc-
trine ofCreation and Redemption, 33-34).
117 It is highly unlikely that this radical form of deism was positively propounded in the history of theol-
ogy. As a theory it rather served as the negative background against which theologians developed their re-
spective notions of divine providence. For this see R. Bernhardt, Handeln Gottes, 178-86.
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God remains the one from whom and through whom and to whom everything is. What we
call here "omni-activity" is defined by Schlatter as follows: "God's activity [Wirken] has
extensive and intensive totality. It is extensively whole because it grips everybody, and it is
intensively whole because it works [wirkt] everything. From his [God's] gift originates the
whole life and acting [Wirken] of man because the latter has nothing which he has not re-
ceived."'" Hence, Schlatter understands divine providence to denote "the whole naturally
existing relation of God to us." 119 It follows that Schlatter thinks of creation and providence
as two distinct yet internally related activities We shall further demonstrate this relational
pattern in our exposition of his concept of God's conservatio.
B. Divine providential action
Schlatter does not develop his notion of divine providence as a coherent doctrine. The
statements on the basis of which we attempt to present Schlatter's understanding of this
dogmatic locus appear throughout his writings in connection with his reflections on God's
works as the product of divine action. An exception is a short passage in an unpublished
lecture where Schlatter summarises the theological results of what he has outlined about
man, nature and history. Here he briefly discusses the concepts of conservatio, gubernatio
and concursus, for which reason we also adopt this structure for our exposition of Schlat-
ter's approach.!" This structure indicates an affinity of Schlatter's thought to the elaborate
concepts of divine providence developed by the theologians of Lutheran orthodoxy - an af-
118 Paulus der Bote, 338. Similarly in "Wandel nach dem Geist," 25.
119 *DogmatikI, 199.
120 See ibid., 196-98.
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finity which, as will become clear in the following, regards not only the structural, but also
the material, level. 121
i. Conservatio
a) God's active and creative presence in creation
Schlatter's intention in his concept of conservatio is to explicate that the ontological
dependence of creation upon God is not limited to the original act of creation. Rather, crea-
turley being and life is sustained and preserved through conservation as a divine activity in
which God is actively and creatively present to creation. This applies, in the sense of
providentia generalis, to the world as the whole of God's creation: "The world would not
exist in its greatness, order and vivacity if God were not present in it."122 Yet, God's preser-
vation is particularly directed towards the human creature (providentia specialis). "We
need an efficacious basis for our life." Schlatter views it as a great illusion to think
that the imperishable life-treasures, of which we are in need, lie in ourselves, that the source of light,
which brings truth into our being, and the source of power, which flows towards etemallife, could be
found in us. The basis on which we can stand, the inexhaustible foundation which sustains and nur-
tures spirits and lets them grow, exists for us in God, in the God whose Word we have before us which
says: 'My son, everything I have is yours.'123
It is in this context that Schlatter explicates the divine conservatio not merely as a general
divine efficacy but in terms of divine action. "If God denies us his gifts, nothing in us re-
mains the way it used to be. We lose what we have. If God does not illuminate, we become
dark for it is in his light that we see. If God does not enliven us, we die - for we live
through him. ,,124
121 Our observations are based on the outlines of Schmid, Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-lutherischen
Kirche, 120-34; Ratschow, Lutherische Dogmatik, 208-47; Bernhardt, Handeln Gottes, especially 123-43.
122 RufJesu, 323; cf. the references above, p. 25 n. 52.
123 "Gottes Sohne," 10-11.
124 "Pforte zum Romerbrief," 61.
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This accentuation of divine providence as actio externa Dei renders God's internal
praevisio or prognosis secondary in Schlatter's approach. "Even conservation is a divine
activity [Aktivitat], not merely a permitting [ein Zulassen] , a passive sustaining of the
things, but the affirmation of the same in their subsistence [Bestand]. It [conservation] is
therefore indeed conceivable as a constant forming [stete Bildung]."125 Through this Schlat-
ter takes up a central moment of Lutheran orthodoxy in which - beginning with Luther-
the doctrinal emphasis concerning God's providence shifted from ''praescientia and deter-
minatio" to "opus extemum.v" However, Schlatter does not mean to reject the idea of "our
being included in the divine teleology." For him there is no antithesis between God's
providential thinking and acting: "God's providential thoughts [fursorgende Gedanken] are
the forming powers through which we are blessed."!"
b) Conservatio and creatio continua
In order to obviate any misunderstanding of his expression "constant forming," Schlat-
ter demarcates his concept again from a certain notion of creatio continua: "The formula
'constant creation' can lead to the idea that creation [as act] does not really succeed, as if it
never brought about the existence of things. They [the things] sink constantly and repeat-
edly into nothingness and must be lifted out of nothing."!" Schlatter, as we have suggested
above, does not establish the link between the creatio originalis and the conservatio by
means of a temporal concept of God's creative act. Rather, both are related through an op-
erational analogy: in analogy to the original act of creating, God acts creatively ex nihilo
125 *Dogmatik 1, 196.
126 See Ratschow, Lutherische Dogmatik, 211-13; Bernhardt, Handeln Gottes, 77-81, 125-26, 137-38;
Schwebel, "God, Creation and the Christian Community," 165-67.
127 *Dogmatik 1, 199. Schlatter briefly discusses God's prognosis in Dogma, 51, 123,337.
128 *Dogmatik1, 197.
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when he - in his permanent presence to creation - sustains and upholds the same. In this
sense one could attempt to capture Schlatter's thought in the phrase "creatio continuata.T"
Consequently, Schlatter's distinction between original creation and conservation does not
rest upon the exclusive identification of creatio ex nihilo with creatio originalisP? Rather,
what makes conservation distinguishable from original creation is that the latter constitutes
the antecedent conditions of the former, as Schlatter words it, "constitutes the determining
canon for the divine efficacy [Wirken]." Hence, Schlatter concludes as follows: "The idea
of conservation expresses the fact that God's relation to that which becomes [zum Wer-
denden] is different from his relation to that which has become [zum Gewordenen]."131 The
terms "origination" (creation) and "interaction" (preservation) are suitable to mark the dif-
ference between the two relations.!" We could summarise Schlatter's thought by saying
that the original creation - because it depends on God for its being - presupposes conser-
vation, and that conservation presupposes the original creation as that which is to be pre-
served.
Schlatter's thought entails the idea that God, in his preserving activity, is determined
through the creature. However, as Schlatter underlines, the fact that the existing creation
constitutes the determining canon for the divine efficacy "does not result in a dependence
of God because it is precisely in the results of [God's own] creating that preservation has its
129 Schlatter's thoughts show an affmity to Luther's emphasis on the actuality of God's creative action ex
nihilo in the here and now. Through this God brings about something new out of the already existing crea-
tion: "Creare semper novum facere" (see M. Beintker, "Das Schopfercredo in Luthers Kleinem Katechis-
mus," 5). Schwebel and Bernhardt, in opposition to M. Beintker, speak of "creatio continuata" (Schwebel,
"God, Creation and the Christian Community," 165) and "continuatio creationis" (Bernhardt, Handeln Got-
tes, 79). A. Torrance argues that even the idea of continued creation does not safeguard the concept of divine
creation against temporal connotations, that is, an act extended in time ("Creatio ex Nihilo," 98).
130 See also A. Torrance's argumentation in "Creatio ex Nihilo," 97.
131 *Dogmatik I, 197.
132 Both terms are taken from Gunton, The Triune Creator, 179.
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rule."!" This suggests that the accommodation which occurs when God acts providentially,
that is, interacts with the creature as other than himself, is the result of a divine self-
determination to act in faithfulness to his own works and original purposes. Especially in
relation to a fallen creation this faithfulness, as we shall elaborate in due course, reveals it-
self as the sole ground for the further existence of man and his world.
ii. Gubernatio
a) The teleological orientation of divine action
In his teaching on divine conservatio Schlatter explicates the fact that the creatures in
general and man in particular are always dependent on God for their being and existence.
Everything is from God. The second aspect of God's omni-activity - that everything is to
God - is the primary concern of Schlatter's notion of divine gubernatio. God actively gov-
ems and steers the creaturely processes, events and actions in such a way as to reach his
purposes through the creaturely causes. Through the idea of gubernatio God's providence
is qualified as teleological action, the ultimate goal of which is a relationship in which man
lives his life in personal response to God, thereby glorifying his Creator with the gifts he
has received from him.
'To him' is what we are. This is the goal, the universal goal and at the same time the personal goal, the
sense of world history and the sense of your history. What we have received was given to us in order
that it may be offered to him. This means the sanctification of our whole life with all its natural and
spiritual property [Besitz] and the unification [Einigung]of all who live for him. 134
In our section on Schlatter's notion of imago Dei we elaborated that the realisation of hu-
man being as being-from-God and being-to-God not only has the purpose of glorifying the
133 *Dogmatik I, 197.
134 "Ziel der Geschichte," 354. The unity of will is a central aspect of the personal relationship of God and
man. Thus Schlatter can say (ibid., 351): "The question about the goal of history means: when have 1 made
my will one with God's will?" See further Erlduterungen I, 978.
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Creator. Rather, human existence itself reaches its completion here - indeed, the well-
being of the whole of creation is fully realised when man lives from and to God.135
b) God's ruling of man through nature and history
Schlatter applies the notion of divine gubernatio especially to the interaction between
God and man.!" The idea that God is the Creator and ruler of nature and history leads, as
we have seen above, to the idea that God creates, enables and rules man through nature and
history. "The creative power [Schopfermachti of God includes that he is the Lord of his
works and rules heaven and earth."!" God "is the Creator and Lord of all things, who rules
us through the fact that he has prepared nature and history for us, in whose [God's] work
we always live so that there does not exist anything senseless or indifferent for US."138 This
is to say that God rules nature and history in such a way that they serve his good purposes
with humanity. In that God orders and steers the natural and historical course of events he
provides the conditional net in which man is able to be and act in accordance with God's
purposes for creation.
Schlatter elaborates that the "royal working [Walten] of God" is not "without relation
to nature, in and through which we live; rather it [the royal working] provides for us nature
through which we experience his goodness, and in its completion effects nature's renewal
and transfiguration."!" Hence, Schlatter defines the notion of divine providence as "faith
granted to us through the purposive ordering of nature," as the belief "that the efficacious-
135 Note the correlation with Lutheran orthodoxy and its articulation of the causa finis of God's providen-
tial action as gloria creatoris, bonum universi, and salus piorum (see e.g. Ratschow, Lutherische Dogmatik,
222).




PROBES INTO SCHLATTER'S CONCEPT OF DIVINE AGENCY 45
ness of nature upon us is regulated in such a way as to be wholesome for US."140 In this
connection, purpose is the most crucial of the four "intelligible powers" through which
God rules nature. The teleology of nature reaches its completion in God's purposive and
beneficial regulating and ordering of the natural processes towards the human person. 141
For Schlatter, nature is a witness who shows "that the power on which we are dependent is
gracious and cares for us. We call the one who helps us with almighty goodness, our
God."142 Schlatter refers to this idea as the "faithful realism [glaubiger Realismus]" of the
Bible, "which perceives in every natural event the divine efficaciousness that creates US."143
Nature is the medium through which God actively determines human being and rules hu-
man life. "God is there and reigns, and this in such a way that nature is neither strange nor
difficult nor a hindrance for him. Rather, it lies softly and flexibly in his hands. For it is his
creature.t''" To believe in the creator "does not mean that we desire a new heaven and a
new earth but rather that we honour this heaven and this earth as the carriers of the divine
efficacy."!" Therefore, simply by virtue of his existence in and dependence upon nature,
man is subject to the divine power and wilL "[O]ur existence - including everything it
comprises - subsists by God's power. . . . The creature stands in dependence upon God
even if it does not know him.... The creature must do the will of God even if it neither
knows nor wills it."146 However, God's purpose with man is a personal relationship in
140 Ibid., 57.
141 See ibid., 53-58. For an illuminating outline of Schlatter's understanding of the teleology of nature see
Neuer, Zusammenhang, 127-29; Walldorf, Realistische Philosophie, 207-09.
142 Andachten, 296.
143 "Natur, Sunde und Gnade," 50. Schlatter underlines that the affirmation of nature as the medium of
God's providence is not dependent upon a complete understanding of nature's teleology (see Dogma, 55; Phi-
losophische Arbeit, 135).
144 RufJesu, 77; see also "Wunder," 831.
145 "Grenzen der kirchlichen Gemeinschaft," 8.
146 Andachten, 197.
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which man realises his creaturely capacities and lives his life in volitional accordance with
God's will. Even in this connection, as Schlatter expounds, nature serves God's good pur-
pose with man in that it mediates and reveals the divine will. "Nature stands before us in
the dignity of the divine work as the medium through which God makes and governs us so
that with the understanding of the natural events our insight into the divine will, which we
have to obey, groWS."147
In a similar way Schlatter outlines the divine gubernatio of history. Although history
is the place where man - in relation to his fellow-creatures and his Creator - actuates his
capacity for free and self-determined action, "[t]he divine decree penetrates ... everything
that happens.":" In other words, God's "reign comprises everything, even that which we
bring forth in our own power, in the free usage [Freiheitsgebrauch] of sovereign decisions
of will."!" We have seen that Schlatter interprets the teleological ordering of history pri-
marily as the benevolent orientation of God's action towards man.!" Man is placed in
community and history, which is to say "that he [God] wills to have us in the way our his-
torical place makes us, as part of this whole which extends through time and knits us to-
gether with the ... curse and blessing of the past."!" Schlatter is convinced that history
provides man with God's guidance and that God shows his will through history.!" On this
147 Ethik, 253. With this we have touched the complex issue of the significance of natural law (Natur-
recht) for ethics. A deeper examination of this topic goes beyond our purposes here. We refer to Neuer's ex-
haustive exposition of Schlatter's concept of natural law and orders of creation (SchOpfungsordnungen) in
Zusammenhang, 49-55,168-71,271-75,279-97; see also idem, "Schopfung und Gesetz."
148 "Wunder," 831.
149 "Wort und Schrift," 25; similarly in Metaphysik, 87.
150 See above, p. 31.
151 Dogma, 85. As we have seen to be the case with nature, Schlatter underlines that the affirmation of
history as the medium of God's providential action is not dependent on a complete understanding of the ra-
tionality and teleology of history (see ibid.; Philosophische Arbeit, 135).
152 See e.g. Ethik, 44, 256. Again, we sense at this point that history, like nature, plays an important role
in Schlatter's notion of the foundation and the material of Christian ethics. Space does not allow us to go into
more details. See Neuer's treatment of the subject in Zusammenhang, 165-71.
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basis history is a divine medium through which man is summoned and enabled to live his
life in personal response to God. "Because there is history through which God blesses
[begnadet] us and acts for us, we are also called to act. The God who acts for us is also the
one who acts through US."153 This transition from the God who acts for us to the God who
acts through us and thus realises his purposes, is well articulated in the following sen-
tences:
The individual is altogether the one who receives, for all things are from God. At the beginning of all
events there is his will and his power, and through him are all things; there is no one who moves who
is not prompted by him, no one who knows and obeys who is not enlightened by him, no one who acts
who does not act as his instrument. As all being is from him and all events transpire through him, so
everything also has its goal in him. Everything is brought to him, to his knowledge, to submission un-
der his verdict, to the unification with his will, to the revelation of his glory. Therefore he is the one to
whom all honor belongs; apart from him no one has it. He is the one who is praised without end!154
Along these lines Schlatter defmes the notion of gubernatio in the sense that human per-
sons "are, in their freedom, set and valued by God as the workers of their own history.
Their history is related to God's goal. They receive the dignity to be doers of the divine
Will."155 With these thoughts we have reached the transitional point from providentia gen-
eralis (the whole world in general) and specialis (the human creature) to providentia spe-
cialissima. This is to say that, according to Schlatter, God's providential action comes to
completion in a very special way in and through those persons whom God has united in a
community of faith. We shall briefly explore this in the final section of our outline of
Schlatter's notion of concursus Dei.
c) The differentiation between mediate and immediate providential acts of God
When we recapitulate the material just outlined we observe that, according to Schlat-
ter, God's providence takes place in continuous accordance with the orderly events and
153 Dogma, 516; cf. e.g. above, p. 31 n. 85.
154 Romans, 226; similarly in Erlauterungen J, 978.
155 *Dogmatik J, 197.
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processes of nature and history. Divine conservatio and gubernatio are conceived as medi-
ate action. With regard to the "course of the world" Schlatter argues "that the forces which
are effective here, are given to the things themselves as their continuous and remaining
property. Hence, in this sphere, the efficacy of God presents itself as something mediated.
It conceals itself behind the measure and law given to nature." 156 Yet, like the theologians
of Lutheran orthodoxy, Schlatter distinguishes, albeit implicitly, between providentia ordi-
naria or mediata and providentia extraordinaria or immediatal" In other words, the
course of nature and history not only consists of events and processes which mediate God's
providence but also of immediate acts through which God, in the sovereignty and tran-
scendence of his will, rules man and his world according to the divine intentions and pur-
poses. This immediate activity is the locus where Schlatter's idea of divine providence as
creative acting in creation is most clearly explicated.
Throughout his work, Schlatter combines his notion of God's creative act with the
concept of miracle: "[Cjreation is a miracle."!" The creative sovereignty of the God in,
through, and to whom everything exists, is a constitutive factor of every miracle. It "is in-
vested with the seal of omnipotence [Allmacht] and comes to light as a creative act. There-
fore, the word is the only perceivable medium through which it is brought about."!" God's
otherness and superiority are clearly marked: "There is only one worker [Wirker] of mira-
cles, namely God; for there is only one who is able to act creatively.v'" Miracles are "crea-
tive acts which happen in nature, but not through nature." Schlatter's intention in all this is
to underline that God's activity must not be reduced to natural and historical processes and
156 "Wunder," 831; similarly in *Dogma und Geschichte, 9.
157 For this differentiation see Bernhardt, Handeln Gottes, 136-37; Ratschow, Lutherische Dogmatik, 219.
158 "Wunder der Bibel," 72; similarly ibid., 75, 79. See also the references above, p. 20 n. 30.
159 "Wunder," 832.
160 Dogma, 59.
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laws. The miracles "show us God's superiority over nature in his creative power." In this
context, Schlatter gives what may be called a definition of a creative act:
An activity [Wirken] proves to be creative when it possesses totality, that means when it unites willing
and acting, word and power. It is therefore superior to space and time and to the obstructions which
both bring upon acting. Therefore, the miracle does not endanger the idea of causality but affmns it.
For in a miracle we do not think of an effect without worker [Wirker] but explicitly apply the idea of
causality here because in the miracle we know God as the one who effects the same.l'"
The question to be asked here is the following: is God's immediate activity not the viola-
tion, even the destruction of the creation in which it happens? Is it not an inconceivable
breach of the natural and historical laws established by God himself so that we are con-
fronted with an either/or decision?
Schlatter's answer to these objections is negative. Because God, and not a creature, is
the acting subject, it is not required of the creature to act in contradiction to itself'!" Schlat-
ter argues that God, even when he performs a miracle, acts in a manner appropriate to the
being and existence of creation. In the case of nature this means:
"Because God is the causing one in the miracle, the unshakeable preservation of nature is an essential
part of the event. This is constantly made visible in that its result is directly integrated in the natural
nexus [Naturzusammenhang] and subjected to the law which establishes the connection of all events
to the one world." 163
As Schlatter puts it elsewhere: "For in the Bible there is only one doer of miracles because
there is only one creator, and this one is God." Therefore, one must not fear that God's
miracle brings nature into disorder. "He, who works the miracle, also created and preserves
nature. It lies inviolably well-protected and secure in his hand, especially when he - in the
glory of his almighty grace - gives what nature can not (and is not supposed to) give US."164
Schlatter goes even a step further when he elaborates that through a miracle God enables
and empowers creaturely being and life. A miracle effects "the strongest, most complete
161 Ibid., 58; cf. "Wunder der Bibel," 72.
162 See "Wunder," 832.
163 Dogma, 58-59; similarly in Ethik, 53.
164 "Wunder der Bibel," 79.
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sanctification of nature." 165 Schlatter illustrates the meaning of this statement through the
miracles of Jesus, arguing that there is no "stronger affirmation of the life ... which was
lived in Bethany than the one which happened when the power of the creator became ef-
fective in order that Lazarus might continue to live a couple of more years in his village."
Schlatter summarises: "That God's will may be done and his work may receive completion
was the goal of Jesus when he denied the miracle and submitted himself in life and death to
the law of nature as well as when he did the miracle.t''"
The aforementioned aspects indicate that Schlatter regards God's immediate and par-
ticular activity as intentional action through which he creatively moves creation, especially
the human creature, towards the goals which also determine his mediate providential activ-
ity. The decisive moment here is that Schlatter understands the divine efficacy not merely
in terms of an omnipotent natural causality but in terms of personal - hence, intentional ac-
tion. Thus, a "harmonious homogeneity between the miracles and the rest of the course of
history" emerges. Indeed, the former become parts of the latter and thus gain intelligibility
and rationality."? Schlatter brings this argument to a point when he reflects on the history
ofIsrael:
The sacred miracle, which comes from above, has its seal in the fact that the power is here subordinate
to truth, righteousness and grace. The miracles of the exodus from Egypt become the ground of Is-
rael's history not merely because they reveal omnipotence, bur rather because it is the omnipotence of
a Father who calls his sons to himself, redeems and preserves them in order that they stand in his
community and service (emphasis A. L.).168
165 Sprechstunde, 24. The term "sanctification of nature" occurred above, p. 36.
166 Ibid., 25.
167 "Wunder," 832.
168 Ibid., 832. It is worth noting the affinity to the concept which Kirkpatrick develops in his essay "Un-
derstanding an Act of God." He argues that a distinction between event and act provides us with the concep-
tual equipment to understand the immediate and particular acts of God as interventions "in the otherwise
natural flow of events." He concludes that God's particular acts are as little a violation of natural and histori-
cal laws as the acts of a human agent (177-78).
iii. Concursus
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The fact that God's providential action is mediated through the impersonal as well as
the personal creation raises the question of the enabling and empowering of the creatures to
be mediators of God's actions. This is, according to Schlatter, the point of the notion of di-
vine concursus or cooperatio. "The concursus-formula" was developed in order to express
"the way in which God's assistance in the things and persons takes place.'?" In Schlatter
the doctrine of divine concursus addresses the modal question that underlies the concepts
of conservatio and gubernatio: how is the divine efficacy related to creaturely efficacy?
Schlatter operates implicitly with three distinctions according to which we structure our
presentation of the material. 170
a) Concursus generalis
Schlatter expounds that every creature - in order to act - depends upon the empower-
ing and enabling activity of God. "Not only is the being of every thing preserved in gen-
eral, but also the concrete effect which it [the thing] exercises in the given moment is made
possible through the cooperation of God."!" With this the concursus divinus is specified as
a creative activity of God which constitutes the necessary condition for any causal activity
of the creature. As we have seen to be the case with the creation of the world and man,
Schlatter has an ontological understanding of God's efficacy as the enabling-ground of all
creaturely efficacy. This is the basis for Schlatter's idea of God's omni-causality in the di-
vine preservation and government of the world. Every event and act happens through God.
Walldorfhas outlined that Schlatter implicitly works with the Thomist conception of causa
169 *Dogmatik I, 198.
170 The terms providentia generalis, specialis, specialissima occur as marginal note ibid., 199.
171 Ibid., 198. For the same accentuation see Harle, Dogmatik, 291.
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prima (principalis) and causa secunda (instrumentalis) when he regards the metaphysical
categories - of which causality is one - as being caused.!" Illuminating in this context is E.
Wolfel's summary: "The whole world, including the causality immanent in it, is conceived
as being embraced by a causality which only now gives it the capacity to act causally it-
self.":"
Schlatter illustrates the cooperation of divine and creaturely efficacy with regard to the
idea of evolution in nature: "In that we know the Last, who is the First, we also know why
there is development [Entwicklung], namely because nature is not devoid of the coopera-
tion of the one who causes it and whom it, after it has been caused, serves as the medium
for his efficacy.!" Schlatter emphasises that there is an actual relation between the divine
and the creaturely cause. They must not be understood as two activities running parallel to
each other. However, the "working with and in each other of God and creature [das Mit-
und Ineinanderwirken Gottes und der Kreatur]" remains a mystery to Schlatter. 175
b) Concursus specialis
In Schlatter's view, the concept of divine concursus unfolds its full meaning when it is
applied to the relation between God and man. The latter is in all his actions as personal
agent dependent upon the cooperation of God: "[T]here is no one who moves who is not
prompted by him, no one who knows and obeys who is not enlightened by him, no one
who acts who does not act as his instrument."176 A case in point is the procreation of man.
172 See Walldorf, Realistische Philosophie, 169-81, especially 177-8l.
173 Wolfel, Welt als Schopfung, 33, also quoted in Walldorf, Realistische Philosophie, 179-80.
174 Dogma, 47; similarly in Griinde, 56.
175 See *Wesen und Quellen, 81-82 where Schlatter is rather sceptical about the term concursus since it
suggests two parallel activities.
176 Romans, 226.
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Schlatter expounds that the "ability to make human persons" should not be conceived of as
a human possibility. "Already the doubleness of function which father and mother have in
it [procreation] compels us to affirm a power that stands above both, destines both for each
other, and makes them capable of cooperation." The same applies to the construction of an
evolutionary chain in which a causal connection is established that - via the ancestors and
the different types of animals - reaches back to the first cell. "[W]e ... need a power that
stands above the single factors which participate in our becoming and procures for them
the capability for cooperation."!" Schlatter grounds this cooperation of human agents and
creaturely causes explicitly in the cooperation of God.178 "Nobody must forget that prior to
everything he does [vor allem, was er macht] stands the moment in which he was made
[der Moment, in dem er gemacht wurde] as the one who only receives." 179
Schlatter is aware that such an understanding of the relation between divine and hu-
man efficacy must by all means be secured against locating both on the same level. We
have mentioned that Schlatter, in implicit adoption of the causa prima-causa secunda
scheme, clearly distinguishes between God's causality and the world-immanent causality.
Schlatter knows of a founding relation iBegrundungsrelatioriy which is not a symmetrical
one but moves exclusively from God to the creature. This distinction is even more crucial
for the notion of the concursus of God and man. To locate God and man on the same ac-
tional level bears the danger of a causal theo-monism in which the action of man is di-
vested of its human authenticity. This amounts ultimately to an inner-theological problem
because God is conceived of as acting in contradiction to his original purpose in which he
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self. Schlatter argues that such a collapse of the human into the divine, and vice versa, can
be avoided when God's cooperatio is consistently interpreted as truly creative action, as
"assistance by God - not only logical but real and effective [assistance] -" "cooperation"
in which "the operation of the 'I' is founded, not destroyed."!"
Whether or not Schlatter is able to relate divine and human being and action in the
way suggested can only be evaluated after we have outlined further details of his concept
of divine agency. Yet this can already be said: the idea of concursus Dei constitutes a
nodal point at which Schlatter's theology of divine agency continuously comes to a head.
c) Concursus specialissima
In Schlatter, divine providential action comes to completion in that God creatively in-
stitutes and enables a personal relationship of faith and love between man and himself. We
must not repeat what has already been said about God's purpose with creation in general
and man in particular. Our concern is this: when God brings forth a community of sons and
daughters he is truly Father and truly King. We are dealing here, as Schlatter argues, with a
divine conservatio and gubernatio which formally and materially constitute the highest
level of divine providential action.": Schlatter develops these thoughts on the basis of a
model of divine interaction which we call here concursus specialissima. "[T]he royal
working [Walten] of God forms our inner life and thus, in that it grips the many in their
180 *Dogmatik I, 198. The struggle of Lutheran orthodoxy for an adequate way of relating divine and hu-
man action is notable in statements such as that of 1. A. Quenstedt: "God not only gives second causes the
power to act, and preserves this, but immediately influences the action and effect of the creature, so that the
same effect is produced not by God alone, nor by the creature alone, nor partly by God and partly by the
creature, but at the same time by God and the creature, as one and the same total efficiency, viz., by God as
by the universal and first cause, and by the creature as the particular and second cause" (Theologia didactico-
polemica, 3d ed. Wittenberg 1669, I, 531; quoted in O. C. Thomas, "Introduction God's Activity in the
World," 3.
181 This is the line of thought in Schlatter's section "Gottes Vaterschaft und Konigtum" in Dogma, 87-89.
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personal life and unites them with God, his kingdom comes about. 182 Elsewhere we have
seen Schlatter articulating this as "the sanctification of our whole life with all its natural
and spiritual property [Besitz] and the unification [Einigung] of all who live for him.'''"
Through this divine concursus man as personal agent is empowered and enabled to act in
accordance with God in such a way that God works through the works of man. "If man is
God's work then the human will originates from God's will and God's work happens in the
human activity."!" Schlatter articulates the specialissima moment of this as follows: "[Tjhe
one who has become obedient to God by faith and for whom Christ has become his Lord,
produces works in a new dimension; and, compared with the natural condition, he does so
to an incomparably greater degree because he now shares in the divine activity.'?" In this
way, Schlatter concludes, God works a history in which he reveals himself.
With the notion of kingdom [Reichsgedanken] we make the concept of providence complete because
through the former we relate God's goodness not merely to our destiny [Geschick] but describe the
complete and personal communion [Verbundenheit] with God which makes our inner life the work of
God and our history, the place of his revelation. 186
For Schlatter prayer is the culminating point of this relation between divine and human
action. Indeed, prayer is the necessary condition in which human action and history be-
come the place of God's activity and revelation.
We are called to volitional service for God in which we are allowed to enter without reservation and
with our complete personhood. Through this we are made carriers of a history.... We must not ac-
complish this particular life-history of ours in isolation from God - but in him and through him and
toward him. Therefore, it is of great importance that we encompass our own history with our supplica-
tion and faith so that our action grows out of God's action and our service is grounded in God's gift.187
It would be an interesting task to use Schlatter's teaching on prayer as a test case for his
concept of divine providence. However, the limits of this study allow us merely to expli-
18?
- Dogma, 87.
183 See above, p. 43.
184 Riickblick, 11.
185 Romans, 51.
186 See Dogma, 88; "Ziel der Geschichte," 354.
187 "Heilige Geschichte," 218-19.
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cate those features which relate directly to the notion of concursus specialissima. Suffice it
to say, Schlatter understands prayer to be "the most direct expression" of man's faith in,
and love for, God.188 Faith and love are the two postures in which man seeks God as the
acting and giving one from whom man receives everything he is and does. To put it in
terms of our subject: prayer is the place where the divine will is received in such a way that
man unites his own will with it and hence acts in accordance with God and his purposes.
Schlatter regards petitional prayer to be crucial in this connection.
Therefore, prayer is the climax of our life. The great thing in it is that in supplication a will is born in
us which aims at God's will, touches him, and offers itself to him as the basis on which God can
ground his work [Wirken] in us. Here the exchange of life between spirit and spirit stands on its high-
est level. 189
This "exchange" does not happen at the expense ofhuman personhood. Rather, as Schlatter
is keen to underline, through his supplication man grounds his will in God's will.
Faith is God's gift; so too is that prayer that proceeds from faith. Precisely through believing prayer
we overcome the arrogance that would gladly place itself above God. And humility becomes a possi-
bility, for we receive with thanks all good things from his hand, as we derive with supplication our ac-
tions from his will. As faith brings about deliverance from the self, prayer brings about repudiation of
our selfish will - not so that we will become will-less, but so that our will might be founded on God's
rule and reign. 190
The immediate connection of the aforementioned thoughts with Schlatter's notion of con-
cursus specialissima is most obvious when he elaborates that "believing prayer" results in a
cooperation [Mitwirkung] between God and man:
In conferring legitimacy on our wishes through supplication, what we request can be carried out and
fulfilled. We have God as an accomplice [Mitwirker] in what we do, once we have prepared ourselves
through prayer to be God's accomplice. He who must act faces the choice of either praying or offend-
ing God, and he chooses the latter by determining his conduct autonomously. Such conduct amounts
to a negation of God. Supplication is imperative for doing one's work as God's servant; every legiti-
mate action must be a fruit of prayer. 191
188 See Dogma, 204. Schlatter's section on prayer (Dogma, 203-12) is quoted according to Yarbrough's
translation "Prayer."
189 Griinde, 88.
190 Dogma, 206. See also Grunde, 88-93.
191 Dogma, 206.
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C. Human sinfulness and divine providence
57
So far we have left Schlatter's concept of human sinfulness more or less aside. This is
no longer possible for a couple of reasons. Schlatter takes seriously the idea that God ere-
ates and enables man as a personal self capable of free and self-determined action. This in-
eludes the possibility of human existence in antithesis to the divine purposes with human-
ity. As will become elear in due course, Schlatter is convinced that man has opted for this
possibility so that the creature is no longer neutral but under sin. If, as Schlatter puts it, that
which God has created "constitutes the determining canon" for God's providential action,
then the reality of human sinfulness must have repercussions on Schlatter's understanding
of God's action toward and relation to man. Thus, we shall now introduce some basic as-
peets of Schlatter's doctrine of sin and after that return to his concept of God's providence,
paying special attention to Schlatter's attempt to integrate the actuality of sin and the omni-
activity of God in the conservatio and gubernatio of the human creature. 192
i. Original sin (peccatum originale) and the concrete act of sin (peccatum actuale)
Schlatter defines original sin in the traditional sense as inherited sin (peccatum hae-
reditarium): "Because our communal life is brought about through procreation and inheri-
tance, the abnormality [Abnormitat] which we have in common is inherited.'?" As such,
original sin determines the single sinful act: "Even the most free acting-out-of-sin is the act
of the one who, already before his own decision, carried the condemnable within him-
192 Although Schlatter's concept of sin is one of the most heavily-discussed subjects of his theology, we
must restrain ourselves and focus on those aspects which serve our purposes here. The most comprehensive
studies of Schlatter's hamartiology can be found in Neuer, Zusammenhang, 172-95 and Rieger, Rechtferti-
gungslehre, 73-78, 118-32, 175-209,284-306.
193 Dogma, 254.
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self."194 Parallel to the unity of human being and work, original sin and the concrete act of
sin are indissolubly connected with each other. Referring to Mt 7:15-20 Schlatter states:
"From thorn bushes and thistles one does not pick grapes and figs; bad fruit: ergo bad
tree."'" Hence, in the same way as the concrete act, original sin stands under "the categori-
cal protest through which we reject that which ought not be (das Nichtseinsollende)." 196
ii. Sin and its total impact on man (peccatum totale)
Sin impacts human life in its totality, that is, there is no sphere which is not under the
influence of sin.!" Schlatter develops this idea on the basis of the mutuality of productivity
and receptivity, power and dependence. As we have outlined above, in relation to nature
and fellow man, man is ruler and servant at the same time. Yet sin collapses the balance
between rule and service: "He [sinful will] wants to rule without serving; to serve without
ruling; not serve God but serve his body, not serve people when he is called to serve, but
instead serving when he is called to freedom." 198 The consequence is the abnormality of the
different relations in which man is placed. At the heart of this is the disintegration of man's
relationship with God.
Schlatter sees man's relation to God as the "primordial seat of evil."!" The distortions
in all the other relationships are "only the reflex of the broken basic relation [des gebro-
chenen Grundverhaltnissesi to God."200 Schlatter describes sin as man's unwillingness to
194 Ibid., 254.
195 *Lehre von der Sunde, 7.
196 Dogma, 254. Cf. *Lehre von der Sunde, 7-8; "Sollen wir gegen unsere SUndekampfen," 84-88.
197 See Dogma, 21. In "Sollen wir gegen unsere SUnde kampfen," 84 Schlatter rejects any attempt to dis-
tinguish between sinful and healthy areas of human being and acting.
198 Dogma, 165.
199 Ibid., 164-65, 223-24.
200 *Lehre von der Sunde, 11.
PROBES INTO SCHLATTER'S CONCEPT OF DIVINE AGENCY 59
allow anybody above himself, the refusal to receive his being and life. Sin is rebellion
against the orders, duties and laws which God has given to man by ontologically relating
the human person to nature, fellow man and Creator. Instead, man wants to be Creator
himself, wants to rule without obeying, and thus "the 'I' loses the 'thou' - the divine 'Thou'
that stands above him, and the human 'thou' that is beside him.'?" Such a reversal of the
Creator-creature relationship is, as Schlatter shows, directly observable in the religions:
man creates God in his image.i" As such, sin is peccatum contra Deum, "the assassination
of God which denies his fatherly and royal right on US."203 Consequently, the true relation-
ship to God, the actualisation of human God-relatedness, is made impossible. Sin means
separateness from God.
In a similar way, sin impacts man's relation to himself, nature and neighbour. Schlatter
operates with the biblical terms of "flesh" and "world" to express the universal impact of
evil.i" "Flesh" means that the bodily instincts and cravings overwhelm man as corporeal
being and turn him into a "permanent bubbling stream of desires. ,,205 Schlatter, in this con-
text, speaks of the "omnipotence" and the "tyranny" of the flesh.?" Gratifying the selfish
desires of the flesh, man lives as homo incurvatus in se, always bent back upon himself?"
Man perverts his corporeality into a means to its own ends. Similarly, man in his egoism
carries sin into the community - but is also inevitably led to sin because of his ontological
201 "Natur, Sunde und Gnade," 56.
202 See "Kreuz Jesu," 7-14 where Schlatter provides a thorough examination of how man puts God in the
service of his egoism and self-centredness when he creates his own idols. Cf. Dogma, 200-03, 220-22, 252;
*Wesen und Quellen, 132; Briefe, 36 ("egoistic religiosity"); "Natur, SUnde und Gnade," 59 ("Therefore, the
religion brought forth by nature is sinful."); "Gott der Patriarchen," 91 ("A religion constructed by us is god-
lessness."). According to Schlatter, the inversion of the ruler-servant relation in man is made complete in his
self-abasement under the created idols. See Romans, 40-41.
203 *Lehre von der Sunde, 11.
204 See e.g. Dogma, 251-53; "Natur, SUnde und Gnade," 58; Griinde, 54.
205 "Natur, Sunde und Gnade," 58.
206 See Dogma, 252.
207 See Romans, 155.
PROBES INTO SCHLATTER'S CONCEPT OF DIVINE AGENCY 60
relation to the other. For Schlatter, this inevitability explains what the term "world" means.
"We cannot transcend the common human type but remain that to which the community
makes us, even in the most powerful strain of our Will."208 What follows is that man's rela-
tion to nature and neighbour is one of evil exploitation and sinful subordination. Thus,
man's being, acting, and the circumstances under which he lives are pervaded by sin.
iii. Sin and the sovereignty and faithfulness of God
Notwithstanding the total impact of sin upon man, in Schlatter the peccatum totale
does not mean that "everything in us and every action of ours [is] sin.'?" In his unpub-
lished commentary on the Bethel Confession of 1933, he goes so far as to "reject the her-
esy that every thought and every act of man is sin" (emphasis A. L.).21O Rather, with respect
to both human being and action, Schlatter argues for a "mixed condition" of man in which
evil and good are together."! Schlatter presents different arguments in support ofhis view.
a) The exegetical argument
He repeatedly points to the New Testament, especially to Jesus and Paul, as the exe-
getical foundation of his understanding: "Jesus did not see only evil in man but also good,
208 Dogma, 253.
209 Dogma, 224.
210 *Commentary on the Bethel Confession, IV, p. 11 second correction.
211 See Dogma, 227, 263-65. Neuer brings to the surface that Schlatter's view on the subject gradually de-
veloped. In his earlier essays *Lehre von der Sunde and "Sollen wir gegen unsere Sunde kampfen" (1888)
Schlatter still outlines that man in his entire being and in all his actions is evil. In his later writings Schlatter
changes his view. See Neuer, Zusammenhang, 179-80. Rieger's distinction between the relation ofjudgement
(Urteilsrelation) and the relation of origin (Entstehungsrelation) is indeed helpful here. With regard to the
origin of sin (Entstehungsrelation) Schlatter argues for a mutual relation between the sinful act and the sinful
being of man. Yet, with regard to the passing of a judgement on sin (Urteilsrelation) Schlatter induces the to-
tus peccator from the sinful act but does not allow for deducing the sinfulness of every act from the totus
peccator. See Rieger, Rechtfertigungslehre, 202.
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and Paul tells us that we are able to accomplish works of the law."212 This is in accordance
with the observation of estimable "values," "various nuances of piety," and "morality" in
people outside the Christian faith.?" Fully agreeing with the intention of Augustinianism to
remove any excuse for evil, Schlatter articulates the difference between Augustinianism
and the New Testament as follows: "Augustinianism denies that any good can be found in
man. Paul denies that our good excuses our evil so that we can justify ourselves through
the fact that what we have done is not exclusively evil. "214
b) The dogmatic argument
Still weightier than his exegetical argument, however, is Schlatter's dogmatic argu-
ment. The theological foundation for the notion of a "mixed condition" of man lies in God
himself, namely in the sovereignty and faithfulness of the Creator toward his creature:
"The possibility that we again and again find in ourselves the good together with our con-
demnable actions and conditions, originates from the fact that in our sinful behaviour we
do not cease to be God's work and to live in his presence. "215 God, in his otherness and sov-
ereignty, remains faithful to that which he has created. Even in the face of human sin, God
actively sustains, rules and enables the human creature to be and to act. The sinner cannot
"remove the two facts which gave him existence: first, that he was a creature of God; sec-
212 Dogma, 226. Cf. ibid., 195-96,578,595-96; History ofthe Christ, 247; Theology ofthe Apostles, 207;
"Idealismus oder Theologie," 363-65; *Lehre von der Sunde, 8-9; "Moral oder Evangelium," 93-94, 106-07.
Some of the passages to which Schlatter calls attention are: Mt 5:8; 7:11,18; 19:17-19; 25:31-46; Lk 10:25-
37; 16:1-9; 18:1-6; Ro 2:14.
213 Ethik, 204-05, 244-45. Schlatter's idea of a mixed condition finds its fullest expression in his exposi-
tion ofLk 16:1-9 and 18:1-6: "Even in the midst of the immediately sinful act, Jesus sees the divine moment
that is contained in it" (*Lehre von der Sunde, 8).
714 D ')26
- ogma, _ .
215 Ibid., 226. Cf. ibid., 263; Ethik, 204-05, 244-45.
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ond, that he was a member of his nation and thus bound to the law.'?" Schlatter rejects "the
heresy that God has betrayed or lost his will of creation [Schopjungswillen]." Likewise, sin
does not destroy the "orders of creation" [Schopjungsordnungen].217
The power of the corrupt will does not reach so far as to eradicate our relation to God and completely
destroy his work in us. Therefore, - through the organisation of our spirit and through our history -
the motives are continuously given to us which make good will possible for us. This happens not only
in the way that they [the motives] remain without effect and merely aggravate our fault [Verschulden]
but that we can appropriate them and, in the action, complete them.i"
The sinner remains embedded in nature and community and thus lives under God's gov-
ernment and guidance. "Because man does not fall out ofnature he keeps his part in the di-
vine endowment and guidance which nature mediates to him in the forming [Bildung] of
his will and thinking. "219 On these grounds Schlatter affirms that human action generates
"mixed results."
Our thinking neither produces only error nor only truth, but in the midst of our erring we also have
true thoughts. Likewise, our volition is neither only malevolence nor only goodness but we have in the
midst of our sinfulness also the good [Gutes]. Both states of affairs have the same reason, namely that
we neither live in loneliness nor limited to ourselves, but are embraced by God's government.P"
It is worth mentioning in passing that Schlatter explicates the mediation of God's
providential action in terms of christological mediation. What stands behind the mediation
of the divine gifts and guidance through nature is "the forgiveness and endowment that
streams into humankind through Christ, through whom everything exists.'?" All of the as-
pects just outlined appear in Schlatter's account of a private session in which one of his
students raises the question. "Why then do you not say that you are evil in everything that
you think, will, and do?" Schlatter answers:
216 KennenwirJesus?,2l5.
217 See *Commentary on the Bethel Confession, IV, p. 7 second correction, IV, p. 10 second correction.
Schlatter articulates these ideas in direct opposition to the teaching of the early Dialectical Theology.
218 Dogma, 226.
219 *Commentary on the Bethel Confession, IV, p. 11 second correction.
220 Dogma, 227.
zn *Commentary on the Bethel Confession, IV, p. 11 second correction. Cf. Neuer, Zusammenhang, 181.
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The reason I do not say this is because I would generate a completely wrong picture of myself if I only
looked at myself - at me separated from God. That was the fallacy of the old doctrine of repentance: it
enclosed the 'I' in itself and deprived it of its life-connection [Lebenszusammenhang] with God. In this
way I too would, of course, only see nonsense, evil and misery in me. However, I cannot and I must
not imagine that I live remote from nature - that is remote from the divine work. I live through nature.
I must also not imagine that I live remote from the power ofthe Christ - that is remote from the divine
grace. In order to achieve repentance the old doctrine placed man only before the commanding God.
Yet we live not only in the commanding, but in the creating and giving God. In this an infinite amount
of what we must not call 'sin' is given to us. Because you think, will and act with what is given to you
by God, you are permitted to say about your thoughts that they are true, about your willing that it is
right, and about your works that they are willed by God. Keep in mind that you work with what you
have received, then you are finally and effectively protected from falling back into the old piety. Now
you no longer ground your participation in God upon your achievements, and now even sinning re-
gains its full and heavy seriousness to you. You sin when you pervert that which you have received
(emphasis A. L.).222
In sum: for Schlatter to say that human being and action are nothing but sin would "turn
man's apostasy vis-a-vis God into God's apostasy vis-a-vis man.'?" God in his faithfulness
is the active and exclusive foundation of the human "capacity for the good." As Schlatter
emphatically points out: "[T]he claim that we can think or do good without God, restricted
to ourselves, is not only absurd but also, in itself, sin."224
c) Conclusion: man is simul creatus et peccator
Based on the material just outlined Schlatter concludes that sin is not an ontological
constituent of the human being. "[T]he individual is under sin. This statement becomes dis-
torted if it is replaced by the assertion that sin is human existence. This latter statement
renders the individual synonymous with sin; Paul, however, distinguished between the
two. ,,225 At this point Schlatter introduces a christological argument to the discussion. If sin
and humanity were synonyms, the incarnation of God's Son would have made him a sin-
222 Sprechstunde, 56-57.
223 *Commentary on the Bethel Confession, IV, p. 11 second correction.
224 Dogma, 577. Here Schlatter points out that he attempts to move beyond the antithesis of Augustinian-
ism and Pelagianism. Cf. Schlatter's exposition ofRo 2:14-15 in Romans, 59-60. The reverse side of the idea
of God as the enabling ground of doing and being good is that any attempt to establish morality without God
results in a defacto atheism, a "negative theology" (see "Moral oder Evangelium," 96-97).
225 Romans, 84.
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nero "The Christ as human person would be impossible if evil constituted an essential mo-
ment of human life. "226 Thus Schlatter takes the fact that Christ assumed the full and con-
crete reality of a human being, yet lived without sin, as an underpinning for the negation of
sin as ontological constituent of the human being. In Schlatter's theology man is, and re-
mains, above all, God's creature - man is simul creatus et peccatorF The ontological con-
tinuity of the human creature implied in this idea is, as we have seen Schlatter emphasis-
ing, not established through the actuation of some creaturely capacities inherent in man,
but exclusively grounded in God's providential action toward man. The relation in which
even the sinner remains God's creature is the result of God's otherness in which he is able
to act faithfully toward his creature and his own original purposes with creation.
iv. The actuality of sin in relation to the omni-activity of God
Schlatter's conception of the actuality of human sinfulness poses a set of serious ques-
tions to his notion of God's providence. At the heart ofthe matter lies the necessity to relate
the sinner and his actions to God's activity since, according to Schlatter, all human being
and action is constituted and enabled through the divine omni-activity. Of special signifi-
cance in this connection is the relation between God's gubernatio and man's sinful rebel-
lion against God and his purposes. Yet, the attempt to relate God's omni-activity and hu-
man sinfulness must be safeguarded against the idea that God is the originator of evil or sin
(auctor mali). The following sections make clear that Schlatter does not leave these issues
unreflected.
226 *Christologie, IV.
227 See Dogma, 263. Schlatter's notion of a mixed condition belongs strictly to the context of simul crea-
tus et peccator and must not be intermingled with the notion of simul iustus et peccator. Otherwise the pic-
ture of Schlatter's doctrine of sin becomes seriously distorted. This is the case in Kindt's exposition of Schlat-
ter's hamartiology (see Gedanke der Einheit, 53-55, 133-34). Rieger's critique pinpoints the questionable as-
pects of Kindt's interpretation in all desirable clarity (see Rieger, Rechtfertigungslehre, 203-04).
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a) Man as the subject of sinful actions
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According to Schlatter, the origin of evil and sin is not in man but outside of himself,
in Satan, whom Schlatter views as a fallen angel and leader of a kingdom of evil spirits.?"
The causation of human sin through Satan stands in line with the universal power of what
Schlatter outlines as "flesh" and "world" although the evil power of Satan generates "new
and original drives to sin" which transcend the causation mediated through nature and his-
tory.?" Important for us is Schlatter's view that man - in his sinful acting - unites his will
with the devil's will and acts according to the devil's law.?" On this basis Schlatter draws a
clear line of demarcation: "Through the existence of the sinful will the whole of human
history is pervaded by events which we must not derive from the divine creating but as-
cribe to our own causal power" (emphasis A. L.).231 Thus, Schlatter obviates the idea that
God is the creator or author of evil and sin. "[O]ur life as it is determined by our evil will is
known by God, but not made by him ..."232
b) The dependence of the sinner upon God concerning the arising of sinful action
The rigid distinction between man, as the subject of sinful actions, and God does not
undermine the supremacy of God in Schlatter. This supremacy reveals itself in the arising
[Entstehen] of sin in a twofold way:
228 For the following see Dogma, 258-62; Neuer, Zusammenhang, 188-89.
229 Dogma, 262.
230 See ibid., 261.
231 Ibid., 262; cf. ibid., 163: "Only the active self-determination of the selfbrings forth evil ..."
232 Ibid., 337.
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First, the causal freedom in which the sinner acts against God is given to him by
God.233 "Even in his rebellion against God man is not separated from the power of God
which rules him. Even his power to resist from God ..."234 We see that Schlatter picks up
one of the central themes of his notion of imago Dei. That man is a personal agent capable
of free and self-determined action must not be conceived of as a limitation of God's su-
premacy but precisely as the result of his sovereign creating and ruling. "We do not take
our freedom, but it is given to us; we do not have it without or against God, but through
him. ,,235 The authenticity of the divine gift of freedom lies, as Schlatter argues, in the fact
that God does not compel man to a life of faith in, and love for, God. God's self-
determination to relate to man in such a way as to be appropriate to the particular identity
ofthe human person is most clearly displayed when God - tempting man - forces the same
to live his life in personal otherness vis-a-vis Godself. One could speak of a pedagogical
moment in Schlatter's notion of divine action (providentia as paidagogia Dei):
[T]he placement into temptation is grace. It requires of me the own will and calls me to the appropria-
tion of the received by means of own action, to the completion of receptivity by means of own activ-
ity. This compulsion to have an individual life - reason that not only sees but also judges; will that not
only desires but also chooses; faith that is my own because in the face of negation it adheres to that
which it affirms; love which is obedience because it recognises the difference between my will and
God's will and unites the individual will with God's will, [this compulsion] is neither hardship nor
heaviness but the revelation of the love that gives me life in order that I live it and grants me its gifts
in order that I have them.,,236
The freedom of man, which is not only created but actively demanded by God, is conse-
quently the necessary ground on which man is able to act in rebellion against God. In other





236 "Natur, Sunde und Gnade," 55-56; similarly in Dogma, 175: God approaches man through his divine
will and commandment. "Because obedience is required of us, our individual life is secured and any notion of
melting with God becomes impossible." Cf. ibid., 167: "The right to love cannot be ascribed to us without
granting us the possibility to hate. However, the possibility to hate is given to us in order that we extinguish it
through making love our will."
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When God's relation to the creature is personal, then it is through the highest gift that the highest trial
arises because the mightiest raising of the individual self happens precisely through the riches of the
divine giving. However, when the gaze of the one who is particularly gifted turns toward himself,
when his love bends back upon himself, a break emerges: the normal movement of life in which the
highly gifted one places himself - including the complete glory of his individual life - under God is
interrupted. Thus emerges an ascending movement without end, beyond God, against God, yet neces-
sarily the sinking, the placement into the impotence of the unfulfillable striving, and the fall in its dev-
astating horribleness will correlate to the original height at which the struggle with God had been
dared?37
The dependence of the sinner upon God presents itself as the inverted mirror image of
the imago Dei. Schlatter states: "Is the sinner God's creature, God's witness, God's image?
Indeed, he is the latter exactly for reason of being the former. ,,238 This means that the image
of God in man is not lost. Just the opposite - man would not be able to be a sinner without
being the image of God, because sin is the volitional perversion of God's image.?" How-
ever, the positive realisation of the God-likeness in which man was created has become
impossible through sin.
Second, God's supremacy is revealed in that human sinfulness can only actuate itself
on that which God has given to man.?" In order to understand this fully we need to recall
that Schlatter does not regard sin as an ontological constituent of the human being. The
sinner remains primarily God's creature, whereas sin is only the second, the volitional
abuse of God's creation. "Evil is not the first, but emerges from the good, the misuse and
corruption of which it is. "241 As Schlatter vividly puts it, sin is "a metastasis," a "parasite ..
. that owes its existence to the pure, God-formed constitution of our being.'?" Hence, the
237 Dogma, 259-60. The way in which P. Brunner grounds human freedom in God's sovereign self-
determination to be the God for us and links this freedom with the possibility of human sin (see especially
"Die Freiheit des Menschen," 113-16) is similar to Schlatter's thought.
238 "Schopfung und Offenbarung, 10.
239 Helmut Burkhardt illustrates this approach when he calls sin the "negative sign in front of the brackets:
- (1+1)= -2" iEinjuhrung in die Ethik, 75).
240 See Dogma, 262.
241 "Selbstdarstellungen," 167; See also Dogma, 231; "Natur, SUndeund Gnade," 51-53; Wir Christen und
die Juden, 13.
242 *Lehre von der Sunde, 9. Cf. "Idealismus oder Theologie," 362-63.
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dependence of the sinner upon God does not only concern the power to sin but extends to
the concrete object, that is, God's good creation, as the antecedent condition for a sinful ac-
tion. "It is, indeed, the case that everybody sins because everybody participates in God's
goodness. Not to sin would only be possible for the one who had received nothing. "243
c) The dependence of the sinner upon God concerning the result of sinful action
God's supremacy is also revealed in the result of man's sinful action in "that the choice
we have made is accommodated by his reign [von seiner Regierung aufgenommen] and af-
firmed in its outcome. ,,244 Again, Schlatter draws on a central idea of his notion of divine
providence, namely that God governs and steers the world in such a way that it is open to
human actions and their results. This divine activity does not cease in the case of a sinful
human act. The reason for this lies, according to Schlatter, in the fact "that God acts very
seriously with us human beings.'?" God takes the human person seriously, even when the
latter acts against God and his purposes. "Divine action and human will are inseparably in-
tertwined in that which transpires. From the divine activity originates the individual's au-
thority that is not taken from him, but rather is confirmed, even if he draws his will from
his own selfish folly."?" Hence, Schlatter argues "that the fire which sin ignites in man is
not at all extinguished at once - that God does not come running in order to crush nasty
seeds and neutralise them but lets them sprout and ripen to their bitter fruit. ,,247
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d) God's reaction to man's sinful action
69
In his attempt to relate God's omni-activity and human sin, yet without making God
the originator of sin, Schlatter adopts the primary intention of the Lutheran-orthodox idea
of divine permissio?" However, permissio must not be reduced to the passivity in which
God restrains himself from making a sinful act impossible and from arbitrarily cancelling
its results. Rather, God is actively involved with regard to the arising and the result of sin.
Schlatter grounds this divine activity in God's self-determination to take man, whom he has
created as personal agent, seriously - in his good as well as his sinful actions. These
thoughts come to a culminating point in Schlatter's concept of the divine wrath, judgement
and punishment.i"
That God takes the sinful actions of man seriously can, according to Schlatter, be seen
in his reaction to sin. "[G]od sets the power of his wrath against us" and "opposes all god-
lessness and unrighteousness through the inexorable power of his wrath. "250 In Schlatter,
God's wrath is free of arbitrariness because it is the execution of the divine justice and,
therefore, ethically qualified.
When we consider our own share in our relation to God through which our will participates in it, then
the divine justice divides itself in two opposite actions because our will executes an opposite action.
The evil will deserves resistance; in that God negates us, because we will evil, he is righteous. The
good will deserves the affmnation; in that God adds to our good will his good will, he is righteous.
Thus, righteousness is the generic term for wrath and goodness. It [righteousness] gives us the good as
reward and the evil as sentence.f"
In this context, Schlatter understands the divine goodness and grace as God's giving and
the divine wrath as God's taking.
248 See Schmid, Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche, 122-23; Ratschow, Lutherische
Dogmatik, 222-23; Bernhardt, Handeln Gottes, 139-40.
249 The biblical realism on the basis of which Schlatter develops his concept of God's wrath stands in di-
rect antithesis to the theological attempts of his own time - especially that of A. Ritschl and his school - to
remove the idea of God's wrath. God's history with Israel and the cross of Jesus serve Schlatter as examples
in this context. See e.g. Dogma, 140-42,570-71; Neuer, AdolfSchlatter: ein Leben, 231-32.
250 Griinde, 81; similarly in Dogma, 141-42; Romans, 28; "Pforte zum Romerbrief," 57-58.
251 Dogma, 182; cf. Romans, 30.
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If God denies us his gifts, nothing in us remains the way it used to be. We lose what we have. If God
does not illuminate, we become dark - for it is in his light that we see. If God does not enliven us, we
die - for we live through him. The deprivation of the divine giving has very specific and positive con-
sequences for us. That these consequences are foreseen, willed and effected [gewirkt] by God is ex-
pressed in the term 'wrath.'252
Schlatter underlines that the divine giving and taking are not to be co-ordinated on the
same level. God's acts of wrath do not reveal him in the same way as his acts ofgrace
because only the giving is a primary, primordial act which does not need any precondition. The tak-
ing, however, presupposes a giving through which the life came into being (which the wrath destroys)
- through which the goods were granted to us in the deprivation of which consists our suffering. The
love of God is the free and complete cause, his own act in which he reveals himself. The wrath, how-
ever, has only space in the already-existing relationship with the creature. It requires a reason outside
of God, a motive tied to what the creature does. God's grace is action, God's anger is reaction. There-
fore, a causal relation consists between both in that the wrath can only emerge where the grace has
preceded. Desecrated grace causes wrath. The latter is the protection of the divine love and gift against
misuse and defilement.F"
God's wrath is the result of man's sinful desecration of the divine grace and love. "For
its [God's love] protection and preservation, God's will and action take their direction a-
gainst us."254 The deprivation of the divine giving is God's punishment, his "counteraction
against evil" through which he inflicts suffering, pain, and ultimately, death upon man.f"
However, the divine punishment not only strikes man in his relation to nature and the hu-
man community, so to speak from outside, but also in his inner life.
The divine punishment consists in that the evil will is thwarted [vereitelt] and turned into an unful-
fillable, always failing addiction that destroys us. This purpose already serves its first consequence,
the guilty conscience. For in the compulsion to despise ourselves, we already suffer the punishment.
Likewise, the consistency of the evil desire, which emerges out of the wrong choice, is a punishment.
Our evil will is confirmed so that we now must have it as a suffering. The godlessness becomes inca-
pacity for piety, the selfishness, incapacity for love, the sensual drive a vice.256
This is the point in Schlatter's concept at which the relation between God's omm-
activity and human sin is most immediate and strong. "God's punitive action toward hu-
252 "Pforte zum Romerbrief," 61.
253 Dogma, 144; see also "Der Herr hat gegeben," 114; "Pforte zum Romerbrief," 66.
?54
- Dogma, 197-98.
255 Ibid., 139-40,238-41; 246-51; Romans, 32-33.
256 Dogma, 239. The German term vereitelt is interesting here because it has a twofold meaning. It means
that something is made impossible. A plan is thwarted, actions are prevented, and hopes are shattered. At the
same time the term means that something is rendered vain and idle. The human will is bent back upon itself.
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mankind is effected by subjecting it to powers that force it to sin.'?" The divine wrath
"brings about sin and destroys fellowship.v" In Schlatter's view, "the connection between
sin and God's wrath does not in the least deny that man acts in this through his own know-
ing and willing." Yet, the terrible and trembling dimension of sin is unveiled, namely
that it reaches far beyond the will of man and in no way stands still at that which man wills. It founds
itself in him with coercive, natural power. This is the point where a divine activity is co-operative in
the vice; for here laws are active which stand above our will and become effective independently of us
- through which they show themselves as foundations and orders of God.259
e) Concluding observations on God's reign in the face of human sin
In Schlatter the origin of evil and sin is not in God but in Satan and man, for which
reason history is full of sinful actions which must not be ascribed to God but to man.
Schlatter's perception of the actuality of sin prevents him from developing an idealistic
concept of history. History carries in itself the motive for fear "for the worst, which is in
man, mania [Wahn] and hatred, rolls with imperishable force through the generations. The
idea of regress is as well-grounded as the idea of progress. "260 History is, in Schlatter, not
necessarily Heilsgeschichte but also Unheilsgeschichte. In his reflections on the relation of
God's eternal will to human action and will Schlatter states:
We can only gain our statements about the divine will from the divine work and the latter brings forth
history with its deep seriousness in which good and evil fight each other and the saving action with-
stands the ruinous action. And this divine work, which happens in history, reveals to us what the eter-
nal will of God is.261
We have elaborated that Schlatter grounds the actuality and efficaciousness of sin in the
divine omni-activity in which God creates and enables man to live as personal agent vis-a-
257 Romans, 42.
258 Ibid., 32-33.
259 "Pforte zum Romerbrief," 59; similarly in Griinde, 81-82.
260 Dogma, 85.
261 Ibid., 265. For history as the place of God's salvific action [Heilshandeln] see also Neuer, "Verstandnis
von Geschichte," 47.
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vis Godself. Schlatter draws out these thoughts into his eschatology and explicates the se-
riousness of the history between God and man as the double outcome of the same. He ar-
gues
that - even in the fmal granting of the divine grace - man stands as the carrier ofa personal life before
God so that that, which he created with his own will, constitutes even for his eternal relationship to
God the ground and possesses imperishable importance. Through this the elemental knowledge is
once more confirmed ... that God's creating invested us with a true life peculiar to us rein echtes, uns
eignendes Leben] and granted us power over our will and that the norms, which are set for us, have
the unbreakable firmness of the divine wil1.262
However, Schlatter rejects "a dualistic view of history in which the complete relation
of all events to God is denied.v'" God's supremacy and sovereignty remain unimpaired -
not only with regard to the possibility and result of sin - but also in God's reaction to, and
dealing with, man's sinful actions. Schlatter's argumentation rests upon his conviction that
the power of Satan and sin must not be located on the same level with the power of God. 264
Applied to man, Schlatter formulates this aspect as follows:
The individual has the authority to will and to act, yet he is not an autocrat and is not authorized to set
his will in opposition to God's will and to produce works that contradict the divine work. Because he
is the one who produces works, his action reaches its ultimate goal by means of the divine judg-
ment.265
God will - in faithfulness to man and to himself - reach his good purpose with creation
through his power, his will, his righteousness, and, ultimately, his 10ve.266 Schlatter speci-
262 Dogma, 550-51. An adequate interpretation of Schlatter's idea that God - in his creative and providen-
tial omni-activity - founds and enables history cannot get around the aforementioned affirmations of Schlat-
ter. They make clear what shall concern us again at a later point, namely that, in Schlatter, the notion of
God's omni-activity does not lead to a monistic concept of divine action for which reason Schlatter does not
confuse history with Heilsgeschichte. When Steck, in his study Idee der Heilsgeschichte, accuses Schlatter's
"naive" idea of history of a "forceful monism" and of an "axiomatically presupposed harmony between the
work of the divine Spirit and the course of history" (pp. 38-42), then our investigation gives us all reason to
return this critique in its original harshness. Steck's undifferentiated study fails to do justice to Schlatter's
concept.
263 Dogma, 260.
264 See ibid., 260-61; Johannes, 5-6.
265 Romans, 51.
766
- See Dogma, 147.
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fies this divine activity in a way that reminds us of the Lutheran-orthodox concepts of im-
peditio, directio and determinatio?"
God counteracts the effects of sin (impeditio). "It is certain that God's government
penetrates all events for which reason the generation of a complete un-nature [Unnatur] is
impossible for any creaturely will. ... This, however, is the case with every diabolic activ-
ity, for it is a vain battle against the Almighty. "268 The idea that "no will directed against
God can reach its goal'?" stands, as we were able to show, behind Schlatter's concept of
man as simul creatus et peccator: "The power of the corrupt will does not reach so far as to
eradicate our relation to God and completely destroy his work in us."270
God is able to steer and direct the evil actions of man in such a way that they serve His
purposes (directio). The effects of sin "remain embraced" and "are accommodated by the
divine governance. "271 This applies also to the power of Satan. It is subjected to God and
serves him in the execution of his righteousness and the revelation of his wrath."? It is pre-
cisely in the surrender of man to the power of Satan that God's directio is revealed as
bringing about consequences which transcend the will and the intention of the sinful agent.
Schlatter refutes the idea which reduces God's righteous government "to its recompensing
function" and limits it "to the aspect of completing our acting in its consequences. "273 A
key to interpreting or calculating God's reign is not given to man: "God's independence
remains unimpaired and crosses all our calculations. This is true concerning the greatness
267 See Ratschow, Lutherische Dogmatik, 223-24.
268 Dogma, 260.
269 Ibid., 166.
270 Ibid., 226; see above, p. 62 n. 218.
271 See ibid., 262, Ethik, 108.
272 See Dogma, 260-61.
273 See ibid., 182-85.
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of his giving and his forbearance as well as the seriousness in which he effects judge-
ment.'?"
God determines boundaries through which human sin is limited in its power and range
(determinatio). Schlatter understands this as a divine activity through which "the corrup-
tion arising from evil is kept away from the individual. "275 In this connection Schlatter talks
about God's foreknowledge and predestination:
The divine thinking orders the course of the world [Weltprozess] in total as well as the life-history of
the individual according to a measure which he determines for them so that their results are yet re-
tarded. This happens to our limitation as a sign that we are ruled. In a roundabout way, it happens to
us as grace, as a sign that redemption and completion are yet kept open to us.276
In Schlatter, teleological governing and steering (gubernatio) in the face of human sin-
fulness is ultimately grounded in God's creative power. "Above the causal chain of things
in the worldly realm stands the one for whom everything is possible, the one whom no co-
ercion of the situation binds, no power of man hinders, the one who always remains the
free one over against the world, the God who does miracles. ,,277 In due course we shall see
how Schlatter specifies God's creative power as the power of grace and love. For now it
suffices to note that Schlatter regards God's creative activity as the sole ground on which
the divine purposes with this world and humankind come to completion. For God does not
merely react against sin but finally overcomes it through his creative grace and love. In the
sovereign, free and spontaneous creativity of his grace, God grants man a new beginning.278
The utmost actuation and revelation of this divine creativity has taken place in God's econ-
omy of salvation the culminating point of which is the cross of Jesus Christ. It stands as a




277 Kennen wir Jesus?, 390.
278 See e.g. "Vergebung und Rechtfertigung," 30.
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of recompense. "Here, [in Christ's word and work] the creative righteousness of God,
which does not consist in the recompense of our goodness or evil, but which orders God's
relation to us according to his good will, becomes effective.'?" It is therefore only conse-
quent when Schlatter speaks of justification and forgiveness as the revelation of God's all-
powerful and creative grace, as God's masterpiece, and the triumph of his grace.?" It is to
this saving economy that we now turn.
3. God - the Saviour of Humanity
A. Divine action toward man: the cross as Jesus' regal act and the reality of salvation
Central to Schlatter's notion of God's work of salvation is the idea of reconciliation. It
is Jesus, the Christ of God, who reconciles God and humankind through his death on the
cross:
The regal act of Jesus was his cross. Through this proof of his reign he removes all human theories
and postulates, destroys all false images of God, fights everything that man calls religion, and, as the
sick condition of human religions requires it, creates a new God-consciousness, one which is truth.
Through this he works man's reconciliation with God which cannot come about as long as man con-
ceals the true God from himself through a distorted image of God.281
God's reconciling work in Christ has a twofold thrust: it consists in the extinction and
forgiveness of sin and in the justification ofthe sinner. "What has happened is not only the
unveiling and removal of what separates us from God but also the granting of his commun-
ion with us, the founding of the new covenant.F" The cross of Jesus is the "elimination of
all false religiosity" but at the same time "the affirmation and completion [of] everything
279 Dogma, 437; see also "Das Kreuz Jesu," 11-13.
280 See e.g. "Wunder der Bibel," 77; "Vergebung der Sunden," 18, 20; "Zwei Scharen von Hoffenden,"
317; Andachten, 20; Kennen wir Jesus?, 41.
281 Dogma, 290. For more details on how exactly the cross reveals the true God and destroys man's false
god's see ibid., 295-96; "Kreuz Jesu," 7-14.
282 Dogma, 295.
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that leads us to the remembrance of God."283 To put it differently, Schlatter rejects the view
that "the Christ is only therefore indispensable because we are sinners." The evil is that
which, indeed, "places us in need of the Christ," and the sinfulness of man is that which
"determined the course of Jesus' work," yet, "again the negative aspect emerges only out of
the positive one. The need that arises from sin has, above itself, the need that arises from
our positive destiny [Bestimmung] - from the fact that we should become a community.Y"
Schlatter attempts to hold both aspects together. Because the cross reveals "God's holiness
in which his power and love, his judgement and grace are united ... it uniformly and si-
multaneously grants us faith and penitence. "285 Hence Christ's reconciling work moves be-
yond restoration toward completion. Schlatter writes:
That Christ does not merely restore man's former glory but brings it to completion is revealed with re-
gard to reconciliation, in that it does not merely demonstrate already-existing love but represents a
new act oflove, which is at the same time more profound and more lofty than anything God has done
up to this point. Reconciliation overcomes the broken communion between God and sinners by being
283 Ibid., 295. The expression "everything that leads us to the remembrance of God" refers to what we
have outlined above as human God-relatedness.
284 Ibid., 81. Cf. Wir Christen und die Juden, 13. In a similar way, Gunton distinguishes between "the sin
of the creature" as "the formal or immediate cause" and "the eternal will of God for fellowship with the crea-
ture" as "the first cause" of the incarnation of the Son (Christ and Creation, 96; see also "Christology: Two
Dogmas Revisited," 155).
The sentences quoted here underline the correlation between Schlatter's concept of the cross and his con-
cept of sin. He counsels caution not to let the concept of sin dominate theology. This would lead to a dis-
torted understanding of nature, God, and the work of Jesus: "When creation disappeared behind the fall, was
there still any positive relation to nature? When God's revelation consisted in sending the saviour of sinners
[Siinderheilandj, did not the picture of God remain poor? When Jesus' work consisted merely in the removal
of guilt, was he still the Lord of the church, the Creator of the community united in him?" ("Selbstdarstellun-
gen," 167; see also "Unsere kirchliche Arbeit," 269).
It is in this context that Schlatter expresses his reservations about Anselm's theory of the cross. Schlatter
calls it rationalism to start with an attribute of God's nature and deduce the meaning of the cross from there.
This leads to the construction of a "necessity that even he [God] himself must obey," to a "hypostisation of
categories the web of which is to inescapably enclose even God." The danger is to lose God as the active sub-
ject of reconciliation (see Dogma, 297, 303-05; Jesu Gottheit, 39; *Christologie, 30, 33). Yet, Schlatter also
attacks the opposite tendencies of his contemporary theology, especially the Ritschl-school, which describes
the cross exclusively as an act toward man and reduces it to anthropology. Schlatter argues to hold the theo-
centric and anthropocentric aspect of Jesus' death together. Christ acted as priest toward God and toward man
(see Dienst, 79-82). For a deeper investigation of these ideas in Schlatter see Rieger, Rechtfertigungslehre,
307-26.
285 Dogma, 296.
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more powerful in effect and richer in gift than what had been forfeited and destroyed through man's
enmity (emphasis A. L.).286
Schlatter emphasises the single, unique and historical dimension of the cross by outlining
that Jesus has worked not only the possibility of reconciliation, but its reality,.
The one by whom God justifies and reconciles is the Christ; both acts together constitute uniformly
the substance of his messianic calling. They are completed in Christ, so that our part is not to effect
but to receive them. They therefore possess a universal scope and are given to the world, because they
reach as far as Christ's rule extends.F"
This quote indicates that Schlatter distinguishes between the reality and the effectiveness
of salvation rather than between the possibility and the realisation of salvation.i"
B. The appropriation of salvation through faith in Christ
Schlatter's emphasis on the reality of salvation, on the universal scope of Christ's
work, does not cause him to view the personal appropriation of salvation as superfluous.
The reality of salvation becomes effective in man through faith in Christ. Schlatter links
the different aspects when he continues the quotation above as follows:
But since they [justification and reconciliation] do not become man's own as long as they remain tran-
scendent and unconscious, they are offered to him for his personal appropriation which, because we
are here confronted with a divine activity and gift, takes place through faith, and in particular faith in
Christ, because justification and reconciliation are linked for us with Christ, and faith places us in
communion with the Christ. 289
i. Faith as an anthropological category
In Schlatter, faith is not only a soteriological but also an anthropological category:
Faith is an affIrmative judgement about a representation which is distinguished from its logical ac-
knowledgement in that the faithful does not merely express the correctness of a representation but
executes its implantation into his life-act. Through faith we make a representation effective for us so
that it is valid for our thinking as well as for our acting.f'"
286 Theology ofthe Apostles, 246. See also *Christologie, fragments.
287 Theology ofthe Apostles, 246. Cf. Dogma, 297-99, 438.
288 The terms "reality of salvation" (Heilswirklichkeit) and "effectiveness of salvation" (Heilswirksamkeit)
are taken from Rieger, Rechtfertigungslehre, 327-30.
289 Theology ofthe Apostles, 246.
290 Dogma, 107. Cf. Griinde, 32.
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The distinctive feature of faith is a personal and relational one that consists in the exis-
tential affirmation, in an act of volitional devotion that takes place even if one's knowing
remains incomplete.?" "Faith requires a will, true faith requires a true will, and the rejec-
tion of faith comes about through a wrong will. ,,292 Yet, for Schlatter this does not mean
"that ignorance and the incapacity to know are essential characteristics of faith." Although
he gives primacy to volition, he elaborates that all three of the personal functions of man
participate interactively in the act of faith. Without exercising them "faith could come
about only through an arbitrary decision that would mean a violation of the intellect and
create a serious inner conflict. ,,293
Since man in all of his personal functions is primarily receptive, faith is a gift rather
than a human work. "In no authentic relationship of faith does faith come into being as our
own work. For the object that testifies itself to us as credible can never be produced by us .
. . Yet, not only the perception of the object but also its relationship to us, through which
the drive to trust is granted to us, exists prior to our volition. "294 Hence, what determines
faith is not the subject, but the object of faith. For this reason, Schlatter argues for different
degrees of faith. Faith in an object is always limited; whereas, faith in another person can
reach the degree of a "complete attachment that determines the whole self. "295
291 See Dogma, 108.
292 Ibid., 111.
293 Ibid., 108. In this context Schlatter elaborates the relation between knowing and faith and concludes:
"We have to know in order to believe and to believe in order to know" (ibid., 112,569 n. 77; cf. *Wesen und
Quellen, 60). For the same mutuality between faith and listening see "Glaube an die Bibel," 238.
294 Dogma, 111.
295 See ibid., 109-12.
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ii. Faith as a soteriological category
79
The distinct mark of Christian faith is, according to Schlatter, that it has its content and
point of reference in Christ. Jesus, in his person and work, addresses the human being in its
totality. In other words, in Jesus man encounters humanity in its fullness. Schlatter outlines
that every creaturely characteristic of man, from which the God-consciousness evolves, is
met in Christ. "The encounter with him awakes our God-consciousness. "296 When man is
exposed to the divine reality of salvation "a correspondence emerges between what Jesus
offers us and that which feeds ourselves with the remembrance of God. Through what we
see in him, that which we probably perceive only unclearly in ourselves is transfigured into
a clear knowledge. "297 The cross of Jesus confronts man with the reality of his sin and, at
the same time, with the reality of forgiveness and justification. Jesus, in proposing himself
to us as the Christ, reveals God's work of salvation, divine goodness and love. The person
and work of Jesus is, as Schlatter emphatically underlines, the one and only basis on which
man actively appropriates salvation.
When I am able to believe, I have found the one who in my inmost being gives me a present, the one
who gives me my will in that he makes his will my own will. When I believe in Jesus, he has unified
me with himself. When I believe in God, he has subordinated me to himself.... Everything faith is
worth and achieves is dependent upon the one in whom we believe. It [faith] does not have any pro-
ductive power in itself, but is worth exactly as much as the one in whom we believe. One can hear
many psychological statements about faith, that it does this and that, that it knows, that it justifies, etc.
All this is nonsense. Faith does nothing, rather the one in whom we believe does, and we as believers
do what the one in whom we believe WillS?98
The relation between the objective reality of salvation and its subjective appropriation
through faith is not a "nevertheless" but a "therefore." In this sense, Schlatter does not only
296 Ibid., 480.
297 Griinde, 67. Cf. Dogma, 278-79, 480-81. "Then, when the remembrance of Christ unites itself with the
God-consciousness, faith in him is there. It [faith] comes about through the fact that the certainty of divine
grace awakes in us through the knowledge of Jesus" (Dogma, 480).
298 *Vom Glauben, 1-2. We owe the references to this manuscript to Rieger, Rechtfertigungslehre, 255-
56. Cf. Schlatter's critical comment on Emil Brunner: "In Brunner's forceful and awakening work on 'the Me-
diator' I read once again one of these confused sentences which describe faith as an independently existing
entity to which a number of activities are ascribed" (Erlebtes, 73).
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speak of the "motive of faith" but of man's "authorisation to believe [Ermachtigung]," the
"enabling and obligation to believe [Befahigung und Verpflichtungtr?" The imperative to
believe is grounded in the indicative - the reality of salvation.
All three of the personal functions are involved in faith. Moreover, because of the
interrelatedness between man as personal being and nature, history and comm~ty, every-
thing that marks human being participates in the act of faith."? Man in his totality opens
himself up to Christ: "When we believe, the foothold [Stiitzpunkt] of our life is transferred
out of ourselves upwards into the giving God.... For faith is the affirmation ofthe divine
work shown to us, the reception of the Word spoken to us, the opening to the gift offered to
us, the affiliation with the Lord given to us."301 Yet, Schlatter regards faith in Christ primar-
ily as an act of that function in which the person is most free and active, namely volition.
He uses different terms to express this, e.g. "synthesis of will;" "choosing will;" "volitional
affirmation;" "decision," "choice.'?" On this basis, Rieger aptly summarises Schlatter's no-
tion of faith as "the conscious, volitional and personal connection [Anschluss] with Christ,
which is mediated through the Word. ,,303
Schlatter's notion of mediation plays an important role in this context. As we have
seen, faith in Christ is mediated through the different constituents of the human being, the
creaturely reality of humanness. Besides this, Schlatter points to a second level of media-
tion. In his Dogma he elaborates the "media of grace," a term that stands for "those proc-
299 Dogma, 480; Grunde, 33 (in above order).
300 See Dogma, 110-14, 482-84. To outline this notion is one of Schlatter's intentions in his Griinde.
Schlatter not only focusses on the three personal functions but also on the recognition of sin and the signifi-
cance of nature, community and history (see Griinde, 30-63).
301 "Natur, Sunde und Gnade," 65.
302 See Dogma, 480-81; *Vom Glauben, 1,3; Dienst, 42-46. "For once let us dare a psychological formula
in order to name the process that takes place in us when we believe. What emerges in faith is a synthesis of
will" (*Vom Glauben, 1).
303 Rieger, Rechtfertigungslehre, 281. Schlatter's term Anschluss, which we have translated so far with
"affiliation" or "connection" also has the connotation of "union" or "communion."
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esses which establish the relationship between Jesus and our presence and, thus, make
Christianity possible. "304 In this setting, Schlatter unfolds his notions of the apostolate,
Scripture, Christian community and church, and the sacraments.?" The encounter with
Christ (faith as existential devotion to Christ) is mediated and effected through these "me-
dia of grace."
We need to pause here and review Schlatter's argument thus far. His concept of faith is
shaped by the tandem of passivity and activity, receptivity and productivity in their typical
arrangement in which Schlatter gives primacy to passivity and receptivity. This pattern ex-
periences an intensification in faith in Christ. Faith, as active, conscious and volitional de-
votion to Christ, is completely dependent on the latter and, therefore, primarily not to be
seen as man's work. Yet the question that arises at this point is how exactly Schlatter un-
derstands the relation between passivity and activity. Is it one of succession in which the
reality of salvation approaches man from outside and merely triggers the human response
to it? Does man appropriate salvation by virtue of exercising his personal functions, e.g.
some kind of free will?306 It is the burden of the next section to examine how Schlatter
deals with these questions.
C. Divine action in man: the mediation of salvation through the Holy Spirit
i. The human impossibility of salvific faith and the necessity of a divine intervention
Schlatter asserts that the encounter with Christ does not automatically lead to faith in
him by some kind of coercive, magical, or mechanical process. In this context, Schlatter
304 Dogma, 357. Cf. ibid., 489-90.
305 Ibid., 358-436.
306 Schlatter has, indeed, been interpreted in this way. See for example Kindt, Gedanke der Einheit, 137-
39. The author here places Schlatter in the tradition of the "Western-Catholic doctrine of salvation," accuses
him of rejecting the notion of the servum arbitrium, and sets Schlatter in antithesis to the Lutheran doctrine
of salvation.
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highlights four major factors."? First, Jesus' earthly work belongs to the past while his
heavenly reign belongs to the sphere of invisibility. This rules out any sensory perception
which could convince man. Second, the end of Jesus' life bears an intrinsic drive to reject
faith in him. The Christ on the cross, the resurrection, the ascension and the presence of Je-
sus all transcend human experience and "remain an impenetrable mystery for us." Third,
the actual state and reality of Jesus' work, e.g. the shape of his church, is in contrast to what
Jesus has promised us. Fourth, Jesus' call to faith "generates a hard collision with our self-
ish drive" and, hence, is diametrically opposed to sinful human nature. "Therefore, we all
have a powerful drive toward unbelief in us. Every sin carries this drive toward unbelief
with itself, and this with remaining and continuous power. "308
All these aspects require faith as a personal, existential and volitional devotion to
Christ. Not even Jesus himself removed the ambiguity which comes about when man as
sinful creature encounters the person and work of God's incarnate Son. "Nothing on Jesus'
side happens that saves us from making our own decision for him. "309 If faith came about
automatically it would cease to be faith. Yet God's work of salvation, the "reality of reali-
ties," is not in itself, but in man who perceives it, an ambiguous one. It leads to the "au-
thorisation to believe" but also, as we may call it, to the impossibility of impossibilities.
Schlatter points out that"... the more carefully we observe the processes that contribute to
faith, the better we understand that it [faith] can appear to us as a strange anomaly within
the ... course of the world."?" In other words, "[w]e helplessly stand before the obligation
307 For the following see Dogma, 481; "Jesus und wir heutigen Menschen," 204-07; "Glaube an die Bi-
bel," 234-35; "Bekenntnis zur Gottheit Jesu," 44-46; Briefe, 49-51. Schlatter's thoughts in this context are
closely linked with his idea that even in the person and work of Christ we do not have an immediate percep-
tion of God (see e.g. *Wesen und Quellen, 10, 158; *Dogma und Geschichte, 8).
308 "Glaube an die Bibel," 235.
309 Dogma, 481; similarly ibid., 157.
310 Griinde, 71.
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to faith as long as the entanglement in the centre of our life, in the sphere of our volition, is
not unravelled. ,,311 The need is for "the creative intervention of the divine grace which
gives us the new will. "312
In the foregoing observations we have roughly sketched Schlatter's understanding of
the impossibility of faith. The kernel of the problem emerging now could be summarised
as follows: On the basis of the reality of salvation established in Christ, God wants man to
respond to and appropriate this reality. Divine salvific action aims at faith as man's voli-
tional affirmation of, and dedication to, Christ, that is, a personal connection with Christ.
Yet, at the same time, the reality of sin makes exactly that which is required of man impos-
sible. God himself is required to establish the reality of salvation in man by means of an
all-powerful intervention. But how then is it possible to uphold the idea of faith as an au-
thentic human response?
ii. The creative action of the Spirit
Schlatter approaches the intricate issue just outlined by introducing the Holy Spirit as
the second mediator of divine grace and salvation besides Jesus.
The Spirit is the perpetual visualisation of God in the course of history, whereas the mission of the
Son distinguishes a moment of it [history] as revelatory act. ... This visualisation of God takes place
in our inward life. In the Spirit, God's work happens inside of us. . . . Thus, his mission is perfect
grace, the institution of true religion, and union of man with God. For our own thinking and volition is
turned toward God through the Spirit. The divine does not merely approach us from outside and is not
merely gained through the appropriation of something foreign to us; rather, through the Spirit, God's
gift becomes our property, and in addition to the guidance from outside we now also receive the guid-
ance of our life through God from inside (emphasis A. L.).313
311 Dogma, 278. Cf. ibid., 220 where Schlatter argues that "even if the intellectual hindrances are over-
come and a strong God-consciousness arises" it is not in man's power to become religious and believe.
312 Grunde, 52.
313 Dogma, 343-44. Cf. ibid., 353; Grunde, 68-69.
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Through the Spirit, the Christ for us becomes the Christ in us - for which reason "our
being-in-Christ and the Spirit's being-in-us is the same process. "314 This work can no longer
be understood as an "enabling" or "authorisation" to appropriate salvation but as a new
creation. Hence, Schlatter explicates the generation of faith as "a miracle veiled in the mys-
tery of the creative act." This miracle is performed by the Holy Spirit who is "the creative
grace that takes charge of our inner man and places the certainty of God in our thinking in
order to bestow on us the love that transforms our life into the service of God."315
The usage of creation language directs our attention to an important aspect of Schlat-
ter's understanding of the transition from the old man to the new. There is a moment of
complete human passivity and of the sole, sovereign and all-powerful activity of God. This
becomes clear when Schlatter discusses the traditional Reformation teaching on conver-
sion. He affirms that "the beginning of the Christian life is constituted by a moment of
complete passivity" ofman:
Without doubt, we go through moments in which God alone works and we are only caused and
shaped, but these creative acts of God are not perceivable events within our conscious interlinking of
thought and will. Where God works alone, we do not participate, not even with our consciousness, not
even as watching witnesses, as if we could observe the process of our creation and watch how God
makes our volition, that is, ourselves.l"
We encounter here again Schlatter's respect for any kind of divine mystery."? The actual
creative act of the Spirit remains veiled, yet its result is recognisable.
That which is conceivable for our eyes and which is, therefore, immediately part of our volition, is the
result ofthe divine creating. It is the 'I' created by God, the thinking of truth, and the willing of good-
ness that God has radiated into us. Therefore, viewed from our perspective there is no moment in our
life-history in which the grace makes us merely passive. Neither is there one moment in which we
314 D "5'"'ogma, -' L..
315 Griinde, 71.
316 Dienst, 46. For a thorough discussion of the issues occupying us here see also Rieger, Rechtferti-
gungslehre, 274-80.
317 For Schlatter's understanding of God's creative activity as a miracle and a mystery see above, p. 20.
Because of the miraculous and mysterious character of God's creative action Schlatter rejects any schematism
about the "how" and "when" of the beginning of Christian life (see e.g. Dogma, 462-63; "Frohlichs Traktat,"
280-81). See also Neuer, Zusammenhang, 231-32; Rieger, Rechtfertigungslehre, 351.
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could appear to ourselves as independent and self-sufficient, as though it were not by God's giving
that we have been raised into the thinking of truth and the willing of goodness.?"
The point to be noted here is Schlatter's realism when he talks about divine creating. The
Spirit is creative in the fullest sense of the word: "We, as a whole, are God's work; it is us,
not something in us, that the Spirit renews and guides; it is us, not without our conscious-
ness but in such a way that he gives us consciousness and will. The passivity in which we
are thus placed has its aim and result in our activity.'?" This second aspect of the work of
the Holy Spirit is crucial to Schlatter. The actuality of God's creative action in the Spirit
does not negate, annihilate or destroy the creature. The mediation of salvation through
Christ and in the Holy Spirit does not eclipse the personal functions of man but lifts them
up to a new fullness. God's Spirit affirms and enables human creatureliness. Applying this
insight to the question about free will, human choice and the appropriation of salvation,
Schlatter formulates as follows:
In the godless state we can talk about free choice only in the sense that we again and again unite our-
selves with our corrupted desire and recognise and will it as our own being. However, in conversion
and also in our continuous renewal the category of choice experiences its fullest application. For
through grace there awakes a good will in the midst of our corrupted desire, and this in order that we
affirm it as ours, unite ourselves with it, and through it extinguish and reject our evil desire.32o
In other words, the Spirit creates the new will in such a way that man wills the Spirit's will
as his own. In the act of absolute passivity and dependence, when the Spirit creates what
man cannot bring about, the latter experiences the fullness of human creatureliness, activity
318 Dienst, 46. In a very similar fashion Schlatter states: "We always only ever perceive the fruits ofthose
processes which create life and we never enter into the workshop in which God's finger creates life and faith"
("Glaube und Geschichte," 347).
319 Dogma, 35l.
320 Dienst, 43. The ideas just outlined show again that Schlatter diverges from the theological tradition
which - enforced through Kant and Schleiermacher - regards human feeling as the sole locus of the work of
the Holy Spirit. The intention behind this approach is, as Schlatter points out, to secure the sovereignty, im-
mediacy and irresistibility of God's pneumatological work in man. In opposition to this tradition, Schlatter in-
sists that the work of the Spirit not only takes place in the feeling of the person, but also in those functions in
which man is most active and free, namely thinking and volition (see Dienst, 38-51and Schlatter's grappling
with Karl Friedrich Nosgen's pneumatology in "Noch ein Wort," 114-21). Through his approach Schlatter
also wants to rule out any synergistic notion of the appropriation of salvation in which the passive part is as-
cribed to God and the active part to man (see Dogma, 351). See further what has been said about Schlatter's
totalisation of Schleiermacher's approach (see above, p. 19 n. 27).
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and freedom - and thus recognises and affirms the new creation as deeply his own. The
Holy Spirit relates the divine and the human in such a way that the primacy, superiority
and sovereignty of God does not destroy the identity and distinctiveness of man.
iii. Conclusion
The salvation of man is an exclusive and all-powerful act of God. Yet, this act neither
violates, nor circumvents, nor absorbs man's creaturely being and constitution. Rather, it
constitutes human being and action and is thus enabling and bestowing action. It leaves
space for man to affirm and respond to God's action in a way that is appropriate to man's
nature. Thus, Schlatter can state, in tacit reference to Phil 2:12-13: "Because God works
both the willing and the acting, we work out our salvation with fear and trembling. That
God's giving does not destroy but establish our personal vivacity, including our will, is an
established axiom in the New Testament. ,,321 The ramifications ofthese ideas for Schlatter's
way of relating divine and human action will be explored in due course.
321 Dogma, 157.
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CHAPTER III. SCHLATTER'S THEORY OF DIVINE ACTION
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The foregoing chapter stands as a representation of Schlatter's understanding of the
ways in which God acts when he works creation, preservation and salvation. In the present
chapter we shall deepen our understanding of the above material and unfold what might be
called Schlatter's theory of divine action. The reader might object at this point, arguing that
the material presented thus far does not provide a sufficient basis for developing Schlatter's
theory of divine agency because only a fraction of the manifold works of God has been ex-
plored. This objection brings us to a central point of Schlatter's approach. He is convinced
that the manifoldness of God's actions cannot be comprehended and is thus difficult to
categorise and order. "The causal power of God encompasses - incomprehensible to us - a
diversity of activities which are qualitatively distinguished from one another. The view that
the divine causality shows itself in a single form stems from an emptied idea of unity [aus
dem entleerten Einheitsgdankeni." This means that the basic categories of a theory of di-
vine agency cannot be found by merely looking at the sequence of God's works as they ap-
pear on the heilsgeschichtliche level." For this reason it is unnecessary to investigate
Schlatter's understanding of every single work of God. Rather, in the foregoing chapter we
have introduced certain continuities which conceptually underlie Schlatter's notion of di-
vine agency. In the following we shall deepen our understanding of these continuities and
develop, as we may call it, Schlatter's understanding of the dimensions, the mode and the
1 Dogma, 37.
2 A case in point is the attempt to capture the manifoldness and diversity of divine agency through the
triad of creation, redemption and completion.
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structure of divine action. This inquiry shall enable us to outline Schlatter's concept of the
relation between God and man as the direct outcome ofhis theory of divine action.
1. Schlatter's Awareness of the Problematic Aspects of a Theory of Divine Action
When we take some of the intricate aspects of a theory of divine action as the point of
departure for our inquiry, we are actually working in the opposite direction to the move-
ment in Schlatter's thought. For he is convinced that the problems, especially those which
arise when theology enters into dialogue with other sciences, must not determine a priori
the nature and style of theological discourse. The questions to be asked arise primarily out
of the theologian's engagement with the theological material.' However, for reasons of
clarity and pithiness we begin by presenting some critical aspects of which Schlatter is
constantly aware when he talks about divine action.
A. Divine transcendence, divine action and the pitfall of monism
i. God's transcendence and his active involvement with the world
In our exposition of Schlatter's understanding of divine economy we encountered two
fundamental claims: First, God relates to, and acts upon creation, in such a way that his re-
lation and action constitute the ontological basis for creaturely being and action. Second,
God transcends creation. As creator he stands beyond this world. Both aspects will con-
tinue to concern us throughout this study. The point to be noted here is Schlatter's aware-
ness that abstract and impersonal concepts of divine transcendence give rise to a problem-
atic notion of the relation of divine transcendence and divine involvement with creation.
Although Schlatter also applies the category of being to God and speaks explicitly about
3 See e.g. Ethik, 43 n. 2; Briefe, 47.
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"the eternal nature of the divine life" and "God's eternal being.:" he delimitates himself
from understanding God as the "highest being" or "pure being. "5 This static-essential con-
cept of God is, according to Schlatter, the result of a "Greek theology" rooted in Hellenistic
philosophy. The latter grounds its concept of God in a philosophy of nature part of which
is that man a) "learns to distinguish himself from that which stands below him" and b)
"learns that the spirit transcends that which is materially bound.!" Thus emerges a deep
contempt for creaturely particularity and diversity.
Wherever the old Greek logic exercises its rule, that which is individual becomes a scandal. It is re-
garded as the accidental, the unessential, the transient, the veiling of the idea, that which turns the di-
vine into a larva through a being there and a being now, the bark around the tree, the shell around the
kernel, and so forth,"
For Schlatter, these ideas give rise to a concept of God which is developed in stark con-
trast to the world as the non-divine. As Schlatter states:
This way of thinking [Denkweise] regards the particular as nothing and the general and the type as
real. Out of this idea emerged the rule that God is to be thought of as the most abstract, the 'pure be-
ing,' or - because we still think about something with this thin abstraction - as the super real, as that
which stands beyond the antithesis of ideal and real, as the completely empty absolute."
The critical point of this theology is that it, in its "veneration of the abstract," separates
God from his works and actions. The idea of God is constructed through negations as a re-
sult of which "the relation between the worker and his work is dissolved.... This pure be-
ing (or less than being) is completely unrelated to us."9 This dualism is cemented through
the divine predicates of "impassability" and "eternity." In this way, God is not only con-
trasted to the world of "becoming and decay", "time and space" but also "locked in the be-
4 Theology of the Apostles, 132; History of the Christ, 306 (in above order). For the following see also
Neuer, Zusammenhang, 55-64; Walldorf, Realistische Philosophie, 188-93.
5 See Dogma, 30-31; Grunde, 38-39; Metaphysik, 66-67.
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yond [Jenseits]."IO God's transcendence undermines his active involvement with creation.
An impersonal notion of God leaves us with abstract hypostases such as "a substance that
is nothing but subsistent; a force that is nothing but causal capacity; a thinking that is noth-
ing but thinking."!' The problem, in other words, is an inner-divine one: God's transcen-
dence and his creative agency seem to cancel each other out. An increase in transcendence
automatically gives rise to a decrease in creative involvement and vice versa."
ii. Divine omnipotence and divine creative action
In connection with what has just been said stands another critical point which Schlatter
brings to our attention: the relation between God's omnipotence and creative agency. The
passages in which Schlatter explicitly uses the term "omnipotence" (Allmacht) are rare." In
our study thus far the concept of divine omnipotence came most clearly to the fore in
Schlatter's notion of creatio ex nihilo. Schlatter speaks of God's "complete causality" in or-
der to express the idea that God - out of nothing - brings man into being, who is other than
God himself, namely creature and not creator. In this context, however, Schlatter calls at-
tention to an inherent self-contradiction that emerges when God's creative action is under-
stood in terms of sheer causal power and abstract omnipotence.
Ifwe conceive of God's power as being effective in the form ofa natural force, that means as institut-
ing merely dependence, then God is conceived of as egoist. Through this, however, the ground of
creation is negated. He [God] affirms, asserts, and actuates himself. Thereby, no room emerges for a
second will, no sphere of action emerges in which an'!' given to itself [ein sich selbst geschenktes Ich]
could be in charge. 14
10 "Glaube und Geschichte," 345-46.
II Dogma, 31.
12 For an elucidative exposition of these issues see Kathryn Tanner, God and Creation, 38-48: "In the
cosmologies of the Hellenistic era, which were formed through the confluence of Platonic and Aristotelian
categories, the transcendence and direct involvement of God with the non-divine appear to be mutually ex-
clusive, to vary inversely in degree" (p. 38-39).
13 See e.g. Romans, 226; "Unterwerfung," 8; "Wort und Schrift," 32; "Wunder," 832; *Wesen und Quel-
len, 87.
14 *Dogmatik I, 140.
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Schlatter is aware of the problems that arise when God's action is understood in contrast to
human action. The positive intention behind such an understanding is to secure the divine
transcendence, sovereignty and freedom in talk about divine agency. Yet precisely this se-
curing is not achieved because a contrast locates both God and man within the same frame
of reference, on the same level, albeit in negative terms. IS Under these circumstances God's
agency has to compete with human agency. God's omnipotence - and thus his being-God -
seems to be in danger from the human capacity for free and self-determined action." As a
consequence, divine agency is understood in terms of unlimited and arbitrary power which
God exercises in order to overcome human agency. Schlatter remarks that "force turns into
violence [Gewalt] when the activity of the one extinguishes the activity of the other."" Ap-
plied to God's agency this means that divine action becomes "an absorbing activity which
does not allow for anything to emerge except its own action." In this way, as Schlatter puts
it, God's action "is made contemptuous, like any other tyranny." It achieves nothing but
the emptying of everything else into apparition and nothingness. Such an idea of power will always
turn into impersonal concepts about the world cause [Weltgrund] and thin down to the primordial sub-
stance [UrstojJ], or primordial force [Urkraft], or primordial idea [Uridee] the work of which consists
in self-preservation.l"
The critical point addressed here is, first of all, an inner-divine problem. If God's creative
action is presented as the power that limits, overcomes and finally absorbs creation and its
agency, then the divine power is indeed all there is, namely omnipotence. Yet Schlatter ar-
gues that causality requires the other as the recipient of the effect. Relation and community
are therefore prerequisites for causal action." Without them the causal process disinte-
15 The problem is aptly summarised in Tanner, God and Creation, 46.
16 See Dogma, 155.
17 Metaphysik, 54.
18 Dogma, 155.
19 See Metaphysik, 52.
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grates into monism: "The process moves only in the one direction from the cause to its ef-
feet so that the terms 'interaction' [Verkehr] and 'community' are no longer applicable to the
relation of that which has been caused [des Gewirkten] to the causing force. "20
Within the concept of divine creative agency just outlined, the category of omnipo-
tence, which was originally employed to uphold God's transcendence and supremacy,
brings God's action down to the same level as human action. Moreover, the above under-
standing of omnipotence makes the same redundant since it annihilates - or at least cuts
the relation to - the other so that there is nothing left upon which God could exercise his
power.
This paradox becomes especially acute in connection with God's act of creation. The
above notion of divine omnipotence makes it impossible for God to create, that is, to bring
into being anything other than himself, not to mention a personal other invested with free
and self-determined causality." To use Schlatter's terminology, the divine act of creation
can never be completed because God's omnipotence collapses and amalgamates that which
it brings forth, into God. What comes about is not creature but something like an extension
or emanation of the Creator. As Schlatter argues in the passage quoted above, "no room
emerges for a second will, no sphere of action emerges in which an 'I' could be in charge."
Thus, the concept of God's act of creation collapses under the pressure of the very catego-
ries which were originally employed to express God's power, sovereignty and otherness in
the divine act of creation."
20 Philosophische Arbeit, 280; similarly in Metaphysik, 54-55.
21 Cf. Schwebel who argues that "the traditional interpretation of God's metaphysical attributes" tends "to
stress divine transcendence to such an extent that God can no longer be understood as the creative ground of
the being of the world" (God: Action and Revelation, 59).
22 We may say that the paradox of omnipotence assumes an ontological character and ultimately becomes
an inner-divine paradox. For this see also Trappe, Allmacht und Selbstbeschrdnkung Gottes, 11-15.
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Besides the inner-divine problem just sketched out, Schlatter regards the way in which
divine being and action is related to human being and action as highly problematic. At the
heart of the matter lies the monistic drive that carne to the surface in the concept of divine
agency with which Schlatter is dealing critically. God acts in such a way that authentic
creaturely being and action is made impossible or absorbed through the divine agency.
Throughout his work we see Schlatter resolutely pinpointing and fighting monistic tenden-
cies which, as he argues, arise when divine action is understood to work in the form of a
natural force." Some examples may suffice to illustrate this:
A concept of faith, for example, according to which the relationship with God comes
about through "removing man from God's revelation and government" is, in Schlatter's
view, a self-contradiction.
For faith is only a possibility if everything else is not eclipsed by God's light - but man begins to
shine. Faith is possible only if man is not rendered speechless by God's speech but begins to speak
himself and learns to think and speak in God's service. Faith is possible only ifGod's revelation does
not result in God's solitude, so that he has no space for anyone but himself-but man is transferred
into aliveness and activity, both of which God grants to him. If God's revelation were delivered in any
other manner then we could not have faith in him; we could not lay hold of God's grace as the founda-
tion out of which our life arises (emphasis A. 1.).24
Schlatter is very clear about faith as God's sovereign act of creation. "How could it corne to
an affirmation of God in us, which grants us a valid personal relationship with him, in any
other way than through God's almighty creative grace?'?' However, this is also true:
If God's creative acting burst into us like a bomb from above, then it destroys everything we are, tears
apart every continuity of our life and history, and, consequently, extinguishes any thinking from our
23 In addition to the passages quoted in the foregoing section, see Schlatter's Dienst where he critically
deals with a notion of divine agency through which man is merely made passive (especially 41,46-47,53-55,
77-79) and "Noch ein Wort" (105-08). Similarly in Theology ofthe Apostles, where Schlatter critiques enthu-
siastic forms of piety which limit "the concept of God to the notion of power" and reduce faith to "the passive
anticipation of a divine operation" after which "a lofty sense of union with the deity" might be attained (369-
72). See further Ethik, 38-39; Dogma, 29-38,123,155-56,175; Erlebtes, 75.
24 Dogma, 366-67. Cf. ibid., 155 where Schlatter, in a similar fashion, relates the form of divine action to
the possibility of trust in and worship of God.
25 Sprechstunde, 9.
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faith. Through this, however, the word 'faith' loses any conceivable sense.... The ground and content
of faith no longer exists when the given existence [Bestand] of our life is destroyed by the miracle
through which faith is created."
Schlatter's discussion of the relation of the divine Word and human speech, serves as
another illustration. With direct reference to Friedrich Gogarten as one of the exponents of
early Dialectical Theology, Schlatter welcomes the attempt to rehabilitate and give abso-
lute primacy to Scripture in the life and worship of the church. However, he is critical of
the way in which the action of the divine Word and Spirit is portrayed in this connection:
What is the goal and the effect of the divine speech? In Gogarten, man is rendered dumb when God
speaks. What is the effect and the goal of the divine Spirit? In Gogarten, the human spirit is extin-
guished when the divine Spirit shines. For us, then, there is only the service [Gottesdienst] of silence
and every sermon is sin. For there is no such sermon in which I, the speaking one, do not speak."
Schlatter locates the basis for such more or less monistic notions of God's action in an anti-
thetical understanding of the relation between God and creation. The operating principle is
a "pre-Christian form of thinking which thought of God and humanity as enemies. "28 The
relation of divine and human agency is viewed - parallel to the relation of divine transcen-
dence and creative involvement - as one of inverse variation. An increase in divine action
logically triggers a decrease in human action and vice versa. This dualism - be it a dualism
from below or above - always tends to collapse into a monism in which the one agency is
conceived of as the annihilation of the other. Schlatter summarises these thoughts in his
discussion of the relation of God and history.
26 Ibid., 13-14.
27 Ibid., 66-67.
28 Dogma, 365. See also Sprechstunde, 66-67. This is also the nexus in which Schlatter critically engages
with the early theology of Karl Barth. In his review of the second edition of Barth's commentary on Romans,
Schlatter writes: "Barth's God is 'the Other,' who is other than we are and other than the world is. From this
arises the powerful No which he places over against the entire state of the world, including the highest and
purest in human life. All that we are, possess, and achieve is therefore judged, for it is not God, not divine,
and therefore stands under the law of condemnation and negation. In Paul, too, every refusal to honor God
falls under absolute condemnation, and he sees in every religious attempt which places man beside God and
makes God dependent on human resolution and on human activity, on our willing and working, the perver-
sion of religion. But that is not all Paul has to say about God, not the statement which he places in our souls,
at Jesus' instruction, with praise of the righteousness and grace of God. For this reverts to the pre-Christian
state of the knowledge of God, since it is the relationship of the unreconciled man to God" ("Barth's Ro-
mans," 123-24).
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Finally, behind a negative judgment about history there stands the awareness of an unresolved opposi-
tion between man and God, and so a pre-Christian idea of God. People are afraid of God's act, as
though it threatened the reality of human life. So they try to protect this reality by denying the act of
God. They think that when God acts, he annihilates everything that exists beside himself. This all-
absorbing God, who will tolerate no world beside himself, and who must be denied for the sake of the
world's existence, is not the God of Scripture. This is how man, oppressed by the sense of God's hav-
ing left him, conceives him."
B. Conclusion: Two desiderata for a theory of divine action
Our exposition of Schlatter's awareness concerning possible problematic aspects of a
theory of divine action allows us - in a roundabout way - to articulate two interconnected
desiderata for a theory of divine action. These desiderata will sharpen our perception of
Schlatter's own approach and lead us to some of its distinctive characteristics.
i. Concerning the inner-divine paradox
We may say that a theory of divine action should obviate the clash between the differ-
ent aspects of God's agency. If, for example, the aspect of God's transcendence and sover-
eignty is played out against the aspect of God's creative interaction and interrelation with
creation, the whole concept of divine action is in danger of collapsing. What seems desir-
able is to relate the different facets of divine agency in such a way that their distinctness
does not undermine the unity of God's action and vice versa. The promise of such an ap-
proach is that it prevents our theological thinking from the predominance of categories un-
der the conceptual pressure of which we are left with a truncated picture of divine agency.
29 "Theology of the New Testament and Dogmatics," 199. For an apt summary of the problem see
Wilfried Harle, "Werk Gottes - Werk des Menschen," 213-16.
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ii. Concerning the dualism of God and creation
A theory of divine action must not operate on the basis of an a priori dualism of God
and creation. An understanding of God's being and action, which is developed in antithesis
to God's creation, leads all too easily to a theo-monistic understanding of divine action.
However, without giving due weight to creaturely being and causal power, a concept of di-
vine agency makes itself superfluous because agency requires the relation to the other as
the recipient of the effect. It is therefore desirable that in a theory of divine action God and
creation are related in such a way that space is given to both so that creator and creature
can be viewed as agents in propriety to their respective and distinct being."
2. Towards a Multi-Dimensional Understanding of Divine Action
We have already suggested that Schlatter's understanding of divine agency is based on
categories which reach deeper than the differentiation of the single acts that constitute
God's Heilsgeschichte. In the following we shall take a first step to bring these categories
to light by outlining Schlatter's conception of different dimensions or facets which together
constitute divine action.
A. The transcendental and the immanent dimension of divine action
i. Transcendental action
The term "transcendental action" refers to Schlatter's idea that God acts in a sovereign,
absolute, and one-sided manner as the one who is superior to man. The most obvious and
prominent locus of this dimension is God's creation out of nothing by which he calls crea-
30 For a similar formulation of this desideratum see Gunton, "God, Grace and Freedom," 133.
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tion into being. He does not need anything other than himself in order to act upon the crea-
ture, for which reason his action is immediate action (actio immediata).
The world came about through the divine creating, and this is something completely different from
our human ability and, hence, remains completely incomprehensible to us. The beginning of this
world is, because it is creation, a miracle, and this requires of us the submission that calms us and bri-
dles our thinking."
In this Schlatter clarifies the "differentia specifica" between divine and human action.
"Only He acts creatively, upon us and in us.':" Throughout his work Schlatter articulates
this aspect of God's agency by using different terms such as "the full majesty of divine act-
ing which is creatively supreme to man and nature,':" or God's "complete causality" in
which God's power to act is one with his Word and will." In the centre of Schlatter's termi-
nology stands his speech about the "creative act" which he defines as follows: "An activity
[Wirken] proves to be creative when it possesses totality, that means when it unites willing
and acting, word and power. It is therefore superior to space and time and to the obstruc-
tions which both bring upon acting."
It would be a serious misunderstanding of Schlatter's thought to think that he ascribes
the transcendental dimension only to God's creative action at the beginning of the world.
The numerous references in which Schlatter speaks of a creative act of God appear in a va-
riety of actional contexts." Thus, we have seen the transcendental moment of divine action
in Schlatter's concept of God's providence. It is precisely because of God's otherness, sov-
ereignty and faithfulness, in which he stands beyond the creature, that God actively and
creatively upholds and enables creaturely life - even that of sinful man. We made the same
3! Andachten, 381.
32 "Unterwerfung," 8. The whole section is important in this context. See also *Kritische Bemerkungen, 7
33 Jesus und Paulus, 105; cf. "Unterwerfung," 8; Furcht vor dem Denken, 12.




36 See e.g. the references above, p. 20 n. 30.
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observation with regard to God's realisation of salvation through Jesus Christ. Schlatter
remarks: "The death of Jesus is an act of God's grace, therefore efficaciously working with
creative force, instituting something new which would not exist without the same [the
death of Jesus]." The most straightforward examples in this connection are those in which
Schlatter outlines a work of God as a new creation.
God presents us with his gifts through the one who is risen from the dead. Therefore, we are 'a new
creation' - no longer merely what the first creation made of us; no longer that which nature already
grants us. Paul orders his relations to all people according to this insight - to the Jews, the Greeks and
the Christians. Now 'he no longer knows anybody according to the manner of the flesh,' nobody in the
way we know each other through the natural media ...38
Especially in the light of this last citation in which Schlatter correlates Christ's resurrection
from the dead and the radical newness of the Christian life, Schlatter's idea of the new
creation must be understood in terms of a creatio ex nihilo, With direct recourse to the first
creation Schlatter articulates regeneration as "the work and gift of Jesus [that] lies com-
pletely beyond nature and is a new work of God which is as creative as the one through
which the world and the flesh came into being" (emphasis A. L.).39 In the same way, God's
eschatological action, by which he will establish his eternal kingdom, is a sovereign and
exclusive act of God: "God's kingdom is not a repetition of creation but a new creation -
because in Jesus the Word, which God has spoken to us, has entered into the world.'!"
We see that the transcendental dimension of divine action is a constitutive part of the
operational analogy through which Schlatter links creatio originalis with any creatio
nova:" Schlatter's intention is to highlight the actuality of God's creative agency in the here
and now. "[W]e have the actuality [Wirklichkeit] of God before us - a revealed God, a God
37 *Christologie, fragments. See also Briefe, 38.
38 "Jesus und wir heutigen Menschen," 214; similarly in Dogma, 279; Wir Christen und die Juden, 14;
Johannes, 18; *Schopfung und Offenbarung, 13.
39 Johannes, 21.
40 "Schopfung und Offenbarung, 13; similarly in Dogma, 534-35, 538; Opfer, 48; "Letzte Bitte Jesu," 335.
41 We touched this operational analogy above, p. 41.
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who does not remain silent but speaks; who is not inactive but works; who did not merely
speak in former times but who is as alive today as on the first day ofcreation" (emphasis
A. L.).42
ii. Immanent action
The second dimension underlying Schlatter's concept of divine agency may be articu-
lated as immanent action, which takes the specific form of enabling or bestowing action.
God interacts with his creation in such a way as to be appropriate to the being and nature of
the different creatures. Creation in its otherness vis-a-vis God constitutes the antecedent
conditions for divine agency. It is this creation which God sustains and enables to be itself
and to become what he intends it to be. We saw this dimension of divine agency most
clearly displayed in Schlatter's view of divine providential action. Yet, also in our outline
of Schlatter's understanding of the creation of man we came across the idea that God not
only creates immediately but also mediately. He creates man through nature and fellow
man. This efficaciousness of the human and the non-human creature is, as we explored in
our discussion of Schlatter's idea of concursus divinus, grounded in God's enabling and be-
stowing action. Even God's sovereign activity by which he establishes salvific faith in
Christ contains the enabling aspect of divine action. God, through his Holy Spirit, enables
man to respond to, and appropriate, Christ's work of salvation in a way that befits the per-
sonal nature of human being. A further case in point is the new man whom God calls into
being through a creative act. Yet this action is, at the same time, the enabling of the old
creation so that human being is fully realised and completed according to God's purposes.
Thus, with regard to human personhood Schlatter states:
42 "Unterwerfung," 48; similarly in Johannes, 21.
SCHLATTER'S THEORY OF DIVINE ACTION 100
Since, however, the divine acting [Wirken] nowhere destroys nature, we cannot expect such an effect
[Wirkung] from the Holy Spirit. The efficacy [Wirksamkeit] of the Holy Spirit seizes our personal life
in its unity. It does not cut off our natural functions; it does not replace them. Rather, the full range of
our natural vivacity is preserved, wanted and used by the Spirit. His gift does not replace the psychi-
cal processes but produces them (emphasis A. L.).43
Along similar lines Schlatter argues that the "ultimate and highest goal" of God's grace,
namely the creation of "the new heaven and the new earth" is neither "the end of the
world" [Weltuntergang] nor "the destruction of nature." Rather, it is an act in which God
works the "transfiguration and glorification of nature. ,,44
B. The interplay of the different dimensions of divine action
The material just explored suggests that the transcendental and immanent dimension
of God's agency are the two categories on the basis of which Schlatter understands the
manifold actions of God. What adds to this assumption is that Schlatter seemingly does not
simply identify one of these dimensions with certain divine actions. Rather, he locates the
transcendental and the immanent aspect in one and the same act. We shall now present two
cases which are particularly suited for corroborating this assumption.
i. The creation of the world
We have already mentioned that, in Schlatter's view, God creates man not only di-
rectly but also indirectly, by enabling personal and impersonal fellow-creatures to interact
efficaciously with man. We have also noted that the transition from God's creative action
to God's providential action is fluid in this connection. However, it is not the case that the
close link between transcendental action and immanent action be explained by ascribing
the former to creation and the latter to providence. Rather, both aspects mark each divine
43 Dogma, 348.
44 "Wunder der Bibel," 79. Similarly in Dogma, 535.
SCHLATTER'S THEORY OF DIVINE ACTION 101
action. Schlatter makes this clear in his unpublished lecture on Genesis. He remarks that
the first verse of Genesis, which includes the Hebrew term bara, stands as a summary of
God's creative activity which is then unfolded in the following verses." The term bara can
stand for different facets of God's action. First, God brings forth the world immediately.
"In our verse [Gen 1:1], however, the bara is conceived in absolute terms [schlechthin ab-
solut gedacht] as - to use the old terminology - creatio ex nihilo. This does not result from
the word itself, but from the fact that God bara through his command-word into the empty
darkness. "46 Besides this creatio immediata, Schlatter also recognises a creatio mediata.
"[T]he word [bara] is not limited to the creatio ex nihilo in the strict sense. Any divine act-
ing can be called bara, even when it is the transformation ... of something that already ex-
ists."47 Thus, Schlatter remarks that man was not created in the same way as the earth was,
namely ex nihilo:" This applies also to the land animals:
The land animals arise from the earth. However, besides the tozeh haardz (verse 24) pay attention to
the wajaas elohim (verse 25). When the earth appears as the immediate producer of the land animals,
then, according to the thought of the text, God is nonetheless the one who makes them. The secondary
activity of the earth is completely enclosed in the divine acting."
The newness of this creatio mediata, which is intrinsic to every act of creation, consists in
that God empowers creation to bring forth something which it could have never generated
out of itself. God enables creation to become what he intends it to be." Through this
Schlatter pinpoints the interrelation between God's transcendental action and immanent ac-
45 *Genesis, 14.
46 Ibid., 15; cf. Jesu Gottheit, 64: "... the majesty which calls that which is not [das nicht Seiende] in or-
der that it be."
47 *Genesis, 14-15.
48 Ibid., 15.
49 Ibid., 37. For a similar interpretation ofthe term "bara" see Ganoczy, Der dreieinige Schopfer, 193-96.
50 Gunton, in similarity to Schlatter's approach, expresses the mediatorial dimension of God's creative ac-
tivity when he says "that part of the divine engagement with creation in Genesis 1 involves the ministerial
use of parts of the created order in the forming of others. When God says 'Let the earth bring forth' we have a
picture of divine action enabling the world itself to take shape in the way the sovereign creator intends" (The
Triune Creator, 63; the whole chapter 3, pp. 41-64, is illuminating in this context).
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tion as the two constitutive dimensions of the one divine act of creation. Schlatter makes
this clear in his discussion of evolution:
The idea of creation leaves therefore full space for the investigation that traces the connections be-
tween the new and the already-earlier existing organisms. The text itself accentuates such a co-
operation of the existing nature in the new works of creation at different points in a simple manner,
without being afraid that it could thereby compromise the idea of creation. The land animals are no
less God's work than the water-animals when the earth produces the former out of itself (emphasis A.
L.).51
As we have seen in the section on concursus divinus, evolution is by no means a process
inherent in creation itself. Creation does not effect its own progress. Rather, that which is
new over against the already-existing creation comes about because God acts in a new and
creative way. Schlatter uses the idea of history to articulate this concept. "There was a time
when man was not; now he is. Therefore, nature has a history. History, however, comes
about through action, and the action which founds and sets that which is new is will. "52 We
observe that the idea of different actional dimensions enables Schlatter to understand di-
vine action as history: "The divine will and acting does not exhaust itself in its first act.
Rather, the latter has only the character of a beginning. Divine creative activity moves on.
Superior formations follow lower formations.t'"
ii. The inspiration of the divine word"
In Schlatter the ministry of the prophets and apostles, who receive and proclaim the
word of God, is grounded in the mediating work of the Holy Spirit: "Just as every personal
51 "Genesis, 52-53. For the discussion of evolution see further Dogma, 45-47; idem, Grunde, 55-56.
52 *Wesen und Quellen, 76. The whole section (pp. 76-78) is important in this context.
53 Ibid., 107. The point to be noted here is that Schlatter's concept entails a teleological understanding of
creation's goodness and perfection. God does not create this world instantaneously but in such a way that fur-
ther creative action is required in order to enable creation to become what God intends it to be. Gunton ex-
presses this intentional and teleological aspect of God's work of creation through the notion of "creation as
project" which includes the differentiation between relative and absolute perfection (see The Triune Creator,
12,55-56,86-89,93, 164-65).
54 For a brief introduction to Schlatter's scriptology see Walldorfs essay "Inspiration und Geschichte."
Bailer's exposition in Prinzip, 77-81 is also illuminating for our discussion here.
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relationship with God is mediated through the Holy Spirit, so the apostolic and prophetic
task has its basis in the fact that the Spirit of God imparted to those who are called their
capacity to think, will and act."55 The inspiration of the divine word is the "inner work of
God in the prophet" which takes place through the Holy Spirit." The pneumatological
process between the giver and the recipient of the divine word is marked by two different
aspects. First, Schlatter specifies the divine inspiration as a sovereign creative act:
The event of inspiration is a creative giving of God, and is thus an absolute act which does not allow
itself to be measured by degrees. No matter whether little or much is given, God is the giver. Syner-
gistic interpretations are not of any use here because the activity of God does not stand beside the hu-
man activity, but rather over and before it and is its cause, out of which it arises."
What happens here is "that God, according to his sovereign choice, places single per-
sons [Personlichkeiten] in a unique relationship to himself. He does so as the Spirit who, in
giving truth, command and power, works in them [the persons], and this not sporadically,
here and there, but in a coherent and progressing history.':" Inspiration thus means a divine
intervention that stands in radical discontinuity to the personal, natural and historical exis-
tence of the one inspired. Schlatter underlines:
Where God is revealed, there he reveals himself. He himselfhas awakened and formed his messengers
for himself, has filled their hearts with his word, and has illuminated their sense with his light so that
his own word is in their mouth and proclaimed through their service. The Spirit is the manner in
which God is internally present in a man, moving him and speaking to him so that he makes man
speak what is God's [was Gottes ist]. As certainly as Scripture comes from God, as certainly it stems
from God's Spirit.i"
The Holy Spirit creates something utterly new which is without any analogy in the
creaturely world of man. "That which comes from the Spirit does not stem from us."60
55 Dogma, 364. See the whole section entitled a. The Origins of the Scriptures from the Spirit (ibid., 364-
69); Einleitung, 479.
56 See *Wesen und Quellen, 142.
57 Dogma, 371. For the inspiration of the prophets and the apostles see ibid., 358-64; *Wesen und Quel-
len, 142-44.
58 *Wesen und Quellen, 144.
59 Einleitung, 479.
60 Ibid., 480.
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Schlatter outlines the novum of divine inspiration when he explores the unique relationship
between God and prophet: "But here [when God speaks and reveals himself] we find proc-
esses which we must call an immediate perception ofGod, a hearing of God that is some-
times accompanied by the analogue of seeing (Is 6:1)" (emphasis A. L.).61 The event of in-
spiration is a creative acting of God upon man in the Holy Spirit. It means a radical break,
a rupture in which the life ofthe person inspired is defined in a new way. God selects, calls
and empowers certain persons to receive and to proclaim the divine word. The Holy Spirit
seizes man and puts him at God's disposal. Schlatter summarises: "Those who receive a di-
vine calling receive a new gift which places them above the community prior to and after
them. A creative act of God equips them. "62
The transition between the first and the second moment of the inspiring action of the
Holy Spirit can by demonstrated on the basis of Schlatter's critical discussion of orthodox
scriptology. He argues that the Ancient Church developed its doctrine of inspiration exclu-
sively in terms of divine power, sovereignty and absoluteness. Schlatter affirms the posi-
tive intention behind this emphasis, namely to underline God's holiness and superiority
over against man and thus to secure the divinity of Scripture. Through this the Ancient
Church wanted to guide the reader of the Bible to focus solely on God - to hear, know and
obey God.63 However, according to Schlatter, these ideas gave rise to a highlyg.uestionable
notion of the work of the Holy Spirit in the event of inspiration:
Therefore, the Spirit, since he is holy and God's [Spirit], becomes the destroyer of what is human. The
activity of the Spirit requires the passivity of the one who is inspired; his own consciousness is sub-
merged and his own will is silenced, he is moved as the harp is by the player or as the pen is moved by
61 *Wesen und Quellen, 143. This is, as far as we know, the only place where Schlatter talks about an im-
mediate perception of God.
62 Dogma, 378.
63 See Dogma, 366-67; Einleitung, 478-79.
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the writer. Understood this way, the act of inspiration is an isolated experience that simply inserts it-
self into the other mental processes. The unity of the life-act is broken by the event of inspiration."
Schlatter calls attention to the tacit theo-monism underlying this concept of inspiration
and the resulting scriptology. "Indeed, in the church one has often tried to erase man in the
Bible in order that God appears in it."65 The reality and truth of the divine work are estab-
lished at the cost of the reality of the human creature. Man is reduced to a mere instrument,
an inanimate tool in God's hands. "The divine acting presents itself as the nullification of
the human acting; the truth of the inspiration rests upon the fact that it puts man into pas-
sivity and silences him. ,,66 The creature is collapsed into God and thus ceases to be itself.
Schlatter critiques: "[T]he old doctrine of inspiration monophysitically used a concept of
God according to which the human act is absorbed by the divine activity ...."67
Schlatter attempts a solution of the problems just indicated by unfolding the second
aspect of the inspiring action of the Holy Spirit. In the event of inspiration the Holy Spirit
neither destroys, nor circumvents, nor disregards, human creatureliness. Rather, the Spirit
is creative in the fullest sense of the word.
God's Spirit does not destroy, but creates. He is the generator of the true knowledge, which is con-
scious of itself, and of the pure will, which has control over itself. That which he [the Spirit} breaks is
the sinful will and the dark thoughts which arise from false desires; however, he does not break the
natural form of the soul but fills it with God's gifts and awakens and empowers it toward that which
man cannot do out ofhimself. ... [T]hat which comes from the Spirit does not stem from us. How-
ever, this does not mean that it remains far from and strange to us. It is not from us, but in us. Exactly
because God joins men in the Spirit, his gifts are meant seriously, real gifts, which become their
[men's] complete property that they have and possess as part of their own person. Therefore, God's
messengers are not divested of their characteristic individuality through the work of the Spirit.
Rather, the Spirit creates and perfects them and makes them people ofone piece whose thought and
will, word and work, originate from the same holy drive and who are pervaded with God's light and
truth (emphasis A. L.).68




68 Einleitung, 480. See also "Theology of the New Testament and Dogmatics," 195. Schlatter's exemplifi-
cation ofthis idea in the opening sentences of his essay "Evangelist Matthaus'' is illuminating.
SCHLATTER'S THEORY OF DIVINE ACTION 106
Schlatter understands the inspiring action of the Holy Spirit as "grace," as divine "giving"
which enables man "to see, know, speak and act. "69 The Spirit acts in such a way as to pre-
serve - moreover, enable and perfect, human being and action in all their personal, corpo-
real and socio-historical particularity.
It is through the history in which the men of the Bible stand that they are the recipients of the Spirit.
The inspiration of the Apostles is grounded in their mission [Sendung] through Christ and arises out of
this history. In a roundabout way, the Spirit leads them into history, not out of it, because he does not
work the emptying [Entleerung] and thwarting [Unterbindung] of the human life, but brings forth
people whose thought and will stem from God because they think what God thinks and will what God
wills. Therefore, he [the Spirit] creates history, that is, correlation and conditionality of the one
through the other, their unification into a community in which the many are placed into a traditional
chain [Traditionskette] with and after each other and are formed through the joint life [Gesamtleben].
This does not entail a degradation [Verminderung] of their [the people's] spiritual nature and force but
is precisely that which the Spirit wills and works. For this reason, the effective power of Scripture
consists in that, in the same way as it stems from history, it also creates history and joins the course of
our thinking and willing with what has happened in the past so that our own life receives its founda-
tion and content from it.70
On the grounds of such an understanding of the action of the Holy Spirit, Schlatter cannot
conceive of the Spirit's inspiring and revealing action, and history in antithetical terms. He
emphatically underlines that the Spirit must not be denied for the sake of history or vice
versa. "Rather, true Pneumatik and true Historik are indissolubly connected with each
other."?' With regard to the persons inspired Schlatter puts it as follows:
Their consciousness stands in unity with what precedes them and exists around them. Here belongs,
for example, concerning the prophets, not only their picture of nature and the historical tradition that
they have about the ages ago, but also a significant part of those imaginations by means of which they
describe the [mal aim of God from the perspective of the present. These connections, which link the
bearer of the divine word with his time, are not tom apart through the activity of the Holy Spirit but
rather instituted. For they are indispensable to him [the prophet] since through them the community
comes about which connects God's messenger with those who are to hear him.72
69 Dienst, 78.
70 Dogma, 367-68. The translation of this passage is, indeed, very difficult. Nevertheless, Dintaman's
translation is seriously distorted (see Creative Grace, 169).
71 Dogma, 367. See also Bockmiihl, "Wahmehmung," 105-06. It is only consequent that Schlatter rejects
an unhistorical conception of Scripture: "[F]or the Bible does not lead us out of the sacred history, but into it.
It is not a substitute for, but part of, the same [sacred history]. Its becoming belongs itself to those deeds of
God which have their root in his holy and gracious will" ("Heilige Geschichte," 224).
72 Dogma, 378. It is obvious that such a conception has direct ramifications for Schlatter's view on the in-
fallibility of Scripture. The idea of infallibility is a "postulate" that "invents a revelation in which God is un-
veiled remote and separate from man. God has not given a revelation to us in which man disappears. This is
because of the riches of his grace, not out of weakness, but for the sake of his glorification. For God's glory is
not that he gives us the proof of being able to compose an infallible book, but that he unites men with himself
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In sum: one of the central thoughts of Schlatter's doctrine of inspiration and of Scrip-
ture is that the Holy Spirit, in his creative activity, enables persons to receive and to pro-
claim the word of God in such a way as to be appropriate to their being and nature. "For
God, that which is human is not merely the patiently endured burden, not merely the im-
peding barrier which for the moment will not yet be abolished. Rather, man, including his
weakness, is valued, willed and loved by God. "73
C. God acts upon, with and through the creature
So far we have met two different dimensions of divine agency in Schlatter's concept.
However, when we recapitulate Schlatter's exposition of the creation account in Genesis
we can see that his explicit reference to the creation of the earth, man and land animals car-
ries an implicit reference to three dimensions of divine action. First, God acts alone in a
transcendental and sovereign manner. He calls the earth into being through his creative
word. Second, God employs the soil of the earth. He actively forms man as something new
out of already-existing material. Third, God and creation come even closer when the for-
mer takes the earth as medium to bring forth the land animals."
We encountered a similar structure in Schlatter's understanding of God's savmg
agency. The salvation of man is an absolute and transcendent act of God. At the same time
it is realised through Jesus Christ, that is, within the created reality of this world, so that
man is confronted with the divine reality in a way as to be adequate to his creaturely and
personal nature. But this is not enough. The sinfulness of man requires an act of God that
in such a way that they, as men, speak his word" (Dogma, 375). See also Walldorf, "Inspiration und Ge-
schichte," 72-76.
73 Dogma, 377.
74 For an illuminating exposition of these three facets see Francis Watson: Text, Church and World, 140-
45; Gunton, The Triune Creator, 61-64.
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takes place in man, enabling the same to appropriate God's salvation personally. This di-
vine acting happens through the Holy Spirit."
This concept of three dimensions of divine action, which is only latent in Schlatter's
lecture on Genesis and subliminally underlies his understanding of salvation, becomes ex-
plicit in some of his published works. Based on his assignment of human passivity and ac-
tivity in the act of thinking, Schlatter expounds:
In this we perceive again the threefold relation in which God places himself in relation to us, working
through us, with us and in us. For in the act of knowing we pass through three levels. The first one
remains beyond our perception - we are made in such a way that we cannot observe ourselves in this
[being created]. We never see how consciousness comes about. We are thus primarily made purely
passive, and, therefore, before everything conscious stands something unconscious, something un-
knowable out of which our conscious forming arises. On the second level, we ourselves participate in
our being-formed [Gestaltetwerden] in that we perceive what is given to us, since it is unveiled to us
as our possession. These are the processes of conscious perception [des bewufsten Vernehmens]
through which we receive something that is seen and thought. The third level is that we ourselves
form what has been received and give it existence and effectiveness in us through the capacity we
have received. Now we think in ourselves what God shows us, and know in ourselves what God tells
us (emphasis A. L.).76
In the respective end note, Schlatter refers to another passage in which he also articu-
lates God's agency in terms of a threefold dimensionality.
Even through the course of our personal life there arise differences which define God's relation to us
differently. We are, wherever we turn our will, open to God's effectivity. It goes through us because
for him we are constantly penetrable. This is the untearable bond through which everything created
clings to the Creator. However, God still places himself into another relation to us through the fact
that a consciousness of God and, thereby, the ability to act for him is given to us. Now God is with us.
And when we overcome the separateness from God, which is grounded in the false individual life [fal-
sche Eigenleben], and reach the stage at which we are reconciled with God in that we make God's will
our own will, then we are in God and God is in us (emphasis A. L.).77
Finally, in one of his books for daily devotions, Schlatter asserts the three facets of
God's action on the level of human creatureliness. With reference to Acts 17:28 ("For in
him we live and move and have our being") Schlatter unfolds the "three aspects of life,
75 For the first time we have reached the point in our study at which the different modes of divine action
are linked with the respective person of the Trinity. However, further information is required before we can
actually engage in a detailed examination of this issue.
76 Dogma, 94.
77 Ibid., 37-38.
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movement and existence as that which man has, only because he is dependent on God. "78
Existence is "the first and simplest characteristic" and to be regarded as "a sign of our con-
nectedness with God. For the real [das Wirkliche] comes about through the worker
[Wirker] of all realities [Wirklichkeiten]." The second characteristic is the ability to move
freely. Schlatter comments: "However, that their [the human persons'] existence becomes a
continuous activity in free movement is something which they receive from God." Finally,
the idea of movement is not sufficient to articulate fully what characterises man as God's
work. "His [man's] movement arises out of that which he is inwardly. There he has a con-
sciousness which shows him what he is and does, and there he has the will which makes
his movements into acts. How could man be alive without God?"79
The cantus firmus of the passages just examined is the differentiation of three aspects
of divine action. First, God's action is transcendental action. In a sovereign and one-sided
act he creates something which would not be there without this action. We have met this
idea throughout our study. Second, God acts within the created reality of this world. Here
the divine action no longer originates outside of, and above, creation. Rather, God is with
the creature and acts in its presence. This involvement of God leads to the idea of actio
mediata because God takes creation as medium for further action within creation. In other
words, he acts within creation in such a way as to be appropriate to creation. Third, the
idea of God's active involvement is specified and taken a step further in the concept of di-
vine action in the creature. Here, as we have seen, Schlatter uses the language of indwell-
ing to communicate the idea that God's agency bestows, enables and empowers. God acts
in the creature in such a way that divine action is not only located within the created sphere
78 Andachten, 417.
79 Ibid., 418.
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of this world but originates in and from the creature. Thus God acts from within, and
through, the creature. Here the notion of actio mediata finds its fullest expression.
We have seen that Schlatter applies this concept of the three dimensions of divine ac-
tion primarily to the human person as God's creature. He summarises his thoughts in the
formula: God acts through, with and in man." The difficulty with this formulation is that
the preposition "through" is understood locally: the action "goes through us because for
him [God] we are constantly penetrable.'?" Based on what has been said thus far, it appears
to be more appropriate for us today to articulate the transcendental aspect of God's action
by using the term "upon." The other two aspects are referred to as divine action "with" and
"through" (instrumentally) man.
In conclusion: in the preceding sections we have elaborated that Schlatter's concept of
divine agency rests on a two-dimensional understanding of action which we have called
the transcendental and the immanent dimensions. We then saw that Schlatter implicitly, as
well as explicitly, works with three different dimensions of divine agency. From an an-
thropological perspective this can be summarised by saying that God acts upon, with and
through man. In Schlatter's understanding, these three dimensions (or facets) are the consti-
tutive elements of a divine act. They function, therefore, as fundamental categories for his
understanding of divine agency. To say that the three dimensions are of categorical charac-
80 This formula indicates the affmity of Schlatter's concept to the thought of the Catholic philosopher
Franz von Baader. Schlatter himself quotes Baader in this connection: "God dwells through, with, and in the
created" (Dogma, 559 n. 24). Kindt (Gedanke der Einheit, 88, 195) and Rieger (Rechtfertigungslehre, 46-47,
280) briefly mention the parallels between Baader and Schlatter. A look into Baaders works shows that he
understands divine action as a) creative action which precedes creaturely action, b) as accompanying or as-
sisting action, and c) as a force that offers itself to the creature. Baader often calls this "the temar of instru-
mental acting [werkzeugliches Wirken], co-acting [Mitwirken], and mono- or self-acting [Allein- oder
Selbstwirken]" (see Samtliche Werke, I, 209-10). Accordingly, Baader describes man in his relationship to
God as caused [gewirkt], co-working [mitwirkend], and mono-working [alleinwirkend] (see ibid., II, 168; IV,
375; V, 68-69.; IX, 193; X, 135). This temar is for Baader parallel with the temar of God's dwelling through,
with and in the creature (ibid., VI, 326; cf. IV, 118-19).
8! See the quotation above, p. 108 n. 77.
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ter means that Schlatter is able to distinguish and, at the same, time link the three aspects
of God's economy."
3. Towards a Modal Theory of Divine Action
We begin to anticipate a possible solution for the problems indicated at the beginning
of this chapter. The way in which Schlatter links and distinguishes the different dimensions
of divine agency will eventually lead to a structural theory of divine action and result in a
distinct understanding of the relation between God and man. However, the fact that God's
agency is characterised by distinct yet interrelated dimensions is, as we shall work out,
grounded in God's personal being of grace and love which determines the mode of divine
action. It is to the way in which Schlatter qualifies divine action as personal action of grace
and love that we now turn.
A. Personal action
i. Schlatter's call for a personal concept of divine action
The single reasons for Schlatter's critical stance towards concepts in which God's
agency is understood as the exercise of absolute and arbitrary power working with the ne-
cessity and coercion of a natural force must not be repeated here. It suffices to recall that in
Schlatter's view such concepts are incapable of capturing the biblical way in which God re-
lates to man by acting upon, with and through the human person.
In Scripture, God - in order to act - neither destroys man nor sets him in the dark, so that his [God's]
light may shine; less so do the people of Scripture dethrone God in order to be highly regarded them-
selves. Scripture is not the testimony of the eternal quarrel between God and us, in which the death of
the one means the life of the other. Rather, Scripture shows us the God who makes people his image,
82 For a brief definition of a categorical distinction see Harle, Dogmatik, 74-75.
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uses them as his instruments, and makes them his messengers so that they speak his word; moreover,
he gives us his Son as the Word become flesh.83
Our exposition of Schlatter's thought should have made clear that he does not intend to re-
move the notion of power from his understanding of God's agency. The most obvious case
in point is Schlatter's understanding of the transcendental dimension of divine agency. As
he underlines, the Christian faith "affirms God's grace as power, and often it is the essential
characteristic of the exercise of faith that it ascribes unity to God's love and powers [Kon-
nen]: 'If you are willing you can.'" "Therefore," Schlatter remarks, "our thinking is given
the task that when we look toward God we do not split up the unity of his power and
10ve."84 However, the critical points and desiderata, which we have articulated on the basis
of Schlatter's problem-awareness, can only be met if the divine mode of action is under-
stood in personal terms.
It is true that where God appears man becomes a disappearing nothing and a worthless unimportance.
What, then is their significance - Moses Isaiah, John and Paul? Here the word of the apostle is fitting:
'Whatever they may have been, is not important to me.' Yet, to know the one and only true God
through Scripture, that must be our highest priority. With this idea, however, we have not yet fully
comprehended God's manner and way. We have only paid attention to God's power which sets man in
the depth far below the magnificence of God. But in Scripture God wants to show us something other
than his power. For this reason he did not reveal himself in that he degraded man, pushed him aside
and made him disappear. Rather, God revealed himself by awakening people, lifting them up to him-
self, placing them in communion with himself, and thus entrusting to them the office and service of
being his witnesses in the world. This gives us a true revelation of God, a divine word that fully re-
veals himself; this is the way of grace. God makes human beings his witnesses through whom we
know and hear him. This is not the weakness but the glory ofScripture (emphasis Schlatter)."
Schlatter attempts to transcend the natural analogies of force and power through the per-
sonal analogies of grace and 10ve.86To grasp the promise ofthis move in the context of our
discussion is the concern of the following sections.
83 "Glaube an die Bibel," 241. This passage indicates what will concern us in greater detail later, namely
that Schlatter argues for Christ as the rule of thought for any concept of the relation of God's being and action
and human being and action.
84 Dienst, 54. In a similar context Schlatter outlines the unity of God's love and God's sovereignty, holi-
ness, righteousness, and wrath (Dogma, 196-98).
85 Einleitung, 479.
86 See Dienst, 54; Dogma, 259.
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ii. Characteristics of personal action
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In Schlatter the mode of divine agency is grounded in God's personal being." In anal-
ogy to man, God acts as a personal self in the unity of his consciousness and through his
thinking and willing. On this basis a number of aspects emerge which characterise God's
agency as personal agency. 88
a) Conscious action
To interpret divine agency through personal analogies means, first of all, to ground the
divine acts in God's consciousness. Therefore, Schlatter argues, divine activity must not be
seen as emanation so that "God pours out what is in himself." Rather than being a "dis-
charging force no longer contained inwardly by the bond of unity'!" every divine act is a
conscious one, for it has its basis in God's will: "Because in God there is nothing dark, un-
conscious or dependent - every activity of God originates from his will. Through the latter
we are created (Rev 4:11) and born again (las 4:15; Eph 1,5)."90
Before we continue to elaborate how Schlatter further qualifies divine action as con-
scious and personal action, we need to pinpoint Schlatter's intention behind the idea that
God's action is grounded in God's will. Schlatter wants to make clear that divine causality
is precisely agency, and not a mere force, which reveals itself in effects. "Since we have to
derive all relations in which we are placed to God, from his will, we gain the predication
that they are deeds or works, not merely the effects of forces or the consequences of proc-
esses taking place in God. This applies to creation as well as redemption and perfection"
87 The way in which Schlatter analogically derives God's personal being from the contingent being of the
human person is well presented in Neuer, Zusammenhang, 69-70.
88 The structure and terminology of the following is partly inspired by Schwebel, God: Action and Reve-
lation, 36-37.
89 Dogma, 36. Cf. *DogmatikI, 195.
90 "Wille," 827; similarly in Andachten, 197; *Wesen und Quellen, 37; Metaphysik, 88.
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(emphasis Schlatter). This is the point at which Schlatter explicitly refers to God's agency
as Heilsgeschichte. "As soon as God is affirmed as will, the course of this world presents
itself to us as a system of actions which are, in themselves, connected through the unity of
the one actor and will."" Thus, in a roundabout way, Schlatter argues for history as the
place where the personal character of God's being and the personal mode of his actions is
revealed: "In that God creates history, he, as person, enters into contact with us and reveals
his holy and gracious will to us. "92
b) Intentional action
The notion of will alone does not yet prevent theological thought from lapsing back
into an impersonal understanding of divine action. In Schlatter's view, this relapse is immi-
nent when the divine will is isolated from the rest of our knowledge about God's con-
sciousness. Such a "hypostasized abstraction" empties God's will of all content and leaves
us with nothing but the idea of "causal power," "unlimited power of causing [Macht zum
Wirken]," and "arbitrariness.':" On the basis of these observations Schlatter grounds divine
action not only in God's will but also in God's thinking, knowing and wisdom."
The perfect unity which marks the deity is also the characteristic of the divine will. God himself is the
ground of his will and knows it as that which is completely his own. Since the divine unity has the
fullness in itself, the idea of choice reaches its fullest completion here. The divine choice orders and
determines the fullness of aims which evolve from the opulence of the divine creator-power
[SchOpfermacht].95
In this way Schlatter qualifies divine action as intentional action. This means that God, as
personal agent, not only wills and chooses to act, but in his willing and thinking determines
91 Dogma, 180-81. In the correlating footnote Schlatter talks about "Heilsgeschichte" as "the system of the
divine deeds" (ibid., 573 n. 109).
92 "Heilige Geschichte," 217.
9"
J See Dogma, 180,479.
94 See e.g. ibid., 479.
95 Ibid., 178.
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the object and the purpose of his actions. Moreover, the divine choice also concerns the ac-
tional means through which God regulates his actions in order to reach the aims he has set
himself." With regard to the divine wisdom, Schlatter speaks about "God's thoughts ...
which order his activity in the world and determine it according to its way and goal ...."97
This concept of intentional action underlies Schlatter's talk about the incomprehensible
"diversity of [divine] activities which are qualitatively distinguished from one another." It
is as personal agent that God is able to relate to, and act upon, different objects in forms
and ways appropriate to their respective being." Applied to the human person, this insight
sounds as follows: "God treats a human 'I' not as an object for the actuation of his force,
but is himself, through his thinking and willing, with it and in it."99 Indeed, Schlatter goes
so far as to say "that it is not normal to regard oneself as 'wood and stone' in relation to
God - that such life- and lovelessness should rather be regarded as sin" and as a sign "that
God's grace, Spirit, and Word are not with US."IOO
c) Free action
In everything that has been said thus far, Schlatter ascribes to God the freedom of ac-
tion and the freedom of choice.101 Schlatter marks this predication as the point at which
theological reflection about God's personal agency reaches its limits. The conscious proc-
96 This aspect was already inherent in Schlatter's idea of Heilsgeschichte "as a system of actions which are
in themselves connected through the unity of the one actor and will."
97 "Weisheit oder Torheit," 108.
98 See Dogma, 37; cf. especially what we have said above about the distinctness of man's imago Dei (pp.
31-35) and about the differentiation of creation and providence (pp. 41-43).
99 Ibid., 337. Although this quotation is taken from Schlatter's christology, its context allows us to apply it
to God's interrelation and interaction with man in general.
100 Dienst, 41; see also Rieger, Rechtfertigungslehre, 276-278.
101 See e.g. *Wesen und Quellen, 37, 75.
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esses in God which lead to a divine act are "no object for our thinking."!" Yet what can
and must be said is that "God himself is the ground of his will and knows it as that which is
completely his own."!" Thus, divine action is constituted by God himself.
God's will governs humanity in freedom and omnipotence. God's judgements are unsearchable and his
ways beyond tracing out. Paul expresses this by means of Isa 40:13. The individual is able to offer
God neither counsel nor contribution. There are no human thoughts that might give God direction, nor
human accomplishments to obligate him.'?'
Schlatter ascribes the same freedom to God's thinking "which is free of any necessity,
which rather sets necessities itself - for it has the plastic, creative power [die plastische,
schopferische Macht] in itself. "105 In sum: There is an absolute freedom in God concerning
the grounding of his agency in the unity of his personal consciousness.
What God is for us does not come about in time and is not subject to becoming and decay. God's will
has eternal status - even the will in which he calls us to himself and makes us alive for himself. It does
not depend on that which we have experienced and worked in time, but it precedes not only our work
but also our existence because it is God's own will. 106
iii. Personal action, Word and history
We have already observed that the togetherness of the divine Word and power is cen-
tral to Schlatter's understanding of the sovereignty, freedom and creativity of God in his
actions. At the same time, this togetherness constitutes the context in which Schlatter de-
velops another central feature of his concept of personal divine action. The unity of Word
and power means that God is not merely acting out his capacity to think and will. Rather,
he reveals his thought and will through his Word and acts as the speaking one. Divine
102 Dogma, 479; cf. Schlatter's theological cautiousness regarding the divine blessedness in ibid., 139.
103 Ibid., 178; similarly in Erlduterungen III, 436.
104 Romans, 226. Similarly in Dogma, 185; "Zwei Scharen von Hoffenden," 330.
105 Dogma, 124.
106 Ibid., 474.
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agency is mediated through the divine Word, an insight which Schlatter unfolds primarily
in connection with the past and present creative acts of God.107
It lies in God's superiority to us that we have to conceive of the unity of his fullness as perfectly as it
is possible to our ability to think. Therefore, we connect the divine thinking and speaking with the
creative power [Schopfermacht]. God's thought is a plastic force fplastische Kraft], not separated from
the productive capability [Produktionsvermogen] but in complete unity with it. Thus, his thinking is
that which sets the real; he speaks and it happens.... Through the union of the creative power with
the Word, the independence of the world is secured and, at the same time, the melting-theories
[Verschmelzungstheorien] which dissolve the 'I' and things into God are prevented. It is not a commu-
nity of substance or force which we should state concerning ourselves and God, but that the divine
thinking and willing makes us the way we are.108
In analogy to the first creation, the divine Word is also the mediator of the second
creation - the new man. According to Schlatter, it is highly questionable to ground one's
faith solely in the divine power, which is undoubtedly an "essential characteristic of the di-
vine glory." Yet the attempt to gain the grounds of faith somewhere apart from God's Word
would mean a distortion in our picture of God - the cancellation "of the highest and most
holy in him."
We make God dumb to ourselves and, consequently, close ourselves from his God-heart. Thus, he is
no longer the one who as person is open and alive to us. With the dumb God there is no communion
[Verkehr]. The power that shapes me and makes me its form does not yet institute communion be-
tween myself and itself - not even if it exercises its effects in me internally; guides my thinking;
founds my willing, and awakens my love. All this is not yet communion with God. Of course, in this
way 1 receive a word that addresses him, however, it is me alone who is speaking. This is not com-
munion. Talking to myself is not communion, but his talking to me. We are not those speaking to the
silent God. Rather, it is only his Word which commences the conversation of our heart with him. Be-
cause he has spoken and has made us listeners, because he has given us words which are his own,
which he has transmitted to us through his messengers, therefore a status of faith has been prepared
for us that is truly communion [Verkehr] with him or, according to the Apostle's word, community
with him. That we know and affirm these words as his own, carry them in our hearts and take them
into our mouth in thankfulness, petition and praise - that is the fundament of our faith.109
107 See Johannes, 4-7; "Jesus und wir heutigen Menschen," 209; "Wunder der Bibel," 72; *Dogmatik I,
195; Erlauterungen 1,604.
108 Dogma, 123.
109 "Glaube an die Bibel," 233. In the whole section (pp. 233-35) Schlatter focusses on the disregard of
the word" and concludes: "We wish to experience the power of God, however, the first thing we need as our
preparation for faith is grace, and the fIrst act of grace is that God speaks to us. We hear God's friendliness
and love. For this reason, the affIrmation of his word is the fundament of our faith" (235).
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To put it as briefly as possible: "It is through the Word that every creative act [Schopfung-
stat] happened and happens." 110 Walldorf has clearly outlined that in Schlatter the creative
Logos of God is not only the ontological basis of the being and nature of every creature but
also the ontological enabling ground of creation's intelligibility, rationality and human
knowablity.!" However, what we have to note is that, in Schlatter's view, God's Word ren-
ders his action ultimately personal. To say that God creates through his Word is "to ascer-
tain the personal manner of the act of creation." lI2 At this point we see most clearly how
the idea of personal action enables Schlatter to relate God and man without divesting either
of them of their respective being. Through his Word, God is able to relate to, and interact
with, man without ceasing to be God and without undermining the distinctness and particu-
larity of the human person in its otherness vis-a-vis himself. As the above quote suggests,
the divine Word institutes a personal rather than a substantial community.
The relation instituted through the creative Word [SchOpfungswort] gives both their autonomy
[SelbsUindigkeit]. The Logos idea secures not only God's supremacy but also the reality of the world
against alI Akosmie, against the dissolving of the human 'I' and ofnature into the divine substance. The
divinity mediates itself only through the Word, giving us our own being [Wesenheit] formed through
God's thought, instituted through God's power. 1I3
Thus Schlatter again affirms that the personal mode of divine action mediated through
the divine Word brings forth history, that is, personal relationship and interaction of God
and man which leaves space for both to be, and act, in propriety to their individual identity.
"Because God grips us and reigns over us through his Word, he deals with us as Spirit with
spirit and lifts us beyond that which nature contains and enables us to partake in a sacred
110 Erlauterungen J, 604; similarly in Johannes, 5.
111 See WaIIdorf, Realistische Philosophie, 133-41; cf. Neuer, Zusammenhang, 80-81 and von Lupke's re-
cent essay "Gottes Gaben wahrnehmen," 288.
lI2 *DogmatikJ, 195.
113 Ibid., 195-96.
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history and leads us to him - the personal God - as persons."!" Schlatter also puts it this
way: "The divine Word has creative power. Therefore it works history and comes to us as
the fruit of history. "1I5
B. Personal action as grace and love
i. Personal action as grace
Schlatter takes his concept of divine action a step forward by defining God's agency not
only as personal agency but as grace. Central in this connection is Schlatter's conviction
that the God of Scripture is good - indeed, the only one who is truly good, who "negates
evil," and "wills and creates the good."!" The notion of God's good, giving and creative
will appears throughout Schlatter's works and is tied up with the idea of God's goodness
and grace: "Grace is giving will ..."II7 Put differently, grace is God's eternal "form of will
[Willensgestalt]"118 and "originates from his own goodness."!" On these grounds, God's
grace has to be seen as the mode of his agency. "God's behaviour towards us is grace, giv-
ing goodness, an affirmation that applies to us, which gives us an individual life [Eigenle-
ben] because it [the grace] makes that which it gives to us our property.":" In other words,
God has determined himself to act pro nobis. As we have elaborated above, God creates;
enables; upholds, redeems and perfects the human creature, and all of these actions reveal
1I4 "Glaube an die Bibel," 234.
I 15 "Vergebung der Sunden," 19.
116 "Moral oder Evangelium," 94; for further references see Neuer, Zusammenhang, 73-74.
II7 "Bedeutung des Denkens," 326; cf. Sprechstunde, 67; Metaphysik, 87; Opfer, 3, 14; "Schatzung der
Individualitat," 127; *Philosophie und Christentum, 28.
118 "Christi Versohnen," 19I.
119 "Wille," 827.
120 Selbstdarstellungen, 154.
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that he wills to give his goodness to man.:" They witness, as Schlatter phrases it, "that the
power on which we depend is kind and cares for us; the one who helps us with almighty
goodness, we call God."122 Hence, Schlatter simply talks about the "divine giving" or God
as the one who gives. 123
Since the divine action of grace is grounded in God's own goodness, it is sovereign
and independent of any precondition.
Paul knew of no other righteousness except God's, which derives its premise and nature from what
God is. God's declaration in Exod 33:19 states what God is like: what allows the individual to share in
God is his mercy. His mercy is his own decision and does not depend upon what the individual does.
It would not be mercy if it were based upon the worth of the individual's work. God gives mercy to
whomever he wants to give it. This attests to the deity of God that knows of no dependence upon the
individual. 124
Schlatter speaks of "the omnipotence of the divine grace" and of God's "almighty grace" in
order to articulate the sovereignty, unlimitedness and independence of the divine grace.!"
This is the crucial move - that the divine causality is no longer conceived of in terms of
power alone but as taking place in the personal mode of grace. Through this Schlatter ob-
viates the danger of theo-monism. The anti-monistic thrust of his thought is already ob-
servable in his idea of God's good and giving will:
His [Jesus'] God is will, in fact, not the will of an absolute egoist, who for the sake of his revelation
annihilates all other life outside himself, but the giving will, who creates life and gives will, and who,
therefore, requires obedience and judges disobedience. He accuses of guilt and forgives guilt; he sepa-
rates the evil one from himself and reconciles him with himself; he takes the glory away from man if
the latter separates from him, and gives him glory in that he [God] unites him with himself. 126
121 Cf. Griinde, 29, quoted above p. 22; Theology ofthe Apostles, 362; Andachten, 367 ("Everything God
does to those who belong to him, is grace.").
122 Andachten, 296; cf. "Wunder," 832 where Schlatter qualifies God's omnipotence in terms of the om-
nipotence of the gracious Father (quoted above, p. 50).
123 See e.g. Dogma, 57, 157; 371; Theology ofthe Apostles, 362; "Natur, Sunde und Gnade," 65; Dienst,
46; "Noch ein Wort," 120; "Glaube und Geschichte," 346; Sprechstunde, 56; "Wort und Schrift," 26-34.
124 Romans, 205-06; see also Dogma, 144, 185; "Wille," 827; Andachten, 376; Kennen wir Jesus?, 90-91;
"Pforte zum Romerbrief," 65-66.
125 See e.g. Dogma, 371; Andachten, 392; Kennen wir Jesus?, 50, 389-90; Opfer, 48; Sprechstunde, 9;
"Wunder der Bibel," 79; "Zwei Scharen von Hoffenden," 317.
126 "Zweifel an der Messianitat," 196; see also "Entwicklung des judischen Christentums," 241-43.
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In qualifying divine causality as personal action of grace, Schlatter wants to show that
God's action does not contradict, undermine, or even destroy man as the actional object and
recipient of the divine effect. Just the opposite - through grace as its mode, divine action is
always oriented toward the concrete and individual life of man in his being-other-than-
God. The New Testament, Schlatter explains,
witnesses to God's giving, which is seriously meant and efficacious; it makes man someone who re-
ceives it, and it shapes him. God's creating and giving penetrate man's existence and consciousness in
their concrete, historically determined form. It establishes him and becomes visible in and through
him. God does his work of grace and judgment not outside man and so, too, not beyond history, but in
it and through ito 127
God's action of grace is the central theme of Schlatter's works on the Dienst des Christen.
Along the lines of what we have said thus far he states that grace "does not regard its re-
cipient as nil; rather it aims at him, seeks and wills him, affirms him, and lifts him up into
vivacity, honour and power."!" Divine grace is truly creative:
Grace seeks and creates its recipient and, therefore sets us into passivity. However, it seriously makes
us its recipients so that it effects us, empowers us and transposes us into vivacity [Lebendigkeit].
Therefore, there is no receiving of the divine gift without the activity founded by it in us, as little as
there is an activity which does not have prior to it as its ground and after it as its fruit and goal - the
.. f h dO 0 oft 109receiving 0 t e rvme gi 0-
In other words, the divine grace not only acts towards, or upon, man as its recipient but
also in man - by creating and enabling him and through man - by empowering man to be
"its instrument and organ.'?" Schlatter summarises this understanding of the efficacious-
ness of God's grace under the term "rule of grace."!"
The notion of God's creative grace is central to Schlatter's attempt to untie some of the
knots of a theory of divine action. This shall concern us in a separate section below. For
127 "Theology of the New Testament and Dogmatics," 199.
128 Dienst, 22; cf. ibid., 43-44; Dogma, 377.
129 "Noch ein Wort," 100; similarly in "Wille," 827; "Bedeutung des Denkens," 326; "Sollen wir gegen
unsere Sunde kampfen," 90; Furcht VOl' dem Denken, 60; "Wandel nach dem Geist," 15.
130 "Auch eine Gabe," 25; cf. Dogma, 511; Griinde, 7l.
131 See Riickblick, 104; Briefe, 64-65. Cf. also the term "way of grace" in the citation above p. 112 n. 85.
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now we note that the idea of personal action of grace constitutes the conceptual basis on
which Schlatter propounds that the contingency of the human creature upon the divine cau-
sality is more than just passivity and dependence but precisely that which constitutes man
as a person in relationship to God:
He [God] is and reigns; but he is the grace for which reason his giving institutes property; his activity
creates life; his will awakens will. Hence, his relationship to us is intended to be of that kind which
develops between persons - not only between forces and substances, not only between natural factors
... He is an 'I' and reveals himself to me as an 'I' in that he presents me with an 'I' and thus becomes a
'Thou' to me.132
ii. Personal action as love
All the decisive aspects of Schlatter's understanding of divine action as grace return,
albeit in somewhat different form, in his notion of divine action as love. Schlatter himself
was filled with a deep respect for the mystery of God's love: he did not dare to speak: pub-
licly about IJn 4:8 (God is love) till he was 83 years old.!" Love "is the final word that we
can reach about God." 134 Important for our considerations is Schlatter's view of the suprem-
acy of love regarding God's being and action: "God is love; he is love not among other
things - he is it in all he is" and, as Schlatter adds a few sentences later, "in all he is and
does."!" Based on what we have said thus far about divine personal action, Schlatter's link-
ing of love and will is only consequent:
It [love] is the highest and ruling form [Gestalt] of the divine will and penetrates everything God
thinks and does ... Because of it he is the Creator and ruler ofthe world. Out of its holy greatness and
truthfulness springs the seriousness of his wrath and judgement, and his righteousness has its ground
132 "Unterwerfung," 9-10; similarly in "Selbstdarstellungen," 154.
l33 "Weihnachtsansprache," 64; cf. Neuer, Zusammenhang, 100.
134 Dogma, 196. For the following see also Neuer, Zusammenhang, 96-101; Walldorf, Realistische Philo-
sophie,2l2 n. 136; Rieger, Rechtfertigunslehre, 380-97, especially 380-85.
135 "Weihnachtsansprache," 64-65.
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in it. Therefore, it alone makes God's words and works understandable, and the one who does not have
it is blind to God.136
A number of aspects deserve our attention here. To begin with, God is absolutely free and
sovereign in his love. This is because ofthe perfection of God's being and love which tran-
scends human love: "It is God's nature to be love, not ours."!" Divine love is "pure love,
whole love":" This is to say that God is not in need of any love or gift for which reason his
action is free of "selfishness," "self-preservation," "egoism," and "self-realisation."!"
Hence, Schlatter conceives of God's love to be absolute and free regarding its factuality
and efficacy: "The love of God is the free and complete cause, his own act, in which he re-
veals himself ...."140 Schlatter's expression, "omnipotence of the creative love," appears to
be an apt summary of his thoughts."!
What follows from the material just presented is that orientation towards the other
which we already met in Schlatter's exposition of divine action as grace. When Schlatter
talks about love as the "highest form" of the divine will, he refers to "goodwill," to the
"giving wi11."142 Love freely and actively seeks the well-being of the other, and precisely
this is the central idea behind terms such as "creative will," "creative love," and "love
which has the creative power in itself." 143
The kind of love that consumes a person's inner life and leaves no goal or desire that would provide
him with the meaning of his own life, would be a nonsensical procedure in Jesus' view. Love cannot
yield this result in relation to God since God is good and himself the one who gives, the one who
136 Erlduterungen III, 155-56. The most direct connection appears in the term "Liebeswille" (Kennen wir
Jesus?, 39). Schlatter's linking oflove and will can also be observed on the formal level when he outlines the
idea oflove in the sections on the will (Dogma, 186-98; Ethik, 116-35).
137 "Weihnachtsansprache," 68.
138 Kennen wir Jesus?, 90.
139 See Dogma, 192; *Dogmatik I, 140-41; *Kritische Bemerkungen, 19; Kennen wir Jesus?, 90.
140 Dogma, 144.
141 "Evangelium und Bekenntnis," 22.
142 Schlatter identifies "the goodwill in its ripeness" with "love" (*Wesen und Quellen, 105). See also
Dogma, 186, 196; Paulus der Bote, 419; Furcht vor dem Denken, 42.
143 See "Weihnachtsansprache," 64; Kennen wir Jesus?, 39,218.
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grants man life and who preserves and perfects him. Love that did not seek or receive anything from
God would deny what God's love desires and produces [schaffi]. If that were the case, God's will
would be presented as complete selfishness that absorbs everything; Jesus conceived of God's love as
a genuine doing of good by which the individual received his life and his strength.144
These words shed the decisive light on Schlatter's notion of man being created in the image
of God.
Out of his love arises our authority for own willing, for own acting. Because his Word enters into us
we are enabled to think truth, and because his command speaks in us we are gifted with the capacity to
work righteousness, and because he makes us partakers in his work he makes it our honour that we are
allowed to serve him. This is the nature of love - that it gives and makes the one it loves, rich. 145
Human personhood, human capacity for free and self-determined action in its particularity;
otherness, and Selbstandigkeit vis-a-vis God is, from beginning to end, grounded in the di-
vine action of love.
"Why does the individual life ofthe creature emerge? Because God wills the creature with an affinna-
tion that is seriously meant for it. Why does it [the creature] have the power to judge its own will and
thought? Because God wills it as the possessor of an own life. Why are we - notwithstanding the ab-
nonnity of our thinking and willing - nurtured by the power source of nature? Through this we re-
ceive mercy [Schonung] and patience. Whence should this come if it is not grounded in love? We
have the hope of redemption and repentance and even experience both in manifold ways. The will that
keeps open for us the possibility to return and grants us a new beginning, is love.146
4. Towards a Trinitarian Theory of Divine Action
A. The mediation of divine action through Christ
A representation of Schlatter's concept of divine agency would remain incomplete
without an outline of his understanding of the mediation of divine action. This mediation is
no longer one through creaturely agents or causes, as we have outlined above, but the me-
diation of God's actions through his Son and his Spirit: "Two mediators of divine grace
stand before us and do their work on us: the Christ and the Spirit."!" In the wake of the
144 History ofthe Christ, 162.
145 Kennen wir Jesus?, 91; similarly in Dogma, 197; "Heilige Geschichte," 216.
146 Dogma, 196; cf. Ethik, 87.
147 Dogma, 352; cf. ibid., 354; Erlauterungen II, 280-81.
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idea ofmediation, Schlatter's concept of divine agency assumes a trinitarian character. This
suggests that a full comprehension of Schlatter's theory of divine action can only be
achieved after having investigated his doctrine of the Trinity. Yet, as we shall see, Schlat-
ter's notion of God's personal action as grace and love culminates, so to speak, in his idea
of the personal mediation of divine agency through the Son and the Spirit. Therefore, we
present the central aspects of this subject at this point of the discussion, accepting that
some issues must await their full explication during the further course of this study.
i. The divine Logos, the eternal Son of God and the logoi of creation'"
We have demonstrated above that the divine thinking, wisdom and Word are funda-
mental to Schlatter's concept of God's agency. God acts upon this world through his Word,
his Logos. Based on his exegesis of Jn 1:1-14, Schlatter argues that through the connection
of the Logos with the human Jesus, the former is personally qualified: "Because the word
is God's Word, it is 'the cause' of everything brought into being. This cause is, however,
not neutrum nor merely force, but will and thought; consciousness; active person.'?" On
this basis, Schlatter holds, John makes it difficult to think of the Logos of God in Stoic
terms as God's elemental power. 150 Similarly, God's Word does not mean "the ground of
reason that creates the world in Stoic thought."!" God's Logos is neither an abstract nor ra-
tional capacity to think, nor a world-plan constructed in God's mind. Rather, it was in
Christ that the divine Logos assumed flesh. Thus, Schlatter remarks, John talks about the
148 For the following see also Walldorf, Realistische Philosophie, 135-36.
149 Johannes, 2. Similarly in Theology ofthe Apostles, 136.
ISO See Theology ofthe Apostles, 136.
lSI Ibid., 168.
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personal God, who speaks his Word; and about the human person, who listens to the divine
Word. 152
Schlatter's argument for distinguishing between the divine Logos and possible other
logoi is fortified in his critique that the divine Logos must not primarily, or even exclu-
sively, be seen in relation to the created world.
The divine thinking possesses perfection also in such a way that it is not only turned toward the world
but also turned inwardly toward God. With this we give the Hellenising teachings on thinking and lo-
gos their necessary correction. For their assumption - that the content of God's Word consists solely
or primarily in the world-plan - encroaches on the notion of God. God's Word is primarily God's im-
age.153
The terminology of image suggests that Schlatter regards the divine Logos as an eter-
nal counterpart which God has in himself, an idea which he articulates as follows: "God
does not have forces, objects or things in himself. Rather, he makes even his Word and his
Spirit capable of themselves [ihrer selbst machtigi, makes them alive in themselves, and
makes them persons.v'" Thus, Schlatter draws a clear line of demarcation between the di-
vine Logos and the logoi of creation.
He [God] does not speak many words but one Word and his word is the Word. The latter does not
have its content just in the world, but primarily in God. As that which is beheld and known by God, it
is with God. Because God knows it as his Word and unites it with himself, it has the deity, it is God,
In 1:1. These are the fmal conceptions we can achieve about the divine act of thinking (emphasis
Schlatter). ISS
Along these lines Schlatter identifies the divine Logos with the eternal Son of God, so that
the following words must be seen as the ultimate statement and summary of his thoughts:
"[I]t [God's Word] is God himself, God's Son.,,156
152 Johannes, 2.
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ii. The exclusiveness of Christ's mediation
127
The eternal Son of God assumed human flesh in Jesus Christ and became the incarnate
Word of God directed to, and spoken in, creation. The repercussion of this on Schlatter's
understanding of the mediation of divine action is that the forms and ideas that give struc-
ture, unity, rationality and intelligibility to the cosmos can no longer be seen as the media-
tors between God and the world. This does not mean that Schlatter rejects those meta:'
physical realities created by God by which he - through his creative Logos and in his wis-
dom - orders the cosmos and makes it intelligible. Yet, these logoi can neither supplement
nor replace the one Logos, Jesus Christ, as the one mediator between God and man.
John conceived of God as a person, especially when he distinguished between God and his Word and
ascribed to the Word the undiminished entirety of the divine life and complete deity.... [T]he suppo-
sition may be correct that John expected he would illustrate Jesus' union with the Father for the
Greeks by way of the term 'Word' and to aid their understanding ofthe reason why their access to God
occurred by way of faith in the man Jesus. For those who took part in Greek education were able to
link the term "Logos" with the concept of the pervasive divine government and express by it what was
divine in nature and in man. John protects his thought from Greek influences by defining the Word
solely in terms of Jesus' history. The community is to realize, not in nature or spiritual processes, but
in Jesus what God has with himself as his eternal Word, by which he created the world and by which
he rules it and leads it to himself. Thereby John was able to fend off Greek ideas that posited a unity
between God and human reason and natural law.157
If we draw out these lines a little further we see that Schlatter sets the divine Logos in di-
rect antithesis to man's logos. In his critique of "Denkreligion" (rationalistic religion),
Schlatter elaborates that identifying the divine Logos with the logoi of creation leads - to-
gether with a rationalistic anthropology and epistemology - to the idea that a certain form
of reason, which comprehends this world and abstracts its principles and metaphysical
157 Theology ofthe Apostles, 168-69. Gunton, in his analysis of Greek concepts of logos and their appro-
priation in Western theology, reaches similar conclusions. He states: "The founders of medieval ontology
were therefore Philo and Augustine, who transferred the eternal Platonic forms from 'external' reality to the
mind of God. Effectively this crowded out the trinitarian, and particularly Christological, mediation of the
doctrine of creation.... The Philonic and Augustinian development means that the coeternal and personal
mediator of God's creating work is effectively replaced by the almost eternal Platonic forms. The Logos is
crowded out by the Iogoi" ("The Trinity, Natural Theology, and a Theology of Nature," 93). Schlatter's view
of the "relationships that developed between Platonic ideas, Aristotelian reason, and Stoic thought on the one
hand and the teaching on God on part of the Greek and Jerusalem synagogue on the other" (Theology ofthe
Apostles, 168) can be found in Geschichte Israels, 295-303.
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categories, establishes unity with the divine thinking and thus exercrses the mediating
function between man and God.158 Schlatter decidedly highlights the points which render
this approach incompatible with the biblical understanding of the church as the community
of faith and its participation in God.
In Plato and Aristotle, and even later on in Stoicism, we find quite admirable definitions of faith. But
this does not mean that faith was valued in those systems as the one factor that decides the course of
our whole life and unites us into a community. In Hellenic piety knowledge (gnosis), rather than faith,
was the dominant ideal. The religious Greek aspired towards right thinking; he exercised his mental
faculties in order to unveil the divine and find the right philosophical expressions for physics and
metaphysics. From knowledge he also expected the highest prize of religion, union with God. The
Christians, on the other hand, were from the outset neither a society of 'righteous' men, nor yet a band
of'gnostics,' but the community of believers; and this was so because the Church was brought into ex-
istence by what happened at the first Easter (emphasis Schlatterj.i"
The logical outcome of this notion is, as Schlatter reasons, a concept of God's being as pure
thinking (Aristotle's noesis noeseos), through which a distinction is upheld between human
thinking and God's thinking. 160
It is through God's Logos, who assumed flesh and was personally spoken to creation in
the person and work of the incarnate Son, Jesus Christ, that Denkreligion is made impossi-
ble: "Through the cross of Christ the God vanished ... who is nothing but reason so that
the achievement of our faculty of thinking is supposed to unite us with him."'" Schlatter
explicitly states Jesus Christ as the destroyer of "that religion known to us all which con-
sists of pious thoughts, words, knowledge and doctrinal statements. Should our unification
158 See e.g. Furcht vor dem Denken, 51; Metaphysik, 38; Grande, 28; *Philosophie und Christentum, 18-
19.
159 Church in the New Testament Period, 6. Similarly in "Paulus und das Griechentum,". Here Schlatter
shows that the striving to "understand God's world-plan" and to penetrate into "the divine process of think-
ing," is the "religious behaviour" resulting from DenkreIigion. This behaviour is diametrically opposed to
Christian faith as "the attachedness of our person to the one whose gift founds, moves and completes our
whole existence" (pp. 134-35).
160 See e.g. Dogma, 565, 582-83,285-86. Schlatter's critique of DenkreIigion is a continuum of his critical
engagement with what he calls "Griechentum." This is the term under which Schlatter - sometimes in a
rather undifferentiated manner - discusses philosophical concepts which, in his view, reach "from Plato in an
unbroken tradition through Kant down into the present" (Briefe, 18; cf. Ruckblick; 40). Neuer and recently
Walldorf have forcefully outlined that Schlatter's grappling with Greek philosophy is an indirect grappling
with idealism. See especially Neuer's essay "Der Idealismus und die Erweckung" and his "Introduction Me-
taphysik," 10-11; Walldorf, ReaIistische Philosophie, 214-24.
161 Dogma, 295.
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and reconciliation with God not consist in that we are able to know, talk and preach what
God is and works?" Schlatter response is this: "However, this idol, which we honour
merely with words and thoughts because it is nothing but perfect reason, must vanish; oth-
erwise we will never be reconciled with God. For our thoughts are too short and his
thoughts are too great to come together."!" In other words, the cross of Christ turns the
wisdom of man, who strives to know God by comprehending the divine thoughts and
works in this world, into foolishness. In his essay on 1 Cor 1:17-2:16 Schlatter states:
God, however, executes a devastating judgement on the wisdom of the world by laying the salvation
of the world into such a foolish deed (1: 19). For in this form it [the wisdom of the world] is com-
pletely unable to know God, and this the less, the more it means to know God and the higher it devel-
ops its thoughts about God and his doing [Tun ].163
Christ, the Logos, transcends, dismantles and destroys any type of religion and theology in
which the human logos has seized the mediatory role between man and God. In this sense
we may indeed say that in Schlatter's theology divine thinking is counter-thinking, divine
wisdom is counter-wisdom, and the divine Logos is the counter-Logos.P'
iii. The christological mediation of all divine actions
How Schlatter's notion of the divine Logos is anchored in his doctrine of the Trinity
shall be examined later. Our focus now is on Schlatter's idea "that God's whole acting takes
162 "Kreuz Jesu," 10.
163 "Weisheit oder Torheit," 111. Schlatter argues that the philosophical work since Descartes also even-
tuated in the collapse of Denkreligion: "'God has made the wisdom of this world into foolishness.' This hap-
pened through the finale ofthe work of Jesus and the founding of the church; it has happened again through
the philosophical history ofthe recent generations" (Philosophische Arbeit, 283).
164 With this interpretation we discover Schlatter's thoughts to be close to Bonhoeffer's notion of Christ as
the Anti-Logos. Christ is the Logos who, in assuming humanity, became flesh and entered the human logos.
Yet, Bonhoeffer emphatically underlines: "It should, however, be noted here that the Logos of God may not
be identified with the human Logos, as in German idealism, nor may it be thought of as analogous to it, as in
Catholicism" (Christology, 50). Indeed, the divine Logos is not only distinct from the human logos but stands
in antithesis over against it (Christology, 30): "But what if the Anti-Logos raises his claim in a completely
new form? If he is no longer an idea, but a Word, which challenges the supremacy of the Logos? If he ap-
pears at some time and in some place in history as a person? If he declares himself to be a judgment on the
human Logos and points to himself: I am the Way, the Truth and the Life; I am the death ofthe human Lo-
gos, I am the life of God's Logos ...?"
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place through his [Christ's] mediation and that he is God's organ and instrument in all di-
vine workings [Walten]."165 To talk about Christ's mediatorship means for Schlatter to say
"[h]ow divine agency reaches us," "how God's agency comes to US."166 The mediator is the
"carrier of the divine agency and gift" and through him "God himself is present and effec-
tive." 167 This point is crucial for our purposes because Schlatter conducts a modal qualifica-
tion of divine agency as the result of which God is conceived of to be actively present be-
fore, and with, man. The culminating point of this mode of action is reached in that the
mediator himself assumes humanity, is "historically located," and thus "stands before us as
God's witness.'?" In Jesus man is confronted with "the totality of divine grace,"!" "Jesus
has placed man before God and God to man; an I and a Thou interact here with one another
and all external media fall." 170
The universal scope of Christ's work already came to the fore in Schlatter's under-
standing of God's saving agency. Schlatter insists on not limiting Christ's work to the re-
moval of human sinfulness and the restoration of man's status integritatis. Christ is not
merely a scapegoat.'?' Rather, God's original purpose with man is realised through Christ
who, in reconciling man with God, establishes the community of faith so that through him
165 Jesus und Paulus, 84; cf. Dogma, 340-41; Theologie der Apostel, 337 where Schlatter states that "all
activity of God upon the heavenly and earthly world takes place through Christ." Kostenbergers rendering
suppresses the mediatorial thrust of the German original when he translates: "The focus of all of God's heav-
enly and earthly activity on Christ ..." (Theology ofthe Apostles, 254). Through the term "organ" Schlatter
wants to indicate that he does not understand Christ to be an inanimate tool through which God actualises his
actions. For Schlatter's notion of "organ" see above, p. 24 n. 48.
166 Paulus der Bote, 255, 256 (in above order).
167 Johannes, 5; see also Kennen wir Jesus?, 161-62.
168 Dogma, 353.
169 Theology ofthe Apostles, 254-55.
170 Jesus und Paulus, 104.
171 See e.g. Schlatter's essay "1stJesus ein Sundenbock?".
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the Kingdom of God has come.!" On these grounds Christ's mediatorship extends to all di-
vine actions through which God relates himself to the world as the one from whom,
through whom and to whom everything has its being.
'For there is one God and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus.' [1Tim 2:5]. This
passage ... towers high above that which the Reformation dogma has read in the New Testament. It
thought of Jesus' mediatorship only because we are guilty. Paul has never forgotten this either and
therefore he describes the glory of Christ by saying that he [Christ] gave himself as ransom. Paul,
however, never viewed Christ merely as the restorer of our fall, but calls him 'the mediator' because
the whole work ofGod happens through him, not only his forgiving but also his creating. In order to
understand why Paul called Christ the mediator, we must understand what he says about God our
Creator (emphasis A. L.).173
The limits of our study force us to leave aside many of the exegetical and material de-
tails of Schlatter's outline and focus on the main aspects.!" Christ is not only the mediator
of salvation but also of God's creative, providential and perfecting agency "who invests us
with the being-from God and the being-to God."!" On the basis ofCo11:15-17 Schlatter
states: "Everything has been created in him, thus also has its abiding subsistence and aim
in him, and everything is created for his sake in order that it be his possession and receive
life and glory from him, thus manifesting his Sonship."!" In other words, Christ's mediato-
rial action is ontologically the enabling ground of the first as well as the second creation,
the community of faith:
Because the community of the Son with the Father precedes everything which God let spring forth
through him, he [the Son] is also the one who gives duration, force and effective power
[Wirkungsmacht] to all things. Because he subsists they subsist; because he lives they are alive; be-
172 See e.g. Dogma, 80-81,280; Griinde, 60, 65.
173 Erlebtes, 74.
174 The exegetical basis are those New Testament passages in which the full participation in God's eternal
being is ascribed to Jesus. The Johannine term "Word of God" and the Pauline term "image of God" are most
important in this context. "The completeness of the One's communion with Jesus" resulted in the "pro-
nouncement that God had accomplished the creative work and ruled over all things through him" (Theology
ofthe Apostles, 28 with reference to Jn 1:3; lCo 8:6; Col 1:17; Heb 1:2; see also ibid., 366). For Schlatter's
linking of the term "image of God" with Gen 1:25.26 see Paulus der Bote, 256; Theology of the Apostles,
254-55,308-09; Erlduterungen 11,659.
175 Paulus der Bote, 255.
176 Theology ofthe Apostles, 307; cf. ibid., 133-35,307-09; "Wort," 830; "Wort und Schrift," 32.
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cause he rules them they enjoy God's government. The one who separates himself from him obliter-
ates the root of his life.177
Consequently, Schlatter places nature and history under the governance of Christ as that
which is "created and ordered in Christ."!"
It does not come unexpectedly when Schlatter also ascribes the three dimensions of
divine agency to Christ who, as the divine Word, mediates this agency to creation. He con-
eludes his exegesis of In 1:1-4 as follows: "yEyovE, (w~ and 4>wc;; make an ascending line.
The subsistence of all things is the effect of the Word. Higher than subsistence is vivacity
[Lebendigkeit], and the highest is the light whereby life is invested with the conscious,
knowing inwardness [Innerlichkeit]."179
B. The mediation of divine action through the Spirit
The work of the second mediator of the divine grace is also of universal scope: all di-
vine acts towards and in the world happen through the Spirit of God.180 Compared with his
outline of the scope of christological mediation, Schlatter's explicit remarks on the pneu-
matological mediation of divine agency are terse. He links the acting of the Holy Spirit
with the miracles that occurred in the history of Israel. 181 Further, as we saw above, inspira-
tion is the work ofthe Holy Spirit through which God's word and will are revealed to man.
Interesting in this connection is that Schlatter ascribes all knowledge of God, even that
which is derived from nature, as God's creation, to the mediating agency of the Holy
177 Erlauterungen 11,661; cf. Paulus der Bote, 255-56; Erlauterungen III, 188-92. See also what we have
said about the christological grounding of Schlatter's notion of man as simul creatus et peccator (above, p.
62).
178 Dogma, 340-41. Regarding Israel's history see Paulus der Bote, 289-90; regarding Christ's heavenly
reign see e.g. Theology ofthe Apostles, 365-68; Dogma, 341-43; Erlauterungen 11,559-60.
179 Johannes, 7; cf. what we outlined about the three dimensions of divine action above, especially the
quotation on p. 109 n. 78.
180 See Paulus der Bote, 288; Theologie des NT 1,478.
181 See Paulus der Bote, 288-89.
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Spirit. 182 A hint that Schlatter ties up divine providential action with the work of the Holy
Spirit can be seen in Schlatter's affirmation that there is - even for non-Christians - "an
inwardly effective presence of God." 183
Schlatter's central concern is to elucidate that the mediation of the Holy Spirit stands
for a mode of divine agency in which God is continuously and creatively present and ac-
tive in man. This idea underlies not only Schlatter's concept of salvation and inspiration'"
but his whole outline of the work of the Holy Spirit.
Through the historical work of Christ the divine grace places itself before us and makes itself visible
to us in the one, who through his Sonship and rule, is set above us. Through the Spirit, however, the
divine activity [Wirkung] is laid into our own inner life [Innenleben]; he reveals the divine grace to us
on our own inner condition.i"
When Schlatter accentuates the immanent dimension of the activity of the Holy Spirit he
does not mean to undermine the transcendent aspect of divine action. Rather, the operation
of the Spirit is marked by God's creative power - and therefore sovereign and free. The
Spirit works "in the full majesty of divine acting which is creatively supreme to man and
nature"!" for which reason neither the acting subject nor the act as such is perceivable but
remains a mystery. Schlatter articulates this in the form of a modal analogy between the
creatio originalis and the creatio nova.
[T]he creative moment, in which the shaping force of the Spirit grips us, is concealed from our obser-
vation. We do not perceive our being-caused [Bewirktwerden] by God. With the work of the Spirit it
is the same as with the establishment of our natural life: the fIrst thing that happens takes place with-
out us, not only without our co-operation but also without our knowing; it has already happened be-
fore we perceive and do the will of the Spirit.,,187
182 See Schlatter's reflections on Ps 19 in Dogma, 371.
183 Sprechstunde, 10. See also Ethik, 261 (God rules us "through nature and history, through the Christ
and the Spirit") and Griinde, 71 (the Spirit as ... the medium of his [God's] royal rule").
184 See especially the citations above, p. 83 n. 313; p. 103 nn. 56, 59.
185 Grunde, 69; similarly ibid., 71; Dogma, 343, 352-53; Jesus und Paulus, 103, 105, 108.
186 Jesus und Paulus, 105.
187 Dogma, 350-51. We briefly touched on Schlatter's linking of the Spirit with the divine creative power
and the resulting incomprehensibility of the creative act, above, pp. 84, 103. Further references are Dogma,
462; Griinde, 71; Opfer, 24; "Glaube und Geschichte," 347; "Jesus und wir heutigen Menschen," 212; "Froh-
lichs Traktat," 280-81; "Wort und Schrift," 33; RufJesu, 318.
SCHLATTER'S THEORY OF DIVINE ACTION 134
The activity ofthe Holy Spirit in man is also creative with regard to its scope and potency.
"The boundaries, which limit that which is possible for us, do not exist for the creative
grace of God which, through the Spirit, is not only effective for us but also in US."188 We
are confronted, Schlatter expounds, with the "highest manifestation of grace," with "God's
perfect grace" which effects man's inner life in its "unity" and "totality."!" Therefore, the
creative activity of the Holy Spirit in man must not be thought of in synergistic terms. 190
The main point of Schlatter's understanding of the work accomplished by the Holy
Spirit in man is the creation of the new man who lives in personal communion of faith in,
and love for, God. Man is made a child of God, and this is not the result of an organic de-
velopment, of an evolutionary process immanent in the human creature.'?' Yet, as we have
so often seen to be the case in Schlatter, to speak of a creative act in this context only
makes sense if the object of action is not annihilated but truly created, enabled and em-
powered. Thus, the Holy Spirit is God's creative presence in whom man receives his whole
life from God, that is, appropriates the divine gifts which are mediated through Christ.
Everything which marks the human person as the image of God now receives its content
from God. Man is renewed in his thinking, willing and acting - the Spirit is "the BUdner
ofthe person."!"
Precisely by proclaiming to us the Spirit as God's gift, God is witnessed to us as person, and because
his creative work happens in the Spirit, it builds persons. That God gives Spirit means that he forms
our personhood so that our thinking and willing stems from a divine root. With this, however, the
Spirit affirms and sanctifies also the law of our whole personal life, namely that nothing becomes our
own except through us, that no motive moves me unless I seize it, that no truth convinces me unless I
188 Ethik, 53;
189 See Griinde, 70-71; Jesus und Paulus, 105.
190 See e.g. Dogma, 351, 371.
191 See e.g. ibid., 344, Griinde, 71.
192 Jesus und Paulus, 105; cf. "Wort und Schrift," 33; Kennen wir Jesus?, 50; RufJesu, 317.
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believe it, and that nothing becomes my property unless I appropriate it. Therefore, we are persons,
and the Spirit is not a natural power but Spirit, and his work is the gift of life. 193
The work of the Holy Spirit is therefore not established at the expense of human creature-
liness. "The activity of the Holy Spirit grips our personal life in its unity. It does not cut off
our natural functions, does not replace them. Rather, the full range of our natural vivacity
is preserved, wanted and used by the Spirit. His gift does not replace the psychical proc-
esses but produces them."!" The Spirit affirms, preserves and vivifies man - indeed, re-
stores and perfects him.
According to Schlatter, this pneumatological orientation towards the particular identity
of man in his otherness to God is most clearly displayed in the toppling of human sinful-
ness and the enabling of man to actively relate to, and act towards, God. "Therefore, the
work of the Spirit is the active man who, through the Spirit, has gained the eager and active
use of all his forces - now, however, in such a way that he no longer turns them against
God - thereby uselessly wasting them - but uses them for God."195 The Holy Spirit em-
powers man to live his life in the service of, and as a sacrifice to, God, offering in faith
what has previously been received from God.196 This does not happen, as Schlatter em-
phatically underlines, through some kind of arbitrary and coercive power but through
God's love: "Love is above all the Pneumatische, 1Co 13, that which through God's Spirit
is poured out into the heart of the believer, Ro 5:5."197 It is this creative love, the gift ofthe
193 "Sunde gegen den heiligen Geist," 75. For Schlatter's refusal to understand the agency of the Holy
Spirit in the sense of a causality of a natural force see also Jesus und Paulus, 107-08; Theology ofthe Apos-
tles, 368-72.
194 Dogma, 348; cf. ibid, 348-51, 588-89; Griinde, 70-71; RufJesu, 317-18; Sprechstunde, 48.
195 Dogma, 350.
196 See e.g. the section "The Sacrifice effected by the Spirit" in Opfer, 13-24; "Noch ein Wort," 95. Con-
cerning the sacrifice of human corporeity, Schlatter states in his exegesis of Ro 12:1-8: "The bodies are
yielded to God as his possession. The selfish use of the body, heeding its desires, ceases (6:13). This origi-
nates a new sacrifice that could not previously be brought to God, for this sacrifice is living and is not
marked as God's possession by being killed."
197 Glaube, 371.
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Holy Spirit, which moves and empowers man no longer to live for himself but to love God
and neighbour. "In perceiving God's love and receiving its gift we are liberated from the
binding to ourselves, and instead will that which God wills, direct our desires to God's
work and kingdom, and use the gifts of his love for him; we consequently act in love to-
ward him."!" The following sentences underline Schlatter's linking of God's Spirit and the
divine love once more as a crucial aspect of his theory of divine action:
Every act which directs us with consciousness and will towards God, is effected by the Spirit. With
this insight we step onto the path of the Apostle who calls love that which is, in the highest sense, the
Spiritual [das im hochsten Sinne Geistliche]. This is because through this love everything in us
thinking, willing, acting - receives its determination [Bestimmtheit] from GOd. 199
Schlatter explicates the work of the Holy Spirit as the realisation of God's purpose
with man. The personal relationship of faith and love is the completion of man's imago Dei
which Schlatter articulates as the gracious transformation of man into the image of
Christ."? Now the human creature is truly from God and to God, and this is, according to
Schlatter, not only the fulfilment of human life but also the fulfilment of God's being and
action in relation to man.?"
198 Ethik, 119; cf. especially Jesus und Paulus, 106; Griinde, 71; RufJesu, 318; "Wort und Schrift," 33;
Dogma, 509-12. Illuminating in this context is Rieger's outline of Schlatter's "battle for love" in Rechtferti-
gunslehre, 380-97.
199 "Noch ein Wort," 120; cf. Kennen wir Jesus?, 468-69.
200 See Dogma, 344, 351; Ethik, 119. The full meaning of this will come through in our exploration of
Schlatter's christology and his idea of the church as the image of God. A. Torrance, albeit without explicit
reference to the Holy Spirit, develops a notion of the "new creation" which is very similar to Schlatter's
thought: "[T]he 'new creation' is creation in truth, that is, creation whereby, in completion of his eternal crea-
tive purpose, God penetrates into the inner structures of creaturely existence and, in and through his creative
presence, transforms the connective matrices of the human order from the inside, to the extent that they have
become dysfunctional and thus distortive of the full realisation of God's creative intentions. And the meta-
phor of the New Humanity confirms that the New Creation is specifically creation in the Second Adam and,
as such, fulfils and completes God's creative purposes for communion" ("Creatio ex Nihilo," 102; emphasis
Torrance).
201 See Opfer, 24.
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C. The three persons of the Trinity and the three dimensions of divine action
137
In the foregoing sections we saw the reappearance of the different dimensions of di-
vine agency. Earlier in our study we already sensed that Schlatter assigns each of these di-
mensions to the respective person of the Trinity.i" We can now specify this assignment as
being grounded in Schlatter's understanding of the mediation of divine agency through
Christ and the Spirit. Through Christ, the activity of God takes place within the created
sphere of nature and history. God acts in the presence of man. Through the Holy Spirit, the
activity of God takes place in man. God transforms man from inside and empowers him to
live according to the divine will and purpose.i" The linking of each of the divine persons
with the respective facet of divine agency is explicitly and most clearly stated in the fol-
lowing passage:
Here is a place where an insight into the inner divine being is possible for us. For in Jesus it is not
only divine acting, divine speaking, and divine acts issuing from God which generate effects in the
world. Rather, divine life gives itself existence within the world; a divine 'I' makes itself perceivable
in a human'!'. There we stand before the empirical moment which gives our conception of God [Got-
tesanschauung] its trinitarian form. Even the doctrine of the Trinity has an empirical basis. It rests
upon the threeness of the divine activities [Wirkungen] as they bring about the institution of the king-
dom [of God] within history. We are confronted with an omni-activity [Allwirksamkeit] of God which
penetrates the whole event and which has its point of origin outside and above the same; with an activ-
ity of God which has its point of origin in the God-human T of Jesus, and, finally, with an activity of
God which has its point of origin in the inner sphere of human personalities as the Spirit of God in-
corporated in them, as we encountered this activity of God in the prophets. Indeed, this threeness of
the divine mode of existence has in itself the witness of unity, but also of truth and can therefore not
be dismissed through the category of appearance but points back to a triune definedness of being [We-
sensbestimmtheit] in God. God is that as which he appears, and the revealed Trinity [Offenbarung-
strinitat] witnesses to the ontological Trinity [Wesenstrinitat].204
202 See above, p. 108 n. 75.
203 In addition to our exposition of this distinction see also Neuer, Zusammenhang, 205-06.
204 *Wesen und Quellen, 158. In the same way Schlatter structures his outline of "the triune name of God"
in RufJesu, 312- I9. Cf. Gunton's articulation of the three "modes of the transcendence of God. The Father is
transcendent as the fount of all being, both God's and the world's: a transcendence of origination. The Son is
the mode of God's immanence in the world, in which he is witness not to himself, but to the Father. The
Spirit is God's eschatological transcendence, his futurity, as it is sometimes expressed. He is God present to
the world as its liberating other, bringing it to the destiny determined by the Father, made actual, realised in
the Son" ("The Spirit in the Trinity," 130).
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5. Concluding Observations on the Conceptual Capacity of Schlatter's Theory
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The task that remains for us is to secure the results of our study thus far in such a way
as to ask critically whether or not Schlatter is able to provide adequate solutions for the
problems of a theory of divine action as we outlined them at the outset of this chapter.
A. Features of a modal ontology of divine action
i. God's action as the ontological enabling-ground of human being and action
Already Walldorf has briefly hinted at the parallels between Schlatter's concept of di-
vine action and the notion of a "modal theory of divine action" as developed by Christoph
Schwobel.?" The latter explains:
Everything that is would have to be interpreted as being made either possible or necessary 'by God' so
that 'by God' would have to be understood as 'constituted by God's action'. God would have to be con-
ceived as the by itself possible and necessary ground of all worldly being and occurrences in such a
way that 'by itself designates the self-constitutive character of divine agency.i"
a) Divine omni-activity, the creative act and the ontology of giving
The idea of God's omnicausality is a central constituent of Schlatter's understanding of
divine agency: God's omni-activity (Allwirksamkeit) is conceived of as the ontological ena-
bling-ground of creaturely being and action - for which reason everything is from God and
to God as "the one who works everything in all men. "207 Schlatter captures the onto-
constitutive character of divine agency in the term "creative". In his idea of God's "creative
act" Schlatter consistently interprets divine action in an ontological sense, thereby defining
the transcendental aspect of divine agency. It is precisely for reason of establishing a
205 See Walldorf, Realistische Philosophie, 180-81, 188.
206 Schwebel, God: Action and Revelation, 42.
207 See "Wandel nach dem Geist," 25 with reference to l Cor 12:6.
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strong conceptual ground for the onto-constitutive dynamic of divine agency that Schlatter
equips his concept of divine efficacy with a modal specification: Divine action is personal
action, grace, and love.i" For he is convinced that a naturalistic or mechanistic understand-
ing of divine efficacy subversively undermines the true creativity of divine agency. Hence,
Schlatter presents us with a modal ontology of divine action, that is, with an ontology of
God's grace and love. And because he continuously defines divine personal action, grace
and love as operations in which God gives good gifts, it is indeed appropriate to speak of
an ontology of giving. Von Lupke has - albeit in a different context - just recently con-
firmed our interpretation of Schlatter's thought: "One could speak of an ontology of gift
and in this way express the fact that Schlatter attempts to answer the question about being,
the question about actuality [Wirklichkeit], on the basis of the actuality of God's gift.'?"
b) The orientation of God's action towards the particular and the other
Integral to Schlatter's modal ontology of divine action is the idea that divine agency is
oriented towards man in his particularity and otherness vis-a-vis God. The conceptual
function of this is to secure the onto-constitutive character of divine action. The actional
orientation towards the other underlies not only the act of creatio originalis, through which
God brings forth somebody other than Godse1f, but also the divine actions which follow
this initial act. God actively and creatively affirms, enables, and establishes human life,
208 This affIrms Walldorf's suggestion that - on the whole - it appears "to make more sense to interpret
Schlatter's concept of divine efficacy [Wirken] by means ofthe model ofpersonal action in which the concept
of action is understood as an ontological fundamental category" (Realistische Philosophie, 180 n. 62). Cf.
Rieger, Rechtfertigungslehre, 416: "For God does not act as impersonal world cause [Weltgrund] or primary
cause [Erstursache] but in personal-creative encounter."
209 von Lupke, "Gottes Gaben wahrnehmen," 289 where the author argues that different motives of
Schlatter's theology come together in the concept of gift. Similarly Dintaman, who tries to establish the thesis
that "the creativity of God functions as an internal dynamic, sometimes explicit though more often unspoken,
which shapes Schlatter's thinking about various issues related to faith and history" (Creative Grace, 25; see
further pp. 24-27, 151-162).
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that is, human being and action, in all its creaturely concreteness and distinctness. In this
context, Schlatter's notion of concursus divinus must be seen as the culminating point of
his concept.
We have seen above that Schlatter grounds the orientation of divine agency towards
human particularity and otherness in the personal mode of divine action, in God's grace
and love. God wills there to be human persons - homogeneous selves capable of free and
self-determined action. It is in the outgoingness of his grace and love that he moves ac-
tively and creatively beyond himself, establishing and empowering man as personal other.
We perceive this to be the point at which Schlatter's ontology of love and giving leads to
the idea that God creates history."? When the personal Creator creates a personal creature,
then history is the adequate way in which God relates to man. God's love creates time and
space in order that man can grow in knowledge of God and enter into communion with
him."! Through the interrelation and interaction with God, fellow man and the rest of crea-
tion, man becomes the particular person God intends him to be.
[T]he generation of the historically and individually determined life is that event through which the
real comes into being and the effective powers come about. History exclusively and continuously
brings forth the particular [Einzelnes], which comes about through the concatenation [Verkettung] of
events and which happens only once. Through this, history does not become the game ofvain shad-
ows, but is exactly in this form [Gestalt] the work ofGod and the revelation ofhis inexhaustible life
(emphasis A. L.).212
210 For this movement from divine personal action, grace and love to the creation of history see "Heilige
Geschichte," 216-17.
211 See Erlduterungen J, 978.
212 Dogma, 284; similarly in Ethik, 150; "Wort und Schrift," 28, 29 ("the divine activity that creates his-
tory"), 32 ("[God] who creates history through the wave [Wink] of his almighty hand"); "Schopfung und Of-
fenbarung, 5; *Philosophie und Christentum, 37-38. On account of these statements, Luck's conclusion must
be affirmed: "Schlatter sees the special feature of the Christian understanding of God in that God, through his
agency, does not break history but works history" ("Introduction Zur Theologie," 19). See further Bockmuhl,
"Wahrnehmung," 96-107; Dintaman, Creative Grace, 105-19.
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In Schlatter, God is the "subject of history;" history is the place of Heilsgeschichte, of
those acts through which God realises and reaches his purposes with man and creation."?
When Schlatter speaks of Heilsgeschichte as "a system of the divine deeds'?" he is not
concerned with the development of an all-comprehensive and "interpretive theory concern-
ing God's plan for the world.'?" Schlatter rather wants to outline the faithfulness and conti-
nuity in which God acts in order to reach his purposes with man. It is because of this conti-
nuity that God has to be conceived of as being actively and creatively at work in the here
and now.
[T]he sacred history, which the eternal God has brought about, is not past; it forms rather, with eternal
power, the basis out of which that new act of God which now rules, humbles, quickens and redeems
us. With the present God the divine work remains also present to us; with the Christ being with us his
saving deed [Heilandstat] is also with us.... The sacred history is not merely a collection of exam-
ples of great and true thoughts, but is the life-creating power. Between that which God once did, and
does today, and one day shall do, there reigns a causal connection ofthe strongest and most powerful
form.?"
God's actional orientation towards human particularity and otherness also comes to the
fore when we recapitulate Schlatter's understanding of the three dimensions or facets of di-
vine action. God's efficacy becomes more and more concrete. God and man come, so to
speak, closer and closer when God acts upon, with and through man.?" Since Schlatter
links the threefold dimensionality with the trinitarian mediation of divine action through
Christ and the Spirit, it comes as no surprise that the outgoing dynamic of God's creative
and giving action finds its fullest expression in Schlatter's understanding of the work of the
Holy Spirit. In the different pneumatological sections above we saw that Schlatter con-
ceives of God's Spirit as the creative Spirit in whom divine agency reaches its highest level
213 *DogmatikI, 53; see also Neuer, "Verstandnis von Geschichte," 47-49.
214 See our outline of Schlatter's understanding of God's agency as intentional action above, pp. 114-115.
215 Theology ofthe Apostles, 261; cf. what we have said above about Schlatter's critique of Denkreligion,
p. 128 n. 159. See also Guting, "Voraussetzungen," 147 n. 80; Yarbrough, The heilsgeschichtliche Perspecti-
ve,52-54.
216 "Heilige Geschichte," 227.
217 This idea occurs in Baader, Sdmtliche Werke, X, 334-35.
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of concreteness, particularity and presence. We may say that Schlatter's ontology of love
and giving assumes a pneumatological character because the Spirit is "for our present time
the final and most supreme work of God" in which we see God's "communicating life as it
is turned towards the world [sein der Welt sich zuwendendes und mitteilendes Leben]."Z18
Hence, what applies to God's agency in general, applies especially to the work of the Holy
Spirit: he creates history.
[H]e [God in his Spirit] creates history - history as the mutually conditioned life and relationships that
are joined together to form a community; history as the joining of life into a chain of tradition which
continues to form subsequent life. This does not entail a belittling of the work and power of the Spirit,
but is precisely that which the Spirit wills and works.i"
In sum: God's creative and giving efficacy is modally qualified as personal action,
grace and love. Divine agency is always upon, with and through man, an orientation to-
wards the human person in its particularity and otherness which could be expressed in the
phrase "actio pro nobis." The Holy Spirit is the mediator of this creative and outgoing
agency. The following table constitutes an attempt to capture the interrelation and inter-
changeability of these different concepts and terms as they constitute Schlatter's modal on-
tology of divine action. Without claiming to be complete, it seeks to provide the most cru-
cial references to those passages in which the interrelations visualised in the graphic are
most striking.
Z18 "Wort und Schrift," 33; *Genesis, 21 (in above order).
Z19 Dogma, 368.
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References Key Words
Creative act «Sprechstunde.Sts -the creative and giving God
and giving - Theology ofthe Apostles, 362 -God's operations, good gifts
- Grunde, 29 -God's causing is giving; his will is goodness
- Metaphysik, 87 - good and giving will
- "Paulus und das Griechentum," 135 - [God's] gift founds, moves and completes our
whole existence
- "Letzte Bitte Jesu," 328 -the will that gives because it is love
- Erlduterungen I, 604 -the Word, creative act
- Andachten, 417 - [God's] Word is the creative power
Creative act, - "Jesus und wir heutigen Menschen," -God's will, creative power209
giving and per-




-*Dogmatik I, 195-96 -the creative Word
- Dogma, 123-24 - divine thinking and speaking, creative power,
plastic force, Word
«Dogma, 437 - creative righteousness
-Opfer, 3 -the giving and creative will of God
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- "Sollen wir gegen unsere Sunde - grace gives
kampfen," 90
- "Noch ein Wort," 100 - grace seeks and creates
- "Theology of the New Testament - God's creating and giving, work ofgrace
and Dogmatics," 199
- "Natur, Sunde und Gnade," 65 -creative grace, the giving God
Creative act,
- "Wille," 827 -God's grace gives because he is good
giving, - "Schatzung der Individualitat," 127 -the gracious, giving will of God
and grace «Opfer, 14 - giving grace
- Sprechstunde, 67 -God's grace, God's giving will
- Andachten, 296 - almighty goodness
- "Wunder der Bibel," 79; Opfer, 48; - almighty grace
- Kennen wir Jesus, 389-90 -the omnipotence of grace
- Sprechstunde, 9 -God's almighty creative grace
- Griinde, 52 -the creative intervention ofthe divine grace
- "Wir Christen und die Juden," 9-10 - grace, free giving goodness, gift
Creative act, «Kennen wir Jesus, 218 -love, creative power
giving, «Paulus, der Bote, 419 -love, giving will
and love - "Weihnachtsansprache," 64 - God is love; He, the creative will
-"Letzte Bitte Jesu," 337 - God is love in effective, love-creating force
Personal ac- «Kennen wir Jesus, 39 - Liebeswille
tion, grace and «Erlduterungen III, 155-56 -love, divine will
love - "Bedeutung des Denkens," 326 - grace is giving will
- "Evange1ium und Bekenntnis," 22 - grace, omnipotence of the creative love
-Ethik,53 - God's creative grace, Spirit
«GrundeT; - creative act, Spirit, creative grace
«Dogma, 371 - creative giving, Spirit, creative power of
grace
- "Glaube und Geschichte," 347 - God's finger which creates life and faith
«Jesus und Paulus, 105 - Spirit of God, majesty of divine acting, crea-
Creative love, tively supreme
creative grace - Dogma, 350-51 -the creative moment, the shaping force of the
and Holy Spirit Spirit
- "Siinde gegen den Heiligen Geist," - creative work, Spirit
75; "Jesus und wir heutigen Men-
schen," 212
«Opfer, 24 - Spirit, miracle ofbecoming, the Creator-
hand, the creative finger of God
- Einleitung, 480 - God's Spirit creates, he fills man with God's
gifts
«Dienst, 78 - grace, efficacy ofthe Holy Spirit, giving
- "Wandel nach dem Geist," 15 - God's will, grace, God's gift, Spirit
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ii. The conceptual employment of the metaphysical attributes of God
145
It is interesting to observe that we do not find a separate and coherent doctrine of God's be-
mg m Schlatter's dogmatics. Rather, he outlines the doctrine of God continuously, and in
strong connection with, God's actions and works.?" Without going into greater detail,
Schlatter's reasons for this method lie in his awareness of a theological self-contradiction
which emerges on the material level of dogmatics. We have mentioned this in the introduc-
tory chapter of this thesis."! However, what primarily interests us at this stage is this: In
the few passages in which Schlatter refers to the so-called metaphysical attributes of God,
he makes conceptual use of the metaphysical attributes in such a way as to qualify how
God's creative and giving agency is established and takes place in the world?" We shall
now demonstrate this interpretation on the basis of Schlatter's thoughts about divine om-
nipotence and omnipresence.
a) Omnipotence
Our exposition of Schlatter's understanding of divine causality has made it sufficiently
clear that, according to him, God's omnipotence must not be understood in the sense of a
natural force for which everything is possible. God's omnipotence is personal power, for
which reason Schlatter speaks of the omnipotence of grace and love. This means that
Schlatter does not impose an a priori and abstract idea of omnipotence upon his concept of
divine action. Rather, the idea of divine omnipotence is - as far as we can see - derived
220 For an in-depth analysis ofthis see Neuer, Zusammenhang, 55-64.
221 See above, p. 9.
222 For an elucidating discussion of the issues at stake here see Schwebel, God: Action and Revelation,
38-42,50-62.
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from the actual disclosure of God's power in his actions.?" We could articulate Schlatter's
notion of omnipotence in the phrase, potentia ordinata gratiae et caritatis?" As Schlatter
makes clear with regard to the events in the history of Israel, we are not just dealing with
any omnipotence but with "the omnipotence of a Father who calls his sons to himself and
redeems and preserves them in order that they stand in his community and service. "225 This
omnipotence of the divine love is, according to Schlatter, the power by which God consti-
tutes and enables human being and action, by which God - in creation, preservation, re-
demption and perfection - acts upon, with, in and through man in such a way as to reach
his creative purpose for communion with man as personal other.
We conclude that the speech about God's omnipotence (Allmacht) and the correlating
term Allwirksamkeit (omnicausality) serve Schlatter to give full expression to the onto-
constitutive character of divine action?" Schlatter underlines that in such an understanding
of God's omnipotence, the true power of God - in which he is creatively supreme to crea-
tion - is conceptually secured. "Even if we merely proceeded from the idea of power, the
production and ruling of beings who are capable of themselves is incomparably greater
223 Schlatter's approach stands in line with those insights which, through Hermann Cremer's important
book on God's attributes, have influenced the theological thinking of a number of protestant theologians: "All
mistakes which are made in the discussion of God's omnipotence are linked to the fact that one does not be-
gin with the actuality of the same [omnipotence] as it makes itself knowable and experiential to us through
the self-actuation [Selbstbetatigung] of God in his revelation, but that one tries to gain its knowledge a pri-
ori" (Cremer, Die Lehre von den Eigenschaften Gottes, 83). For the positive reception of Cremer's book see
Burkhardt's introduction, XIX.
224 This must, however, not be understood in terms of a conflict in which God's love limits his power.
Such a notion of divine self-limitation presupposes, again, an a priori concept of omnipotence.
225 "Wunder," 832. Cf. Barth's view on the subject: "God's omnipotence is not some power that we might
be enclined to regard as omnipotence. It is the power of the Father that does not make itself known to us as
omnipotence in abstracto but only as the omnipotence of the Father, and that means - in the Father's reveal-
ing Himself to us" (Credo, 19; similarly in Church Dogmatics 2. 1,524-25).
226 See also Schwebel, who conceives of omnipotence "as the specific mode in which God makes the be-
ing and processes ofthe world possible and necessary" (God: Action and Revelation, 42).
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than the generation of nullities. For God reveals his power precisely in creating the real,
not merely the apparition; those who will, not merely machines. ,,227
b) Omnipresence
At different places we saw that Schlatter relates God's creative and giving agency with
God's presence. A case in point is Schlatter discussion of God's providential action: the life
of the creature is dependent upon God's presence in creation. The sinner remains God's
creature because God remains present with him.?" Hence, Schlatter's ontological under-
standing of divine action with its emphasis on the actuality, concreteness and particularity
of God's agency, requires a concept of God's continuous and universal presence. Indeed,
Schlatter can identify both: "God's presence is creative activity and extends to every-
thing.'?" Consequently, God's omnipresence is the way in which God creates and actively
enables human existence in space and time: "Therefore, we call God omnipresent because
our insertion in a space and in a moment in time is God's effect and because the divine cau-
sality does not separate itself from its effect but remains present in it."230
We have already mentioned that God's presence accommodates itself according to its
object. As incomprehensible as "the being-in of the things in God and God's being in the
things [das Innesein der Dinge in Gott und Gottes in den Dingen]"231 may be, Schlatter ar-
gues that the way in which God is present in the things is different from the way in which
227 Dogma, 155.
228 See e.g. RufJesu, 323; Dogma, 226
229 Theology of the Apostles, 28; see also "Heilige Geschichte," 227: "With the present God the divine
work remains also present to us." The terms Allgegenwart and Allwirksamkeit occur together in "Letzte Bitte
Jesu," 335. Again we observe an affinity to Schwebel who understands omnipresence to "express the way in




231 See *Wesen und Quellen, 81.
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he is present in the human person.?' Schlatter distinguishes, in this context, between
Durchwohnung (a dwelling through) and Inwohnung (a dwelling in).233 The latter means a
creative presence in man by which God constitutes and enables the processes of human
consciousness and the personal functions of man. To take human thinking as an example:
when God - through his thinking and willing - is with and in man, the result is that "we are
known by God and at the same time knowing; the things are only known.V" Thus, Schlat-
ter speaks of "an inwardly effective presence of God" and specifies this pneumatologically
as "the presence of the divine almighty grace with the human spirit," "the presence of God
as the Spirit with our intellect. ,,235
iii. The conceptual integration of divine transcendence and divine relation to creation
We are now justified in arguing that, in Schlatter's modal ontology of God's gracious
and loving action, divine transcendence and creative involvement with creation are con-
structively integrated. The basis for this lies in Schlatter's understanding of divine efficacy
as personal action, grace and love. Far from being mere anthropomorphic speech about
God, this notion of divine agency is precisely that which secures God's genuine transcen-
dence as a constitutive and consistent feature of Schlatter's concept. For he does not de-
232 See above, p. 33 n. 94.
233 *Dogmatik I, 124; cf. Schlatter's reference to Baader above, p. 110 n. 80.
234 Ibid.; cf. Dogma, 337.
135 Sprechstunde, 10; Dogma, 371; "Bedeutung des Denkens," 324 (in above order). See also "Bedeutung
des Denkens," 325 and Furcht vor dem Denken, 17-18 where Schlatter speaks about "God's mild hand"
which he "opens above our capacity to think" and "the closeness of God" which "also applies to our capacity
to think." With these quotations we have touched upon Schlatter's idea that the Logos, through whom God
called the world into being, constitutes the necessary condition for human thinking, self-knowledge, and
knowledge of the world. "God's thought stands prior to all reality as its prius" (*Dogmatik I, 125). This onto-
logical primacy of God's thinking and knowing renders human thinking a thinking-after God (ein Nach-
Denken Gottes) for which reason Schlatter completes Descartes' famous dictum as follows: "cogitor, ergo
sum ergo cogito" (*Erkenntnislehre, 46; similarly in Dogma, 99). For a profound outline of these thoughts
see Walldorf, Realistische Philosophie, 133-41,238-39. Schlatter's understanding of God's omniscience, to
which he - as far as we are aware - never refers explicitly, would have to be interpreted along the above
lines.
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velop the transcendental aspect of divine agency in contrast to the non-divine but on the
basis of God's own personeity, grace and love. In this context a couple of aspects deserve
closer attention.
In Schlatter's concept God's creative action is completely self-constituted and self-
regulated. As we have elaborated in the respective sections above, the factuality, modality
and success of divine action are solely grounded in God's thinking and Word; in God's will
as grace and love, and in the perfect interplay and unity of these with God's power. In this
way Schlatter gives conceptual expression to the perfection of divine agency. On this basis
Schlatter is able to uphold the notion that divine action is uncaused and unconditioned.
Causality is, as Schlatter argues, not "a predicate of God's being," God is not "cause ac-
cording to his being." There is no necessity or coercion which forces God to be efficacious,
rather, "God wills to be cause.'?" Schlatter's specification of the divine will as pure love is
the ultimate affirmation of the contingency of divine action.?" Thus, the concept of divine
agency as personal action, grace and love also provides a sufficient answer to the question
of regress us infinitus. Schlatter argues that "[f]rom the abstractum of causality we should
never infer that everything is caused, nothing uncaused, nothing only worker without being
caused itself. "238 In other words, every cause has its effect and vice versa, but not every be-
ing is caused?" Consequently, there is no need for Schlatter to resolve the problem of re-
gressus infinitus through a concept of God as causa sui. This is because he conceives God
236 *Kritische Bemerkungen, 19; similarly ibid., 21.
237 See above, p. 123. However, this idea requires a respective doctrine of the immanent Trinity. For if
God's being is love, the idea is imminent to say that God's action of love ad extra is necessary for the actua-
tion or even realisation of his eternal being. How Schlatter resolves this issue shall concern below, pp. 244ff.
238 Dogma, 28.
239 Walldorfhas brought to light that Schlatter works with a metaphysical concept of causality that differs
from the physical or natural-philosophical law of causality (Realistische Philosophie, 169-81). The idea that
every cause has its effect and vice versa is an analytical principle and has, in the sense of causae sufficientis,
metaphysical validity. Yet, the notion that every being has its cause is induced from the experience and per-
ception of creaturely contingence and, therefore, does not have absolute validity (see Schlatter's exposition of
these thoughts in *Kritische Bemerkungen, 4-7).
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as personal agent and divine efficacy as personal action. Put differently, to say that God
wills to act in a certain way for a certain purpose sufficiently explains the origin of an
event and makes the search for further causes unnecessary. 240
The notion that God is able to create something other than himself is, according to
Schlatter, based on the ideas just outlined. "If an act of will gives origin and goal to us and
all that has being, then it is a creative act which brings forth the world ... "241 God's contin-
gent act renders the world a "work" of God, which means that the world stands "vis-a-vis"
God "as something which is distinguished from him although it exists solely through
him."?" The contingent act brings forth a contingent work.?" The point to note for our pur-
poses here is that the transcendental, that is, self-constitutive and contingent character of
divine action does not contradict, but found, God's creative involvement with the world.
This clarifies once more Schlatter's usage of the terms "creative grace" and "creative love"
because they are highly capable of capturing both moments: the transcendence of God,
who acts in the pure liberality of his grace and love, and the creative outgoingness of God,
who acts pro nobis.
In a roundabout way, Schlatter's consistent ontological interpretation of divine action
must be seen as the ultimate conceptual securing of God's transcendence. The onto-
constitutive moment is the differentia specijica of divine action. The ontological founding
relation is strictly asymmetrical and takes place exclusively from God towards the world,
240 For a similar argumentation see also Schwebel, God: Action and Revelation, 37 and Kirkpatrick, "Un-
derstanding an Act of God," 171-74.
241 Metaphysik, 88.
242 *Kritische Bemerkungen, 19-20.
243 For a defmition of the term "contingent" with its different nuances see e.g. T. F. Torrance, Divine and
Contingent Order, vii-viii, 29-35; Gunton, The Triune Creator, 9-10, 112-13. The latter differentiates be-
tween contingence as the dependence of the creature on God and contingency as the freedom of the creature
to be itself ("The End of Causality?," 68).
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and not vice versa?" To understand all creaturely being and action as created and enabled
by God's action means, therefore, a radical interpretation of divine transcendence.?" The
divine and the human are located on different levels for which reason they do not have to
compete with each other. Yet, as soon as God's transcendence is no longer conceived to be
at risk through his active involvement in the world, a theory of divine action exceeds the
frame of reference in which the transcendental and immanent dimension of divine agency
cancel each other out.
B. Towards a structural theory of divine action
Our exposition of Schlatter's concept of divine action has repeatedly brought to our at-
tention how he understands the relation between the different actions and works of God. In
the following we seek to outline the fundamental distinctions of unity and distinctness;
continuity and discontinuity, according to which Schlatter relates and structures the divine
actions and works.
i. The unity of divine agency
a) Different dimensions - one agency
In our study thus far we have laboured to demonstrate that, in Schlatter's view, the to-
gethemess of the different facets or dimensions is characteristic of a divine act. Divine ac-
tion is always multidimensional action. Thus, Schlatter can state that "each act of God has
a totality of acting and working in itself.'?" When we recall that Schlatter a) links each of
244 See above, p. 97 n. 32.
245 The phrase "radical interpretation of divine transcendence" is taken from Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and
the Trinity, 2. Illuminating for our outline of Schlatter's approach is Tanner's exposition of radical transcen-
dence in God and Creation, chapter 2, especially pp. 78-80.
246 *Christologie, 4; similarly ibid., i.
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the three dimensions of divine action with the respective person of the Trinity and b) un-
derstands all divine actions as mediated through the Son and the Spirit, it appears only
logical when Schlatter argues that every divine act takes place in a trinitarian way.
The gift of the Father founds the giving of the Son, this [founds] the giving of the Spirit. In tum, the
work of the Spirit founds the giving of the Son and this [founds] the giving of the Father. The Father
is the foundation as well as the goal of all acts that reveal him and he is without split and rupture in
everything that is Christ's and the Spirit's.247
What we have here is Schlatter's conceptual application of the principle developed in the
Augustinian tradition: opera trinitatis ad extra sunt indiviso?" This unity of divine agency
does not exclude, as we have seen, the appropriation of certain actional aspects to a spe-
cific person of the Trinity so that certain works are conceived of as the specific work of
one of the trinitarian persons.?" Rather, what is excluded is that a work which is particu-
lar1y ascribed to one person - for example, creation to the Father - can adequately be un-
derstood by eclipsing the participation of the two other persons. As Schlatter puts it, "the
whole divine work participates in every occurrence.Y" Thus, a "separation of the divine
work in the three Articles [of the Creed]" is obviated. "We are always dealing with the one
God, the indivisible one, who is always completely that which he is. ,,251
b) Different works - one history
If we draw out the lines of the foregoing a little further, we discover a second concep-
tual application of the principle opera trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa. According to Schlat-
ter, God is the one subject of his actions and works - for which reason they are internally
247 Dogma, 352.
248 For similar approaches see Harle, Dogmatik, 392-97; Schwebel, "Trinitatslehre als Rahmentheorie,"
40-41.
249 For the notion of appropriation see Schmidbaur, Gottes Handeln in Welt und Geschichte, 527-28.
250 Ethik, 296.
251 "Schopfung und Offenbarung, 5.
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related. "Divine action unfolds itself in an ordered connection of acts, in a divine history.
Therefore, it [divine action] sets itself in positive relation to time and is not placed beyond
it as the timeless. "252 It is unnecessary to repeat how Schlatter conceptually derives the
unity and continuity of this history from his notion of divine agency as personal action,
grace and love. Suffice it here to say that the continuity of God's agency emerges because
every act serves God's eternal purpose for a communion of faith and love with man - for
which reason God's action constitutes not any Geschichte but precisely Heilsgeschichte.
[G]od is not only present and efficacious in single moments but in the whole course of history. His
government is not temporarily suspended nor does it happen in leaps and impulses [Sprilngen und
StOjJen], but constitutes a whole in which the first beginning and the fmal completion are connected in
a strong unity.253
Because of this homogeneous, intentional and eschatological directedness, the different di-
vine actions and works must not be understood in contradictory terms; they must not be
played out against each other.?" Due to the limits of this study we must refrain from dem-
onstrating how Schlatter explicates the continuity between all the single works of God. The
crucial aspects can be demonstrated sufficiently by looking at the way in which Schlatter
relates God's works of creation and salvation.:"
Creation "is the basis of all acts of God which have happened - and will happen - in
the world and for the world."?" For Schlatter this means that all consecutive divine acts
take the form of interaction so that God acts in faithfulness to his original purposes with
the creature, that is, in propriety to the being and nature of his own creation.?" Along these
252 *Christologie, 38.
253 "Neue Testament," 108; similarly in "Pforte zum Romerbrief," 67; "Heilige Geschichte," 222, 225,
227; "Gott der Patriarchen," 87; Jesus und Paulus, II.
254 See e.g. Dogma, 469; Opfer, 32.
255 Aspects of the following are also discussed in Neuer, Zusammenhang, 209-11, 228-34; Rieger, Recht-
fertigungslehre, 274-80, 348-53, 401-07.
256 "Schopfung und Offenbarung, 3a.
257 See the section on immanent action above, p. 99.
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lines Schlatter states: "Being man [Menschsein] is the presupposition of becoming Chris-
tian, according to the old rule: fiunt, non nascuntur christiani. We are born as human be-
ings and become Christians through the encounter with Christ.Y" Salvation presupposes
creation. However, because Schlatter has a teleological understanding of creation's good-
ness and perfection, "creation is a beginning which does not yet reveal the complete will of
God."259 This is to say that creation, and especially the creation of the human person, pre-
supposes a Heilsgeschichte - further acts through which God works the perfection of the
creature according to his purposes. Therefore, creation - in a certain way - presupposes
salvation.i" Schlatter articulates the mutual continuity between creation and salvation in
nature-grace terminology: "Grace is not the slave of nature, yet it is neither its enemy, but
its completer.v'" In this, Schlatter stands in line with the Thomistic axiom of "Gratia non
tollit naturam sedperfecit. "262
In the wake of the thoughts just outlined, Schlatter explicates the operations and the
works which are specifically ascribed to Christ and the Spirit neither as the negation, nor as
the destruction, but rather as the transformation and perfection of creation as a work par-
ticularly appropriated to the Father. "What Christ makes out of us can be something differ-
258 Briefe, 38; similarly in Dogma, 18.
259 *Schopfung und Offenbarung, 13; see also above, p. 102 n. 53.
260 We say "in a certain way" because such an understanding of the relation between creation and salva-
tion becomes problematic without the supralapsarian aspect which we have met in Schlatter's understanding
of Christ's work of salvation (see above, pp. 76, 130). If God's saving agency is primarily viewed as the re-
moval of human sin, the above sentence means that God's eternal decree to create man and be in communion
with the same through Christ includes the Fall of man, Christ's assumption of fallen humanity, and his death
on the cross. The danger here is to lose the actuality, concreteness and dramatic seriousness of sin and the re-
sulting history of redemption. In how far this is the case in Barth's notion of creation as the external basis of
the covenant and the covenant as the internal basis of creation (see e.g. Church Dogmatics, 3. 1, 97, 231)
cannot be discussed here. For the critique that Barth - through his concept of election - subordinates creation
to covenant, thereby depriving the Bundesgeschichte of its true historical character, see e.g. Gunton, Christ
and Creation, 94-95; The Triune Creator, 162-65; P. Brunner, "Trennt die Rechtfertigungslehre die Konfes-
sionen," 104-12; Klassen, Heilsgeschichte bei Peter Brunner, 240-53; Hempelmann, Unaufhebbare Subjek-
tivitat Gottes?, 146-77.
261 "Natur, SUnde und Gnade," 63; cf. *Lehre von der Sunde, 22-23.
262 See Neuer, Zusammenhang, 375.
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ent than humanity and can transform and complete it, but not destroy it."263 Similarly, a
pneumatology must not be developed "in tacit contradiction" to the work of the Father and
the Son.264 That Schlatter regards it as one of the central characteristics of the work of Holy
Spirit not to undermine or break, but to empower and perfect, the human person as God's
creature, came sufficiently to the fore above. Hence, to conceive of the one work of the tri-
une God in contradiction to the other ultimately leads to a conflict between the persons of
the Trinity. As Schlatter argues in his dispute with Karl Heim:
Flight to Jesus - oh yes.... Our walk to Jesus is indeed a flight. But from what do we flee? Do we
flee from God's world? Away from nature, away from space and time, away from the body and from
life, from the law that forms us inwardly, from thinking, willing and acting? Do we want to flee to Je-
sus, away from what God has made and given? Do we really think we could come to Jesus when we
flee from God? Is he, in the end, a substitute for God and the destroyer of God's work? The antithesis
stands like this: Why did Jesus come into this world? Was it because this world is God's work and
property or because it is not?265
ii. The distinctness of the divine actions and works
a) The actuality ofHeilsgeschichte - new actions and works
To speak of a teleological and eschatological directedness of God's agency means, for
Schlatter, to speak of new actions and works which transcend the earlier ones.r" God "is
the one who moves forward and creates the new. What happened once does not set him
limits.'?" This newness is not to be grounded primarily in God's reaction to man's sinful
action but in the personalness of divine action as grace and love. "The grace speaks of a
263 Dogma, 279. Cf. Sprechstunde, 14.
264 Griinde, 70-71.
265 "Idealismus oder Theologie," 371. Further passages in which Schlatter outlines the actional unity of
the three persons of the Trinity are History ofthe Christ, 388-89; Theology ofthe Apostles, 143-44; Dogma,
352-53; RufJesu, 318-19; Erlduterungen II, 280-81. For the Heim-Schlatter dispute see Neuer, AdolfSchlat-
ter: ein Leben, 708-25.
266 We met this idea above, p. 102.
267 Andachten, 419; cf. "Zwei Scharen von Hoffenden," 320 (God "is not yet finished with what has al-
ready been created").
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new beginning, of the vanishing of the old, of the freedom of the one who gives out of his
spontaneous love. "268
The remarkable aspect here is that Schlatter's concept of the interaction and interrela-
tion between God and man entails the idea of genuine novelty and surprise. Concerning
Christ's death on the cross Schlatter states that this act of the divine grace
is something new for the world, however not in such a way as if only the relationship of the world to
God became different. A relationship cannot change without there being at the same time a change in
the relationship of both entities which are related to each other. The relationship of the world is re-
newed because God's acting [Verhalten] towards it is newly formed. He gave what so far he had not
given, he creates what so far does not exist, he realises what so far constituted the mystery of his hid-
den kingdom. To think of a manifoldness, a development, a progress, in one word, a history in God's
acting towards the world does not undermine his absoluteness and invests the historical act at the same
time with its true meaning [Realbedeutung].269
As far as we can see, this is the point at which Schlatter's attempt to overcome the old dual-
ism of God and world finds its strongest expression. The sentences just quoted state clearly
that God is capable of truly experiencing time and history. This is because of the difference
between works already accomplished and works not yet accomplished - a difference which
is integral to a concept of teleological agency."? On these grounds, Schlatter questions the
dualistic world view in which the human sphere of time and space in its changeability
stands in an unbridgeable contrast to the divine realm of eternity in its immutability. The
Christian faith, says Schlatter, understands God
as the giving and working one, as the one who endows us with his grace. By this the entry of the di-
vine acting into our own living space is stated, and the time is no longer separated from the divine
work but is seized by it. The 'now' is set into God's goal, and he is thought as the one who prepares for
us the present moment and who, in the present moment, grants us participation in his work in such a
way that he himself grips and moves us. Thus, the world view is overturned which understands the
268 "Vergebung und Rechtfertigung," 30.
269 *Christologie, fragments; cf. Paulus der Bote, 564-65. For a similar statement regarding the eschato-
logical perfection of creation see Dogma, 535.
270 The idea of God's ability to experience time was already adumbrated in Schlatter's conviction that God
remains present in time as that which he has created (see above, p. 147; cf. Walldorf, Realistische Philoso-
phie, 198). For the notion that intentional action requires the experience oftime see P. Brunner's critical en-
gagement with Thomas Aquinas' concept of teleology in Probleme der Teleologie, 45-47. In his essay "Die
Freiheit des Menschen" P. Brunner reflects: "Why is the creation of man as such not yet his perfection, not
yet his eschatological transformation? Obviously this "not yet" is the ground of the actuality of God's
Heilsgeschichte" (p. 112).
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sphere of changeable life, that moves from being born to death, as a dark cave below and which,
above all of that, constructs a divine sphere in the rigidity of the ever same to itself being [in der Star-
rheit des sich selbst gleichen Seins].271
b) Divine monocausality, human sin and the distinctness of God's works
In Schlatter, the new works of God are understood as a new creation which means that
they are qualitatively distinct from, and even discontinuous from, the first creation. Schlat-
ter outlines the transitions from the first creation to the new creation and from the new
creation to the eschatological and eternal kingdom of God - the new heaven and the new
earth - not only in terms of development and progress but also as a one-sided, sovereign,
creative act. This act takes place in operational analogy to the ereatio ex nihilo of the first
creation and must therefore be qualified as a divine mono-act [Alleinhandeln].272 Put in the
nature-grace terminology this sounds as follows: "God's grace originates beyond nature
and enters into the natural process and uses it according to its [grace] will. Yet, because of
this it is never clamped [eingespannt] in the natural process. The beginning of eternal life
is not already the birth but rebirth. "273
The aforementioned aspects reappear in Schlatter's concept of the trinitarian mediation
of divine action. We could summarise this in the phrase opera trinitatis ad extra sunt dis-
tineta. The works of Christ and the Holy Spirit are not simply the restitution of creation. As
we have seen, Schlatter speaks of "a new act of love" being "more profound and more
lofty," "more powerful in effect and richer in gift than what had been forfeited and de-
stroyed through man's enmity. "274 In Christ, Schlatter underlines, we are dealing with a his-
tory which "carries a divine creative act in itself and thus establishes a true development
271 "Glaube und Geschichte," 346. The whole passage (pp. 345-46) is important in this context.
272 See the section on transcendental action beginning on p. 96.
11'
- 0 Andachten, 48.
274 Theology ofthe Apostles, 246; similarly ibid., 260.
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which seizes everything we are - not merely repeating or partly changing that which exists
but lifting everything into a new and more supreme form [Gestalt].,,275 The actions of
Christ and the Spirit are as creative as the act of creatio originalis?" And therefore, the be-
ing of the new man is of a new quality because it is being-in-God, in Christ and in the
Spirit."?
The discontinuity between the old and the new creation can take the form of an an-
tithesis. This is because of the actuality of sin in the world. A mere development, Schlatter
argues, concerning the perfection of all things, would also bring the results of human sin-
fulness to their ripeness. Therefore, we are in need of the one "who creates the new and lets
the old vanish.'?" Probably the strongest expression in this context occurs in Schlatter's
outline of regeneration: "It [regeneration] does not speak of the preservation and develop-
ment of the life already in us but of a new beginning which not only transcends the existing
but demolishes it and replaces the old life, which is doomed and gets removed, through a
new one. "279
Schlatter understands the relation between the old man, the new man and the perfected
man - even when he leaves sin out of consideration - in terms of discontinuity because a
creative act of God brings the creature to perfection. Under the conditions of human sin-
fulness, Schlatter expounds, this creative act becomes a divine mono-act."? These distinc-
275 Dogma, 279.
276 See especially above, pp. 84,98, 133.
277 See Dogma, 342, 352, 541.
278 Ibid., 538; cf. "Vergebung und Rechtfertigung," 30; Paulus der Bote, 256; Kennen wir Jesus?, 33;
Theology ofthe Apostles, 246.
279 Dogma, 461. See also Einleitung 480: "That which he [the Spirit] breaks is the sinful will and the dark
thoughts which arise from the false desires."
280 As the respective quotations make clear, the idea of a monocausa1 creative act excludes any synergistic
understanding of the transition from the old to the new man. Rieger is fully right to conclude that "through
his reference to a 'creative act' ... Schlatter - in his own way - makes allowance for a deeply Reformatory
concern" (Rechtfertigunslehre, 419-20).
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tions and the correlating idea of a true diversity of divine actions and works mean that
creation - even the prelapsarian one - must not be ascribed salvific quality. Schlatter's
statements are not lacking the desirable clarity: "Something completely new, however, has
happened - something which nature is never able to accomplish - when the gracious will
of God grips us in such a way that we believe in him.'?" In the same way, Schlatter clearly
differentiates between Geschichte and Heilsgeschichte. "It is not a quantitative limitation
but a qualitative distinction that characterises that part of history which possesses faith-
creative power: the events, which show us God's grace, possess the procreative power to
bring forth faith.'?" Put in pneumatological terms: " Sacred history is only that which
stems from the Holy Spirit, and only then can there be talk about the Holy Spirit, when
there are holy persons in whom he lives as his work. "283
iii. Continuity, discontinuity and the mystery of God's creative act
One could articulate Schlatter's concept of the structure of God's agency in terms of an
integrative polarity: the divine actions and works are related in such a way that a) through
their unity and continuity their distinctness does not collapse into separateness and b) their
distinctness and discontinuity does not amalgamate their unity into uniformity. Schlatter
labours to hold both aspects together, a fact which could be seen in those passages in
which he speaks of new creation and, at the same time, of continuity?" The conceptual ba-
sis of the relational pattern of integrative polarity is God's personal action as grace and
love. It provides Schlatter with the equipment to argue for an exclusive, creative act in
281 Andachten, 47; similarly e.g. in Dogma, 51; "Natur, Sunde und Gnade," 56; Selbstdarstellungen, 156.
282 "Glaube und Geschichte," 339.
283 "Heilige Geschichte," 221.
284 See e.g. Dogma, 279, 538; Theology ofthe Apostles, 246; Andachten, 46-47; Marienreden, 14-15.
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which a) God alone is active and the creature passive and b) the creature is treated accord-
ing to the ways of God's grace and love; according to God's eternal purpose for commun-
ion of love with man. As Schlatter states with regard to the new heaven and the new earth,
the creature "lies inviolable, well protected and secure in his hand, especially when he - in
the glory of his almighty grace - gives what nature cannot, and is not supposed to, give
US."285 We have seen that Schlatter consistently reflects this idea christologically and
pneumatologically. Through the incarnate Word and in the Holy Spirit, God is able to ere-
ate the new in such a way that he completes his creature.?" In this Schlatter has reached the
mystery of God's creative act and thus the point at which theological reflection comes to an
end.?" This explains Schlatter's awareness that a completely satisfactory answer to the
question about continuity and discontinuity is impossible: "How in the act of new creation
the preservation of that which is now given to us takes place, lies beyond any theory.'?"
C. Towards a non-competitive relation between God and man
At different points in our study we have suggested that Schlatter's modal ontology of
divine action paves the way for a non-competitive relation between God and man.?" In
Schlatter, as we shall expose in a few moments, God and man are not mutually exclusive
but related in such a way that both are given the space to be truly themselves and to act ac-
cording to their distinct being. How Schlatter secures the distinctness of God's being and
action through his radical interpretation of divine transcendence has been expounded
285 "Wunder der Bibel," 79.
286 See also Neuer, Zusammenhang, 209-11; Rieger, Rechtfertigunslehre, 348-50.
287 See above, p. 20 n. 32, p. 133 n. 187.
288 Dogma, 541.
289 The phrase "non-competitive relation" is taken from Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity, 2 be-
cause it adequately captures the central aspect of Schlatter's concept.
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above. Our concern now is to inquire whether Schlatter's thought carries through conceptu-
ally thereby achieving the second desideratum outlined in the opening section of this chap-
ter.
i. On the relation between human and divine being
Schlatter's modal ontology of divine action, his - as we have called it - ontology of
love and giving must be understood as a resolute fight against any monistic or pantheistic
notions of divine agency.
For love does not work absorbingly. A Godhead which annihilates all the reality besides itself is
power but never has good will. Goodness gives, and it does so by making its gift the property of its re-
cipient and by enriching, strengthening and giving life to him through it. Only an egoistically distorted
love brings about the weakening and abolition of its recipient. However, when love arises in us as the
undistorted affirmation of the other, it has the power to overcome the logical mistake that we commit
in perverting the unity into an empty One. Whereas the one who exercises his union with God as
amalgamation with him desires unity only as uniformity, love institutes that type of unity which unites
those who are alive in themselves, in the same thought and will.29o
The conceptual function of Schlatter's notion of divine personal action as grace and love is
not only to safeguard God's transcendence but at the same time to secure the distinctness of
human being in its otherness and Selbstandigkeit vis-a-vis God. "Our being-in-God is of
such a kind that personalities have space in him to be, so that he in himself not only allows
but establishes and sustains the own, spontaneous and free activity of human persons
[Geister]. This is the point where pantheism always fails" (emphasis A. L.).291 What seems
to cancel each other out as long as divine causality is conceived of as operating in the form
of a natural or tangible force, is now conceptually integrated - namely true relatedness and
true otherness of God and man. Indeed, as we have seen above, when God in his action
290 Dogma, 34; cf. ibid., 156,506,520.
291 *Wesen und Quellen, 94. See also ibid., 133. This is the context in which Schlatter sets the Christian
notion of man's relation to God in contrast to Spinoza's ideas which were influenced by "the pantheistic
thoughts of Jewish mysticism" (see Philosophische Arbeit, 51-52; Dogma, 31-34). Schlatter expounds that "a
theology ... according to which the divine action deprives the world of its reality" can be called "Spinozism
in the wider sense" (Metaphysik, 59).
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upon, with and in man comes closer to the same, this increase of presence leads to an in-
crease of distinctness.?"
Under these conditions the relation between man's dependence upon the giving agency
of God and human freedom can also be interpreted in terms of direct proportion. Again
Schlatter argues that an unspecified and abstract notion of causality leaves us oscillating
between freedom and dependence. Freedom is understood as the "breach of dependence",
and dependence is understood as the "hindrance of freedom." However, as soon as grace
and love become the modes of God's efficacy, freedom must no longer be understood as
freedom from God, but precisely through, and - ultimately for, God, as a gift mediated
through God's action by which he enables and liberates people to be themselves.i" Put dif-
ferently, when the divine love is actualised, the contingency of the creature upon God be-
comes the ground of creaturely freedom and fullness. It is, Schlatter argues, God's "good
and giving will that makes the dependence in which everything created stands to him, the
basis of our freedom. "294
We could summarise Schlatter's concept of the relation between God and man in the
phrase, "relationship without absorption; community in otherness and distinctness." And
to establish and realise this relationship is, according to Schlatter, the specific work of the
third person of the Trinity ad extra. The Holy Spirit mediates true relationship. In the Spirit
God is actively and creatively present in man. Yet, this point of utmost divine presence and
immanence is, at the same time, the point of true distinctness because the Spirit as person
292 See Tanner's succinct articulation of the same idea in Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity, 3: "The dis-
tinctness of the creature is thus the consequence of relationship with God as its creator; here difference is the
product of unity, of what brings together, of relationship. The perfection of created life, the perfection of the
creature in its difference from God, increases with the perfection of relationship with God: the closer the bet-
ter." Similarly in God and Creation, 85.
293 See Furcht vor dem Denken, 54-55; Dogma, 155-56.
294 Metaphysik, 87; similarly ibid., 59; Ethik 77, "Unterwerfung," 9. For Schlatter's adoption of these ideas
from Baader see Rieger, Rechtfertigunslehre, 274-80.
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personifies, that is, gives true being, individuality and autonomy [Selbstandigkeit] to man
vis-a-vis God. "For the work of the Holy Spirit does not consist in that we meld together
with God, but in that we are reconciled with him; this, however, rests on the recognition of
our distinctness from God. ,,295 This otherness applies also, as Schlatter repeatedly empha-
sises, to the Holy Spirit himself. The Holy Spirit must not be confused with the human
spirit.?"
ii. On the relation between divine and human action
It is almost self-evident at this stage that Schlatter's modal ontology of divine action
leads to the notion of a non-competitive relation between God's action and human action.
Because of God's grace and love, his action is not the negation or limitation of human ac-
tion but that which ontologically founds and enables the same. This is, as came to the fore
above, the central moment of Schlatter's notion of concursus divinus: the true dignitas
causalitatis of the human person stands in relation to - moreover requires - the "exten-
sive" and "intensive totality" of God's omnicausality.?" Put the other way round, God's
omniactivity includes human agency. An increase of divine activity means an increase of
human activity.
On this basis, Schlatter argues for a comprehensive and universal cooperation, a "Mit-
und Ineinanderwirken" of God and creature. In every creaturely event and activity, God
must be said to be active - indeed, God acts in and through the creature. It is crucial in this
connection to recall Schlatter's differentiated view of this concursus. It applies to different
creatures in different ways, that is, in propriety to their respective being. What distin-
295 Briefe, 62.
296 See e.g. Dogma, 347; Griinde, 70.
297 See above, p. 39. For the dignitas causalitatis as part of the ontological dignity of the creature see also
P. Brunner, "Gott, das Nichts und die Kreatur," 43-44.
SCHLATTER'S THEORY OF DIVINE ACTION 164
guishes the concursus specialis from the concursus generalis is that man is not "wood and
stone" but person. God does not use him as inanimate tool or instrument, rather the coop-
eration takes place in the full affirmation of all that characterises man as personal agent.?"
Further, the concursus specialis of God and the postlapsarian man is qualitatively dis-
tinct from the concursus specialissima of God and his children. There is a structural anal-
ogy between the different concursi in that God's omnicausal creativity generally brings
forth and enables authentic human activity. As Schlatter states in his exposition of the
work of the Holy Spirit in the prophets:
The enigmatic factor in the epiphany is not absolute, not essentially different from the incomprehensi-
bility intrinsic to every event, in so far as the course of the world shows the activity of God always
united with the activity of things. Here too, in the prophetic illumination, we have duality encom-
passed in unity, human spiritual activity is not surrendered because of the inner work of the divine
Spirit. Only the incomplete and initial levels of prophecy experience inspiration as obstruction and
bonding of the mental capacities. In its purity, prophecy is self-willing as well as divine thinking and
willing in the prophet. The unification of both consists in the fact that the divine activity awakens,
guides and rules but at the same time adapts itself to the individual particularity of human spiritual
life.299
Yet, the new concursus specialissima is not itself the result of concursus specialis.
Rather, in analogy to the first concursus, the new concursus is constituted through a mono-
causal creative act of God. The same applies to the concursus of God and man in the es-
chatological kingdom of God in which "the unification of everybody with God's will and
acting takes place immediately; and this unification is unlimited and makes everything,
which the creature does, a work of God. 300 Rieger aptly summarises this aspect of Schlat-
ter's thought: we can only speak of an inclusive ornni-activity (Allwirksamkeit) of God
298 To give expression to this Schlatter frequently uses the term "organ" (see above, p. 24 n. 48; p. 121 n.
130; Rieger, Rechtfertigunslehre, 416).
299 *Wesen und Quellen, 143-44.
300 Paulus der Bote, 419.
SCHLATIER'S THEORY OF DIVINE ACTION 165
when the same is preceded by an exclusive monoactivity (Alleinwirksamkeit) of God which
enables and founds human activity.'?'
It is important to see that Schlatter's concept makes it possible to speak of cooperation
without relating creaturely and divine activity in a synergistic or Pelagian manner. Schlat-
ter formulates in all desirable clarity:
We must not teach synergism, thereby combining a bit of God with a bit of human, a bit of gift and a
bit of work in such a way as to say that God begins and man helps him to completion, or man begins
and God helps him to completion. This is the beginning toward the negation of God. Rather, we must
teach the God who is a person, the personal Spirit whose work is, generates, shapes and determines
personal life, however in such a way that what he creates is my own life. If the Spirit is to move us
without us moving, is to enlighten us without us thinking, is to sanctify us without us willing, is to
make us obedient without us obeying, is to deliver us from evil without us leaving it, then we do not
have Christ's promise for US. 302
iii. The mystery of God's creative act, the glory of God and the glory of man
Schlatter perceives the mystery of God's creative act in the context of the above issues
as follows: a human act does not cease to be authentically human when it has its possibility
and ground above itself in the sovereign act of God. A further inquiry, which attempts to
explain the point at which a divine act gives rise to and enables a human act, is not possi-
ble. The hiddenness and incomprehensibility of the "How" does not, Schlatter underlines,
question the "That" of the connection between God's agency and man's agency.?" Schlatter
sees himself confronted here with the mystery of Christian faith.
301 See Rieger, Rechtfertigungslehre, 419.
302 "Die Sunde gegen den heiligen Geist," 75. On the whole, Schlatter's concept shows an affinity to the
notion of "double agency" as defined by Owen Thomas: "What is affirmed in double agency, as I understand
it, is that in one event both divine and creaturely agents are fully active. God has not overwhelmed the [mite
agent so that it is merely a passive instrument, and God is not simply the creator and sustainer who allows the
creaturely agent to act independently of divine agency. Furthermore, the divine and finite agents are not
merely complementary, that is, they do not contribute distinct parts to the one event. As many authors have
'It it, God acts in and through the finite agent which also acts in the event" ("Recent Thought on Divine
-'cy," 46).
~ above, p. 20 n. 32; p. 84. In his argumentation Schlatter refers to the fact that man knows of the
:t and body without being able to explain how a spiritual act gives rise to a physical act (see e.g.
14, 157, 541; Griinde 30-31. This does not, however, mean that Schlatter regards God as the
which is supposed to be God's body.
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There must be, of course, a final and deepest point in our inner life at which it is impossible for our
eye to distinguish between what has been given to us and what its consequences are in our personal
life; between what is God's act that touches us and what is our act by which we let ourselves touch.
Exactly this is the peculiar thing of faith - that both merge into one another, indistinguishable to our
eye, no longer analysable. In my view, religious psychology fails here completely. We only have the
finished result before us and with that the clear consciousness: 'what has come into being here is not
my product.' If the consciousness was, 'I have made my faith; I have made myself to believe; I believe
this because I want to believe it,' then I would refuse to use the term 'faith' in this context. To the one
who tells me 'I believe this because I want to believe it,I I will answer: 'You do not even know what
faith is.' ... Thus, they are mysteriously interwoven: divine activity and human decision; God's creat-
ing and, breaking out of that, the life ofthe creature; the Fatherly work of God and the looking up of
the child who finds the eyes of the Father.304
The analogy which, according to Schlatter, comes closest to capturing such an assign-
ment of divine and human agency is not that of natural causality but that of interpersonal
love. Love is liberating action in which the agency of the one founds and enables the true
agency of the other "in order that through it the other may become capable of himself
[seiner selbst machtig werde]. "305 Since this creative love is mediated through the Holy
Spirit we return here to Schlatter's notion of the specific function and work of the third per-
son of the Trinity ad extra. Schlatter reflects the mystery of God's creative agency pneuma-
tologically. "From our perspective it appears to be unbelievable that an act which we have
executed, in which we act as the thinking and willing ones, is brought about through God's
Spirit and is a gift that he grants to us." A function of pneumatology is therefore
that it demonstrates the reception in the most supreme functioning of our spirit, namely in our thinking
and our willing .... Through this reception our activity becomes primarily and simultaneously a be-
ing-formed [Gestaltetwerden] by God and also a service for God. The doctrine of the Spirit has to
show when and how the productive power of our intellect is grounded in a hearing through which our
thinking becomes a receiving of the divine truth; when and how our willing and loving rests upon a
being-moved [Bewegtwerden] through which our willing and loving becomes the receiving of the di-
vine love.,,306
304 "Unterwerfung," 11; cf. Dogma, 484; Marienreden, 8.
305 *Dogmatik J, 139-40. For the explicit application of this analogy to God's liberating and bestowing ac-
tion see Dogma, 154-55. In a similar way Greshake argues that the relation between God's grace and human
freedom must be developed on the basis of the "phenomenologically demonstrable model of personal love"
("Freiheit oder Gnade?," 123-28). Bieler argues "that the unfolding ofthe question about human freedom is
only possible as a phenomenology of love" (Freiheit als Gabe, 17). See also Rieger, Rechtfertigunslehre,
414-20 where further references to Greshake and other authors are given.
306 "Noch ein Wort," 120-121; similarly in "Wandel nach dem Geist," 15.
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It is appropriate to say that, according to Schlatter, pneumatology is that dogmatic locus
where the notion of concursus divinus - the central subject of the doctrine of divine provi-
dence - needs to be discussed.
Schlatter's notion of a non-competitive relation between divine and human being and
action eventuates in a positive assignment of God's and man's glory.
[T]he glorification that God grants the creature happens always and completely through his own glori-
fication.... The condescendence of God's love brings forth God's greatness, and his hiddenness,
which emerges through the fact that he grants the creature to actuate itself, mediates his revelation.
Therefore, we have nothing to desire but God's glory, for since God's work has its ground in God's
love he reveals his glory by making the creature glorious.Y"
We could call this Schlatter's rendering of Irenaeus' phrase "Gloria Dei vivens homo."
God's glory consists in that man is truly alive.?"
God's love is the ultimate revelation of his holiness, for he remains "the absolute, sub-
lime one above us before whom we bow in worship." Schlatter points out that God's "love
makes his distance from us ultimately real, ultimately recognisable, for God's greatness is
revealed in it. It is precisely through the knowledge of the divine love that real worship
comes about - which is more than dull astonishment at his power.'?" However, the mutual
glorification between God and man takes place when God indwells man in his Holy Spirit
and pours out his love into the heart of man. When man loves God the circle of gift and
love between the giver and the recipient is closed.
Because love is the point of unification toward which aII the capacities given to us move, it is the
greatest among the gifts given to us through which the other gifts in us are completed. It is the goal of
grace, its fuII appropriation in knowledge and the will, the will and acting. God's grace thus deter-
mines the basis of our personal life. In giving us love, Christ achieves both: God is revealed to us and
effective in us, and man is made alive and effective in God. It [love] accomplishes God's and our glo-
rification in unity so that God's glory works our aliveness and our life works God's glorification.i'"
307 Dogma, 197; similarly ibid., 33: "Because God has his glory in that which he creates, we work the glo-
rification of God by being what he has made us for."
308 Cf. Gunton, "Soli Deo Gloria?," 171-72; Greshake, "Freiheit oder Gnade?," 135.
-09
, Dogma, 197.
310 Ibid., 515. See also ibid., 37-38, 520. The paraIIels between what we have just outlined and Schlatter's
notion of the personal-dialogical character of the communion of the different persons of the Godhead are ob-
vious here.
D. Critical questions
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The claim of Schlatter's "empirical theology" to be in accordance with the experiential
reality of this world serves as point of departure when we now move to bring some critical
aspects to our attention. The problems which we discern concern Schlatter's notion of evil
and lie more in what he does not say than in what he does. Our main critique is this:
Schlatter's emphasis on God's grace and love compromises - indeed, limits his perception
of the actuality of evil in this world.
The positivity of God's grace and love determines Schlatter's thinking through and
through. His modal ontology of God's action makes it impossible for Schlatter to develop
his theology out of the antithesis of sin and grace. For all creaturely being and action is,
and remains, a good gift of God who, notwithstanding the actuality of sin, will bring his
creation to perfection. One would be mistaken to interpret Schlatter's positive theology of
creation as theo-ontological positivism and triumphalist monism. Schlatter, not least be-
cause of his first hand experience, is aware of the dark side of nature."! The same applies
to his understanding of man and history?" Because of the true otherness, freedom and
causal power with which God endows the human person, the latter is capable of sinful ac-
tion in rebellion against God and his good purposes with creation. The fact that history be-
comes Heilsgeschichte is anything but self-evident in Schlatter.
However, it is in this context that we see the questionable aspects arising. As we have
seen, Schlatter ascribes a relative creaturely creativity to man. Yet, although he elaborates
that the evil will has "heroic energies in itself' and is connected with "great achievements
of thinking and acting," he negates the idea that man "actuates creative power" when he
311 See Erlebtes, 128-29; Neuer, AdolfSchlatter: ein Leben, 22-25.
312 See especially above, Chapter II. 2. C. iv.
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brings forth evil. 313 This view is the direct correlate to the idea of sin as the volitional per-
version of God's good gifts.!" We must ask why Schlatter excludes the gift of creaturely
creativity from the abusus boni? He wants to ensure that the power of evil and sin is not to
be located on the same level with God's power, an idea which provides the basis for Schlat-
ter's notion of man as simul creatus et peccator. But is this not a lapse into the old frame of
reference in which the power of the creature must be denied in order to secure the power of
God? To us it appears unnecessary to reduce the power of evil in this way precisely be-
cause Schlatter's concept of divine action provides him with the conceptual equipment to
conceive of the power of God's grace and love in such a way that even that which evil
"creates" is kept within bounds through God's creative presence. Furthermore, the decisive
acts of God's Heilsgeschichte - Christ's work of salvation and the creation of the new
heaven and the new earth - through which the power of evil is overcome and, finally, de-
stroyed, are interpreted by Schlatter as creative acts. This is the ultimate basis for the con-
viction that God, and not evil, will achieve his good purposes with creation. To be clear,
the power of man is limited simply because he is creature. In the same way as he does not
have the power to bring himself to being from nothingness, it does not stand in his evil
power to return to nothingness.?" Yet, to deny that man is "diabolically creative'?" within
these bounds runs contrary to the main outlines of Schlatter's concept, especially his em-
phasis on the actuality of the history between God and man and his idea that the most su-
preme gift of the Creator is man's greatest danger when used against God.3 1?
313 Dogma, 23l.
314 For Schlatter's idea of evil as abusus bani see above, p. 67; Rieger, Rechtfertigungslehre, 425-26.
315 See P. Brunner, "Gott, das Nichts und die Kreatur," 45-47.
316 The term is taken from P. Brunner, "Die Freiheit des Menschen," 116.
"17
, See above, p. 67.
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The fact that he fails to discern those actualities and structures in which human sin and
evil assumes demonic or satanic quality, is as weighty as the inconsistency of Schlatter's
approach in this nexus. Without going into greater detail, the atrocities of the twentieth
century have sharpened our perception of such collective structures. Schlatter is fully
aware that human, sinful action can assume satanic form. This happens when the drive of
destruction determines the action to such an extent that destruction itself becomes the pur-
pose of action and evil the means to experience lust.?" Here, however, Schlatter's observa-
tion breaks off. He does not reflect on the possibility that the evil actions of man could, for
example, establish socio-political structures which then act back upon man in such a way
that man is enslaved by evil. In such a context human sin and evil can no longer be viewed
as the abuse of the good. Rather, we might be confronted with institutions and structures so
powerful that they provide a plausibility for sinful action, that is, doing evil makes simply
more sense than doing good. As Rieger has outlined, Schlatter's hamartiology shows "what
the subject does in his willing and acting towards sin" but fails to show "what sin does with
the subject. "319 The same must be said with regard to Schlatter's understanding of atheism.
When he argues that there is strictly speaking no atheism but only antitheism'" he fails to
see the power of secularisation. The latter establishes a secularity in modem society which
renders the God-question simply redundant because of the strong plausibility of living
without God in the world."!
318 See Dogma, 228.
319 Rieger, Rechtfertigungslehre, 427. The whole passage (pp. 420-27) is instructive in this context.
320 See Dogma, 27.
321 Craig M. Gay has outlined this aspect of secularisation in his book The Way ofthe World. A very in-
teresting remark in this context comes from Hans Stroh: "After reading Trotsky's autobiography he [Schlat-
ter] admitted that he - in the face of this book - must depart from his principle that there is no atheism but
only antitheism" (quoted in Bailer, Prinzip, 199). In a way, we may say, Schlatter confirms our critique that
at this point his theology does not fully correspond with the actuality of evil and sin in this world.
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With regard to the satanic, Schlatter explains: "I shrank from the dealing with the sa-
tanic because -looking at my own weakness - I avoided the sight of evil. ,,322 However, this
autobiographic confession must not cause us to overlook the dogmatic reasons for the blind
spot in Schlatter's perception. It is the presupposition that evil is not creative, together with
the idea that God, in the sovereignty and freedom of his grace, upholds the human creature,
which leads Schlatter to argue that "the generation of a complete unnature [Unnatur] is
impossible for any creaturely Will."323 The fully justified emphasis on God's creative and
giving action and the resulting positive theology of nature, man and history brings Schlat-
ter's theology unnecessarily into conflict with the experiential reality of our fallen world.
This can also be seen in Schlatter's understanding of the state. In his ethics Schlatter out-
lines that Christianity has a "critical force" vis-a-vis the state and the responsibility to op-
pose "the rotten habits [Unsitten] of our people and the oppressive or slack law of our
state." Schlatter goes as far as to not exclude the employment of force in this context "be-
cause the selfish blindness of man can aggravate to the extent that he must be overpowered
with force and the community must be newly founded through its destruction. "324 It is the
same Schlatter who - commenting on certain events regarding World War I and its after-
math - states that "the state cannot steal. When it [the state] requires life, it does not mur-
der and when it takes property, it does not steal.'?" The Schlatter biographer brings this na-
ive trust in the authority of a government into connection with Schlatter's peculiar "hesita-
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frage]."326 This hesitation can be seen in Schlatter's commentary on the Bethel confession
of 1933.327 At the end of August 1933 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Georg Merz, Hermann Sasse,
Gerhard Stratenwerth and Wilhelm Vischer had formulated a draft of the Bethel Confes-
sion which was send to a couple of examiners, among them Adolf Schlatter, Paul Althaus,
Karl Barth and Hans Asmussen. The article, "Kirche und die Juden," was written by Vi-
scher and concluded with a strong statement of solidarity which originally stemmed from
Bonhoeffer: "Die aus del' Heidenwelt stammenden Christen miissen eher sich selbst del'
Verfolgung aussetzen als die durch Wort und Sakrament gestiftete kirchliche Bruderschaft
mit dem Judenchristen freiwillig oder gezwungen auch nul' in einer Beziehung preis-
zugeben. "328 Schlatter's critical comment on this sentence is as follows: "The community
with the Volksgenossen is, in this hour, more important than the community with the
Judenchristen.F" According to Neuer, who has forcefully outlined Schlatter's sharp rejec-
tion ofNationalsozialismus and the Deutsche Christen, this comment "is devoid ... of any
plausibility." Notwithstanding his personal rejection of the Arierparagraphen, Schlatter's
theological and ecclesial evaluation ofthe same in 1933 was lacking "that uncompromising
clarity ... which characterised the confessing groups around Bonhoeffer, Kunneth and
Niemoller." This, Neuer states, "was not devoid of a certain element of the tragic.'?"
326 Neuer, AdolfSchlatter: ein Leben, 749.
327 For the history of the Bethel Confession see MUller, Bekenntnis und Bekennen; Felber, Wilhelm Vi-
scher als Ausleger der Heiligen Schrift, 77-9l.
328 Quoted according to MUller, Bekenntnis und Bekennen, 115.
329 "Commentary on the Bethel Confession, VI, p. 23.
330 Neuer, AdolfSchlatter: ein Leben, 750-53.
CHRIST AND THE TRINITY
CHAPTER IV. CHRIST AND THE TRINITY
1. Schlatter's Doctrine of Christ
A. Introductory remarks
i. Jesus as the rule ofthought for a concept of divine agency
173
When we now move to investigate basic aspects of Schlatter's christology, the reason -
indeed, the necessity for this procedure is given by Schlatter himself. In numerous pas-
sages he explicitly turns our attention to Jesus in order to illustrate and deepen his notion of
divine agency as we have outlined it so far. The majority of these references occurs in con-
nection with Schlatter's outline of the work of the Holy Spirit.
God's act of revelation . . . consists in that he sets human personalities in a specific relationship to
himself by indwelling them. Yet, that which the prophet experiences only in an initial way exists in
the God-man in completion. The separation between life-moments conditioned either by the divine or
by the human is transcended. It is substituted through a complete union, through a human 'I' that is -
in its entire existence and life - a God-united one, a divine one. The Christ is the perfect prophet. 1
It is, so to speak, in the genre of parallelism that Schlatter correlates the work of God's
Spirit in the prophet and the relation ofthe divine and the human in Jesus:
The human 'I' of the prophet becomes the place of the activity of the Spirit and does not cease to be a
human 'I' as a consequence of the inspiration it has received; the human 'I' of Jesus carries in itself the
pleroma of God and becomes ontologically one with the 'I' ofthe eternal Son of God, and this without
his human nature being destroyed.'
Schlatter argues that any conception of divine agency towards, and in, man must take
its measure from the way in which the deity acts upon, and in, the incarnate Son of God. In
his discussion of the idea that "the Spirit, since he is holy and God's [Spirit], becomes the
destroyer of what is human," Schlatter critiques:
1 *Wesen und Quellen, 172.
2 Ibid., 177. Cf. ibid., 187; Dogma, 337; Theology ofthe Apostles, 133.
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This is an understanding of the Spirit which is not yet measured against Christ: neither against what
we ourselves can see in him, nor against what he grants to us as God's grace. In Jesus we come face to
face with the normal way in which the divine giving and the human receiving are related to each
other.3
Schlatter also finds the notion of measuring one's concept of divine pneumatological
agency against Christ in the teaching ofthe Apostles. "The disciples considered Jesus to be
the bearer of the Spirit par excellence. They looked first and foremost to him in order to
see how God's Spirit manifests itself and what he gives to men."4 It is precisely along these
lines that we must understand a reference which appears right after Schlatter has presented
his concept of the work of the Spirit in man:
The knowledge of Jesus guides us to the proper apprehension of this idea by means ofthe manner in
which deity and humanity are united in him. It is not the case that humanness is broken - rather it is
wanted, brought forth by God and sanctified to be his organ. This provides the rule according to
which also in us, proportional to our measure, the divine and the human enter into unity (emphasis A.
L.).5
The tenor of the passages just quoted may be summarised as follows: we must not
simply apply an a priori concept of the interrelation and interaction between God and man
to christology. Rather, our understanding of the former must be developed in correspon-
dence with the interaction and interrelation between God and his incarnate Son." This pre-
scribes for us the lines along which we shall examine Schlatter's christology: how does
Schlatter conceive of the relation between the incarnate Son and God and what are the
ramifications of this for his understanding of Christ's humanity?
3 Dogma, 365. Similarly in Griinde, 70-71; Theology ofthe Apostles, 371; Sprechstunde, 67.
4 Theology ofthe Apostles, 369.
5 Dogma, 348-49. For similar references see also Theology ofthe Apostles, 133-135,271.
6 It is typical of Schlatter's form of thinking when he also states that the emergence of the God-man pre-
supposes a relation of God and man in which the latter does not cease to be human (see *Christologie, IV).
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ii. Schlatter's critique of different christological conceptions
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In the centre of Schlatter's critical assessment of traditional attempts to relate Christ's
deity and humanity, stands the twofold conviction that impersonal categories and analogies
taken from nature a) are only of limited use in developing an adequate picture of the God-
man as a living person, and b) tend to undermine the true humanity of Christ.' The Chal-
cedonian formulation of the doctrine of the two natures of Christ safeguards, Schlatter af-
firms, against the separation as well as the merging of the two natures in Christ. However,
what is meant to describe a person turns into a picture of a physical connection, an "exter-
nal composition" in which "two substances lie side by side."8 The attempt to relate the two
natures by ascribing priority to Christ's deity as that which is constitutive of his person,
remains unsatisfactory. According to Schlatter, it is the image of a divine substance acting
upon a human substance which renders the idea of enhypostasis problematic: Christ's hu-
manity is undermined because it is not ascribed to his person but only to his nature."
Schlatter's critical appraisal of the Reformation attempt to develop a more dynamic
concept of the relation of Christ's deity and humanity through the doctrine of the communi-
catio idiomatum runs along similar lines. The idea "that the attributes detach themselves
from their substance and that their transference to another substance does not alter the
same" is, Schlatter outlines, more than questionable. He holds that "the humanity of Jesus
would disappear if it were invested with the attributes of divine being." 10 The resulting dis-
7 Unfortunately, Schlatter does not provide a differentiated and detailed discussion of the different chris-
tological approaches. In a rather general manner he refers to the unsatisfactory character of what he calls "the
formula of Greek theology and its further development through the Lutheran and Reformed teachers" ("Bek-
enntnis zur Gottheit Jesu," 44). See also Rieger, Rechtfertigunslehre, 325-26.
8 "Bekenntnis zur Gottheit Jesu," 44.
9 See Dogma, 337-38. For a similar critique see Gunton who argues "that the weakness of all Christolo-
gies of enhypostasia ... is that they tend to underplay the humanity of Jesus" (Yesterday and Today, 223; cf.
idem, Christ and Creation, 48-50).
10D ""9ogma, -'-' .
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cussion between the Lutheran and the Reformed traditions offinitum capax (or non capax)
infiniti moves, according to Schlatter, in the wrong direction. Being aware of the impropri-
ety of spatial concepts, he states: "If, for once, the spatial imagery should be used it would
say: the eternal Son has made space in himself for man and makes himself his [man's]
place."!' Put differently: infinitum capaxfiniti.
Schlatter also discerns the difficulty in relating Christ's deity and humanity in the type
of kenotic christology according to which the eternal Logos - emptying himself of certain
divine qualities and attributes - has transformed himself into human flesh. Schlatter agrees
with the idea that "the will and action of the deity is directed towards the generation of Je-
sus' humanity." However, the natural analogy of transformation employed undermines both
Christ's humanity and his deity. A deity which transforms itself ceases to be deity. A deity
which transforms itself into man in such a way that, in a roundabout way, the deity
emerges from humanity, has never brought about true humanity. 12
The cantus firm us of Schlatter's critique is that the analogies taken from the realm of
nature which are employed conceptually to explain the relation between Christ's deity and
humanity, tend to establish the former at the expense of the latter. This docetic tendency is
not merely the outcome of a christology which begins with the affirmation of Christ's deity
by means of a high doctrine of the incarnation. In the same way as there can be a docetism
"from above" there can also be a docetism "from below." The notion that "something di-
vine" was, "as light and force," radiated into Jesus after he had already become a complete
man remains, Schlatter expounds, "on the docetic track" because it divinizes Christ's hu-
manity and thus renders it indifferent." Not those who affirm, but those who deny Jesus'
II "Bekenntnis zur Gottheit Jesu," 44.
12D ""9ogma,-'-' .
13 "Bekenntnis zur Gottheit Jesu," 42.
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deity, are in need of "idealising the man Jesus," of doing "hagiolatry with the man Jesus,"
of fantastically venerating "his human genius and amiableness.?" It is to Schlatter's own
solution ofthe problems just adumbrated that we now turn.
B. The birth of the Son of God - a creative act of the Trinity
Although Schlatter himself does not begin his christology with the doctrine of the in-
carnation, this dogmatic locus gives us the most direct access to the issues which need to
be addressed in the context of our study. As we shall see in due course, Schlatter's concept
of the incarnation of God's Son rests upon his understanding of divine Sonship as it is re-
vealed in the concrete course of Jesus' life. For this reason, Schlatter cannot conceive of the
incarnation in abstraction from the history of the Christ. Suffice it here to observe that
Schlatter understands divine Sonship to denote a communion between God and Jesus
which - and this is the crucial point here - is constitutive of the life of the incarnate Son:
"In the concept of Sonship, Jesus affirms the priority and superiority of God. Through the
divine loving and giving he himself comes into being with everything he has.':" Schlatter
perceives this ontological dependence of the incarnate Son upon the Father throughout Je-
sus' life and in particular at the beginning of the same.
i. Incarnation and the gift of divine Sonship
When Jesus "praised God as his Father, ... he described God as the one who had
given him life through his creative activity.'!" This creative act is the moment of Jesus' be-
J4 Ibid., 47. An illuminating exposition of such a docetism from below can be found in Gunton, Yesterday
and Today, 1O-3l.
J5 Glaube, 231-32.
16 History ofthe Christ, 28.
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coming and, as such, Schlatter argues, the granting of divine Sonship to Jesus." Schlatter
specifies the divine creative activity through which Jesus' Sonship comes about as God's
loving, vivifying and giving. IS To understand Jesus' Sonship as the sovereign and creative
gift of God obviates the idea according to which the man Jesus gradually became the Son
of God by "growing from below upwards into the Godhead." This idea would render God
passive by positing a communion with God - a divine Sonship - which is supposed to have
come about without God.19 Schlatter counters such a notion by explicating the birth of Je-
sus as a creative act of the triune God, a notion which is grounded in the different New
Testament statements, which regard either the eternal Logos, or the Holy Spirit, or the Fa-
ther as the acting subject.
Whether the Father, or the Word, or the Spirit, who else does it other than the one and same God?
Certainly, with respect to the manner in which the glance at the triune God is embraced by thinking, it
is important whether the bond that unites Jesus with God is described this way or the other. However,
it is wrong to say that in those apostolic words which derive Jesus' being from God's Spirit, a negation
or a reduction of Jesus' deity is present. God's Spirit is no less divine, no less pre-existent, no less one
with God than God's Word?O
a) The incarnation of the eternal Logos
Schlatter understands the divine Word as "the causal power by which Jesus' humanity
came into being and by which it was determined and led."21 As we have elaborated above,
Schlatter ascribes full deity to God's eternal Logos and identifies the same with the person
of the eternal Son of God.22 Therefore, the birth of God's Son is - as the incarnation of the
divine Word - a personal act - an observation that shall concern us again at a later point.
17 Dogma, 332.
IS Glaube, 232.
19 See Dogma, 332; Jesu Gottheit, 8; Theologie des NT 1,473.
20 "Bekenntnis zur Gottheit Jesu," 42. The whole section (pp. 41-42) is one of Schlatter's strongest expres-
sions of the principle of opera trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa.
21 Theology ofthe Apostles, 135.
22 See above, p. 126.
CHRIST AND THE TRINITY 179
What interests us now is Schlatter's view that the incarnation establishes a unique Sonship
of Jesus, a oneness between the Father and the incarnate Son which must be qualified as a
unity of essence. "In John's view, Jesus proceeded in his human life, will and thought from
the divine Word, and this not as a formation detaching itself from it [the divine Word] but
as one permanently united with it [nicht als ein von ihm sich ablosendes Gebilde, sondern
als bleibend mit ihm geeinigt].,,23 In this a presence of God in Christ is stated which is
clearly distinguished from any other presence of God in the realm of creation.
John achieved this by saying of believers that the Spirit was with them, and of Jesus that he was the
Word. And even in the portrayal of Jesus' earthly ministry, the concept of the Spirit did not completely
prevent the notion that what was in view was merely a limited, isolated movement by a divine im-
pulse, an inspiration by which individual words were received from God and individual works done
with God. For the concept of Spirit was easily emptied to denote mere 'power.' In John, however, Je-
sus' majesty does not consist of individual deeds he performs, but of the continual unity of his per-
sonal life with God. Among existing terms to describe the persistent presence of God in Jesus, by
which he shaped him in his conscious existence and revealed himself through him, John knew none so
apt as that of 'the Word.'24
To say that the Word became flesh means, therefore, to ensure that "the human being
that originates in such a way stands in complete communion with God and possesses God's
glory;" "that Jesus' person belongs to God's essence [Wesen] and life; that he, conse-
quently, carries God's fullness of light and life in himself, and this in order to disclose and
mediate the latter to the world.'?' The "divine life" is not subject to a process of becoming
in Jesus, rather: "He is it, he has it.':" In this connection, Jesus' "perfect unity of essence
[Wesensgemeinschaft] with God," that is his deity, is expressed in terms of pre-existence
and eternity."
23 Theologie der Apostel, 165. Kostenberger's translation of the second half of the sentence is rather mis-
leading and does not capture the point Schlatter wants to make: "... and Jesus' humanness was for him not
merely a temporary shell but an abiding, integrated whole" (Theology ofthe Apostles, 135).
24 Theology ofthe Apostles, 136.
25 Ibid., 135; "Wort," 830 (in above order).
26 "MuBich nicht sein?," 147; cf Theologie des NT1,482-84.
27 See especially Theologie des NT 1,454; History of the Christ, 30 (with reference to Jn 3:13, 31; 17:5,
24; 8:58; Mt 28:19); Jesu Gottheit, 32 ("In that eternity is ascribed to him, deity is predicated about him.").
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What is done by God in history and time contains a being. His Word was in the beginning: it did not
originate when the world began and man heard it; it is not a product of history.... The Son does not
come into being but is before Abraham was, and his relationship with God is immutable."
The Word, which brings forth Jesus' 'I,' is from God and, therefore, eternal. Conse-
quently, Schlatter outlines, "that which the earthly Christ is, is one with that which God is."
Jesus "has an eternal 'I'" and "is authorised to speak an 'I am,":"
b) The creative agency of the Holy Spirit
Schlatter ascribes a specific role to the Holy Spirit in the birth of the Son of God. This
role is one of mediation: God's creative agency in the incarnation of the eternal Son takes
place through the Holy Spirit who generates the baby Jesus in the womb of the virgin
Mary." The New Testament makes clear, Schlatter expounds, "that the first beginning of
Jesus was worked by the Holy Spirit, that we are dealing here with a human life that came
about through the creative force of the divine Spirit, that Jesus in his whole existence - in
body and soul- is the formation [Gebilde] of the Spirit."31 Through this the ontological de-
pendence of the incarnate Son upon the Father is pneumatologically specified as the com-
pleteness in which Jesus is the creation of the Holy Spirit. It is in this completeness that
Schlatter discerns the ground of Jesus' unique Sonship." This is to say that "the generation
through the Spirit founds Jesus' divine Sonship and holiness as communion [Verbunden-
heit] with God.'133
28 Theology ofthe Apostles, 132.
29 Dogma, 334. See further History of the Christ, 29-34; Theologie des NT J, 454-62; Theology of the
Apostles, 132-35; 254-56.
3D See Theologie des NT J, 478; Dogma, 332; Kennen wir Jesus?, 53; Marienreden, 7-9; "Neue Testa-
ment," 108-09.
31 "Bekenntnis zur Gottheit Jesu," 41-42. The same statement occurs almost literally in "SUnde gegen den
hei1igen Geist," 76.
32 See Theology ofthe Apostles, 78.
33 Dogma, 333.
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In this way Schlatter explicitly dissociates himself from that type of Spirit christology
according to which Jesus Sonship came about at a later point in his life, for example at his
baptism or through some other event. Against such adoptionist notions, Schlatter argues
that divine Sonship must not be reduced to a "dynamic connection between Jesus and God"
in which a divine force is operative in the former." It is not the case "that the course of na-
ture and history forms a suitable man in which he [God] puts his Spirit and, then, thank-
fully makes use of his help." To posit such a dependence of God upon man carries in itself
the denial of God. Divine Sonship is the gift of the Father and therefore "not ... the fruit of
his [Jesus'] own piety,":" even if that piety is enabled by the Holy Spirit. Divine Sonship is
"not 'appropriated by Jesus' because, according to the Gospel, God does not lay his gift in a
man suitable for him but creates the same himself. ,,36 Schlatter draws a clear line of demar-
cation in this connection: it is not the case that "the Father is made the Father through the
Son," rather "the Son is made the Son through the Father.":"
c) Concluding observations
For the further course of our christological inquiry it is crucial to bring two interlock-
ing aspects of Schlatter's concept of divine Sonship to our attention. Through his high doc-
trine of the incarnation Schlatter knows of a persistent [beharrende], immutable and there-
fore, substantial presence of the deity in Jesus. The predication of Jesus' divine Sonship has
ontological content in Schlatter. Jesus is the Son of God in an indelible and substantial
manner - and as such, consubstantial with the Father. Yet Schlatter refrains from reducing
34 See ibid., 336.
35 "Neue Testament," 108.
36 Furcht vor dem Denken, 12-13; cf. ibid., pp. 44, 45.
37 "Neue Testament," 108.
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Jesus' deity to a static possession of a divine nature. Rather, he answers the question about
the actuality of Christ's divine being by referring to divine Sonship as the relation in which
the Father actively gives deity to the incarnate Son. This conceptual possibility emerges
because Schlatter moves from a binitarian to a trinitarian understanding of the incarnation.
The Holy Spirit mediates the Father's action and relation to the incarnate Son by means of
which the latter is constituted in his divine being. The onto-constitutive quality of this
pneumatically mediated action and relation is grounded in the divine loving and giving.
Hence, Schlatter can speak of the Godhead as "that which gives [das Gebende] - and what
it gives [to Jesus] is deity.''"
Divinity is exclusively God's own will and act. If the man Jesus has it, it is not his through the move-
ment of man towards God, but through the movement of God towards man; not through the develop-
ment of man, who extends himself to the deity, but through the condescendence of God in which he
descends to man. It is not that man assumes God, but that God assumes man.39
Because Schlatter interprets the divine action in - and relation to - Jesus ontologically, he
cannot conceive of either in contradiction to Jesus' divine being. Put differently, Schlatter
does not reduce divine Sonship to a relation between God and the man Jesus, in which the
latter exercises divine functions - precisely because he takes relation seriously. This to-
getherness of being and action, being and relation - indeed, as we saw, Logos and Pneuma,
incarnation and inspiration - will continue to concern us during the remainder of our chris-
tological inquiry.
ii. Incarnation and the gift of humanity
In the same way as his divinity is the creative gift of God, so is Jesus' humanity.
Schlatter states: "I regard it as important for the understanding of the deity of Jesus that we
38 Dogma, 355.
39 "Bekenntnis zur Gottheit Jesu," 33; similarly in Dogma, 336.
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pay attention to that which is so strongly emphasised by the Gospels, namely that the deity
is that which forms, builds and creates the humanity of Jesus.'?" Central to this notion of
the enhypostasia of Christ's humanity is the idea of action, of an "effective relationship" of
the deity to humanity, "so that the agency of God generates and rules the humanity of Je-
sus." This agency is mediated through the Word and the Spirit:
God's agency is directed toward the humanity of Jesus through the Spirit as well as through the Word
so that it [the humanity] receives its existence and history through him [God]. In that he [Jesus] came
into being through the Spirit, he received his being, his will and his power from the Spirit. In that the
Word here brings forth flesh - that is a human life including its natural substrate - Jesus is, from the
beginning ofhis life, constituted through divine activity."
When Schlatter speaks of God's creative agency in this context, he gains that dynamic
which he critiques "Greek christology" as lacking - divinity and humanity are no longer
"two static things alongside each other,"42 rather, the agency of the former brings forth the
being ofthe latter.
a) Jesus' humanity and the act ofthe eternal Logos
In Schlatter, the eternal Word of God is the causal power which creates and deter-
mines Jesus' humanity. "In that the Word became flesh, the humanity of Jesus was gener-
ated through the divine Word and, therefore, serves the same as its place and organ."43
Schlatter articulates this agency of the Word as personal agency in terms of will and love.
John's use of "Word" indicates, as Schlatter expounds, that "he grounded the human person
of Jesus not in [God's] nature or God's power but in the wisdom and love of God. ,,44 In this
connection Schlatter speaks ofa "union of will [Willensverband]" between Jesus' deity and




44 Theology ofthe Apostles, 136.
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humanity. "Jesus' humanness is willed by the deity and therefore also brought forth, 'as-
sumed' ... however, not in such a way that we should conceive of this assuming in terms
ofapassive 'having-to-itself [Ansichhaben]. Rather, Jesus' humanness has the full 'Yes' of
the deity for itself ... ,,45 Along these lines, Schlatter understands the kenosis of the eternal
Son as the volitional and self-determined condescension to human estate. The incarnation
does not take place in the absence or at the expense of his deity, but in the full actuation of
the same.
From his participation in God's power to effect creation Jesus enters life in the flesh through God's
will. God sent his Son in the likeness of flesh (Rom. 8:3; Gal. 4:4). Corresponding to the divine will is
the will of Christ, who, in unity with God's will, was intent not on equality with God but on human ex-
istence: he emptied himself (Phil. 2:6-8). Paul derived the origin of Christ and his taking on human
likeness not from a natural destiny or compulsion, to which God was subjected or to which he sub-
jected Christ, but conceived of it in terms of a free act that occurs because Christ wills to be what we
are, desiring human likeness and the position of slave as they characterize US. 46
We note that Schlatter outlines Jesus' humanity as the outcome of an act which is grounded
in the will of the Son to be other than God. In accordance with the will of the Father, the
Son "willed not to grasp at equality [Gleichheit] with God but willed to be subject to every
natural and spiritual order which is given to man." This active renunciation is part of the
deity of the Son. Therefore, the assumption of humanity does not stand in contrast to
Christ's deity but requires the same: "He had the glory of God, had the being of God, yet
through the deity, not in spite ofthe same, he had the will to carry the form [Gestalt] of the
slave although he was in the form of God" (emphasis A. L.).47 For it is "as the Son" that he
"enters into this 'being-other' than God."48 Schlatter's idea that the personal communion be-
45 Dogma, 338.
46 Theology ofthe Apostles, 257. The whole section (pp. 257-60) is important in this connection. See also
Schlatter's exegesis of Phil 2:5-8 in Erlauterungen II, 628-31.
47 "Bekenntnis zur Gottheit Jesu," 45. Cf. Gunton, Christ and Creation, 84: "Injinitum capaxjiniti. In the
incarnation the being of the Son expresses itself, is laid out in all its fullness, because in his self-emptying the
Son is most fully divine. The eternal triune love of God takes historical shape in what is at once the sending
by the Father, the Son's self-giving to death, and the enabling of the Spirit."
48 Jesu Gottheit, 40.
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tween Father and Son constitutes the enabling ground for the humanity of the latter will
continue to come into focus."
b) The humanising agency of the Holy Spirit
The divine agency which brings forth the humanity ofthe Son is mediated by the Holy
Spirit in a special way. We count it as one of the most remarkable ideas in Schlatter's chris-
tology that the Holy Spirit not only establishes the oneness between Jesus and the God-
head, but also the full reality and particularity of Jesus as a human creature. "Docetic
thoughts do not arise from the gospel account. That which was brought into existence
through the Spirit was a real child.":" In Schlatter, the creative agency of the Spirit corre-
lates to the actuality of Christ's human existence in otherness vis-a-vis God.
In him [Jesus] we see the fullness of the Spirit, and the Spirit creates in him humanity in all its full-
ness. It [humanity] arises from the Spirit as that which is wanted by God, and therefore, it is brought
to vivacious activity so that it serves him [God]. So the humanity of the God-man is not drained to a
state of lack of awareness and passivity, but rather is called and empowered to act. By this means the
grace of God is carried into the world."
49 This is the point at which the parallels between Schlatter and Pannenberg originate. Pannenberg estab-
lishes a systematic link between "the thought of kenosis" and "the eternal uniqueness of the Son as such in
his relation to the Father." Thus, "the incarnation of the Logos" is conceived of as "the self-emptying of the
eternal Son in his self-distinction from the Father." Pannenberg concludes: "[T]he self-emptying of the Pre-
existent is to be understood as a renunciation not of his divine essence but simply of any equating of himself
with the Father. By distinguishing the Father from hirnselfas the one God, the Son certainly moved out of the
unity of the deity and became man. But in so doing he actively expressed his divine essence as the Son. The
self-emptying of the Preexistent is not a surrender or negation of his deity as the Son. It is its activation" (Sys-
tematic Theology, vol. II, 377-78). Barth - albeit in his own way which is determined by his doctrine of elec-
tion - comes to similar conclusions: "It is not at the expense but in the exercise of His Godhead that for the
sake of all flesh His Word becomes flesh." (Church Dogmatics 4. 1. 532-33). We owe this reference to We-
ber, Foundations ofDogmatics, vol. 11,23 n. 78.
50 Dogma, 333.
51 Dogma, 365-66. Schlatter's understanding of the specific role of the Holy Spirit is very similar to the
way in which Gunton stresses the action of the Holy Spirit in this context. Gunton, drawing on basic chris-
tological insights of the English Puritan, John Owen, and the Scottish theologian, Edward Irving, calls for "a
greater emphasis in the action of the Holy Spirit towards Jesus as the source of the particularity and so his-
toricity of his humanity" (The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 69). The tendency of underplaying the hu-
manity of Christ, which Gunton discerns in the enhypostasia teaching as well as in the notion of communica-
tio idiomatum can be obviated "if we give a more prominent place than has been the case to the place of the
Holy Spirit in christology" (Christ and Creation, 50; see further ibid., 50-59; "Christology: Two Dogmas Re-
visited," 161-64; "Creation and Mediation," 84-86).
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The role of the Holy Spirit in this connection can be defined as a humanising and personal-
ising activity which prevents the incarnate Son from becoming merely "a vessel of the di-
vine power.':" Schlatter underlines: "What God's force creates here is a man - not some-
thing about him, but [the man] himself, including his thinking and willing. However, God
treats a human 'I' not as an object for the actuation of his force, but is himself, through his
thinking and willing, with it and in it. ,,53 The mediation of God's personal relation to and
action upon the incarnate Son through the person of the Spirit is the ontological basis for
Christ's human personhood. Hence, the miracle of the person of Christ is, as Schlatter for-
mulates it, "the miracle of the pneumatic action of God at its highest level. All this is about
the formation of a human self through God, about the fact that God becomes the root of
human volition and thinking, of human personhood - and creates its natural basis. "54
c) Christ assumed the nature of fallen man
Based on the thoughts just outlined Schlatter cannot picture Christ's humanity and di-
vinity in contrastive terms. His notion of the action of the Word and the Spirit towards Je-
sus leads him to the full affirmation of Christ's humanity. To say that Jesus shared the same
human nature with us, that he lived in the same flesh in which all men live," means for
Schlatter to affirm the concreteness and particularity of Jesus' humanity.
The Spirit generates out of himself the human 'I.' He does not bestow divine 'attributes' on him - an
idea that, taken seriously, destroys the humanity of Jesus. It is just the opposite, he [the Spirit] gives
him [Jesus] the full distinctiveness of a human being, indeed, of a single man, a Palestinian Jew of the
first century. The deity befits the man from Nazareth."
52 Theology ofthe Apostles, 37l.
53 Dogma, 337.
54 "Bekenntnis zur Gottheit Jesu," 44. Cf. Dogma, 340.
55 See e.g. Dogma, 312.
56 "Bekenntnis zur Gottheit Jesu," 44.
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Jesus fully affirmed the human form of life when he "took the place which history had pre-
pared for him and which individualised him.":" Consequently, the incarnate Son of God
stands in continuity with everything that marks the human creature. Concerning the natu-
ral, that is, bodily life of man, Schlatter specifies this continuity in the sense that Jesus is
"at home in nature," and is "subject to its orders.'!" Schlatter makes the same point about
Jesus' historic and social existence.
He [Jesus] did not enter a world completely forsaken by God; neither was it [the world] connected
with God through nature only, but there already existed, prior to him [Jesus], a community which was
the work of that grace which grants man the knowledge of God and his service. Therefore, in the same
way as he affirmed God's activity which creates nature by possessing the human nature, he also sancti-
fied the divine grace, which reveals itself to us human beings, in that he was a Jew.59
Schlatter's concept of a non-competitive relation between Jesus' divine Sonship and his
human particularity is aptly summarised in the following sentences:
Therefore, I saw the Jew in Jesus, not although I saw the Son of God in him, and [I saw] the Son of
God, not although he was a Jew. Rather, he stood before me as God's work because with every
movement of his soul he felt in a Jewish way, thought in a Jewish way and willed in a Jewish way.
For God works history, and the completeness of his grace is revealed in that he brings forth the fully
defined being. Only in this way do we really have a God who is ours/"
Schlatter is pushing the authenticity of Jesus' humanity to its limits when he outlines
that the incarnate Son took on the humanity of fallen man.
[T]he life-stage [Lebensstufe] of sinful man is given space in the deity. It is not a new primordial hu-
man being [Urmensch] that is generated through it [the deity], not some paradise-figure, but someone
who has the measure of what is fallen to himself, and who is naturally and historically placed at the
spot that has been prepared for him through the sinful history of humankind and especially of the
Jews.l''
57 Dogma, 312; similarly ibid., 283-84.
58 Griinde, 66.
59 Dogma, 326-27. The whole section "Die jiidische Art Jesu" (pp. 326-31) is illuminating in this connec-
tion. See further *Wesen und Quellen, 121-73; Jesus und Paulus, 17-18; "Zweifel an der Messianitat," 158-
59; "Gott der Patriarchen," 85-87; "Prophetische Zeugnis," 97-98.
60 Ruckblick, 52.
61 "Bekenntnis zur Gottheit Jesu," 45. Schlatter refers in this context to Ro 8:3 and Gal 4:4. See also Jesu
Gottheit, 31-23; "Christi Versohnen," 195,205.
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In Schlatter's view, the radical kenosis of God's Son results in his partaking of human
weakness, suffering, temptation and limitation of consciousness.f To give an example,
Schlatter takes seriously the fact that Jesus did not have absolute knowledge of history and
the future." Based on Jesus' words in Mt 16:28 Schlatter states that "God's government has
not only affirmed but also corrected the prophetic word of Jesus. "64 For Schlatter, the no-
tion of kenosis achieves its full sense only when Christ's incarnation is interpreted as the
"conformation [Gleichgestaltung] with sinners." Schlatter defines this conformation in a
radical way as "the narrowness; the pressure; the derangement of consciousness; the
wretchedness of thinking; the limitation of capability, all of which are the lot of the world
of the sinner - in one word, our whole intellectual, moral and physical impotence. "65 Such
statements, however, must not be interpreted in the sense that Schlatter no longer upholds
the sinlessness of Christ. As we shall see in a few moments, Schlatter perceives the great-
ness of Christ's life and work in the fact that he - in the full reality of fallen manhood -
lived in perfect communion with God.
iii. Concluding observations
In Schlatter, the incarnation of the eternal Word, which is the eternal Son of God, is
the complete union of the deity with the humanity in Jesus. This means that in Jesus we are
dealing with the one Son of God and, therefore, with God himself. In this sense, Schlatter
clearly affirms the notion of logos ensarkos: "The rule: 'The Word not outside the flesh and
the flesh not outside the Word' is right if it describes the union of the humanity of Jesus
62 See Theology ofthe Apostles, 257.
63 See Dogma, 319-20.
64 "Bekenntnis zur Gottheit Jesu," 47-48; similarly in Erlauterungen J, 193.
65 "Bekenntnis zur Gottheit Jesu," 45.
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with the divine Word as complete ... "66 Through this, Schlatter rules out that Jesus - con-
cerning his own person - distinguished
between something temporal and something eternal, something human and something divine. He
rather claimed that he, as a unified person, participated in God's eternity. He did not single out indi-
vidual thoughts as given to him by the Father nor individual decisions as worked in him by God. He
also did not use one of the concepts dispersed by gnosticism, that is, that in him a preexistent soul or a
heavenly spirit or a divine power was present.67
Schlatter is aware that the notion of the perfect union of deity and humanity in the incar-
nate Son must be safeguarded against undermining the humanity of Christ. This conceptual
securing is accomplished through Schlatter's trinitarian understanding of the incarnation in
which special emphasis is given to the work of the Holy Spirit. Rather than reducing the
incarnation to an act of the Son, Schlatter understands the communion of Father, Son and
Holy Spirit a) as the place where the humanity of the Son originates: the Son - not intent
on equality with God - wills to become man in accordance with the will of the Father; and
b) as the actional mode in which the incarnation of the Son takes place: the Father sends
the Son in the form of sinful flesh, the eternal Word assumes flesh and the Holy Spirit me-
diates the onto-constitutive agency and relation between the Father and the incarnate Son.68
Schlatter's employment of the trinitarian relations enables him, therefore, to hold together
what otherwise seems to be mutually exclusive. The eternal identity of the Son, who ex-
isted before Abraham was, does not exclude the spatio-temporal realisation of the being of
the Son, which begins when the Word becomes flesh. Likewise, the deity of the Son does
not exclude his humanity.
66 Dogma, 587-88.
67 History ofthe Christ, 30.
68 It is interesting to see the proximity between Schlatter's concept of the incarnation and that of the Scot-
tish theologian Edward Irving. Without trying to evade the differences between them, which cannot be out-
lined here, the way in which Irving pictures the incarnation as a triune act reminds us of Schlatter's approach:
"He [the Son] submits Himself unto His Father to be made flesh; His Father sendeth the Holy Spirit to pre-
pare Him a body ... and thus, by creative act of Father, Son and Holy Ghost, not by ordinary generation,
Christ is constituted a Divine and human nature in one person" (The Collected Writings ofEdward Irving in
Fife Volumes [London: Alexander Strachan, 1865], vol. 5, 159; quoted in Gunton, "Christology: Two Dog-
mas Revisited," 155). See further McFarlane, Christ and the Spirit, 161-63.
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The conceptual space between humanity and deity secures both the authenticity of
Christ's humanness and God's identity and superiority. According to Schlatter, Jesus did
not teach "a promiscuous commingling with God, as if he felt merged with God, dissolved
in God, or had absorbed God into himself." In the incarnation, humanity is neither etemal-
ised, nor is the deity temporalised. Rather, Jesus "understood God's effect on him in the
unity of his person and in his complete humanity in such a way as to view what he was as
God's property.':" God is consistently conceived of as the one who gives being and life to
the incarnate Son. The union of God and man in Jesus does not, therefore, put both on the
same level so that the Godhead would be locked in Jesus' humanness. Rather, in Christ,
a personal deity is revealed to us, who is, however, not clenched by the law of humanness. The Father
in his complete divine glory remains above the Son who is one with him. The deity stands above the
Christ and in the Christ. It makes him, rules him, transfigures him and is for him that which gives -
and what it gives is deity."
We need to note that Schlatter counters a wrong and one-sided interpretation of the idea of
logos ensarkos neither through the notion of a logos asarkos nor along the lines of the so-
called extra Calvinisticum of the Reformed tradition, but through a certain understanding
of the triune communion between Father, Son and Holy Spirit." Jesus' humanity does not
limit the union of the divine Word with the Father." The Father's deity remains "above" the
incarnate Son as that which constitutes him in his God-manhood. With these thoughts we
have reached the point at which Schlatter's christology a) gives rise to a doctrine of the
immanent Trinity and b) assumes its distinctive form - as we will seek to sketch out in the
following sections.
69 History ofthe Christ, 30-31.
70 Dogma, 354; cf. ibid., 340; *Wesen und Quellen, 157.
7! For a similar concept see Greshake, Der dreieine Gott, 324.
72 See "Bekenntnis zur Gottheit Jesu," 33. Schlatter refers to this as a wrong understanding of the idea of
logos ensarkos (Dogma, 587-88).
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C. Divine Sonship in the otherness of a human being
i. On the leading questions of Schlatter's christology
a) The relation between the incarnation and the concrete history of the Christ
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According to the christological material just presented, the incarnate Son lives in two
sets of relationship, namely with God and with man. As Schlatter puts it:
Jesus knew himself to be linked with God and with humanity through his origin so that this dual con-
nection gave him the measure of his life and the goal of his work. By 'Son of God' he said that he had
his life from and for God. When he simultaneously called himself the Son of Man, he said that he had
and wanted to have his life from and for man. While the one name expressed his closeness to God, the
other expressed his closeness to man. This double communion determined what he was and did.73
The point to see for our purposes is this: the hypostatic union of deity and humanity is, as
we saw Schlatter expounding it, the outcome of the interrelation and interaction between
Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Yet, as the foregoing quote suggests, Schlatter does not limit
this aspect to the initial act of the incarnation but applies it to the whole of Christ's life. The
God-manhood of Christ is not a static condition which - once established - necessarily
causes a respective life. The fact that Jesus "had his divine sonship in the same flesh that
mediates to us our sinful passion and weakness and that he hung this same flesh on the
cross, raising it to eternal glory at the resurrection," is, according to Schlatter, anything but
self-evident. In Christ, we are not dealing with the pre-programmed outcome of the hypo-
static union, but with a form (Gestalt) of life that is grounded in the same volitional act
through which the Son - in accordance with the will of the Father and by the power of the
Holy Spirit - assumed the nature of fallen man. Schlatter elaborates
that Paul thought of the earthly Christ even when he stated that Jesus was in the form of God. For he
follows up the statement 'he emptied himself through the second affirmation: 'he humbled himself,'
and does not conceive of this as a one-time act that preceded Jesus' history but as his insistent will that
determines his entire life up to the cross. He described Jesus' lowliness that rendered him a slave who
must obey, not as a condition but as a thing desired by him, and does not say, r he was lowly because
73 History ofthe Christ, 134-35.
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he emptied himself,' but sees in Jesus' weakness and subjection his free renunciation whose greatness
he measures by Christ's possession of the divine form."
The net effect of the ideas just adumbrated is that Schlatter can no longer see the ques-
tion of the compatibility of the two natures of Christ - "the analysis of his being''" - as the
central issue in christology. Rather, the christological question, "Who is Jesus Christ?,"
needs to be answered with reference to the relationships in which he lives, for the latter are
constitutive of Christ's being and work. As Schlatter puts it, "the question of how a divine
and a human nature can be one in Jesus' person" is something which "can deeply occupy
us. However, it tends to screen off "the essential miracle in Jesus ... the miracle which lies
in his will; how he could, and can, love God with all his heart and, at the same time, love
the world.':" Therefore, the concept of the incarnation as the establishment of the hypo-
static union of deity and humanity must not result in disregarding the particular life and
story of Jesus - as is the case, Schlatter critiques, with Greek christology. Rather, christol-
ogy must be grounded in the history of the Christ, as it is told in the Gospels, and ask how
divine Sonship is enacted and realised in the creaturely concreteness, particularity and
otherness of manhood - indeed, of fallen manhood."
74 Theology of the Apostles, 258. Along these lines Schlatter distinguishes between the christological
categories of 'nature' and 'form' (ibid., 259). See further Dogma, 339-40.
75 Dogma, 335.
76 "Christi Versohnen," 196; the whole passage is crucial in this context (pp. 195-96): "That he is simulta-
neously connected with the Holy God and with evil man, that is the miracle of his course oflife." It is worth
noting the affmity between Schlatter's concept and key aspects of Schwebel's essay "Christology and Trini-
tarian Thought," pp. 139-44. Two points deserve closer attention: a) Schwebel describes the identity of Jesus
Christ "as the union of the person of the Son who is constituted as the Son through his relation to the Father
in the Spirit with the humanity of Jesus which is constituted in its relational structure precisely through its
hypostatic participation in the person ofthe Son in its relations to the Father and the Spirit." The being of the
incarnate Son "is to be in two sets of relationships." b) According to Schwebel, the christological question
does not concern the compatibility of the two natures, but the enactment of divine Sonship in Jesus' human
life. The answer to this question lies in the biblical account of "the story of the life, death and resurrection of
Jesus Christ." The difference between Schwebel and Schlatter comes to the fore when the former argues that
such a trinitarian Christology means a "paradigm shift from natures to persons, from substance metaphysics
to a metaphysics of relations." As shall become clear in due course, such a polarisation of substance and rela-
tion is - given Schlatter's critique of the doctrine of the two natures - not part ofhis christology.
77 See e.g. Dogma, 334-35, 338.
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That means: we ask the question about the relation of the Godhead to the 'I' of Jesus, about the nature
and measure of his unity with God. We ask ... whether God's relation to him is essentially and quali-
tatively distinct from our fellowship with God and establishes a unity which grants him unity of es-
sence with God and thus creates the God-man."
In conclusion we may say: that which is ontologically the case - namely that the inter-
relation and interaction between Father, Son and Holy Spirit brings forth the human other-
ness of the Son - is applied on the noetic level. The actional orientation of God towards the
humanity ofthe Son, which is the specific work of the Holy Spirit, gives Schlatter's chris-
tology a noetic directedness towards the concrete life of the incarnate Son. With reference
to l Jn 4:2, Schlatter expounds that the Spirit does not lead us away from, or beyond,
Christ's Fleischesgestalt thereby rendering his human life indifferent to us.
Rather, John sees the gift and characteristic of the divine Spirit in that we - in the one who carried the
same flesh on himself as we do - know the one who came from above and was sent by the Father. The
first thing that we know about Jesus - not merely through our natural knowledge but also and not less
so in the school of the Holy Spirit - is that he was what we are. Consequently, the question that the
New Testament poses to us is this: Is divinity revealed in this human person? What about this man
compels us to affirm the divine being as his essence?"
Consequently, Schlatter does not separate the doctrine ofthe person and the doctrine of the
work of Christ from each other for which reason he entitles his christology "Das Werk
Jesu.i" For he is convinced that "Christology and soteriology must not be separated from
each other. Rather, they become woven into each other. Who Christ is, is demonstrated by
the goods [Guter] which he gives, and what the goods he gives are, is elucidated by who he
is."8!
78 Jesu Gottheit, 12.
79 "Bekenntnis zur Gottheit Jesu," 33.
80 See Dogma, 280-356; cf. Rieger, Rechtfertigunslehre, 307.
8! *Christologie, 2; similarly in Wort und Wahrnehmung, 103.
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b) The centrality of the concept of Jesus' divine Sonship
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According to Schlatter, Jesus' deity and messianity do not merely consist in that the
beginning of his life was worked through God's creative willing and acting. Rather, "the
whole course of his life is shaped by God, so that the T of Christ is permanently formed,
filled and moved by his deity. ,,82 Therefore, if we want to know who Christ is, the primary
thing to which we have to pay attention is "the way in which God was present in him. "83
Jesus receives his life from God, and this is, as Schlatter elaborates, one of the central as-
pects of the New Testament concept of Jesus' Sonship of God. In using the term 'Son,' Je-
sus "referred not to what he had made himself to be, but to what God had made him. By
calling himself the Son of God he derived, with complete assurance, his existence and his
will, his vocation and his success, from God."84 It is "God's Fatherhood in the power of
which Jesus lives as his Son.,,85 The ground and grammar of this relationship is the divine
10ve:86
Jesus possesses sonship of God in the personal realm of his being that is illumined by consciousness,
not by a transfer of power or a communion of substance with God, which might tie him to God be-
neath or alongside God's personhood without actually touching it. On this point, John's pronounce-
ments have a deliberate clarity, because he seeks to distance the concept of a God-man, which he
shows Jesus to be, entirely from gnostic, magical connotations. Jesus' sonship provides him with a
share in God's love and thus also in his power, and the uniqueness of his sonship results in the fact that
this share amounts to perfect communion. God's love that is given to him provides him with the ability
of colaboring with God to an unlimited degree, and, since it is based on God's love, this collaboration
is predicated upon the fact that the Son truly apprehends and does the Father's will and brings his
work to completion. He has sonship because his love is matched by identical obedience. Now there is
no work that the Father does not hand over to the Son (5:19-30; 4:34; 8:28-29; 12:49; 14:10).87
Along these lines, Schlatter explicates the communion of love - in which the Son fully
participates in everything that is the Father's - in terms of a "communion oflife." This is to
82 "Bekenntnis zur Gottheit Jesu," 43.
83 "Ausgang Jesu," 134-35.
84 History ofthe Christ, 30; similarly in Dogma, 311; Furcht vor dem Denken, 13,54.
85 Kennen wir Jesus?, 29.
86 See e.g. Glaube, 231-34.
87 Theology ofthe Apostles, 130.
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say that the Son receives his thoughts and words from the Father." He is with God and in
God as his Father; is known, willed and loved by the Father." The "communion oflife" is
also a "communion of willing" in which the Son receives his will through the Father's
will." Finally, the communion of Father and Son is a communion of power and acting:
"The closeness with God he felt as sonship did not consist merely in the fact that God gave
him norms for his will. Jesus ascribed to himself a complete communion of will with the
Father that was a communion of life and therefore also gave him part in the Father's power
and activity. ,,91
Schlatter is keen to show that the dependence of the Son upon the Father neither un-
dermines Christ's personhood nor renders him an inanimate instrument of the Father.
Rather, precisely because it is a communion of love, the relation and action between the
Father and the Son constitutes the continuous ground for the true being and life ofthe Son.
However, the being which comes about through the relationship with God is, for Jesus, neither empty
nor comparable to the existence of things, but is life. The statement of the Son: 'I am,' is one with 'I
live,' and life takes place in willing and acting - for which reason Jesus possesses his Sonship through
that which he does."
The Father's action upon - and in - the Son enables the latter to be truly active himself.
This non-competitive relation between the Father and the Son culminates in Schlatter's idea
that the Son - in the full particularity and distinctness of his human life - is empowered to
work the works of the Father. "As the Son, he knew that the Father gave him his complete
love, and this love was perfected by his work in him so that his work was accomplished
88 History ofthe Christ, 129.
89 See Glaube, 231.
90 See e.g. "Christi Versohnen,' 192; Theology ofthe Apostles, 130; History ofthe Christ, 126.
91 History ofthe Christ, 130.
92 Theologie des NT J, 440.
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through the Son."93 Schlatter's concept of the communion of Father and Son is powerfully
captured in one ofhis expositions of Jn 5,17 from which we quote here at length:
And because God works, the Son says: 'I work.' This would be impossible if God were not the Father.
If he were the one and only in the sense that he could not bear anything beside himself, but revealed
his power in debilitating and binding everything, then the work of the Son could not emerge from his
work. However, he is the Father who gives life to the Son and together with the life he gives to him
the capacity to work. His vocation is neither inactivity nor the mere adoring contemplation of what the
Father works. He works himself; but how can he work if the Father does not work? In the same way
as inactivity is impossible for him - because the Father works, arbitrary acting which is not grounded
in the work of the Father is impossible for him. His relationship to the Father is communion which re-
veals itself in the commonality of acting so that the work of the Father takes place in the work of the
Son.94
The crucial point for the further course of our christological inquiry is this: in the per-
sonal communion of love between the Father and the incarnate Son, the dependence of the
latter founds his Selbstandigkeit in which he acts himself, indeed, is empowered to act with
divine authority and work the deeds ofthe Father. Schlatter explains:
Through these acts his sonship was revealed. Since he performed them through God's power and
grace, they revealed the unhindered wholeness of his relationship to the Father. ... Therefore the ac-
counts emphasize both: that the work Jesus did was received by him, and that they were his works
rather than appearing beyond, beside, or above him."
Because - through the communion of love - the Son is constituted to be and act as the Son
vis-a-vis the Father, that very relationship of Sonship requires the agency of the Son as
personal "other". Schlatter argues that - for reason of its personal nature -
the Sonship of Jesus becomes an ethical event [Vorgang]. The Father counts on the will of the Son
and the latter gives it to him. His obeying and loving is not merely a consequence of, and supplement
to, his dignity in being Son and Christ. Rather, it is through his loving and obeying that he is Son and
Christ.96
In other words, the Son "has his life from God and for God.,,97 The second movement,
however, does not take place by coercive necessity caused through a divine substance or
power in Jesus, but as a filial act of love, will and obedience in which the Son freely re-
93 History ofthe Christ, 126.
94 Andachten, 34; similarly in Theologie des NT 1,305.
95 History ofthe Christ, 185; cf. Theologie des NT 1,306.
96 Glaube, 233-34.
97 Theology ofthe Apostles, 130.
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sponds to the Father by giving back the life which he receives from him. And precisely for
this reason, as Schlatter outlines, it became Jesus' "task to prove his divine sonship in the
temptation ... For divine substances or powers are not subject to temptation but create
their effects to the extent they are present of necessity. Only will is tempted, not powers.':"
c) Schlatter's notion of Jesus' tempted Sonship
According to Schlatter, the central question of the Gospel account of Jesus' temptation
is "how he conceived of his divine Sonship and how he used it.?" Schlatter holds that Jesus
- throughout his life - was tempted to "egoistic sonship." Behind this phrase stand differ-
ent forms of distorted sonship which we now shall succinctly outline.
Egoistic sonship emerges through a gnostic understanding of sonship according to
which a heavenly being or a divine power, substance or hypostasis is present in a human
being. The result is "a miracle of nature ... whereby the person thus privileged enjoyed the
peculiar phenomenon of his supernatural nature in self-admiration and presented it to oth-
ers for the same purpose." Applied to Jesus, this means that "he would have made the
knowledge of divine activity by which he originated the center of religion and would have
required people to admire the divine miracle that stood before them in his person."?" Jesus'
Sonship would have disintegrated into a life "out of himself and for himself [aus sich und
fur sieh]." That is, he would have arbitrarily acted by means of his own power in order to
display and prove the miraculous union of the divine and human nature in himself. The re-
sulting admiration of his person would have enhanced his own self-esteem.'?' "The gnosti-
98 Ibid., 132.
99 History ofthe Christ, 88.
100 Ibid., 132.
101 See "Zweifel an der Messianitat," 193-94.
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cally conceived sonship demands to be admired and needs great success for its valida-
tion."!"
Egoistic sonship also emerges through a mystic understanding of sonship in which Je-
sus' communion with God would be limited to his inner life "so that it is experienced and
enjoyed through a psychic process." The aim of mystic sonship would be a commingling
and merging of Jesus and God, the dissolving and absorption of the one into the other. Je-
sus would give up his own will and lose his own self in order to "enjoy the merging with
God" in a moment of"overwhelming sensation." 103
According to Schlatter, both of the aforementioned concepts stand for "the selfish
abuse of his sonship" which Jesus had to reject.'?' Important for our purposes is the obser-
vation that Schlatter perceives the consequences of such an abuse not only in the commun-
ion between the incarnate Son and the Father but also in the way in which Jesus relates to
mankind. If the Son lives egoistically out of himself and for himself he will conceive of his
divine Sonship and his humanity in contrastive terms and arbitrarily use his divine power
to transcend the limitations of his human existence. As Schlatter puts it, the question
throughout Jesus' life was how he - on the grounds of his divine Sonship - conceived of
his relationship to humanity. "Did he derive from it his incorporation into human life or his
separation from it? Did he, as the Son of God, want to be a human being, with all that ori-
gin from humanity entails, or not?"!"
In a similar way, Schlatter links the Sonship of Jesus and his messianic work. As ego-
istic Son, Jesus would never have exercised his office as the Christ because the aim of his
102 History ofthe Christ, 133.
103 "Zweifel an der Messianitat," 194-95; cf. Jesu Demut, 80; History of the Christ, 30-31, 57, 85, 133;
Dogma, 33, 201-02; Theologie des NT 1,302.
104 History ofthe Christ, 91.
105 Ibid., 135.
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life would not have been outside of, but in, himself. Schlatter expounds that Jesus under-
stood and enacted his Sonship of God in such a way that it included his office as Christ and
VIce versa.
His [Jesus'] communion with God gave him his vocation, duty and work. Likewise, his work and rule
took place completely within the framework of his relationship with God; it was his worship, his relig-
ion. Because he understood his sonship messianically and obtained his office through it, he did not
conceive of it as an enhancement of his own life and did not make it the subject of his own enjoyment.
It became for him the basis for action, since he existed for the community because he was the Son,
and what God was for him was revealed in the things he did and provided for humanity. This lent his
relationship with God its greatness, because it was not limited to the content of his own life but en-
compassed all that he must accomplish with man. It conferred depth and strength on his dealings with
others, since he had his ground and aim in his communion with the Father. 106
Because Jesus did not want to act as the Christ outside of his relationship with the Father,
he refused to accomplish his messianic work without God and overcame the temptation to
"win the world by turning away from the Father."!" Thus Jesus cast off that popular messi-
anism in which the Christ all too easily replaced the rule of God through his own rule,
thereby becoming the antichrist. 108
ii. The communion of love between the incarnate Son and the Father
Our brief exploration of the leading questions of Schlatter's christology has brought us
to the point at which we begin to see the links between Schlatter's notion of Jesus' Sonship
of God and Jesus' humanity and office as Christ.'?" Our objective in the following sections
is to systematically present the decisive aspects of Schlatter's understanding of Jesus' Son-
ship of God which, as we shall see, provide the conceptual ground on which Schlatter ar-
gues for Jesus' divine Sonship as the inner basis of his human life.
106 Ibid., 126; similarly in "Zweifel an der Messianitat," 193, 195-97; Glaube, 232-33. See especially
Schlatter's coherent presentation in Theologie des NT J, 429-43.
107 History ofthe Christ, 89.
108 See "Zweifel an der Messianitat," 186-87; Dogma, 281-82; History of the Christ, 89-92, 132; Jesu
Gottheit, 7.
109 Schlatter explicitly points to this "inseparability" in History ofthe Christ, 91.
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a) The self-distinction of Jesus as the Son from God as his Father
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Schlatter understands Jesus' Sonship of God as the personal communion of love be-
tween Father and Son. The two elements of unity and distinctness are constitutive of this
relationship and must not, according to Schlatter, be conceived of as contradictory. The
oneness of Father and Son, in which the Son receives his life from the Father, is the ground
of the individuality and Selbstandigkeit ofthe Son.
His connection [Verbundenheit] with the Father is complete in its content and scope, for it comprises
his whole life. Its result is not his impoverishment, emptying and deprivation of rights. Rather, it lifts
him up to the Father and places him in the Father so that he lives in the Father as the Father lives in
him. ll o
Schlatter explicitly outlines the otherness ofthe Son as the gift from the Father to the Son.
Where there is Sonship, the distance comes about through the will of the Father who gives individual
vivacity [Lebendigkeit] to the Son. This [distance] is not a conflict of will but the precondition for and,
in tum, the result of, the communion of will and therefore not in need of reconciliation; rather, the Son
is immediately, and in complete connection, one with the Father.l!'
Since we are dealing here with one of the most crucial aspects of Schlatter's christology, it
seems important to underline once more that, in his view, the idea of the ontological space
for the otherness of the Son can only be secured conceptually through the notion ofthe free
and giving love of the Father.
In Jesus' communion with the Father there existed, therefore, a community that did not grow out of the
drive of a natural desire. No natural coercion compelled the Father to prepare for himself the Son.
Likewise, it is not the emptiness of privation that makes his [the Son's] love desirable to him [the Fa-
ther], and it is not through his own impotence that is he in need of the Son's service. Just as little is it a
law that creates community here, for above God there stands no further duty that binds him. Here
community flows out of the fullness oflife as the revelation ofthe will that wants to give because it is
love.I I:!
Schlatter examines the aforementioned aspects from the perspective of the Son and
reaches correlating conclusions. Jesus neither regarded his communion with God as a static
condition which he had to endure passively, nor did he attempt to gnostically or mystically
lID "Letzte Bitte Jesu," 328.
III Jesu Demut, 84.
nz "Letzte Bitte Jesu," 328.
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dissolve himself in God. Rather, he "stood as 'I' before the 'Thou,' as person before the per-
son of the Father."!" The Son distinguishes himself from the Father and relates to him as
personal other.
His communion with God was a person-to-person exchange, since he saw the Father in divine self-
sufficiency [Selbstandigkeit] over him while at the same time possessing a life of his own [Eigenle-
ben]. Therefore his disposition toward God was love, and his closeness to him was the commonality
of will that arose because he wanted the will ofthe Father with all of his own will.114
The thrust of these words indicates that Schlatter is particularly concerned with the idea of
distinctness. He further specifies the self-distinction of the Son from the Father, expound-
ing that Jesus' "God-consciousness" made him always and simultaneously aware of "his
distinctness from, and connection with, the Father." Hence, his will was "to be under, as
well as in, the Father - the former not without the latter, the latter not without the former;
he wanted to have him as the greater one above himself and to be one with him.'''" The
point to see for our purposes is that the Son - having a life of his own, like the Father -
does not locate himself on the same level as the Father. Rather, the Son affirms the creative
love in which the Father gives life to him. This means that he acknowledges the
"Selbstandigkeit and superiority" of the Father as the one who is greater than himself, and
precisely this recognition is, in Schlatter's eyes, "the unavoidable precondition" of Jesus'
relationship with the Father.!" For it is in this volitional subordination that the Sonship of
the Son corresponds to the Fatherhood of the Father."? Schlatter, we may say, understands
the love between Father and Son as a mutual but not symmetrical one. Filial subordination
and obedience are those forms oflove in which the Son is able to respond to the love of the
Father, that is, enter into true communion with the Father, without levelling out the dis-
113 Glaube, 231; similarly in Jesu Demut, 80.
114 History ofthe Christ, 126.
lIS Jesu Demut, 79-80.
116 See Theologie des NT I, 451.
117 See ibid., 305-06.
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tinctness between themselves. "He understands his Sonship as love - not in the sense of a
fusion of essence [Wesensverschmelzung] but of a community of will, and this in such a
way that he affirms the superiority of the Father by making his love his obedience."!"
Therefore, when Jesus calls himself the Son and relates to God as his Father, he affirms
both unity and distinctness as essential features of his Sonship. This simultaneousness of
distinctness and unity is the characteristic of love.
Jesus' relationship with God was love. It is essential to it [love] that it knows and wills both at the
same time: distinctness and connection [Verbundenheit]. It has nothing in common with tendencies
toward melting or absorption. It consumes neither its subject nor its object, enslaves neither the one
who has it nor the one who receives it, but liberates both in that it connects them.l'"
The thoughts just outlined provide the basis upon which Schlatter establishes a sys-
tematic link between Jesus' love for God (in which he distinguishes himself as the Son
from the Father) and Jesus' subordination to God.
It was Jesus' concept oflove alone that led to the fact that the concept ofeternity did not cancel out his
self-sufficiency [Selbstandigkeit] in relation to the Father. No leveling [Vereinerleiung] with God re-
sulted. The clear distinction of his life from God and his entire submission to God remained the char-
acteristics of his communion with him. 120
Christ's humility, Schlatter states, "originates from the fully personal nature of Jesus' Son-
ship of God through which he distinguishes his own will from God's will, his own work
from God's work, so that the certainty of the 'himself-excelling-greatness' of the Father
constitutes the constant precondition of his entire agency.":" Because Jesus conceives of
his relationship with God in terms of Sonship, he regards "complete subordination to God
as the essential and indestructible basis of his life."!" Referring to Mt 19:16-17 and Mk
10:17-18, Schlatter does not see a contrast but rather "the strictest causal relationship" be-
tween Jesus' divine Sonship and "his abandonment of his own honor, by which he put him-
118 "Zweifel an der Messianitat," 194. See also Theology ofthe Apostles, 130; Glaube, 232.
119 Jesu Demut, 81.
120 History ofthe Christ, 316.
121 Jesu Demut, 37.
122 Theologie des NT J, 451.
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self aside so that God's goodness alone would be believed and God's commandment would
be done." In other words, Jesus' subordination, in which he distinguishes himself from God
as the only good one, indicates not a deficiency in, but the full actuation of, Sonship of
God. Schlatter speaks of "the aliveness of Jesus' divine Sonship" and of "the faithful ex-
pression of his filial will [seines Sohneswillens] " in this context."?
b) Concretions of divine Sonship in the life of Jesus
Much could be said about Schlatter's understanding of the concrete form of Jesus' Son-
ship of God. The constraints of this study make us focus on those aspects which directly
contribute to a solution to the questions we are asking. To begin with, Schlatter character-
ises the love in which the Son corresponds to the fatherly love of God as selfless love:
Because Jesus knew his life - including its entire content - as given by the love of the Father, he did
not live for himself. However, in doing this he did not experience the decline of his life but precisely
the eternal aliveness with the highest purpose. The selflessness emerges and preserves itself here in
that the self gains its most supreme content. 124
Jesus' selflessness is neither weakness nor poverty nor self-destruction but active love for,
and confidence in, God so that he "had whatever he was and had as the gift of the Father"
thereby not having "his own wealth and success as his goal."!" Positively stated, he lived
from, in and for God. "[T]he foundation and the destiny of his life are in God."126 On the
grounds of this love Jesus dedicated his entire life to God.
Jesus fulfilled the great commandment - to love God with the employment of all of his strength - in
that he willed God's honour, God's law and God's reign. He willed this in such a way that he desired
no other honour except God's honour, no other rule except God's law, no other reign except God's
123 History ofthe Christ, 311; Jesu Demut, 50 (in above order); see also Dogma, 315-16.
124 Jesu Demut, 81.
125 History ofthe Christ, 311. See also Schlatter's definition of selflessness ibid., 40 n. 10: '''Selfless' I call
not that person who is nothing and has nothing but the one who is everything he is and does through the one
from whom and for whom he lives." Cf. Theologie des NT 1,451; "Jesu Verhalten," 128.
126 Romans, 144.
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reign; and that he received his glory through God's glory, his commandment through God's com-
mandment, his kingdom through God's kingdom. 127
The notion that Jesus lives a completely God-related life so that the Father is the prime
centre of everything the Son is and does is of such importance that Schlatter distinguishes
his christology from that of his friend Hermann Cremer at precisely this point: "The dis-
tance remains which everywhere comes to the fore in your and my way of unfolding the
theological base lines. I myself cannot capture the entire content of the gospels in the rela-
tion of the Son to us but hear in the same [gospels] strongly and essentially the TiT TOO gEOO
rrj5 gE~ taking shape from Jesus' will and work."!"
Schlatter - proceeding especially along Johannine lines - specifies the active love of
Jesus to his heavenly Father as the "religious ground" which constitutes the passivity char-
acteristic of Jesus' life. "The fact that he thought and acted in love to the Father gave him
the incapacity to work for himself, to protect himself, to witness for himself - be that in
word, work or miracle."!" Jesus did not selfishly use his divine Sonship for himself when
he spoke and acted. "[B]y acting in the selflessness of genuine love" the "arbitrary disposal
of himself and the world remained foreign to him." In that he - in his filial acting and
speaking - glorified the one God, "he did not commit robbery on that which is God's."130
Schlatter, in response to Hermann Cremer, summarises: "Certainly, he is the object of re-
ligion - this, however, as 'the one and only Son of the Father.''' Schlatter points to the ED;
127 Theologie des NT 1,302-03; cf. History ofthe Christ, 126-27; RufJesu, 4.
128 Wort und Wahrnehmung, 92-93.
129 "Zweifel an der Messianitat," 192; Theologie des NT 1,304 (in above order).
130 See History ofthe Christ, 91, 188. Unfortunately, the [mal sentence, which in the German original (Er
beging keinen Raub an dem, was Gottes ist.) is an allusion to Phil 2:6, does not occur in the English transla-
tion (see Geschichte des Christus, 246). See also Jesu Demut, 68-69.
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dyag6~(Mt 19:17) and recognises a "grain of truth" in "Harnack's statement that Jesus did
not place himselfinto the gospel" 131 Jesus' gospel, Schlatter expounds,
was therefore the proclamation of God's rule, and he did not need to call undue attention to himself.
Through the Lord's prayer, he turned his disciples' desire toward God's name, rule, and will, and did
not command them to pray: sanctify the name of your Son and bring about the kingdom of your
Son.132
As interesting as it may be, we cannot enter into the details of Schlatter's understand-
ing of the passivity of Jesus. 133 Important for us to see is that the selflessness and passivity
of the incarnate Son originate neither in his weakness nor in his incapacity to will and act
himself, but in his love in which he wants to do the will of the Father and complete his
work. Therefore, Jesus makes himself dependent on God in that he waits for the reception
ofthe Father's will and work.
He is bound to that which he apprehends and receives in his communion with the Father. His charac-
teristic is the incapacity to do anything by himself. In this Jesus sees the precondition and the rule of
his entire activity. He cannot act ifthe Father does not act; cannot will ifthe Father does not command
him; cannot think if the Father does not teach him.134
This includes, so Schlatter, that Jesus "was not elevated beyond that asking which searches
for God's will." To affirm his filial dependence means for Jesus that "he - in his own action
- remains subordinate to the guidance of the Father."!" The Son unites his will and work
with the will and work of the Father. This activity finds expression in Jesus' prayer. Rather
than being "an impairment of his Sonship" the reason for Jesus' prayer lies, according to
Schlatter, in the fact that "he bases his relationship with him [the Father] upon the obedi-
ence that is grounded in love."136 The communion of will, word and work is gained through
prayer - that is, it does not come about by the coercion of a natural force but through an
131 Wort und Wahrnehmung, 92.
132 History ofthe Christ, 126-27.
133 See especially "Zweifel an der Messianitat," 188-98; Theologie des NT 1,301-19.
134 Theologie des NT I, 306.
135 Glaube, 233.
136 Theologie des NT 1,344; cf. History ofthe Christ, 196.
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inner struggle in which Jesus seeks and receives unity with God's will, word and work. Je-
sus' prayer in Gethsemane is Schlatter's paradigm case in this context.!"
In that Jesus - "by the free act of obedient love" - "wills what God wills and does
what God does," he rejects egoistic Sonship and reveals himself as the true Son who par-
takes in everything that is the Father's and acts with divine authority.!" Sonship meant for
Jesus "the total affirmation of the divine love, not merely a conditioned or limited partici-
pation in God's gift, but rather a completeness of community which finds expression in the
words: 'everything is committed to me by the Father."?" Thus, Jesus' possession "arises
from his receiving, his power from his selflessness, and his rule from his obedience."!"
c) Jesus' Sonship of God as the inner basis of his humanity
We have now reached the point at which are able to see that Schlatter's concept of Je-
sus' Sonship of God, as we have outlined it thus far, constitutes the basis on which due
conceptual space and weight can be given to the humanity of Christ in all its humility. In
Schlatter, the self-distinction, subordination and obedience of the Son, which are essential
constituents of his filial communion with the Father, are identical with, and include, the
will to live an authentic human life and to sacrifice that life on the cross. We have observed
this link already in our presentation of Schlatter's doctrine of the incarnation."! The will of
the Son in which he did not grasp at equality with God, that is, "by which he seized not di-
vinity but humanity" cannot, therefore, be "condensed ... into a single transcendent mo-
137 See Theologie des NT I, 311-13; Dogma, 314-15.
138 History ofthe Christ, 130; Glaube, 233 (in above order).
139 Glaube, 232. See above, p. 194.
140 Theology of the Apostles, 130; cf "Jesu Verhalten," 128; Jesu Gottheit, 39; Jesu Demut, 44-45, 56;
Furcht vor dem Denken, 54.
141 See above, p. 184.
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ment" but must be conceived of as determining the whole life of Jesus. 142 The submission
of the incarnate Son to the one God has to be understood not as a renunciation ofhis divin-
ity but as a renunciation of what Schlatter calls "egoistic Sonship," that is, the egoistic
abuse of divine Sonship for the sake of equation with the Father.
The passage's [Phil 2:6-8] ethical import is not that Paul conceived of Jesus' self-emptying in terms of
a loss of nature but that he thought of the selfless renunciation that did not exploit for himself what Je-
sus owned as his abiding possession on account of God's fatherly regard for him. If he thought thus,
he predicated existence in the fonn of God and existence in the form of man as Jesus' simultaneous
possession; yet not the former but the latter is made by him the determinative aspect of his experience
and his actions. 143
Throughout his christological writings Schlatter points to the connection between Je-
sus' love for God, his denial of egoistic Sonship and his decision to live as human creature
in otherness vis-a-vis God as his Father. The twelve years old Jesus, "who so vividly felt,
thought and willed in God," did not derive from his communion with the Father "any op-
position to the natural order, nor did he opt out of any of the pressure it placed on him.
Work for his family did not seem to him a defilement or weakening ofhis communion with
God, but rather its proof." 144 Schlatter's exposition of the temptation account is of funda-
mental importance in this connection. Through a filial act of "confidence in, obedience to,
and love for God" Jesus did not embrace that posture in which he deduced from his divine
Sonship the "rejection of suffering," the "full authority to venture every risk" and the grasp
"for power by every means." The reflex, so to speak, of his rejection of egoistic Sonship is
that the incarnate Son submits himself to the natural and historical concreteness and deter-
minateness of humanity even ifthat means for him to suffer.
142 Theology ofthe Apostles, 258; see above, p. 192.
143 Ibid., 258.
144 "MuJ3 ich nicht sein?," 146; cf. History ofthe Christ,41.
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The norms to which Jesus thus subjected himself guided him in his entire work. We find him always
in that complete confidence in God that needed nothing else for life than a divine word, and this in
such a way that his confidence in the divine life-giving love rendered him free from selfish passion
and incapable of anxiety or self-interest, so that he subjected himself to every natural order.l"
According to the New Testament, "Jesus in conscious and insistent sharpness refused to
use his Sonship of God for himself ... but obtained from it the duty that unites him with
humanity."!" As Jesus' life progressed, Schlatter elaborates, this decision "received ever
greater depth and an escalating seriousness, climaxing in his way to the cross. It was, and
continually remained, his will to lead a human life in the strength of his communion with
God - and precisely because he led this life in communion with God, he was 'the' Son of
Man."147
The foregoing citations indicate that, in Schlatter's view, Jesus' "will that established
his humanity" includes his Heilandswillen and his "will to the cross."!" Jesus' communion
with God is the basis on which he works for, and serves, his fellow man, and this work has,
in turn, its "indispensable precondition" in Christ's consubstantiality with man.!"
In John, the Son of God does not come into the world for the sake of presenting his divine nature or a
miraculous force, but in order to complete a work which consists in the gathering of the community.
That means that he is the Christ. He is there neither for the sake of his own enjoyment nor for the sake
of communicating a theory but in order to rule. His rule must not be conceived of as egoism which
makes its own exaltation the humiliation of others but as love which helps others to their own share in
God and thus liberates them.150
Because Jesus neither lived by himself nor for himself but from and to God as his Father,
he became the Christ for mankind. As Schlatter puts it, Jesus "lived not for himself but on
account of mankind in the Father. His sonship did not pull him away from mankind but
145 History ofthe Christ, 91.
146 "Zweifel an der Messianitat," 194.
147 History ofthe Christ, 135; cf. Dogma, 323-24; "Jesu Verhalten," 132-33.
148 Theology ofthe Apostles, 258.
149 See Dogma, 312.
150 Theologie des NT I, 431.
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towards it and rendered him one with it, since he had to complete his work for it."I5I Hence,
Jesus' love for God becomes the ground of his love for man so that both are one.'? Schlat-
ter even takes his argument a step further when he states: "The fact that Jesus' unlimited
co-ordination with God not only kept its constant basis in the total subordination to him but
also continuously rendered him [Jesus] a servant in relation to man and nature and placed
him into equality with us, is the seal of its authenticity." 153
It would be a promising task to explore Schlatter's doctrine of the cross of Christ along
the lines just sketched out. This, however, would carry us beyond the limits of this study.!"
Suffice it to say that, according to Schlatter, the death on the cross marks the climax of Je-
sus' love for, and active obedience to, God in which he unites his will with the Father's
will. The proprium of Jesus' death was that "he not only renounced his natural life but sur-
rendered everything: his mission that placed him in the world, his royal right that made
him the creator and Lord of the new community, his office as saviour."!" In other words,
Jesus gives himself, including his deity, back to the Father from whom he has received
everything he is and does. Yet the cross is an act of giving, obedience and sacrifice because
Jesus affirms God as his Father "in the conditions of earthly and guilty man" - that is, as
the one who participates in the state of life [Lebensstand] of the fallen ones."'" Jesus ad-
heres to his communion with man before the Father for which reason the gift, obedience
and sacrifice of the Son is not answered directly through a correlating act of the Father.
"He gives his life but does not instantly receive it back from the Father's love. He remains
lSI History ofthe Christ, 132.
152 See Dogma, 317; "Jesu Verhalten," 133; "Zweifel an der Messianitat," 195.
153 "Bekenntnis zur Gottheit Jesu," 46.
154 For an illuminating outline of Schlatter's notion of the death of Christ see Rieger, Rechtfertigungsle-
hre, 307-26.
155 Opfer, 12; cf. what Schlatter says about Jesus' "totale Entselbstigung" in Jesu Gottheit, 63-69.
156 Christi Versohnen, 205.
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with the Father, but the same does not remain with him; he stands by the Father, but the
same does not stand by him. He glorifies him while he is being humiliated."!" Here the
self-distinction from the Father reaches its escalating climax because the Son "takes the
consequences of sin into his experience: weakness, pain, death and Godforsakenness."!" In
Schlatter, "the renunciation of the actio ad extra," that is, the refusal to opt out of his hu-
manity and passion, is a constitutive aspect of Jesus' sacrifice to God and stands as such "in
antithesis to our robbery of that which is God'S."159 It is precisely as the one who dies on
the cross that Jesus is the Son of God.
The work of Jesus gained its greatness through the fact that he, in the same flesh which by natural co-
ercion brings forth in us a darkened God-consciousness and an egoistically distorted self-
consciousness and an 'into-hatred-degenerated' behaviour over against the others, has lived as the Son
in God's obedience and at peace with him and the world160
In conclusion: Jesus' Sonship of God, in which he participates in everything the Father
is and does, stands, according to Schlatter, not in contradiction to his human life in its
humble form but rather founds it. Christ's humanity and self-humbling have their inner ba-
sis in the self-distinction and subordination as essential constituents of the Son's relation-
ship with the Father. In other words, exactly as this concrete man from Nazareth and in his
subordination to God, Jesus is the Son of the heavenly Father.!" That this notion of Jesus'
Sonship of God is conceptually secured through a corresponding understanding of the eter-
nal communion between Father and Son shall become clear in due course.
IS? Jesu Gottheit, 66; cf. Opfer, 11.
158 Christi Versohnen, 205. See also Dogma, 294; Jesu Gottheit, 2-7.
159 Wort und Wahrnehmung, 93; Jesu Gottheit, 70 (in above order). See further ibid., 97.
160 Dogma, 312.
161 Notable is the affinity to Pannenberg's view that "much depends on whether Jesus avoided making
himself equal to God. That is, it depends on whether, as a creature of God, he subordinated himself to the
imminent rule of God that he announced with just the same unconditionality as he required of others. Only in
this subordination to the rule of the one God is he the Son. As he gave his life in service to the rule of God
over his creatures - namely, to prepare the way for its acknowledgement - he is as man the Son of the eternal
Father. Rejection of any supracreaturely dignity before God shows itself to be a condition of his sonship. It is
mediated by his self-humbling (Phil. 2:8)" (Systematic Theology, vol. II, 373). For Schlatter's usage of the
term "precondition" in the same context see above, pp. 201, 202.
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Schlatter ascribes a central role to the Holy Spirit in Jesus' life, and this not only ap-
plies to the incarnation ofthe eternal Son of God. 162 For communion with the Father, which
ontologically constitutes everything the Son is and does, is mediated through the Holy
Spirit. Thus, we are not off the mark to say that, in Schlatter, the Holy Spirit is not only the
Spirit of Christ, but that Christ is the Christ of the Spirit. Jesus was "the one born of the
Spirit and anointed with the Spirit ... he was from beginning to end in body and soul the
work of the Holy Spirit."!" The same Spirit, who - in the incarnation - establishes the true
otherness of Jesus as the Son vis-a-vis God as his Father, enables the man Jesus to live his
life in love and obedience to God so that divine Sonship is actualised in the otherness of a
human creature. Examining the events at Jesus' baptism Schlatter states:
By the fact that the sign consisted of the sending of the Spirit and of the attestation of his Sonship, his
internal relationship with God, which determined his personal existence, was made the foundation of
his entire work. The prospect of his rule was opened up for him, since, as the Son, he was connected
by the Spirit with the one who now revealed his rule to the people. If he was connected with God
through his Spirit, he was linked to the power that perfects all things, with the grace that reconciles,
and with the righteousness that executes justice. 164
The christological centrepiece - that Jesus lived from and for God - is now pneumatologi-
cally reflected. For Schlatter, it is "God's Spirit by whom Jesus receives the power to carry
out God's will. Jesus is conceived by the Spirit, revealed by the Spirit's descent upon him
and empowered by the Spirit to do his work.v'" Because Jesus is equipped with the Spirit
of God, he serves God, belongs to him and is sanctified for him. 166
162 Scholarship has thus far paid no attention to the place and meaning of the Holy Spirit in Schlatter's
christology. See especially Fraas, Gotteslehre, 63-83 but also Rieger, Rechtfertigungslehre, 307-26.
163 "Sunde gegen den heiligen Geist," 76.
164 History ofthe Christ, 85.
165 Theology ofthe Apostles, 78.
166 See RufJesu, 15-16. The conceptual significance of the agency of the Holy Spirit for Schlatter's chris-
tology is substantiated when he articulates it as the "motive and theme" of his christology to show "that here
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Even the selfless love in which Jesus dedicates and submits himself to God is medi-
ated by the Holy Spirit. "In his temptation, he proved to be the bearer of the Spirit by dis-
tancing himself from evil will by his own decision and by yielding to God with all his
trust."!" Schlatter directly links Jesus' refutation of egoistic Sonship and his subordination
to God with the agency of the Holy Spirit. "Jesus can overcome sin as he remains in the
Father's good pleasure and thinks, chooses and acts in the Spirit."!" This means for Jesus to
wait for God and receive his actions from him.
Jesus was enabled by God to the deeds that he performed out of his mercy by his own will. It was
God's gift, first for himself, and through him for the one who requested it. For this reason he said, re-
garding the signs, that God's spirit worked them through himself and that they were mediated through
his prayer and were God's answer to it.169
As the Son, Jesus is dependent upon the Father in the Spirit. "It was when Jesus saw that
God's Spirit was in him that he acted."!" Hence, Schlatter outlines the passivity and humil-
ity of Jesus, in which he did not selfishly abuse the gifts of the Father for himself, as "the
product of the Spirit."!"
The mediatory work of the Holy Spirit concerns Jesus' vertical relationship with the
Father as well as his horizontal relationship with fellow man. The same pneumatic related-
ness by means of which the Son lives from and for the Father enables Jesus to accomplish
his work as Christ for mankind.!" The latter, Schlatter argues, collapses without the Spirit.
a human life originated from God, was lived in service for God and was sanctified to be God's instrument in
order that God's grace might show itself to us unabridged and completed through him" (Briefe, 29; see also
Ruckblick, 92; Kennen wir Jesus?, 55).
167 History ofthe Christ, 133.
168 Ibid., 86.
169 Ibid., 185 (with reference to Mt 12:28).
170 Ibid., 83
171 Jesu Demut, 57. A similar view of the work of the Holy Spirit in Jesus can be found in Pannenberg:
"Since the whole work of Jesus, aiming as it does at the knowledge and acknowledgment of the Father and
the coming of his kingdom, has the glorifying of the Father as its ultimate goal, it is to be viewed as a work
of the Spirit in him" (Systematic Theology, vol. I, 316-17).
172 For a similar attempt to articulate the "double relationality" of Jesus Christ in pneumatological terms
see e.g. Greshake, Der dreieine Gatt, 359-62.
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The function he [Christ] exercises is giving - for his goal is neither self-portrayal, nor self-actuation
[ein Sich-selbst-ausleben] on the basis of the special property granted to him, nor enjoyment of his
blissful communion with God. In him the royal grace of God enters into mankind, seeking man, form-
ing man from God and for God, and this happens through the Spirit.173
, Jesus' way to the cross on which his life as the incarnate Son of the eternal Father reaches
its dramatic climax, was made possible for him through the work ofthe Holy Spirit in him.
Schlatter makes this point with reference to Heb 9:14. Jesus' "Opfersinn" and "Heilands-
wille which urged him to his priestly work," "the power to carry the cross, to shed his
blood and to honour God until his last breath" came from the Spirit.
The draught that drew the Son to the Father so that he offered and sacrificed himself to him, [the
draught] that made him one with the Father so that he served God's grace as instrument and his cove-
nant as mediator, that is the Spirit, the eternal Spirit, because it is God's Spirit who makes the Son one
with the Father in eternal communion.i"
Thus, Schlatter links the origin, outcome and success of Christ's work with the fact that he
lived completely by the Spirit. "However, because Jesus did what he did in the body ac-
cording to the will of the Spirit and in the power of the Spirit, his history is imperishable,
unforgettable - the place at which eternal life originated." 175 The resurrection from the dead
reveals the Holy Spirit once more as the quickener and enabler of the man Jesus. "The fi-
nale [Ausgang] of Jesus takes place through a creative act of God that resurrects him."!"
Along the lines just sketched out, Schlatter summarises the history of Christ stating
"that Jesus was born from the Spirit, was equipped through the Spirit in his baptism for his
173 D "46ogma,.J .
174 Erlauterungen III, 282-83; similarly in Jesu Gottheit, 34-35. Cf. Schwebel's words about "the story of
Jesus as the story of a life constituted by and conducted in the Spirit which is obedient to God the Father to
the death on Calvary and to the resurrection on the third day and which in this way is the coming of God's
kingdom for the salvation of his creation. One element of this story is here of special significance. The obedi-
ence of Jesus as the Son to the Father is over and over again from his birth to his resurrection described as
one that is enabled from the Father by the Spirit and exercised in response to the Father in the Spirit" ("Chris-
tology and Trinitarian Thought," 140-41).
175 "Jesus und wir heutigen Menschen," 213; see also Theology ofthe Apostles, 347-48.
176 Dogma, 332; similarly ibid., 310. For the notion of resurrection as "the creative act by which God
gives life" see also History ofthe Christ, 383; "Auferstehung Jesu," 153.
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work and was made alive by the Spirit after his cross."!" Schlatter can also put this in
terms of God's creativity: "Therefore, God's creative activity is nowhere as visible as in
him. This is true with regard to his beginning in the miracle of Christmas, as well as his fi-
nale in the miracle of Easter, and it shows itself no less in his healing deeds."!" Schlatter is
keen to underscore that the creative agency of the Holy Spirit in Jesus never operates at the
expense of his humanity.
What did the Spirit create? A child in the womb of the mother. What came about through the trans-
figuration of Jesus? The one who willingly walked from the presence of God down to the faithless
people and completed his way to the cross. What arose through the resurrection? Not the renunciation
of humanity, not the recall of the act of Christmas, through which the Word had become flesh, rather
its [humanity's] etemalisation.i"
Corresponding to this is the fact that "Jesus distinguished between his inner life and the
Holy Spirit. He looked up to the Spirit as to the strength by which he received the ability to
do miracles." The "enthusiastic concept of the spirit," according to which the divine spirit
overcomes and suspends human personhood, remained as foreign to Jesus as the "gnostic
concept of 'son.'" 180 In the New Testament, Schlatter argues, the "Son of God completely
retains the natural manner of human life and is united as a human being not with an infe-
rior God or a divine force - such does not exist for the apostles - but with the Father."!"
To sum up Schlatter's understanding of this: Jesus - in the otherness of a human crea-
ture - relates to God as his Father in the Holy Spirit. Jesus' Sonship and his being-moved
by the Holy Spirit are indissolubly connected in Schlatter's christology. The uniqueness of
Jesus' Sonship of God is grounded "in the completeness with which he possessed the
177 RufJesu, 327.
178 "Wunder der Bibel," 74; cf. RufJesu, 329; Theology of the Apostles, 369. Similarly Gunton who re-
gards Christ's incarnation and resurrection as "paradigm cases of the way of the Spirit with all created reality"
("God the Holy Spirit," 118).
179 Sprechstunde, 26.
180 History ofthe Christ, 133.
181 Theology of the Apostles, 366. Cf. Gunton in Christ and Creation, 90: "The Holy Spirit represents
God's otherness to Jesus: his allowing and enabling him to be himself, free and truly human. He is personally
alongside Jesus, present to him as another."
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Spirit's power that had conceived him body and soul. Since he lived completely by the
Spirit, he stood alongside the Father and the Spirit: on the same level as God rather than
man."!" Schlatter brings it to the point when he states that "the principle ... on which the
Sonship of the God-man rests" is "the Spirit of God."183 Thus, Schlatter's christology must
be seen as a pneumatological, and hence, trinitarian christology which, indeed, shows a
remarkable affinity to those christological conceptions in which due weight is given to the
agency of the Holy Spirit.!"
D. Aspects of a trinitarian christology in Schlatter
Schlatter's references to Christ as the rule of thought according to which we have to re-
late humanity and deity prompted us to investigate basic features of his christology. In our
view, Schlatter relates Christ's deity and humanity without flattening out the distinctness of
each. Shaped by his awareness of the docetic tendencies lurking in different christological
traditions, Schlatter develops an incamational christology which gives due weight to the
full humanity of Jesus. Schlatter's conception rests upon a trinitarian hermeneutic, the key
aspects of which we are to pinpoint now.
182 Theology ofthe Apostles, 78; cf. History ofthe Christ, 58, 85.
183 *Wesen und Quellen, 171.
184 For the Holy Spirit "as the medium of the communion of Jesus with the Father" see e.g. Pannenberg,
Systematic Theology, vol. I, 266-68: "The fellowship of Jesus as Son with God as Father can obviously be
stated only if there is reference to a third as well, the Holy Spirit (267).
The parallels between Schlatter's christology and that of Gunton would provide sufficient material for a
promising comparative study. Suffice it here to say that Gunton, learning from theologians such as John
Owen and Edward Irving, conceives of the Holy Spirit as "'the author'" of Jesus' "'bodily life' ... as God's
free and life-giving activity in and towards the world as he maintains and empowers the human activity of the
incarnate Son. The Spirit is thus revealed ('manifested') in 'subduing, restraining, conquering, the evil propen-
sities of the fallen manhood, and making it an apt organ for expressing the will of the Father; a fit and holy
substance to enter into communion with the untempted and untemptable Godhead'. God the Spirit opens,
frees, the humanity of the Son so that it may be the vehicle of the Father's will in the world ("God the Holy
Spirit," 115-16, partly quoting Irving). The main references for Gunton's pneumatologically driven christo1-
ogy are Yesterday and Today, 220-26; The Promise ofTrinitarian Theology, 69-71, 99-100 Christ and Crea-
tion, 50-68; "God the Holy Spirit," 114-19; "Christology: Two Dogmas Revisited," 161-68. For Owen and
Irving see McFarlane, Christ and the Spirit, 125-83, especially the listing of the Spirit's acting upon Christ
on pp. 160-61; Spence, "Christ's Humanity and Ours: John Owen," especially pp. 75-76, 83-88, 95-97.
i. The concept of enhypostasia
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Schlatter clearly affirms the classical doctrine that the humanity of Christ subsists en-
hypostatically in the eternal Logos, in the person of the Son.I8S The former is ontologically
dependent upon the latter. However, the incarnation ofthe Son is the result ofthe interrela-
tion and interaction of Father, Son and Holy Spirit and, as such, an expression of the deity
of the Son. As we have seen, the notion of the Son's otherness from the Father and the me-
diation of the Holy Spirit playa crucial role in this context. Christ's deity, that is, the being
of the eternal Son in his relation to the Father in the Holy Spirit, and his humanity are not
located on the same ontological level, for which reason Schlatter is able to affirm the in-
carnation as the creation of a fully human being. The distinct character of Schlatter's chris-
tology lies for us in his application of the aforementioned concepts to the entire life of the
incarnate Son. The idea of enhypostasia means for Schlatter precisely not that the incarnate
Son relates himself to the Logos in him but to the Father above him. Whereas the divine
Word is ascribed the active role in the incarnation, it is the agency of the Holy Spirit which
comes into focus when the now incarnate Son lives his life in the Father.!" In his discus-
sion of a possible egoistic sonship, Schlatter has forcefully argued that a life of Jesus from
and for himself would result in a loss of divine Sonship, whereas the life from and for the
Father in the Holy Spirit means the actualisation of Jesus' Sonship of God.187 Through this,
as we may call it, trinitarian understanding of enhypostasia Schlatter is able to relate Jesus'
185 For the origin of this doctrine see e.g. Pannenberg, Jesus - God and Man, 385-87; Stickelbroeck,
Christologie im Horizont der Seinsfrage, 183-203.
186 In a certain way Schlatter's thoughts run parallel to John Owen's conviction "that the eternal Son of
God assumed human nature into personal union with himself, but ... that all direct divine activity on that as-
sumed human nature was that of the Holy Spirit" (Spence, "Christ's Humanity and Ours," 75-76).
187 A similar modification of the notion of enhypostasis is undertaken by Pannenberg: "He did not live in
dependence upon the Son; this obvious understanding of the enhypostasis of Jesus in the Logos does not do
justice to the historical features of the life of Jesus. Rather, he lived in dependence on the Father, but pre-
cisely in so doing showed himself to be one with the Son" (Jesus - God and Man, 388; see also Systematic
Theology, vol. II, 389).
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divine Sonship and his humanity without making them compete against each other on the
same level.
ii. Communion in distinctness
Schlatter's grasp of the communion of love between Father and Son is of fundamental
importance for his understanding of Christ's humanity and lowliness as expression of his
divine Sonship. The love from the Father to the Son and vice versa is conceived of as crea-
tive and giving love. The divine love constitutes the unity between the two relata but also -
and this is the decisive point - their true otherness. This relationship is mediated by the
Holy Spirit, the "principle" of Jesus' Sonship. Through this pneumatological concept of the
communion of love between Father and Son, Schlatter gains the conceptual space for the
otherness and particularity of the Son.188 On these grounds, the humanity of Jesus can be
conceived of as corresponding to the otherness of the Son from the Father.
For Jesus ... there was even room in his filial relationship for a genuine, real human life, since he did
not view God merely with regard to his power but foremost of all with regard to his grace. He could
be a man in such a way as to be with the Father; he could be the Son in such a way as to be able to be
a man. For the decisive point at which communion with God occurred lay for him in the personal act
of life. Being known by the Father meant to stand in his love; knowing the Father meant to love him.
But he also had the complete love of God characteristic of the Son of God in his human course oflife
and on the way to the cross.189
We saw in this connection that Schlatter works with a concept of the monarchia of the Fa-
ther according to which "the Son has his origin from the Father."!" Jesus' self-humbling
and subordination to God do not undermine his deity but are expressive of the relationship
in which the Son corresponds to the Fatherhood of the Father.
188 Gunton procedes along similar lines when he argues "that it is in the incarnation and particularly in re-
lation to the humanity of Christ in general that we discern the activity of the Spirit as the life-giving power of
God in and towards his creation. It is in that way that the Spirit particularises: brings it about by his action in
relation to the creation that this Jewish humanity is able to be distinctively what it is as the bearer of God's
salvation" ("God the Holy Spirit," 114). "The Spirit is on such an account not so much an endowment as the
one sent from the Father who in personal divine action enables the incarnate Son to be himself' (ibid., 116).
189 History ofthe Christ, 223.
190 Furcht vor dem Denken, 54.
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For Jesus does not present himself as God's manifestation in such a way that only in him, only in this
human 'I' the God-power, the God-life, the God-truth exists. The same exists in him as well as above
him, and this, of course, in the absolute perfection of a person. Jesus expressed this distinction in God
through the terms 'Father' and 'Son.' In this he puts himself in the fullest dependence upon the Father
for the Son is everything he is and has from the Father. At the same time, it is precisely the idea of
Sonship which expresses equality with the Father: he distinguishes himself from God in no other way
as the Son from the Father.191
iii. Jesus and God - essential and personal communion
We are now able to see that Schlatter's critique ofthe orthodox doctrine of the two na-
tures of Christ concerns not what the latter says but rather what it does not say."? Schlatter
clearly affirms the ontic-metaphysical character of the christological statements of the An-
cient Church:
God's life does not merely consist in individual acts or temporally limited effects. He is. The same is
true of Jesus. What he is gives shape to what he does. He does not acquire sonship and rule through
his individual acts but possesses them on account of what he is in his continual relationship with
GOd. 193
However, christological reflection about the identity of Jesus Christ must not, as Schlatter
emphasises, stand still at this point. For the idea of the possession of a divine and a human
nature can all too easily tum into the image of a composition of two substances so that the
being of the incarnate Son is presented as something static and self-sufficient. "Jesus'
communion with God is then conceived of merely as nature, not as Spirit and will, there-
fore as gebundenes Einerlei, not as dynamic vivacity." 194 Schlatter was fully aware of the
191 *Wesen und Quellen, 157; similarly in Dogma, 354-55. Cf. Gunton on Irving's employment of the
concept of monarchia in this context: "[T]he Son need not be conceived as being divine in the same way as
the Father. He is divine, we might say, according to his own hypostasis, a hypostasis having its shape by vir-
tue of its relations to Father and Spirit, but having the distinctive shape manifested by self-giving obedience,
kenosis. That is the reason why the humanity of Jesus is not foreign to but an expression of the deity of the
Son ... ("Christology: Two Dogmas Revisited," 167).
192 See what we have outlined above, pp. 175ff.
193 Theology of the Apostles, 132; cf. the citations above, p. 179. Brodbeck's statements about Schlatter's
christology must be rejected as simply misleading when she writes that Schlatter critiques the"dogmatische
Vergottlichung Jesu" and turns against a "Hoheitschristologie, die Jesus zur Gottheit erhob, statt in ihm eine
Offenbarung Gottes zu sehen" (Hunger nach Gerechtigkeit, 184). The same applies to Fraas when he speaks
of Schlatter's "Skepsis gegen eine ontologische Interpretation der Zweinaturenlehre" (Gotteslehre, 73).
194 Jesu Gottheit, 94.
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fact that a christology which loses the creative and giving communion of love between Je-
sus the Son and God the Father, is increasingly unable to uphold Christ's deity as well as
his humanity. For Jesus' self "is neither sunk nor imprisoned in his 'I'-entity, but is that self
which wants to do the work of God and wants to destroy the works of the devil. It lives and
preserves itself in that it receives nothing from the devil but everything from God." 195 In
other words, a christology which claims that, in this man Jesus, we are dealing with the
Son of God who fully participates in the deity of the Father, can - and this is Schlatter's
decisive insight - only substantiate this claim by referring to the biblical account of the re-
lationship between the incarnate Son and the Father in the Spirit.
On these grounds, Schlatter explicates the being of the incarnate Son in terms of dy-
namic being, thereby consistently linking the substantial character and the relational and
actional aspect of being. As Schlatter puts it with regard to John's christology, "being and
act are here not brought into a mutual tension; rather, essence generates act, revealing and
upholding itself through it."196 An ontological understanding of Jesus' Sonship must not
render his life and work indifferent as something external or supplementary to his filial be-
ing.!" Rather, the being of the incarnate Son actua1ises itself in and through his interaction
and interrelation with God and man.
Jesus' 'nature' would not exist apart from these acts; his works do not merely reveal his nature but ren-
der it effective, so that it has its existence and its reality by them and in them. From Jesus' 'I am' result
his knowing and loving, his bearing of witness, and his ministry. His obedience is not merely a mani-
festation of his Sonship but [his Sonship] exists and is preserved by it [Jesus' obediencej.i"
195 Jesu Gottheit, 93.
196 History ofthe Christ, 130.
197 Schlatter's awareness of the problematic soteriological implications of such a concept of Christ's hu-
manity cannot further be explored here. His critique of the notion of "the passive humanity of Jesus" in Di-
enst, 79-82 is crucial in this connection.
198 Theology of the Apostles, 133. We must include the brackets in the citation here because Kostenber-
ger's translation is imprecise in suggesting that Jesus' Sonship determines his obedience. Yet, this would only
repeat the first half of Schlatter's statement. What Schlatter articulates in the second half of the sentence is
that Jesus' obedience is also constitutive of his Sonship (see Theologie del' Apostel, 162).
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This means that the unity of the incarnate Son with God his Father is established via
the otherness of the Son who makes his will and work one with the Father. Schlatter articu-
lates this in stating that "Jesus possesses his Sonship through that which he does" and "by
means of having his goal above himself in the Father and, therefore, in front of himself in
us so that he lives, dies and is glorified for the Father and, therefore, for US."I99 Therefore,
Schlatter outlines the communion between the incarnate Son and God in terms of essential
unity (Wesenseinheit) and personal unity of will and action, both of which stand in mutual
relation to each other."? "How would it be possible to believe in the unity of essence (Ho-
mousie) of both [Father and Son] if the unity of will between them was doubtful? In the
unanimity of the wills, the unity of essence has its manifestation." In a roundabout way,
Schlatter speaks of a relationship with God "which grants him the unity of essence with
God and thus creates the God-man. ,,201 As far as we can see, Schlatter appropriates the
unity of essence in a special way to the action of the Word, and the personal unity of will
and action to the agency of the Holy Spirit.i"
In all of this Schlatter is able to do justice to the biblical vivacity and particularity of
the person of Jesus in his relationship with God. Schlatter's notion that the distinctness of
Jesus from God is "the precondition as well as the result of his communion [Verbunden-
heit] with him" must be seen in the light of the material just outlined.?" The ramification
for Schlatter's understanding of the God-manhood of Christ is that the humanity is not only
199 Theologie des NT 1,440; Ethik, 63 (in above order); similarly and with direct reference to Jesus' office
of Christ in History ofthe Christ, 131-32.
200 See e.g. "Christologie der Bergpredigt," 328; History of the Christ, 30; Jesu Gottheit, 21, 28, 30-31,
42,47,51-52.
201 Jesu Gottheit, 8-9, 12. See also Rieger's remarks in Rechtfertigungslehre, 322, 325-26.
202 That this appropriation does not operate at the expense of the actional unity of the Word and the Spirit
has been outlined above, pp. 152ff.
203 Jesu Demut, 80; similarly ibid. 84.
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assumed by the Word but actively participates in the filial communion by means of which
Jesus shares in the divine being of the Father.
[T]he humanity in Christ is that which the Godhead wills, and the human'!' in its natural and historical
limitedness is set through the Godhead. The Spirit generates Jesus, including his corporeality, and the
Word itself determines the natural being of man. God opens himself to man and takes him into com-
plete communion with himself. Therefore the God-manhood is, even with respect to its human side,
grounded in the act of will. The God-given human will turns upwards and has its goal as well as its
origin in God. In the affirmation of the Father, the Son lives as Son by means of which the union of
deity and humanity remains real in him.204
In this, as Schlatter underscores, no development of Jesus' Sonship of God is stated accord-
ing to which deity and humanity gradually grow together. "[T]he union of God with man in
Christ must not be conceived of in terms of becoming but rather as that which founded the
becoming and growing of Jesus' humanity" so that it "becomes increasingly suitable to be
the organ and revelation ofthe deity."205
Now Schlatter's notion of the God-manhood of Christ as "the miracle ofthe pneumatic
action of God on its highest level" unfolds its full meaning. Since the Holy Spirit is the en-
abler of Christ's humanity, the unity ofwill and action is a "pneumatological union." Hence
Schlatter's conclusion: "The miracle in Jesus' being seems to me a miracle of union, ofvo-
litional and, therefore, essential union, not of a transubstantiation of nature. "206
To draw an intermediate conclusion: Schlatter's christology has presented itself to us
as a trinitarian christology which not only gives rise to, but is also determined by, a doc-
trine of the triune being of God. We are therefore well advised to explore Schlatter's under-
standing of the Trinity before we - in the concluding chapter of this study - expose the
christological and, on that basis, trinitarian grounds of Schlatter's theology of divine action.
"04 D "40
- ogma, j .
205 Ibid.; cf. Rieger, Rechtfertigungslehre, 326.
206 "Bekenntnis zur Gottheit Jesu," 44, 48, 46-47 (in above order).
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2. Schlatter's doctrine of the Trinity
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The indissoluble connection between knowledge of God's being and knowledge of
God's works, as we have outlined it in the opening paragraph of this study, is directly re-
fleeted in Schlatter's doctrine of the Trinity: the ground for our knowledge of God's triune
being is God's triune economy.
When we distinguish between the Trinity of God's revelation and of God's being, we must not speak
about the revealed Trinity as an inferior kind of Trinity; for it exists for us only in so far as it is re-
vealed in God's action. Rather, we must completely affirm the threefold way of God's acting and fmd
in it that which is God's being. The description of God's being comes about in no other way than
through collecting what reveals itself to us in the plurality of the event. It [the description of God's be-
ing] shows us nothing beyond the historical act, but elucidates to us only what the act, in its concrete
form [Gestalt], places before us. For in the act the being makes itself visible, and the latter is not being
without the act.207
The strengths and the limitations of Schlatter's "empirical theology" come clearly to the
surface in Schlatter's outline of God's triune being. Schlatter, as we seek to show in the fol-
lowing, provides us with a trinitarian theology in which - because of its consistent refer-
ence to God's actions and works ad extra - the doctrine of the Trinity is never disconnected
from the rest of the other dogmatic loci. However, his reflections with regard to the content
break off too early in order to bring about a fully elaborate doctrine of God's triune being.
A quick look at Schlatter's dogmatics shows that "Schlatter's comments on the doctrine of
the Trinity are remarkably terse: of the over 600 pages of his dogmatics he dedicates only
three pages to this doctrinal piece. ,,208 Schlatter himself was fully aware of the limitations
of his dogmatics in this respect. Looking back upon his work he explains that his "thoughts
often ended where the theological task strictly speaking just begins." He hopes that his
successors will develop "more substantial formulae for the Trinity, for the deity of the Son
207 Dogma, 354. Although Schlatter does not use the terms "economic" and "immanent" we are reminded
here of Karl Rahner's axiom: "The 'economic' Trinity is the 'immanent' Trinity and the 'immanent' Trinity is
the 'economic' Trinity" (The Trinity, 22). In how far this statement must be safeguarded against misinterpreta-
tion when we apply it to Schlatter's approach will be outlined in due course.
208 Neuer, Zusammenhang, 118. These three pages are found in Dogma, 354-56. Additional remarks on
the Trinity occur ibid., 24, 34-36, 148, 179-80, 198,352-53,479,559.
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• • •"209 On account of this, a critique which confronted Schlatter's approach simply with
those of contemporary trinitarian theology, would not do justice to him. Having critically
remarked on this, we now attempt to outline what Schlatter has to say about God's triune
being on the basis of God's actions and works.
A. Vestigia trinitatis - the relational pattern of unity and plurality
The theological method to deduce knowledge of God's triune being from God's works
stands in line with the theological tradition of the vestigia trinuatis?" Schlatter's proposi-
tions about God's triune being take the form of analogical predications based upon his per-
ception of unity and plurality as ontological constituents of the creaturely reality of this
world. The creaturely analogues are man, nature and human community. Space does not al-
low us to present Schlatter's treatment of the metaphysical categories of unity and plural-
ity."! For us it is sufficient to note that, according to Schlatter, both categories are indissol-
ubly and mutually related. "We do know unity only in the way that it has plurality with it-
self, and plurality only in the way that it possesses unity. "212 Thus, Schlatter continuously
underlines that the one category must not be denied for the sake ofthe other. If the unity is
removed, the plurality of reality collapses into pluralism. If the plurality is removed, the
unity of reality disintegrates into uniformity. 213
209 Ruckblick, 238. See also Neuer, AdolfSchlatter: ein Leben, 491-92.
210 Barth locates the origins of this tradition in Augustine. The expression vestigium trinitatis "seems to
come from Augustine and it means an analogue of the Trinity, of the trinitarian God of Christian revelation,
in some creaturely reality distinct from him ... " (Church Dogmatics 1. 1,334). We owe this reference to A.
Torrance, Persons in Communion, 125. Schlatter himself does not use the phrase vestigium trinitatis but ex-
pressions such as "a kind oftriunity," "trinitarian order," "witness," "manifestation," and "image."
211 Walldorfhas done this in an exemplary way in Realistische Philosophie, 151-62.
212 Metaphysik, 26.
213 See e.g. ibid., 31-32; Dogma, 25; Grunde, 52-54; Philosophische Arbeit, 239-40, 279-81. The parallels
between Schlatter and Baader in this respect have been outlined by Kindt (Gedanke der Einheit, 63-64) and
Walldorf (Realistische Philosophie, 151).
i. The anthropological analogy
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The following quote about the unity of man's self-consciousness brings us directly to
the heart of Schlatter's understanding ofthe human person as vestigium trinitatis:
We assign all our uncounted presentations to the same'!'. We possess the marvellous faculties of
memory and foresight, through which we relate the multiplicity of our acts, which stretches out in
time, to the same 'I,' to 'us.' Through the constant presence of the concept of unity in our inner life the
number emerges. One'!' is not two or three, but one, not a half or any other fraction, but a whole. Our
unity, however, is only given to us together with a fullness that is uncountable for us, not as exclusion
but as embracing of an endlessly rich manifoldness. An endless row of emotions, presentations and
desires is set into the one'!'. In that the fullness of the event is penetrated by unity, we are given
wholeness [Ganzheit], completeness [VollsUindigkeit] and totality [Totalitat]. The 'whole' comes about
through the unity that embraces the plurality. We can neither deny the certainty of our unity nor the
perception ofthe manifoldness that exists in us without destroying our personal Iife.i'"
When Schlatter applies the same complementarity to the personal acts of knowing and
willing, reference to trinitarian traces becomes explicit.
[O]ur inner acting and forming is known by us as a unity. Already the process of consciousness
shows this since we, the ones who see, distinguish our picture from - but at the same time unite it with
- us. Because we are in possession of our picture, there constantly arises in us a kind of triunity; to the
person who knows there comes the one who is known, yet not in such a way that the two stand over
against one another but there appears at once the third: the person who knows himself in the one
known."215
In direct analogy to the "kind of triunity" appearing in the act of thinking, Schlatter ex-
pounds the act of volition. "The trinitarian order of our life is visible here as well; we have
a direct volition, an elective volition and the union of the two - the volition elected by US,
which has within it the power to act.,,216 It is therefore not surprising that Schlatter in his
section on the Trinity refers to "the unity which our self-consciousness shows us" and to
the fact "that our inner acts are united to trinitarian formations [Bildungen] so that we de-
scribe the life acts [Lebensakte], as far as they possess unimpaired normality, by employ-
214 Dogma, 24-25; cf. Metaphysik, 31-32; "Schatzung der Individualitat,' 122.
215 D 74ogma, _ .
216 Ibid., 148. Barth rightly notices the close connection between F. W. 1. Schelling and Schlatter here:
"We need only refer to the relation which results from this [Schlatter's concept] to Schelling's triad of subject,
object and subject-object ..." (Church Dogmatics 1. 1,338). Schlatter himself affmns the connection with
Schelling in his Philosophische Arbeit, 188-89. For a similar link between Schlatter and Baader see Kindt's
synopsis in Gedanke der Einheit, 72-74.
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ing trinitarian formulae, ,,217 Schlatter's anthropological analogies stand, as Barth remarks,
within the Augustinian tradition and its idea of the trinitarian structure of human con-
sciousness.:"
ii. The natural analogy
Just as in the personal life, the sphere of the natural life of creation reveals, according
to Schlatter, the same relational pattern of unity and plurality. Unlike our personal life, "na-
ture stands before us as a plurality. The unity, which it also possesses, stands above the
many and keeps them (as their law) together in that it makes the many effect each other."
For Schlatter, "the glory of nature does not consist in infinity alone but in the controlled,
ordered, united infinity. It [nature] does not disintegrate into a repulsive plurality ..."
Schlatter exemplifies the interplay of unity and plurality in nature on the basis of the hu-
man body. "We ascribe to ourselves a single body, not many, yet in this body we see an
uncountable number of independent particles. "219 The crucial point to see here is that unity
and plurality mutually constitute each other. Discussing the idea of type, Schlatter states:
The particular [die Besonderung] does not adhere to the typical [Typik] as the latter's damage - just as
little does the type corrupt the individual life of the individualised entity [Gebilde]. The body consists
of organs which possess their individual life, and the type which makes the body a whole gives pecu-
liarity to the part.220
Schlatter outlines the relational pattern of unity and plurality as a manifestation of the
triune God, although he does not use the terms "Trinity" or "trinitarian" explicitly in this
connection. For what is true of nature in general applies to unity and plurality in particular.
217 Dogma, 354.
218 See Barth, Church Dogmatics 1. 1, 337-38. For a brief outline of the Augustinian tradition see also
Greshake, Der dreieine Gott, 95-100; Gunton, The Promise ofTrinitarian Theology, 31-57.
219 All quotations are taken from Dogma, 38-41.
220 Dogma, 53.
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Both are created by God, "the generator of the unity that embraces the fullness.'?" Schlat-
ter explains: "'In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.' Through this the
world became a unity for it has one worker [Wirker]. It did not become a place of disorder
or a playground for ghosts for it cannot disconnect itself from the perfect will who gave ex-
istence to it.,,222 Yet, as Schlatter puts it, "[o]ur Creator is, at the same time, the Creator of
infinities. ,,223 In its interplay with unity, "the unlimitedness of nature becomes a witness to
the divine glory because it unveils to us the inexhaustibility of the divine creating. ,,224
Schlatter even goes a step further and ascribes unity and plurality to God's being.
It [unity] cannot be conceived of as the nullification of all particularity [Bestimmtheit], as the exclu-
sion of all plurality. Nature manifests God as myrias virium, as the originator ofthe material as well as
the spiritual forces, and each of these spheres has in turn a manifoldness of particularities in itself....
God is, however, not only the originator of plurality but also of unity in the cosmos. Here his simplic-
ity manifests itself as well in so far as all plurality in him is comprehended in the undivided and
unsplit unity of his being. It is here that the idea of personhood originates.I"
iii. The social analogy
Schlatter's extensive reflections on human sociality constitute the most significant
analogy on which he grounds his knowledge of, and speech about, God's triune being. It is
therefore appropriate that we - in all due pithiness - pay closer attention to Schlatter's
ideas in this respect.
a) The normal community and its human impossibility
The issue of unity and plurality is, at the sociological level, reflected in the question
about the individual person in relation to community. In Schlatter, as we have outlined
22! Ibid., 26.
222 "Die von der Bibel uns bereitete Not," 7.
223 Dogma, 40.
224 Ibid., 51.
225 *Wesen und Quellen, 213-14.
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above, individuality and sociality are conceived of as simultaneously original. He locates
the imago Dei of man in the interrelation and interaction in which human persons enable
one another to be.226 Important for our purposes here is Schlatter's notion of the "normal
community" or "free community.'?" These phrases refer to a community "which brings
forth, rather than hinders, the individualisation of the single persons and makes them, with
their whole particular property, fruitful for the community."?" It is Schlatter's biblical real-
ism which, however, prevents him from idealistic conceptions of human communities and
makes him aware of the destructive lapse of the reciprocity of individuality and sociality
into the mutuality of despotism and anarchy?" Schlatter works out that "the quarrel be-
tween the whole and its parts'?" is due to human sinfulness and can only be overcome
through love:
For the distortions of our communities into either anarchy or despotism come about through the self-
ish will to power. If we, however, obey the rule of love, then the individual arises who lives for the
other, and the community which serves its members. The question for the Creator ofthe normal com-
munity is thus identical with the question for the one who creates the love in us" (emphasis A. L.).231
The terminology of creation indicates that Schlatter understands the realisation of the
community of love as being outside the reach ofhuman possibilities.
226 See above, pp. 27, 37f. According to Schlatter's critical assessment of different philosophical ap-
proaches (see Philosophische Arbeit, 45-46, 49,82-83, 149, 166, 171-72, 183,207-08,276-77), Baader is
one of the great exceptions in ascribing ontological status to community, thereby mutually relating individu-
ality and sociality: "Community [Sozietat] does not arise only after the individuals but with them, and the
same become through community as well as community through them. It is absurd to understand man as
God's creature, society, however, not as God's creation but as an artificial product of man. Baader resolutely
dispenses with ideas about the origin of the state as they are held by Hobbes or Rousseau" (p.193). Similarly
Gunton's critique in The One, the Three and the Many, 219-23.
227 The terms occur e.g. in Dogma, 344, Griinde, 60, "Letzte Bitte Jesu," 319-22.
228 Griinde, 60. Similarly in Dogma, 64; Ethik, 61-62, 112-14, 140.
229 We must leave a closer examination of Schlatter's analysis to other readers of his work. Crucial texts
are e.g. Dogma, 65-69, 71-72, 74-77; Griinde, 59-60; Ethik, 23, 111-14, 139-40, 151-52, 184-86; Metaphysik,
45-46; Paulus der Bote, 344-53; Die neue deutsche Art, 17-22; Philosophische Arbeit, 22-23, 193-96. Re-
markable is Schlatter's clear perception of the "Gleichheitsideal" as "the strongly effective poison that endan-
gers all our communities" (Ethik, 113).
230 Ethik, 63.
231 Griinde, 60; similarly in Ethik, 252; Dogma, 64, 78.
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b) The community of love - creative action and revelation of the Trinity
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Schlatter answers the question for the creator of the normal community in his impor-
tant essay on Jn 17:20-25. The free community "was that which the dying Christ pleaded
for, for himself, from the Father. "232 The prayer unveils the goal and purpose of Christ's life
and work, namely the establishment of the church - the community of faith. The climax of
Jesus' prayer is that he asks the Father for the unity of those people who believe in him.
'I pray for them that all ofthem are one.' In making the unity of the believers his plea, Jesus expressed
that he expected the same from a divine activity ... The liberating community can only come about in
such a way that God creates it as an effect of grace. Thus those considerations which regarded Jesus'
goal as impossible, are given their relative right. Indeed, 'with man it is impossible.' However, Jesus'
eye embraced not only that which was given to man through creation or through the revelation medi-
ated by earlier history. The will with which Jesus forms his goal has its ground in the certainty that
completely determined him, 'that what is impossible with man is possible with God.'233
The free community of love has its basis in the communion of love between the incarnate
Son and the Father. Schlatter's articulation of this analogia relationis or communionis is so
clear and powerful that we quote him at length:
There exists a community in which that which he [Jesus] pleads for concerning the believers, is al-
ready realised, which already makes visible what God's work will prepare for them. 'That they may be
one just as you, Father, are in me and I am in you.' His communion with the Father is complete in its
content and scope, for it comprises his whole life. Its result was neither his impoverishment, nor his
emptying, nor the deprivation of his rights. Rather, it has lifted him up to the Father and placed him
into the Father so that he lives in the Father as the Father lives in him.
In Jesus' communion with the Father there existed, therefore, a community that did not grow out of the
drive of a natural desire. No natural coercion compelled the Father to prepare for himself the Son.
Likewise, it is not the emptiness of privation that makes his [the Son's] love desirable to him [the Fa-
ther], and it is not through his own impotence that is he in need of the Son's service. Just as little is it a
law that creates community here, for above God there stands no further duty that binds him. Here
community flows out of the fullness oflife as the revelation of the will that wants to give because it is
love. Therefore, also the Sonship of Jesus does not remain the property given to him alone, but is
given to him in order that he may grant power to many to become God's children. And for this reason
he, as the dying one, has the will now to plea for them for that unity which has its ground and rule in
his own community with the Father.234
The church as the community of faith and love is the work of Christ as well as that of
the Holy Spirit. "Through the Spirit faith comes into existence, it is the implantation of the
232 "Letzte Bitte Jesu," 322. The translation of the German original is difficult. "... sie war das, was sich
der Christus sterbend vom Vater erbeten hat."
233 "Letzte Bitte Jesu," 327-28.
234 Ibid., 328-29.
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divine Word into the'!', so that it [the Word] is the force that moves us; likewise, love for
God, that is, a will turned toward God that achieves liberation from selfish motives." The
Holy Spirit makes human persons sons and daughters of God. This imparting of divine
sonship is "our conformation to the Christ so that to the one Son of God the many children
of God are joined." Hence, the church is the community of love in which
the individual life of the single person is secured in the same way as the community. Because the in-
ner life of the person is the place where the Spirit creates his work, each one receives an own move-
ment for himselfthrough God. The Spirit is consequently the giver of freedom. In finding in Christ the
Lord under whose authority we are, we receive independence through our dependence on him because
the indwelling of the Spirit in us gains for us a property given to us by God. In this way, however, the
grounding and securing of the individual life does not generate a danger for the community but estab-
lishes the complete unity between us. For the Spirit is the same to all of us and is not gained by the in-
dividual person but received. Consequently, our history is no longer determined by the egoistic will of
man; rather, the divine gift and the unity of what is given to us creates the unity of the church so that
both aspects are simultaneously realised here: the freedom through the individual ground of the person
in God and the unity through the unity of the ground that carries and forms everybody.i"
What follows from this is that Schlatter's concept of the imago Dei culminates - as was al-
ready suggested earlier - in his ecclesiology: "God's glory, God's grace can only appear in
us in that it brings us together. If we remain in lonely forlornness, we can not be God's
witnesses, can not be a demonstration of Jesus' government. We carry the image of the one
who created the church [Gemeinde] by being in the church. "236
On these grounds, the analogy between Christ and the church concerns not only the re-
lational pattern of communion in otherness but also the mode of action by means of which
the communion of the respective analogues is established. We might speak of an analogia
operationis in this respect, indeed, of an analogy of love, and because the operation of the
divine love is, at the same, time the operation of the Holy Spirit, we might call it an anal-
ogy of the Holy Spirit. As Schlatter himself puts it:
235 Dogma, 344; similarly in Die neue deutsche Art, 17-18. See also Glaube, XVII-XVIII: "The formula
'unity in distinctness' has a real ground [Realgrund]. It rests on the fact that the one God efficaciously in-
dwells a plurality of persons each of which has - and is supposed to have - its own life." For the church as
the community oflove see further Dogma, 220-22; Ethik, 113; Theology ofthe Apostles, 397.
236 Ethik, 176; cf. above, pp. 37f.
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The church [Gemeinde] experiences communion with Christ [Christusverbandj as an inner acting of
the Holy Spirit, that means as an essential appropriation of the person to God in Christ so that a divine
potency enters into the human, personal life as a new real-principle [Realprinzip] ... Thus Christ
forms the church into his own image; to the archetypal Son of God comes a multiplicity of sons of
God whose sonship rests on the same principle as the archetypal Sonship of the God-man, namely on
God's Spirit.237
In Schlatter, the church as the community of faith and love is that "which the Christ
and the Spirit create in a sinful world.'?" It is "the word about the grace of Jesus Christ and
the love of God the Father and the fellowship of the Holy Spirit through which we are one
church.'?" Precisely as the work of the Trinity the church is enabled to bring forth true
communion through the individuality of its members, and true individuality through the
communion between its members. In this way it images the communion of the incarnate
Son with God the Father in the Holy Spirit, indeed, receives the likeness of the triune God
in his eternal love.
Thus, we remain in line with the Creator of the free community, Jesus, who possesses his Sonship of
God through the fact that he has his goal above himself in the Father and, therefore, in front of himself
in us so that he lives, dies and is glorified for the Father and, therefore, for us. Likewise, we remain in
accordance with what we reach as the final glance into God's being, the glance at the triune one,
which gives us an inkling of the eternal love of God.240
iv. Concluding observations on the different analogies
Given the convergence of Schlatter's approach with traditional concepts of vestigia
trinitatis, the frivolous playing with the numbers "one" and "three" - which repeatedly oc-
curred in Western tradition - is not something in which Schlatter participates.i" For the
analogical attribution - the interplay of unity and plurality - is independent of the number
7-7
_J *Wesen und Quellen, 171.
7'8
_J Dogma, 385.
239 Die neue deutsche Art, 22.
240 Ethik, 63.
241 Concerning this play, A. Torrance, in his examination of Barth's critique of the notion of vestigia Dei
(for Barth see his Church Dogmatics 1. 1,333-47), discerns the danger that "the controlling determinant too
easily becomes the number three" (Persons in Communion, 203).
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of the respective relates. Hence, Schlatter does not straightforwardly derive the triunity of
God's being from any triadic pattern of creaturely relationality.?" Rather, in analogy to the
actuality of creation, he attributes unity and plurality (distinctness) to the being of God.
Because God, who makes us unities, is greater than we are, we have to think of the unity in him as
perfect as it is possible for us. However, not perfection but nothingness comes about, if fullness is ex-
pelled from this unity. Therefore, the affirmation of God's unity includes the idea of self-
differentiation, of the inner going-out [Ausgang] and going-in [Eingang] in full self-knowledge and
self-affirmation. Therefore, the ground plan [Grundrif3] ofthe notion of the Trinity is intrinsic to every
God-consciousness that comprehends God as the one and the living because he gives unity and life.243
How Schlatter connects the two analogues on the noetic level, that is, the movement of
his thought from knowledge of God to knowledge of God's works and vice versa, shall par-
ticularly concern us in the concluding chapter of this dissertation. What we need to see
now is that, on the ontological level, the unity in diversity of creation is grounded in the
unity in diversity of God's being.r" This should be especially clear from what was said ear-
lier about Schlatter's modal ontology of divine action. The knowledge of the irreversibility
of this founding relation is consistently present in Schlatter's talk about God's being.?" This
can be demonstrated in Schlatter's exposition of Gen 1:26:
The conception of God in Scripture concentrates most strongly in a divine 'I' ... However, already on
Old Testament ground the awareness broke through that this divine 'I' is not a lonely one. This is also
the case here, where the OUl/ctj.tlr;; ToO Beau is perceived in its most supreme unfolding. The Trinity is
therefore not exegesis but real explanation [Realerklarung] ofthis 'we.' It lifts it from the region of
presentiment to enhanced brightness in substantiated knowledge. However, this is only possible on the
ground of the heightened revelation of God which makes his inner fullness of life in the Son and the
Spirit known to the world (emphasis A. L.).246
242 Schlatter's understanding of the triads of human self-consciousness is indeed, as Fraas remarks, prob-
lematic in that he does not see the modalistic tendency inherent in them. However, since Schlatter uses these
triads merely as illustrations of the unity and diversity in God's being they do not keep him, as we shall see,
from developing an adequate picture of God's triune being. Fraas' critique in Gotteslehre, 61 therefore only
partly applies to Schlatter.
243 Dogma, 34; see also Griinde, 29.
244 Cf. Walldorf, Realistische Philosophie, 160-6l.
245 In the correlating endnote to the above quotation, Schlatter explicitly delimitates himself from the at-
tempt "to make discoveries in God through the combination of ideas" (Dogma, 559).
246 "Genesis, 39.
CHRIST AND THE TRINITY 232
The fact that we have trinitarian statements in Schlatter's doctrine of creation must not lead
us to conclude that he intends to prove the Trinity on the basis of God's revelation in crea-
tion. Rather, the knowledge that the one being of God is constituted in the diversity of
three persons is, in Schlatter, exclusively bound to the revelation of God in Jesus ChriSt. 247
The following words by Gunton pertinently capture our interpretation of Schlatter's ap-
proach. Gunton suggests that
patterns ... of trinitarian relationality offer possibilities for drawing analogies between the being of
God and that of the world. The world reveals the hand that made it in the remarkable combination of
unity and diversity, ofrelationality and particularity, that it manifests, marks that can be recognised by
their analogy to the unity and diversity of the triune God. Relevant here is T. F. Torrance's suggestion
that we look for parallel rationalities in theology and science, in the sciences of God and of created
things. The revelation of the Creator is to be found in the fact that Creator and creation represent par-
allel structures of meaning, each with its own intrinsic rationality, the one that of the creator, the other
that of the created. The latter derives from the former, but 'no argument from created intelligibility, as
such, can actually terminate on the Reality of God .. .'. Revelation - God's personal interaction with
the world through his Son and Spirit - suggests ways of seeing parallels between uncreated and cre-
ated rationality ...248
The aforementioned criteria, according to which Schlatter proceeds, apply fully to the
analogy he draws between God's thinking and willing ad extra and ad intra:
The fact that we know God as the willing one also determines our doctrine of the Trinity. We must not
illustrate the Trinity merely through the act of thinking [Denkvorgang]. For just as the Word is
thought, it is also willed. The will is essential to the image of God. The latter is not only the goal of
the divine will, rather, because of the completeness of its unity with God, it is itself a willing one. The
Word is the Son. Likewise, the Spirit not only sets a unity of thinking but also a unity of will. In this
lies the merit of the formula 'three persons' by means of which the analogies taken only from nature
are rejected and the completely personal being of God is affirmed even in the inner distinction of the
divine life. God does not have forces, objects, or things in himself. Rather, he makes even his Word
and his Spirit capable of themselves, makes them alive in themselves, and makes them persons.i"
The personal agency of God, his thinking and willing, in which he creates, and gives life
to, the creature as other than himself is analogically attributed to God's being which means
to say that there is aliveness, action and relation in God himself. Schlatter talks about God's
247 See *Dogmatik I, 103-04.
248 Gunton, A Brief Theology of Revelation, 62-63, quoting from T. F. Torrance, The Ground and
Grammar ofTheology, 100.
249 Dogma, 179-80.
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perfection in this context.?" The idea that this inner dynamic enables true otherness in God
can only be upheld, Schlatter argues, by employing the analogy of the person as "the high-
est form of life shown to us - the selbstandigen owner of a life peculiar to himself. "251 That
Schlatter can specify the analogia operationis in terms of an analogia caritatis should be
obvious from our outline of his concept of divine action.
[W]hen we think of God's hidden, inwardly turned life, we not only have to remind ourselves of the
completeness of his seeing, which brings forth a word that is like him, nor only of the generating
power of his will, which gives himself a willed one who has life like he himself, but of the fact that
God, also in his relationship to the eternal Son in the eternal Spirit, is love. The fact that the Son is the
beloved one rules out any reduction or gradation in his relation to the Father and gives him the full
unity which grants him 'the sameness of being' with the Father.252
This quote indicates that the notion of love constitutes the basis for Schlatter's doctrine of
the Trinity. His further unfolding of this inner-divine love is conceptually grounded in
God's revelation in Christ and the Spirit.
B. Christ and the Trinity
i. Christ as "the creator of the Trinitarian concept of God"
God's revelation in the person and work of Jesus Christ is the ground on which Schlat-
ter sees himself enabled to speak about the triune being of God on the basis of God's triune
economy. This can be clearly seen in the opening sentence ofthe passage quoted earlier:
Here is a place where an insight into the inner divine being is possible for us. For in Jesus it is not
only divine acting, divine speaking, and divine acts issuing from God which generate effects in the
world. Rather, divine life gives itself existence within the world; a divine 'I' makes itself perceivable
in a human 'I'. There we stand before the empirical moment which gives our conception of God [Got-
tesanschauung] its trinitarian form.253
Yet, the "personal deity ... revealed to us" is not "clenched by the law of humanness." The
way in which this divine "I" relates as the Son to God the Father in the Holy Spirit reveals
250 See what we have outlined above, p. 126.
251 Dogma, 573.
252 Ibid., 198.
253 *Wesen und Quellen, 158; cf. above, p. 137.
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that "the God-power, the God-life, the God-truth" exist "in him as well as above him, and
this, of course, in the absolute perfection of a person. "254 These two statements signal the
twofold way in which Schlatter's takes seriously the giving and creative love of the Father
to the Son in the Holy Spirit which leads him to the full affirmation of the homoousios of
the trinitarian dogma of the Ancient Church.
a) The Father gives deity to the Son, and this giving love is not dependent on a human
creature suitable enough to receive it. "Therefore, we speak of the eternal Son of God, of
God the Son and of his Wesensgleichheit with the Father." An inferiority of the deity of the
Son and, consequently, his separation from the Father are thus obviated.
b) Christ's person must not be understood as a temporal mode of appearance of God.
This would mean a truncation of the Father's love. As Schlatter critiques: "In this way, the
love of God in its relationship to the Son remains incomplete. It does not bring forth a
complete giving for it does not prepare for itself an eternal object." Thus, the notion of We-
sensgleichheit renders any commingling [Vereinerleiung] of Father and Son impossible.
Along these lines, Schlatter responds to Sabellianism and Arianism: "In the profession
of 'Wesenseinheit,' however, the complete giving, the complete love, is expressed which
makes the Son the perfect image of the Father.Y" The communion oflove between Father,
Son and Holy Spirit as it is revealed in the person and work of Christ is therefore not
merely something temporary but "points back to a triune definedness of being [Wesensbes-
timmtheit] in God."
Jesus became the creator of the Trinitarian concept of God by placing his office into the eternal and
complete revelation of divine grace, setting the sending of the Spirit beside himself as a second testi-
mony to God. Thereby it became the religion of his community that it possessed its communion with
God in fellowship with the Christ and with the Spirit. Jesus never thought of this merely as a tempo-
rary form of divine activity, since he conceived of his sonship as being personal and therefore eternal.
Moreover, with clear recognition of the Risen One the thought of a disappearance of his office and
254 See the quotations above, pp. 190, 218.
255 Dogma, 354-55; similarly in Jesu Gottheit, 42.
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work was completely ruled out. While it always remained a profound mystery how the earthly Christ
could claim eternity for himself, the concept of eternity was confirmed by the view of the Risen One
and the completeness of his sonship, which united him with the Father, was revealed.I"
ii. The Trinity
a) Persons in communion
Schlatter's doctrine of the ontological Trinity can be seen as the exposition of the sen-
tence that God is 10ve.257 His statements about God's triune being and God's eternal love
run parallel to each other: "[T]he glance at the triune one, which gives us an inkling of the
eternal love of God," is "that which we reach as the final glance into God's being.'?" In the
preceding paragraphs we have seen that the unity of essence between the Father and the
Son is the expression of the perfect and eternal love of God. This love is mediated by the
third person of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit. "The Spirit is the eternal and vivacious bond"
which unites the Father and the Son.259 Therefore, we have to locate Schlatter's thought in
the Augustinian tradition which speaks of the Holy Spirit as the vinculum caritatis. Yet, we
saw Schlatter moving beyond this notion by arguing that the divine love not only estab-
lishes unity but also distinctness in God.260 The background for this is Schlatter's insight
that the concept of unity of essence may indeed prevent God-talk from anthropomor-
phisms. Yet, its weakness is to "place both [Father and Son] in their common glory and
256 History ofthe Christ, 388.
257 See above, pp. 122ff.
258 Ethik, 63. Cf. Dogma, 196 (love "is the final word that we can reach about") and ibid., 356 ("The trini-
tarian name of God gives us the [mal glance into what God is."). See also Neuer, Zusammenhang, 118-19;
Walldorf, Realistische Philosophie, 212.
259 Erlduterungen 111, 283.
260 Gunton critiques the absence of this dimension in Augustine's notion of the divine love: "Because, we
might also say, he [Augustine] has an inadequate conception oflove as love for the other as other, he is un-
able to conceive true otherness in the Trinity ...." (The Promise ofTrinitarian Theology, 51).
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perfection immovably side by side." Such a static and unlively picture of the oneness of
God's being contradicts God's self-revelation in Christ.
[T]he oneness of the Son with the Father is grounded in the fact that the Son, with all that is his, enters
into the service of the Father, has his goal in the glory of the Father, and has his rule in his [the Fa-
ther's] will. Therefore, the Father hands everything over to him and has his goal in the glorification of
the Son. The words of Jesus regarding his communion with God powerfully represent how Jesus' su-
premacy evolves from his subordination to the Father. 261
The unity of God's being is not an empty unity but embraces plurality. It has the distinct-
ness of the different persons as its precondition and its result, and precisely in this it is per-
feet unity. We could say that Schlatter conceives of the unity and distinctness of God's be-
ing in terms of a simultaneous originality (Gleichurspriinglichkeit). Crucial is that not only
the unifying but also the personifying activity is ascribed to the Holy Spirit. The interrela-
tion and interaction of Father and Son is - in analogy to the role of the Spirit ad extra and
especially in the life of the incarnate Son - pneumatologically mediated.i" "A protection
against the unliveliness [Unlebendigkeit] inherent in the formula 'essence' is given through
the fact that the Spirit belongs to the Trinity. The 'one and same essence' in the Father and
the Son is Spirit, and the communion between them consists in the Spirit.'?" In this way
Schlatter seeks to prevent his concept from collapsing into tritheism as well as modalism:
"The disciples did not receive three names of God from Jesus. Neither did they, however,
261 Dogma, 356; cf. Erlduterungen II, 631-32.
262 A similar analogy between the role of the Holy Spirit in the economic and ontological Trinity is devel-
oped by Gunton: "Therefore, not only must we say, with Augustine, that the Spirit is the unifying link be-
tween Father and Son; it is even more necessary to add that he is the focus of the distinctiveness of Father
and Son - of their unique particularity ... [T]he Spirit's distinctive mode of action in both time and eternity,
economy and essence, consists in the constituting and realisation of particularity" (The One, the Three and
the Many, 190).
263 Dogma, 356. Schlatter touches here on two aspects of the notion of the Holy Spirit in one sentence. On
the one hand, he refers to God's Spirit in an absolute sense as to God's divine being (ousia). On the other
hand, Schlatter makes clear that we are not to flatten out the distinctions between the different persons of the
Trinity. Thus, the second part of the citation is directed toward the Holy Spirit as the third person of the Trin-
ity. The Holy Spirit has his own hypostasis, his own mode of existence. Although Schlatter himself does not
use the term hypostasis, he underlines the personal existence of the Holy Spirit in distinction from the per-
sons of Father and Son in the correlating footnote: "In the same way [as with the Father and the Son] only the
idea of person is suitable. For in the description of God there is no space for things, neither for the mere force
nor the mere idea" (ibid., 589, n. 206). For a detailed outline of these pneumatological issues from the per-
spective of patristic theology see T. F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith, 205-31.
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receive only one name for a hidden God; rather he was now present with them and was re-
vealed to them in the two bearers of his grace.V"
b) The inner-trinitarian relations and actions
What follows from the material just outlined IS that Schlatter applies the onto-
constitutive moment of God's love ad extra to the eternal being of God. In the divine econ-
omy it is especially the love between the Father and the incarnate Son which "corresponds
to the archetype of the eternal love."265 Schlatter does not provide an elaborate concept of
the way in which the three persons of the Godhead relate to, and act upon, each other.
However, at different places he suggests that within the loving relations between Father,
Son and Holy Spirit each actively seeks the other, and in and through this, the particular
identity of each is mutually constituted and secured. Schlatter articulates this in the sense
of originating relations.i" The Son is "the eternal recipient of the perfect love of God" and
as such "the one begotten through the eternal love in such a way that he has eternity and
deity in the Father.'?" We discern here the notion of monarchia according to which the Fa-
ther is, in a special way, the source of the giving and enabling action in the Godhead. As
Schlatter puts it with respect to the Apostle Paul:
He never conceived of the Preexistent One's eternal existence in God in terms of rest; this is not per-
mitted by the elementary terms by which he describes God's relationship to the world. If he had
wanted to find phrases that depict existence without activity, he would have had to derive them from
nature. But his conceptions of God are all taken from personal life. Here life consists in will and activ-
ity, and God's will is love which perfects communion by making the Son to be the one who accom-
plishes his works. Paul assigns to the Father the primary, initial activity that provides the Son with his
will and power. 268
264 History ofthe Christ, 389.
265 "Christologie der Bergpredigt," 325.
266 See e.g. the quotation above, p. 232.
267 Jesu Gottheit, 42; Dogma, 475 (in above order). In his critique of Hegel's understanding of the Trinity,
Schlatter refers to the begetting of the Son as "immanente Produktion" which must not be replaced by a
"transeunte" Produktion (*Dogmatik I, 103).
268 Theology ofhe Apostles, 254.
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However, Schlatter does not reduce the inner-trinitarian relations to relations of origin.
The personal exchange between Father and Son is not symmetrical, but this does not ex-
elude that it is reciprocal. "[T]he love of the Father belongs to the Son in whom it awakes
the love so that that love is completed to perfect communion." The Son is "the eternal re-
cipient and giver of the divine love.'?" According to Schlatter, the complete communion of
love is established when "the gift returns to the giver." Love not only takes but - in the act
of receiving and in its way of taking - "generates the pleasure and power of the giver."270
Hence, in analogy to the movements of the revealed Trinity, the relations and actions in
God's being go from, as well as to, the Father.?" There is a mutual giving and receiving be-
tween the Father and the Son in the Spirit. The Son is the Son by means of the gift he re-
ceives from Father. However, the Son actively corresponds to the Fatherhood of the Father
by giving back what has been received so that the Father is the Father by means of what he
receives from the Son. Thus, the subordination of the Son to the Father is essential to the
eternal communion of both in the Spirit.
It is not only a consequence of his earthly nature, that means it is not a deficiency of his Sonship that
he has God above himself, as ifhe thought of a future community with God in which lived for himself
and glorified only himself. That he stands under the Father and that he - not through himself but
through the Father - is lifted into the participation in his glory, is as eternal as the love which unites
him with the Father and the Father with him.272
In the mutual giving and glorifying between Father and Son, as Schlatter remarks in
his exposition of l Cor 15:27.28, the "perfect love" appears "by which the Father does eve-
rything for the Son and the Son everything for the Father. "273 The vivacious and reciprocal
269 Dogma, 490.
270 Jesu Gottheit, 52; cf. "Christi Versohnen," 204-05.
271 See above, p. 152. It is worth noting that the connection between the immanent processiones and the
economic missiones gives Schlatter's doctrine of the Trinity its particular shape. For an elaborate discussion
of the necessity to link the immanent processions with the economic missions see e.g. Pannenberg, System-
atic Theology, vol. I, 311-13, 319-21; Schwebel, "Christology and Trinitarian Thought," 140.
272 Jesu Demut, 84.
273 Erlauterungen 11,318.
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exchange of love in God is of such a perfection that the persons of the Trinity in their mu-
tual constituting and enabling establish the unity of God's being. As Schlatter phrases it,
"Wesenseinheit" refers to the fact that "everything which is yours, is mine; for the Son is
and wills nothing apart from the Father, as the Father is and wills nothing apart from the
Son."274 Through these words Schlatter leaves no doubt that the otherness of Father and
Son and the resulting asymmetry of the relations from the one to the other does not stand in
contradiction to the deity of both in which they mutually constitute each other.?"
c) Conclusion: the Trinity - being in action
As Schlatter was himself aware, his doctrine of the Trinity lacks in a final elaborate-
ness. His thoughts move hastily towards the affirmation of basic features of the orthodox
doctrine of the Trinity. Schlatter's hesitation to talk about the inner life of God can be ex-
plained on the basis of his "empirical theology" and its deep respect for the mystery of
God. However, in our view, Schlatter could have applied his knowledge of the economic
Trinity as it is revealed in Christ more extensively to his concept of the ontological Trinity
without speculating unduly. Along these lines it seems appropriate to point to the disap-
pearance of the Holy Spirit as the major weakness of Schlatter's approach. Although
Schlatter clearly affirms that the Spirit exercises divine functions in his own person ad ex-
tra as well as ad intra, the role of the third person of the Trinity concerning the inner life of
God is merely marginally outlined.?" Put straightforwardly, Schlatter gives away the op-
274 Jesu Gottheit, 42.
275 Cf. how Athanasius connected the notion of the Father's monarchia with the daring thought that the
Father is not Father without the Son and does not have his deity without the Son. See Pannenberg, Systematic
Theology, vol. I, 322-23; T. F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith, 312-13.
276 How such an outline could look is adumbrated in Schlatter's exposition of 1Cor 2:10: "Paul's concept
of God is trinitarian for he places the Spirit in own existence before God" (Paulus der Bote, 117).
CHRIST AND THE TRINITY 240
portunity to substantiate fully his claim regarding the eternal personhood of the Holy
Spirit."?
Yet, as we have been able to show, Schlatter has something to say about the inner life
of God.278 According to him, the "concept of the Trinity" is the "explication of the divine
life. "279 Schlatter's concept of the inner-trinitarian relations and actions of love constitutes
the basis for his conviction that God's being must not be conceived of as static and immov-
able being but as dynamic being, as being in action.i" This interpenetration of being and
relation, being and action, cannot be established if God's being is conceived of as sub-
stance. For in the latter concept, plurality is regarded as something external to God's being.
"Unity remains the "kernel" which sits beneath the attributes - mysteriously, indefinable
and empty. "281 However, as the above quotes have shown, the unity of essence is nothing
which - as something unknowable - underlies the three persons. Rather, it is realised and
takes place in the mutual exchange of love between Father and Son in the Holy Spirit. The
particular persons are what they are by virtue of what they give to, and receive from, each
other so that, together with the one person, the two other persons are always given.
However, this concept of the divine Wesenseinheit must not be understood in the sense
of an ontological actualism in which any substantiality conditioning and carrying the ac-
tions and relations is denied.?" In other words, the being of the particular persons must not
be dissolved in some kind of process of becoming. As Schlatter argues in his rejection of
277 Fraas' critique in this respect is therefore understandable but overshoots the mark (Gotteslehre, 91-92).
278 This needs to be said against Kindt's comment that Schlatter refrains from more specific propositions
about the life-process of God (Gedanke der Einheit, 67-68).
279 *Dogmatik 1, 104.
280 This is well presented by Neuer, Zusammenhang, 58-60 and Walldorf, Realistische Philosophie, 190-
92. The latter hints at a link between Schlatter's notion of life, relation and his concept of the Trinity.
281 *Dogmatik 1, 104.
282 Cf. above, p. 218 n. 193.
CHRIST AND THE TRINITY 241
the notion of God as causa sui: "The biblical God does not come about, does not become,
~v ~J/ apXTJ, he is. In. 5:26: the Father has life in himself ~J/ EavT~ not out of himself; he
has it as his own property without having to process himself into life. "283 Thus, God is not
subjected to a process of becoming, rather, his being is eternally and unchangeably a dy-
namic and active being. Schlatter even speaks of "the complete interpenetration" of "being
and becoming" in God's being.?" We would therefore endorse Walldorfs conclusion: "In
that Schlatter thus conceives of being and becoming (acting) in God as unity, he walks on
the middle course between the unmoved mover of Aristotle and process theology ..."285
C. The Trinity, Christ and the divine love ad extra
i. The triune communion of love as the ontological basis of God's love ad extra
In our exposition of Schlatter's christology we have elaborated that the love between
Father and Son in the Holy Spirit is indissolubly connected with Christ's love pro nobis.
Schlatter's understanding of the Trinity allows him to draw out these lines completely by
outlining the inner-trinitarian love of God as the ground of God's love toward, and in, crea-
tion. This, as the following quotes will show, is also the culminating point of Schlatter's
understanding of the trinitarian mediation of divine action. With regard to God's agency of
creation and redemption, Schlatter states in his exegesis of Heb 1:2:
It is, however, a great truth that we are - already from the origin of our natural life - completely de-
pendent upon Christ, that everything we receive from God - down to our existence - is given to us
through him, that the love of the Father for the Son is the root of our whole existence and generates
the whole course ofthe world.286
283 *Kritische Bemerkungen, 7.
284 *Dogmatik I, 105: "... der Sein und Werden in ganzer Durchdringung in sich seiende."
285 Walldorf, Realistische Philosophie, 192.
286 Erlauterungen III, 189. In this context Schlatter goes as far as to say that "God brought forth the crea-
tion for his Son in order that it be his kingdom that belongs to him" (188). Cf. Pannenberg, Systematic Theol-
ogy, vol. II, 21-22: "The goodness of the Father as Creator, by which he gives and upholds the existence of
his creatures, is not different, however, from the love with which the Father from all eternity loves the Son ..
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For Schlatter, "the eternal grace turned toward man" is grounded "in the eternal love
given to the Son by God."287 Hence, God's salvific action is not only mediated through
Christ but also originates in the eternal love between Father and Son.
Concerning our calling to Christ, we should not think that through it something completely new arises
of which God did not think earlier. Rather, it unveils to us that which always had its ground in the
eternal communion of Christ with the Father. The love of God is eternally directed toward us; God's
decree of creation [Schopjungsrat] is united with his decree of grace [Gnadenrat]. For the love of
God, which elects us to communion with God, has in the eternal Son, who - through his deity - is
with God, not only its executive organ but also its supporting foundation.P"
Schlatter explicitly states the link between the Trinity and the divine action pro nobis in the
context of election:
Weare chosen in the Son, eternally loved in the eternal Son ... The notion of the Trinity and the no-
tion of election are closely linked with each other. The Son's eternal communion with the Father com-
prises our election, and therefore our election includes also our calling for him, our faith in him, our
love for him and our work for him. But these do not give grace its beginning; rather, the foundation
and beginning ofgrace is God.289
In sum, it is the eternal love between Father, Son and Holy Spirit, which is actuated when
God relates to, and acts upon, that which is other than himself. On account of this, we are
able to understand Schlatter's argument for the identity of the immanent and the economic
Trinity?" Because God is in himselflove; being in relation; being in action, the trinitarian
way of his relating to, and acting toward, man can be explicated as the self-disclosure of
the triune God .
. In the Son is the origin of all that differs from the Father, and therefore of the creatures' independence vis-a-
vis the Father."
287 Theology ofthe Apostles, 254.
288 Erlauterungen 11,548. We owe this reference to P. Brunner who provides an astute discussion of the
question "Why is there not nothing?" in "Gott, das Nichts und die Kreatur," 33-36.
289 Dogma, 479.
290 See the citations above, p. 137 n. 204; p. 222 n. 207.
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ii. The transcendence of the triune God and the life of the creature
a) The doctrine ofthe Trinity in its critical function for christology
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The point that now requires our full attention is that Schlatter's way of relating the di-
vine love ad intra and ad extra, the ontological and the economic Trinity, does not entail
the element of a relational symmetry between the relata. While the inner relations and ac-
tions are constitutive of God's being and, as such, ontologically constitutive of God's
agency ad extra, his relation to, and action toward, that which is not God is not constitutive
of what he is. Schlatter is aware that christology is the primary locus where this distinction
needs to be made. His idea of the "ethical moment" of Jesus' divine Sonship and ofthe mu-
tual relationship between the incarnate Son and the Father must be safeguarded against the
misinterpretation that the Fatherhood of the Father is dependent upon a creative act in and
toward creation by which he generates a human being as his Son. Schlatter's statements in
this respect do not lack in the necessary clarity and differentiation:
What God is for us does not come about in time and is not subject to becoming and decay. God's will
has eternal status, even the will in which he calls us to himself and makes us alive for himself. It does
not follow according to that which we experience and work in time, but it precedes not only our work
but also our existence because it is God's own will.
This is the manner in which also we take part in God's eternity and constitutes - proportioned to the
order of our life [Lebensmaj3] - the analogy to the pre-existent being of the eternal Son. He, however,
is the one begotten through the eternal love in such a way that he has eternity and deity in the Father.
We take part in God's eternal love only in such a way that he envisages our image in his eternal sight
and unites his grace with the latter, thereby achieving that we - in the course of time at our place - en-
ter into life and receive the effects of his eternal will through history.f"
In this is clearly stated that the Fatherhood ofthe Father is independent of his creative ac-
tion and relation ad extra because it is eternally realised in his communion with the eternal
Son. Thus, Schlatter's affirmation of the homoousios reappears - so to speak retrospec-
tively - in its fundamental import for his theology."? The interlocking of christology and
291 Dogma, 474-75. See e.g. the statement quoted above, p. 181 n. 37.
292 For the conceptual importance of the insight "that while God was always Father, he was not always
Creator or Maker" see T. F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith, 84-89; Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol.
II, 367-71; Stickelbroeck, Christologie im Horizont der Seinsfrage, 108-10.
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the doctrine of the immanent Trinity is the conceptual basis on which Schlatter is able to
maintain the ontological distinction between Christ's deity and humanity. Precisely for this
reason, as we have seen above, he can positively relate both in such a way that he presents
us neither with a humanised God nor with a deified man.
b) The doctrine of the Trinity in its critical function for the theological assignment of God
and creation
The ultimate conceptual securing of God's transcendence vis-a-vis the creature - one
of the crucial aspects of Schlatter's theory of divine action - is achieved through the doc-
trine of the ontological Trinity. This can be demonstrated on the basis of Schlatter's brief
outline of different scenarios which arise "where the concept of the Trinity is missing.'?"
Schlatter touches upon those conceptions in which God's aliveness is conceived of as
mediated by something external to God. This is the case when a) God is ascribed a body,
b) the world is conceived of as the divine body and God as the world-soul, c) God is as-
cribed vivacity by placing him into a community, a family that stems from him, a council
of gods, or a community of angels. In all these approaches Schlatter discerns "a darkening
of God's unity" because "a distinction is established not in him but at him [nicht in ihm,
sondern an ihm]." The consequence is that "God obtains his completion in the world and is
in need of that which is not God." This conceptual failure to create space between God and
world leads all too easily to the renunciation of "our life in order that God in the world re-
mains with himself." Finally, as the history of the Jewish concept of God shows, the prayer
directed to the angels reappears in a strongly monotheistic context.?"
293 The following quotations refer to Dogma, 34-35. See also *Dogmatik 1, 100-06.
294 Cf. the second part of Schwebel's two-fold thesis expounded in "Radical Monotheism and the Trinity":
"[O]nly a proper trinitarian theology can be radically monotheistic theology" (74).
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Schlatter argues that the confirmation of monotheism together with the simultaneous
rejection of the internal aliveness of God results in the abolition of human life. With refer-
ence to Islam, Schlatter states: "In immutable identity with itself the divine thinking and
willing stands still in eternal perfection. Thus, man does not gain the reason for his think-
ing and willing in him [the immutable God] but merely the placement into passivity." In
antithesis to such conceptions stands the "Hegelian Trinity." Yet, even here, Schlatter
points out, God is made dependent upon that which is not God.
The aliveness of God takes place in the life of the creature. Through this the unity is lost. The pleroma
of God pours itself out, it flows away from him. He does not have the power to see an image in him-
self that is with him and is himself. He does not have the power to beget the Son in himself who is not
something different than himself but stands in absolute unity with him. He replaces the immanent
through the transeunte production.f"
Finally, the incapacity to secure the transcendence of God's being re-occurs in the at-
tempt to explicate God's life through the concept of substance. The fullness is understood
as epiphenomenal to the unity of God's being. Hence, the concept of God is rendered "the
other part of the antithesis" between God and the world. "Dem Werdenden steht er als der
Seiende gegeniiber, nicht als der Sein und Werden in ganzer Durchdringung in sich seien-
de."296 The problems which arise when God is simply contrasted to the world were outlined
earlier.297
The cantus firmus of these different scenarios is that without the doctrine of the imma-
nent Trinity, dogmatics is divested of its conceptual means to affirm the reality, freedom
and distinctness of God in relation to that which is not God. Put positively, the absolute on-
tological distinction between God's being and creaturely being is secured through the fact
that God - in the eternal communion of Father, Son and Holy Spirit - can completely real-
295 *Dogmatik I, 103.
296 Ibid., 105.
297 See above, pp. 88ff.
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ise himself without being in need of any action or counterpart ad extra in order to become
or be God. God is eternally in himself a communion of love, he has life in himself, and
therefore he is independent of any object ad extra for the realisation of his love, his alive-
ness, his personalness, his will, his Word and his blessedness. Hence, when Schlatter re-
jects the respective theological conceptions of Hegelian provenance by referring to God's
superiority, omni-sufficiency (Allgenugsamkeit), independence and transcendence, his ar-
gument - and this is the point to see - stands ultimately on trinitarian grounds, that is, on
his notion of "the in-himself-vivacious and blessed, only-true God of Scripture. "298
What we have here is a concept of divine transcendence which carries through concep-
tually precisely because God is not simply contrasted to the world. This also secures the
freedom and integrity of creaturely existence; for only a God who is independent from
what is not God can - in his free and unconditioned love - create, enable, redeem and per-
feet a free creation. Thus, Schlatter obviates any pantheistic tendencies which collapse ei-
ther God into the world or the world into God. The underlying differentiation between the
ontological and the economic Trinity could be summarised as follows: the triune God is
what he is eternally in himself. His triune way of acting toward, and relating to, the crea-
ture is the actualisation of his eternal love ad extra and has - as a volitional act of his free
love - an absolute beginning in time and space.?"
298 *Kritsche Bemerkungen, 20. The whole manuscript is illuminating in this context. See especially pp.
4-11, 17-22. Cf. Neuer, Zusammenhang, 60; Walldorf, Realistsche Philosophie, 192.
299 Cf. Peter Brunner's differentiation between the ontological and the economic Trinity and his conclu-
sion: "God does not need a world, God does not need angels nor human beings in order to be God" ("Die
Freiheit des Menschen," 109). Without trying to prove a direct dependence on Schlatter, whose Dogma
Brunner thoroughly studied (see Walldorf, Realistische Philosophie, 265 n. 130), the affinity to Schlatter's
outline in Dogma 34-35 cannot be overlooked.
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CHAPTER V. TRINITARIAN DEPTH STRUCTURES
IN SCHLATTER'S THEOLOGY
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Our objective in this concluding chapter is to summarise and secure the essential re-
sults of this study. In this way, we shall bring the trinitarian depth structures of Schlatter's
theory of divine action to the surface. In a second step, we will briefly indicate how single
structural elements could deepen our understanding of the whole of Schlatter's dogmatics.'
1. The Doctrine of the Trinity as the Ontological Basis of Schlatter's Concept
of Divine Action
The eternal love between Father and Son in the Holy Spirit - as it is revealed in the
person and work of Christ - is, according to Schlatter, the ontological basis of the divine
economy ad extra. We think that - in the face of the above results - Schlatter is not over-
interpreted when we further specify this ontological founding-relation.
A. The Trinity and the modal ontology of divine action
We can speak of a constructive function of the doctrine of the Trinity for Schlatter's
understanding of the mode of divine agency ad extra? The personal mode of action -
God's grace and love - and the onto-constitutive moment of divine agency are rooted in the
communion between Father and Son in the Holy Spirit. The mutual love, the reciprocal
I Some of the aspects outlined in this chapter have been adumbrated in Loos, "Divine Action and the
Trinity," 272-77.
2 See above, Chapter III. 5. A.
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giving and receiving in which the trinitarian persons constitute each other, is actuated ad
extra in that God creates, enables, redeems and perfects the creature as other than himself.
Of central importance in this connection is Schlatter's clear grasp of the dynamic orienta-
tion towards the particular and the other - an "outgoingness", we may say, which is essen-
tial to God's relations and actions of love ad intra as well as ad extra. Thus, the factuality
and the modality of the trinitarian economy are grounded in the eternal communion of Fa-
ther, Son and Holy Spirit, a communion which is revealed in the story of Jesus Christ. In
other words, Schlatter answers the question about the "Why" and the "How" of God's rela-
tion to, and action toward, creation by referring to the immanent and eternal love of the tri-
une God. Schlatter's modal ontology of divine action rests on an analogia operationis
which has to be specified as an analogia caritatis. That Schlatter consistently reflects these
analogies pneumatologically completes the trinitarian character of his concept and uncov-
ers the remarkable affinity to the thought of trinitarian theologians such as Colin Gunton:
The third person of the Trinity is the one whose function is to make the love of God a love that is
opened towards that which is not itself, to perfect it in otherness. Because God is not in himself a
closed circle but is essentially the relatedness of a community , there is within his eternal being that
which freely and in love creates, reconciles and redeems that which is not himself. The relation of
God to the creation, which is expressed in creation, reconciliation and redemption, is grounded in the
other-related love of the Father, Son and Spirit in eternity. It is the particular being and function of the
Spirit to be the dynamic of the love, both in itself and towards the world.'
Along the aforementioned lines, Schlatter's ontology of love and giving entails aspects of a
trinitarian ontology. Schlatter is not concerned primarily with finding Ternare, that is, tri-
adic structures in creation. Rather, he seeks to outline the actuality of creaturely being as
the gift of God's love and, hence, as grounded in the eternal love of the Trinity. As Bieler
puts it, a trinitarian ontology
musste im Lichte der Trinitatslehre und in innerer Offenheit auf die Heilsokonomie den Gabecharakter
der Wirklichkeit zu entfalten suchen, d.h. die Schopfung als durch den Prozess der trinitarischen Her-
vorgange ermoglichte Seinsmitteilung und die darin enthaltenen Implikationen bedenken.
3 Gunton, "God the Holy Spirit," 128.
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Wie oben gezeigt worden ist, stellt sich der Prozess der trinitarischen Hervorgdnge als das Leben der
Liebe selbst dar. Eine trinitarische Ontologie kann demnach nur analogia caritatis sein.4
The analogia caritatis gives rise to an analogia relationis. This is not surprising when
we recall Schlatter's conviction that the communion between Father and Son in the Spirit -
as it is revealed in Christ - "provides the rule according to which also in us, proportional to
our measure, the divine and the human enter into unity." The same love which constitutes
the communion in distinctness between the three persons of the Godhead, institutes a rela-
tionship between God and man which is best expressed as relatedness without absorption,
community in otherness. Schlatter's concept of the non-competitive relation between God
and man must be seen as the consequent application of this principle of the triune love. At
this point, the constructive function of the doctrine of the Trinity depends on the differen-
tiation between the immanent and the economic Trinity. Through this, Schlatter maintains
the ineradicable ontological difference between the two analogues which consists in the
fact that the communion of love in God exists from eternity and is perfectly realised in the
mutual exchange of giving and receiving, whereas the relational pattern between God and
man is not mutually established but solely grounded in God's one-sided acting and has
come about in time. It is only in this way that the other-related love of God ad intra can be
conceived of as truly other-related love ad extra so that the particular identity and integrity
of each - God and man - is secured. In our view, this conceptual securing - and not a
speculative deduction of God's inner being - is the prime reason why we find statements
about the immanent Trinity in Schlatter's anthropology.'
4 Bieler, Freiheit als Gabe, 454. See also Schulz, Sein und Trinitdt, 891: "Das Sein bekundet Gottes Lie-
be, ihn als Geber von Leben. Sein wird gegeben, es gibt sich nicht selbst als Subjekt ... Versteht man das
Sein als Gabe, verweist es in dieser Hinsicht auf den HI. Geist, der innertrinitarisch und okonomisch Gott als
Gabe und Liebe darstellt und vermittelt ..."
5 See Dogma, 34-35, 148, 179-80, 198 and what we have outlined above, Chapter IV. 2. A. iv.
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In Schlatter, we could summarise, the doctrine of the immanent Trinity - as it is re-
vealed in the person and work of Christ - explains a) the ground and mode of God's action
toward, and relationship with, the human person and b) why God's being is not constituted
in this interaction and interrelation." In thus meeting one of the central desiderata for a the-
ory of divine action in a trinitarian way,' Schlatter's thought can be seen in obvious prox-
imity to a fundamental aspect of contemporary trinitarian theology: "It is the relation-in-
otherness between God and the world that is conceived with the help of the doctrine of the
Trinity, and probably cannot adequately be conceived in any other way. "8
B. The Trinity and the structural theory of divine action
Schlatter's approach opens up the possibility of understanding God's triune economy
as the manifestation and revelation of God's triune being." The unity in diversity of the di-
vine agency and work is affirmed and grounded in the trinitarian relationality of God's be-
ing. Schlatter differentiates between three dimensions of divine action and links each with
the respective person ofthe Trinity. Yet in every act appropriated to the one person, the ac-
tion of the two other persons is also given, which is to say that every act of God entails the
threefold dimensionality of divine agency so that God can be conceived of as the one agent
of all divine actions. Schlatter relates the divine works according to the same relational pat-
tern. The distinct works are, in a specific way, appropriated to a particular person, and pre-
cisely in this diversity they constitute the one Heilsgeschichte of God with the creature, a
6 This statement is articulated in imitation of Schwobel, God: Action and Revelation, 43.
7 See above, p. 96.
8 Gunton, "Relation and Relativity," 97; similarly idem, Christ and Creation, 75; The Trinune Creator, 9-
10. See also, just to mention a few, Greshake, Der dreieine Gott, 219-43; Bieler, Freiheit als Gabe, 211-17;
Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. II, 20-35.
9 See especially the quotations above, pp. 137 and 222.
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history which - through the fall and sin of man - assumes the character of Erlosungs-
geschichte.
In all this, Schlatter grounds the continuity and inner relatedness between the different
divine works not in a supposed continuity between the world and God, but in the transcen-
dence and unchangeable faithfulness of God. Two aspects need to be highlighted in this
context which, again, bring to light the trinitarian depth structure of Schlatter's conception:
a) Only a God whose love for the world is grounded in his triune being and thus independ-
ent of the love of the world can - even in the face of human sin - remain faithful to his
self-determination to be the Godpro nobis. b) Only a God who acts "in the freedom of the
one who gives out of his spontaneous love" can accomplish those creative acts by which a
sinful world is kept from falling back into nothingness.
This indicates that Schlatter's trinitarian concept of divine action is capable of doing
justice to the diversity of the divine actions and works, especially when this diversity as-
sumes the form of a discontinuity and - because of the sinfulness of man - of an antithesis
between the old and the new." In this way the historical and factual event-character of
God's Heilsgeschichte is affirmed. II This includes also the recognition of God's opus
alienum. Especially those actions in which God - in his wrath and judgement - acts against
10 See above, Chapter III. 5. B. ii.
II This is the point at which Schlatter's concept diverges from Schwebel's understanding of the relation
between the opera trinitatis ad extra (see Schwebel, "Divine Agency and Providence," 229-41; God: Action
and Revelation, 31-44; "Trinitatslehre als Rahmentheorie," 37-43). Notwithstanding the obvious parallels be-
tween the two approaches, Schlatter would see the factual event-character of God's agency endangered in
Schwebel's notion of the "three types of divine agency: God's creative action as the constitution of created
being; God's revelatory action as the disclosure of truth about the relationship of God the creator to his rec-
onciled creation and God's inspiring action as the enabling of certainty concerning the truth about the consti-
tution of reality." Schwebel links these three types with the three persons of the Trinity (see God: Action and
Revelation, 35 and 43). According to Schlatter, the divine work of Christ cannot be reduced to revelation for
it is creative action: "... a becoming takes place through it; it institutes something new; it reveals in that it
creates" (Dienst, 81).
TRINITARIAN DEPTH STRUCTURES IN SCHLATTER'S THEOLOGY 252
his creatures presuppose his transcendence vis-a-vis, and independence of, his creatures."
Even if these acts remain incomprehensible and can hardly be integrated into the homoge-
nous and teleological structure of God's agency; even if they do not reveal God in the same
way as do his actions of grace, they are, nevertheless, actions of the one and same God.13
This notion of the interrelation of unity and diversity in the triune economy is pushed to its
limits in Schlatter's understanding of the cross of Christ. The actional unity of Father and
Son gives rise to the utmost tension and distinction between the two in that the Father
hands over the Son into the Godforsakenness of sinful man. A trinitarian theology which
remains theologia crucis is capable of doing justice to both principles: opera trinitatis ad
extra sunt indivisa et distincta:"
2. Trinitarian Forms of Thought
A. Dogmatic thinking in methodological obedience to God's triune economy
The trinitarian depth structure of Schlatter's thought consists in the way in which he re-
lates statements about God's triune being; about God's triune action toward, and relation-
ship with, the world (especially man); about the relationality of the divine actions and
works, and about the relational and dynamic character of creaturely being. We have 10-
cated the ontological basis of this concept in the communion of love between the Father
12 See above, Chapter II. 2. C. iv.
13 Crucial in this connection are Schlatter's statements on the incomprehensibility of God's agency in and
through nature and history (see e.g. Dogma, 265, 473; 561; Ethik, 279; Briefe, 65; Metaphysik, 86; "Wert und
Unwert," 262; "Heilige Geschichte," 222-23; Marienreden, 19; "Atheistic Methods," 223; Philosophische
Arbeit, 283; "Theology of the New Testament and Dogmatics," 199) and on the hiddenness of God through
nature and history (see Dogma, 51; 85; RufJesu, 322; Walldorf, Realistische Philosophie, 262, nn. 121, 122).
14 Without pursuing these issues any further, the problem that the unity and diversity of divine agency
cannot always be integrated satisfactorily must not lead to the suggestion "die Identifikation der Trinitatsle-
hre mit der allgemeinen Gotteslehre zu zerbrechen" and to understand "die Trinitatslehre als Lehre vom opus
proprium" (see Roth, "Trinitatslehre als Rahmentheorie?," 62, 65).
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and the Son in the Holy Spirit as it is actualised and revealed in the person and work of
Christ. 15 Schlatter's theology presents itself to us - once more - as a theology of love."
On the noetic level we discern a twofold movement of dogmatic thinking which can
easily be demonstrated with respect to the notion of unity in plurality. On the one hand,
Schlatter moves from statements about God's works and agency to propositions about
God's triune being. This is the prima facie movement of Schlatter's dogmatic thinking
which we have purposely followed in our study. However, in doing so we discovered a
second movement: from knowledge of God's triune being to knowledge of his actions and
works. Our point here is pertinently summarised by Schlatter himself with regard to Paul's
sociology and ecclesiology:
The sociology of Paul, when we ask for its grounds, cannot be outlined without his theology. Why did
the fascination about the ideal of homogeneity wane for him? The acting God carries in himself the
inexhaustible fullness which reveals itself in the endlessness of the formations.... Here we stand at
the point where we must elucidate to ourselves what Paul meant when he talked about Christ and the
Spirit. The divine acting, which Paul meant to perceive, did not disintegrate, however, into isolated ef-
fects in the individuals but created the complete and remaining community. Thus, the tension between
the appreciation of individuality and the establishment of commonality lay behind him, and he gained
the community that brings forth, secures and preserves the individual life, and [gained] the individual-
ised persons who use everything they are for the community because they do not live for themselves. 17
At the end of his metaphysical treatise of unity and plurality, Schlatter articulates the two-
fold dynamic of dogmatic thinking as follows: "The theological statement therefore pre-
supposes that the metaphysical theorem is given to us, and the latter in tum receives its se-
curing and grounding through the fact that the certainty of the one God is given to us." 18
Schlatter concludes that a veridical perception and understanding of the metaphysical cate-
gories of unity and plurality is only possible through the theological concept of God who,
15 Cf. Schwobels outline of what he calls the "proto-trinitarian depth structure" of the New Testament
("Christology and Trinitarian Thought," 121-28; "God is Love," 312; "Trinitatslehre als Rahmentheorie," 32-
37). One has only to read Gunton's The One, the Three and the Many, 180-231 in order to see the dogmatic-
structural parallels between his theology and that of Schlatter.
16 For further aspects of Schlatter's theology of love see Neuer, "Introduction Dienst," 7-15 and Rieger,
Rechtfertigungslehre, 380-97.
17 "Schatzung der Individualitat," 126.
18 Metaphysik, 39.
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in his unity in plurality, creates and establishes the same in their mutuality." This idea
must not only be applied to the issue of unity and plurality. Rather, the goal of Schlatter's
Metaphysik is "to revise fundamentally the metaphysical thinking of pre-Christian antiq-
uity and to develop a new metaphysics in propriety to God's revelation in Christ. ,,20
Is it not the case that, because we receive our relationship to God from Jesus and with it a new ethics,
even the ideas by means of which we interpret the world are set into a movement that renews them?
Did not Jesus, because he gives our religion a turn which we thankfully praise as our reconciliation
with God, also create the epoch in our understanding of nature and the psychical life so that he also
grants us a new metaphysics?"
The twofold movement in Schlatter's dogmatic thinking is the specification of the in-
dissoluble connection between knowledge of God's being and knowledge of God's actions
and works as we have sketched out in the opening chapter of this dissertation:
Was I not supposed to forget the world in order to open myself toward God, and likewise to forget
God in order to be open toward the world? However, the necessity to reject this thought prevailed in
me again and again. For there is no movement toward God which separates us from what shows itself
to us as God's work. The twofold direction of our glance that turns it to God and to the world is iner-
adicably given to us parallel to the twofold direction oflove which we owe to God and to the brothers.
For we can neither separate God from his works nor his works from God - for which reason we re-
ceive the love that turns us toward the world together with the love that is directed toward God.22
Schlatter explains that this figure of thought is to be derived from the course of God's sav-
mg economy,
It is impossible that the concept of God has the meaning of a single locus which is coordinated with
other loci in the whole of dogmatics. The doctrines of God, Scripture, sin and reconciliation are not to
be regarded as coordinated quantities. God is of principle importance to the whole dogmatic circle of
ideas [dogmatischen Begriffskreis]. Hence, he is also the goal-category [Zielbegrif.l] which must rule
the whole of dogmatic thinking. Ex auton kai eis auton ta panta. This is the all embracing law for the
course of the world as well as for the course of dogmatic thinking."
On these grounds, Schlatter's dogmatic method of thinking can no longer be understood
without considering his trinitarian concept of divine action. For what is ontologically
19 Metaphysik, 39. See also Neuer, Zusammenhang, 160.
20 Neuer, "Introduction Metaphysik," 2; cf. idem, AdolfSchlatter: ein Leben, 530; Walldorf, Realistische
Philosophie, 30-34.
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the case - the reciprocity of the inner divine loving and giving and its actualisation ad
extra through the mediation of the Son and the Spirit - is made the governing principle
at the noetic level. Along these lines von Lupke states: "To ask theologically for God
means to follow the 'logic' of his gift.':" In this, Schlatter's own insight is reflected that
"the method of the dogmatic development of ideas ... is formed according to its ob-
ject.":" We may say that Schlatter's thinking takes place in methodological obedience to
God's triune economy. In this respect, T. F. Torrance's formulation can be taken as a
pertinent summary ofwhat we see in Schlatter:
Since OlKOVO,wa refers to the way God has Himself taken in His action for us and our salvation, and
we know no other divine method of revealing or saving, it must be in strict accordance with that
OlKOVOf.Lla that we are to think and speak of Him in all His ways and works.... To think and speak
KaT"OlKOvOj.LlaV is to think and speak truly of God, that is, in accordance with His own nature as re-
vealed in His acts and words."
Before we open up some trinitarian perspectives concerning the whole of Schlatter's
dogmatics, two aspects need to be underscored. First, the point of intersection between
God's triune being ad intra and his agency ad extra, is Christ. This christocentricity applies
also to Schlatter's method of thinking. As we have laboured to show, Christ is the rule of
thought according to which Schlatter applies aspects of his knowledge of God's triune be-
ing to his concept of God's triune agency and vice versa. This echoes Schlatter's fundamen-
tal conviction that "[t]heology remains for always christology; comprehension of Jesus'
image; insight into his story.":" Second, the co-equality and simultaneity in which Schlatter
executes the two movements of theological thinking makes instantly clear that he uses the
doctrine of the Trinity neither as an abstract ideal nor as an a priori principle for construct-
ing a theory of divine action and a view of this world as God's creation. Therefore, in no
24 von Lupke, Preface to Glaube und Wirklichkeit, 11.
25 *Christologie, 7.
26 T. F. Torrance, "The Implications of Oikonomia for Knowledge and Speech of God," 238.
27 Griinde, 68.
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way do we claim to have found the principle of Schlatter's theology in the Trinity, for
which reason we speak of trinitarian depth structures. Because Schlatter's theology is not
the result of a trinitarian deductionism, it does not require an explicitly trinitarian point of
departure in order to be understood. Nevertheless, central aspects of his dogmatics have
their inner-theological basis in his doctrine of the Trinity and unfold their full meaning
when they are outlined from a trinitarian perspective.
B. Trinitarian Perspectives
i. Schlatter's linking ofknowledge of God's being and knowledge of God's agency
Schlatter's insistence on talking about God's being on the grounds of God's agency and
works is grounded, as Neuer elaborates, in his epistemology, his understanding of revela-
tion and his attempt to elucidate the content of Christian faith to non-Christians as well."
We are now also able to explicate Schlatter's theology of God's works as the methodologi-
cal application of the outgoingness of the Trinity towards the particular and concrete real-
ity of this world. Concisely stated, the Trinity's free and loving orientation toward creation
becomes the orientation of Schlatter's dogmatics. One way of putting it is to say, with
Klaus Bockrnuhl: "When God is 'decided towards the earth' (A. Delp), then theology does
not have any other choice than doing likewise. ,,29 Indeed, Schlatter's theological method in
this context is not expressive of an epistemological lack of a better foundation for knowl-
edge of God. Rather, Schlatter takes seriously, at the noetic level, what is true ontologi-
cally, namely God's triune being in action.
The interrelation between God's being and agency concerns not only Schlatter's
method of knowing but also the existential execution of this method. This means that the
28 See above, p. 9 n. 9.
29 Bockmuhl, Leiblichkeit und Gesellschafi, 274. Cf. above, p. 193.
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theologian actually participates in the dynamic of God's giving love." The idea of meth-
odological obedience - and thus the radical a posteriori character oftheology - culminates
in Schlatter's conviction that "[e]very scientific method must adapt itself to its object. The
theologian speaks about the one to whom he belongs. "31 Knowledge of God is only possi-
ble through God's own revelatory action. "If we want to know God, then 'we can only think
of him as the one who is active, not as the one who is subordinate to our knowing, but as
the one who is superior to us and who lifts us up into his knowledge. God is not only ob-
ject, but primarily subject whose own activity conditions all our knowledge of him'" (em-
phasis Walldorf)." The "cogitor, ergo sum ergo cogito" applies therefore especially to
theological knowing: "'Knowing because of being known,' Mt 11 :27; Gal 4:9; 1Cor 8:3;
this is the basic rule ofthe New Testament knowledge of God.'133 Consequently, theology is
from beginning to end a thinking-after God (ein Nach-Denken Gottesi enabled through
God's bestowing action through his Word and his Spirit. "[W]e have to give back to him
[God] his image because and in the way that we have received it from him; as those who
are known and made by him we have to know him; wherever his work touches us we have
to look toward him because ... he looks upon us. "34
3D von Lupke speaks of a "logic of gift" in this context ("Gottes Gaben wahrnehmen," 289).
31 "Schopfung und Erlosung, 4.
32 Walldorf, Realistische Philosophie, 253 n. 89; quoting *Erkenntnislehre, 47.
33 Ethik, 259. Cf. above, p. 148 n. 235.
34 Dienst, 61-62. A similar idea of Nachdenken can be found in Karl Barth (see A. Torrance, Persons in
Communion, 74-5). A further investigation of these issues would have to examine Schlatter's notion of "sanc-
tification of thinking through knowledge of the Bible" (Dienst, 60-67), his conviction that "[t]he love of God
is the pure, imperishable root of theology on all its levels" (Dogma, 510) and the role of prayer in Schlatter's
theology (see Neuer, "Introduction Grunde,"9-10 who also hints at the parallels between Schlatter and Karl
Barth in this context). The result of such a study would be that, according to Schlatter, the a posteriori nature
of theology and its being bound to its subject-matter is the ground of its unique objectivity and scientific
character (see especially Schlatter's Briefe, 22-23 and his critical engagement with Paul Jager in "Atheistic
Methods").
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ii. Schlatter's thinking in polarities
Bockmuhl aptly summarises the nature of Schlatter's thinking when he states:
258
The method of thinking by which Schlatter abides ... is a method of circumspect differentiation and
synopsis or synthesis, a form of complementary depiction as the only way in which justice is done to
the manifoldness of the observed aspects. In our paper we were again and again urged to use expres-
sions such as 'as well ... as' and 'not only ... but also.' Schlatter teaches that reality cannot be inter-
preted by a single, one-sided sentence. ,,35
Indeed, our study has brought to light the synthetic power of Schlatter's dogmatic think-
ing.36 Yet, the unity of his thought has diversity as its precondition and result. Harle - in his
foreword to Walldorfs Realistische Philosophie - refers to Schlatter's "thinking in polari-
ties" as "stimulating and trend-setting." We may speak of an integrative-polar character of
Schlatter's theological thinking in which a) the unity of the theological material does not
reduce its diversity and particularity to a uniformity, and b) the plurality and distinctness of
the theological material does not allow its unity to collapse into irreconcilable dualisms.
The material waiting for our work is an uncountable diversity, an inexhaustible plurality; and this di-
versity shouts at us: unite me; I am the work of the One; you have known me if I have become a
whole.... Because the uncountable and the inexhaustible shows itself to us in order that we recognise
the unity and wholeness in it, the failure [of theological work] comes close to us in a double shape. If
we lose unity, then a splintered expanse of ruins evolves, a heap of notes. Ifwe lose plurality, then the
hollow abstraction evolves, the rattling formula, the meaningless idea."
According to Schlatter, "[i]t is in the ability to see the particular and, at the same time, the
whole that the systematic power of our thinking consists. A system is a totality in which
the fullness ofwhat is perceived is pervaded with - and formed by - a unity."
The results of our study urge us to conceive of the integrative-polar character of
Schlatter's thinking as being grounded in his understanding of God's triune love which - ad
35 Bockmuhl, "Wahrnehmung," 106.
36 See e.g. Ruckblick, 235-36; Neuer, AdolfSchlatter: ein Leben, 493; Bailer, Prinzip, 46-47,59-61, 74 n.
50, 192-94.
37 "Erfolg und Millerfolg," 260. See also "Significance of Method," 66.
38 Dogma, 19.
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intra as well as ad extra - works both unity and diversity." The fact that Schlatter explic-
itly refers to God as the conceptual basis for the unity as well as the polarity of his thinking
is only explicable against the background of his doctrine of God's triune being and action."
Along these lines Schlatter marks the a posteriori nature of his method stating "that the
systematics of knowing is grounded and actual in its object and that it becomes distorted
only ifwe allow ourselves artificiality and succumb to the fantastic arrogance that the ideas
arbitrarily made up by ourselves are wiser than reality.":"
On account of these conclusions, our suggestion is that any discussion of Schlatter's
structuring of the dogmatic loci in his Dogma cannot get around the fact that he proceeds
according to the trinitarian structure of the divine actions and works in this world, a struc-
ture consisting of continuity in discontinuity."
iii. Schlatter's concept of analogia entis
Schlatter holds that theological statements about God's being on the basis of God's
works must be analogical predications. As such, they are neither entirely equivocal nor
wholly univocal statements. The theological thought, as Schlatter phrases it, "employs the
category of similarity at its highest level by the mightiest distinction that separates Creator
from creature; God from the world, and by the most glorious likeness which makes that
39 See especially above, Chapter IV. 2. A. iii.
40 See Ethik, 252, 258-61; Briefe, 22-23; Sprechstunde, 32. When Schlatter speaks of God as his "a pri-
ori" in this context, this "a priori" is of a radical a posteriori character. For, as Walldorf elaborates, the "fun-
damental difference between Kant and Schlatter" lies in the fact that "for the former, the categories of know-
ing (and the forms of intuition) constitute 'reality,' [whereas] for the latter, reality constitutes and/or sets the
categories of knowing" (Realistische Philosophie, 101).
41 Dogma, 19; similarly in "Theology of the New Testament and Dogmatics," 172-73.
42 Rieger - albeit without reference to the trinitarian hermeneutic of Schlatter's concept - has done this in
an exemplary way in Rechtfertigunslehre, 241-49. The author takes all the relevant secondary sources into
account and indicates how the issues at stake are connected with the question about natural theology.
TRINITARIAN DEPTH STRUCTURES IN SCHLATTER'S THEOLOGY 260
which has been generated by God into his image.':" Schlatter works implicitly with an
analogia entis which God institutes between himself and his creatures." This analogia en-
tis assumes, as we have seen, the form of an analogy of operation and relation, whereby the
close connection with Schlatter's statements on the imago Dei ofman is obvious. However,
these observations must not be interpreted as indicating a rejection of an ontological under-
standing of analogia entis. In this case, Schlatter would contradict himself because his is a
dynamic understanding of being as being in action and relation, for which reason an anal-
ogy of proper proportionality could - in the same way as an analogia entis - lead to a
problematic subsumption of God and world under the same category of being." Schlatter
obviates such a subsumption in different ways. First, in correlation to his trinitarian con-
cept of divine action, Schlatter gives primacy to God: that which is analogically predicated
is a) predicated primarily of God and b) ascribed to the creature in dependence upon, and
derivation from, God.46 Second, the doctrine of the immanent Trinity provides Schlatter
with the conceptual equipment to maintain an absolute ontological distinction between
God's being and the being of the creature. Ens can be predicated of God because - as the
triune one - he has being eternally and perfectly in himself. The creature has ens not in it-
self but only in dependence upon, and as gift from, God. Given the fact that Schlatter, as
we have remarked earlier, hesitates to penetrate the mystery of God's inner being, the evi-
dence we have gathered is strong enough to argue that Schlatter has an analogical rather
43 Metaphysik, 46.
44 See Walldorf, Realistische Philosophie, 167-68; Neuer, "Introduction Metaphysik," 10; idem, Zusam-
menhang, 62-64, 337-38; Kindt, Gedanke der Einheit, 129-30, 137-38.
45 A. Torrance makes clear that replacing a "straightforward predication of a simple attribute" with a
"predication of a similarity of relations" is merely transfering "the similarity from a) the quality to b) the sub-
ject's relation to the quality." "It is not clear why correspondence between relationships is relevantly different
from correspondence between 'beings' or 'attributes' - especially if we are not to dichotomise between being
and act or being and being-in-relation" (Persons in Communion, 140, 186).
46 See e.g. Dogma, 29-30. Walldorfrightly points to the parallels between Schlatter and Thomas Aquinas
(Realistische Philosophie, 167). For the latter's "analogy of one to another according to priority and posteri-
ority" see A. Torrance, Persons in Communion, 136-39.
TRINITARrAN DEPTH STRUCTURES IN SCHLATTER'S THEOLOGY 261
than a univocal concept of being. It is precisely in this that the idea of analogia entis un-
folds its full meaning and inner truth."
iv. A critical engagement with Kindt's interpretation of Schlatter's dogmatics
The results of this dissertation require a brief critical dialogue with Kindt's study in
which she argues for the concept of unity as the central motive and proper theme of Schlat-
ter's theology." The merit of her study is to have outlined the synthetic force of Schlatter's
theology and the connecting lines between Schlatter and Baader. However, in the decisive
points of her interpretation of Schlatter's approach, we cannot follow her. According to
Kindt, Schlatter has a theonomous or theistic concept of creature1y being and actuality
(138, 142). Schlatter, so Kindt, grounds the relation between God and the world in a
"Grundgesetz der Einheit" which corresponds to God's own being (150). It is according to
this "Grundgesetz der Einheit" that Schlatter develops his understanding of all theological
and anthropological data: "Und tiber dies alles hinaus wird mit dem Begriff 'Einheit' das
innerste Geheimnis der Theologie angesprochen, namlich die Verbindung, die der all-
machtige und verborgene Gott zu dem sundigen Geschopfstiftet. Von dieser Zentralbedeu-
tung aus sol! sich der Begriff bis in die entferntesten Erscheinungen von 'Einheit' hinein
erstrecken" (148).
Kindt is aware that Schlatter demarcates his concept of unity from such ideas as "Ein-
erleiheit." "leere Eins," "Vereinerleiung." "Einseitigkeit,' "Dualismus" and "Monismus"
(12,26-27, 147) and that the "Urbild" of unity - God's unity - can take manifoldness into
47 On account of this, Walldorf's interpretation that Schlatter does not have an ontological understanding
of analogia entis is not only questionable but also superfluous (see also Neuer's critique in "Review of Real-
istische Philosophie," 933). Along the above lines it is indeed appropriate to translate the term analogia entis
as "Analogie des Seienden" rather than "Analogie des Seins" (see Neuer, Zusammenhang, 338). For the uni-
vocal concept of being in John Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas' analogical concept of being, see Drumm,
Doxologie und Dogma, 299-323; Schulz, Sein und Trinitat, 77-81.
48 Kindt, Gedanke der Einheit, 11-12. Further references appear in the main text in brackets.
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itself (68, 86). Nevertheless, she critiques that Schlatter's theology unfolds a "Seinsbegriff.
. . der aufAnalogie, ja aufIdentitat hin angelegt ist" (134). This analogia entis is the basis
on which Schlatter a) levels out the ontological distinction between God and creature (137,
150) and b) excludes a priori any antithetical aspects from the actuality of man and world
as the work of the one God (54, 134, 138).
Even a benevolent critique of this interpretation cannot get around the fact that Kindt,
first of all, fails to see the a posteriori character of Schlatter's theology. Schlatter's under-
standing of the unity of God's works is not the result of imposing an a priori principle of
knowing upon the perceived object but is ontologically grounded in the same." Further,
and this is the central point to be critiqued, Kindt does not explore what could be called the
trinitarian foundation of Schlatter's concept of unity. For this reason, she misses the whole
emphasis which Schlatter puts on the notion of otherness and particularity as the precondi-
tion and the result of unity. It is this interrelation of unity and distinctness on the basis of
which Schlatter - on explicitly christological grounds - a) relates God and world; God's ac-
tions and works and b) is able to outline unity and plurality as ontological constituents of
creaturely being. In doing so, as we have worked out, Schlatter is very keen to create that
conceptual space between the different relata which is necessary to give due weight to their
respective authenticity and Selbstandigkeit. Kindt's interpretation fails to capture this side
of Schlatter's thinking - for which reason some of her conclusions need to be revised. To
give an example, Schlatter's theology of nature is not merely grounded upon the notion that
nature - as God's work - is one with God (see 29-31). Rather, precisely because nature is
distinct from God and - in its Selbstandigkeit - characterised by its own intrinsic rational-
49 See e.g. Riickblick, 110-11,235-36 and Walldorf, Realistische Philosophie, 108-12. In this sense it is,
indeed, appropriate to speak of Schlatter's "Theologie der Einheit" (Neuer, AdolfSchlatter: ein Leben, 493.
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ity and intelligibility, it reveals its Creator. "However, not that which nature is lacking
makes it a revelation of God, but that which it is and has."50
In sum, one suspects that Kindt's own premise - an axiomatically presupposed antithe-
sis between God and man - made her overlook that Schlatter, by means of his trinitarian
understanding of God and his agency, has departed from that frame of reference in which
God's transcendence and otherness are contrasted with his relation to, and interaction with,
the world."
v. Schlatter's contribution - concluding observations
The twofold movement of thought by which Schlatter relates knowledge of God's tri-
une being with knowledge of God's triune economy can also be articulated as follows:
Schlatter's doctrine of the Trinity entails elements of a phenomenology of love,52 and his
anthropology - which constitutes an ontology of creation and man - entails elements of a
trinitarian ontology. The christocentric way in which Schlatter executes both movements
gives his thinking a biblical form. It is in this context that we locate the primary signifi-
cance of Schlatter's conception for trinitarian theology today. His contribution does not lie
in his offering an extensive and explicit exposition of a doctrine of the Trinity. Rather, it
lies in his modelling a theology which operates in a manner appropriate to its object.
Schlatter offers a theology that speaks trinitarianly about God - an applied trinitarian the-
ology, as we may call it.
The trinitarian name of God gives us the final glance into what God is. However, it has truth and
power only then, when it does not lose its connection to the act of God out of which it arises. The
theological tradition has not always emphasised this connection clearly. Rather, the inclination has
been to turn the dogma of the Trinity into a description of God that stands for itself, not teIIing us any-
50 Dogma, 52. Cf. Gunton, A BriefTheology ofRevelation, 61.
51 For a similar critique of Kindt's interpretation see WaIIdorf, Realistische Philosophie, 20.
52 See WaIIdorf, Realistische Philosophie, 212.
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thing about his relationship to us. Under these conditions, it [the doctrine of the Trinity] not only re-
mains worthless but easily becomes damaging. That is, it generates an appearance of knowledge of
God which consists merely in words. The New Testament does not participate in this employment of
the doctrine of the Trinity because it grounds all its statements about God in the divine action that
seizes US. 53
We are well-advised to listen to these words afresh since trinitarian theology today is
still uneasy with respect to that which we see integrated in Schlatter's approach. Contempo-
rary theology seems to oscillate between treating the ontological Trinity as an ideal for
constructing a view ofthis world as God's creation and surrendering the ontological Trinity
for the sake of God's action and work pro nobis. As Gunton phrases it, "limiting expression
to the economic Trinity" or "using an ontological trinitarianism as an immanent principle
of reality" are the two dangerous tendencies in trinitarian theology today." Schlatter helps
us to see that the interrelation between God's triune being ad intra and his trinitarian action
pro nobis is vital for theology. Without the mutual reference from one to the other, theol-
ogy is divested of its conceptual means to establish true knowledge of either. That such a
theology requires a fuller and more elaborate doctrine of the immanent Trinity than Schlat-
ter is able to provide, should have become clear during the course of this study. However,
it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of his theology for the task of systematic theol-
ogy. Four elements in his approach warrant specific mention in this respect, namely, the
success with which he seeks
a) to develop a concept of divine agency in which God's involvement with the world is not
played out against his transcendence and vice versa
b) to outline a structural theory of God's actions and works which is firmly grounded on
the principle of opera trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa without denying that the redemp-
tion and completion of a fallen creation requires creative divine actions and works
53 Dogma, 356.
54 Gunton, The Promise ojTrinitarian Theology, XVII-XXI. Roth's critique of different trinitarian theolo-
gies - whether it is justified or not - is a further illustration of this uneasiness (see his essay "Trinitatslehre
als Rahmentheorie?").
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c) to construe a model of the relation between God's being and action and human being and
action in which due space is given to the distinctness of both
d) to operate in propriety to the object of theology, that is, the God of Scripture who - in
the person and work of Jesus Christ - has made himself known as Father, Son and Holy
Spirit.
The fact that these contributions come from a theologian whose work dates back to the end
ofthe 19th century, makes it fully appropriate to speak of Schlatter as a true "teacher of the
church.t'" We now hope that our reconstruction and analysis of the trinitarian grammar of
Schlatter's theology provides the basis for the next task, namely, to engage in a conversa-
tion between Schlatter's conception and contemporary systematic theology. In light of this
thesis, it is not inconceivable, indeed, that the renaissance of trinitarian thinking today may
lead, in the same way as in the ecumenical debate", to a serious and critical reassessment
of Schlatter's dogmatics within academic theology.
55 See MuBner, "Introduction Jakobus," VI.
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